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1. Introduction 
 
Over last three decades, China’s economic performance amazed the world. An 
average annual growth rate of 9% is phenomenal. China’s economic success can be 
traced back to the year 1978 when the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided to 
pursue a “reform and opening up” policy. The aim of the reform was to shift the focus 
of the government from ideological struggle to economic development. Through a 
series of experimentation, both the leadership and ordinary people came to the 
conclusion that a transition to the market economy was the most effective and 
efficient way to improve productivity and bring about economic growth. Hence, the 
great transformation was unveiled. It took China 30 years to grow from a poor 
country to one of the world’s economic superpowers.  
 
China’s economic success is admired by the economists for its rapidity, vitality and 
sustainability. They wonder if China’s experience serves barely as a footnote to 
neoclassical economics, or provides a new account of the market, transition and 
development. Comparing to Russia’s “shock therapy”, China’s gradualist approach to 
reform is more pragmatic and so far more successful. But it is apparently in 
contradiction with the well-acknowledged international best practice demonstrated by 
the “Washington Consensus”, including small government, fast privatization and 
liberalization and secure property right. In fact, China’s experience suggests the 
contrary: strong government, phased privatization and liberalization and insecure 
property right. It is highly interesting to economists that China has achieved such a 
great economic success in spite of the “institutional flaws” that economics textbooks 
regard as significant hindrance to the smooth operation of market economy. Therefore, 
China’s unprecedented growth and unique development pattern has given rise to many 
new thoughts that provoked debates over the existing theories as well as the policies 
derived from such theories. And this dissertation, as one of these struggles, is intent 
on providing a new account for China’s economic transformation and looking for the 
factors, among others, the institutional factors, essential to the sustainable growth.  
 
In general, three factors explain growth. They are factor accumulation, technological 
improvement and institutional change. Among these three factors, it is submitted that 
the most fundamental one is the institution because a good institution provides the 
incentive to accumulate factors and knowledge. In that sense, China’s economic 
success can only be understood in an institutional perspective. However, China’s 
experience is not a puzzle piece that fits into the framework of the existing 
institutional theory. A new analytical framework is needed for such studies.  
 
The focus of the new analytical framework is to develop a theory dealing with the rise 
of market economy, as the most fundamental institutional change that happened to 
China was the transition towards a market economy. As we know, the market is a free 
exchange system with the price as a major means to divert the resource to where it 
generates highest value. This is what Adam Smith terms the “invisible hand”, as the 
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price is not determined by a benevolent and able dictator or a central planning body 
with incredible computational ability but by demand and supply. According to what 
Adam Smith presents in his book, the market system is not possibly a human-devised 
institution, but a spontaneous order emerging from the decentralized activities.  
 
Opposing to the idea of “invisible hand”, Karl Polanyi (1944) argues that the market 
is not self-regulating in nature. In his remarkable book titled The Great 
Transformation, Karl Polanyi points out that economic activities used to be embedded 
in the social system and governed by the principles such as re-distribution and 
reciprocity prior to the rise of the market economy. Afterwards, the modern states 
pushed a change in social institutions to allow for the rise and preserving of market 
economy. Indeed, what the modern states had done is engineering an institutional 
environment to support the operation of impersonal market. As a result, the market is 
dis-embedded from the social system and reversely dominates the social system. 
Polanyi’s model shed some lights on the origins of market economy and “market 
society”, a term which he used to describe contemporary world we are living in.  
 
It is conceivable that both Adam Smith and Karl Polanyi are right. They grasp 
different aspects of market. Adam Smith focuses on the impersonal aspect of the 
market that operates in the equilibrium (the metaphor of “invisible hand” shows that 
the price mechanism has a decentralized nature) while Karl Polanyi pays more 
attention to the institutional environment surrounding the market. Because the 
institutional factor is essential to China’s unmatched growth, as mentioned above, 
Karl Polanyi’s contribution is of importance. The scholars agree without hesitation 
that China’s economic success is achieved through the re-establishment of the order 
of the market. What the controversy persists over is how China accomplished the 
transition to the market economy. Karl Polanyi provides a new perspective to account 
for what occurred during China’s transition. He distinguishes between two types of 
market economy. One is the rule-based market economy which invites recurrent 
investigation in the existing literatures. The other is the relation-based market 
economy which Karl Polanyi considers as a mode of economy prior to the industrial 
revolution. At the early stage of its transition, China could not afford to use the “rule 
of law” system to support the operation of the market. While its culture also favors a 
cooperation-friendly environment, China turned to seek the institutional underpinning 
from the relational culture to ensure a smooth transition. The market economy was 
embedded in the social network resulting in the rise of those so-called “Chinese 
characteristics”. That is the reason why China’s development strategy differs so 
sharply from the international best practice.  
 
Thus, the main hypotheses is that Chinese culture and the institutional resources, 
particularly those in relation to social network, has played an essential role to China’s 
transition to the market economy. And no less important is that China’s political 
structure allows an active local institutional innovation as a response to the interaction 
of emerging market mechanism and changing social environment. Only when the 
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government finds a right way to deal with the economic transition, which is, in 
China’s case, a trial-and-error method with the evolutionary nature, the available 
institutional/cultural resources can be diverted to where the market mechanism and 
surrounding social environment is bridged. If the politics are so structured that no 
barrier is imposed to the bottom-up private-ordering of market domain, which is 
obviously cost-saving, and also that a monopolistic structure of market is prevented, 
the market would probably, as Chinese experience suggests, develop an adaptive 
structure to smooth the transition and support its operation as a whole as well as in 
different sectors. This emerging market structure, enabled by the politics and evolving 
under the informal cultural forces, results ultimately in making a mixed economy with 
Chinese characteristics, sustaining a long-term growth that the development 
economics pursues. Therefore, this mixed economy, which integrates the relational 
culture, adaptive politics and market mechanism, is what this dissertation focuses on, 
with the hope that one can contribute to the struggle against poverty across the 
regions all over the world.  
 
It is also interesting to see what will happen to the mixed economy as it faces 
challenges from inside as well as outside. After China’s entry into WTO, Chinese 
market was further integrated into the world economy. It was a turning point that 
marked China’s entering into the second stage of the transition. During this stage, the 
market exchange has been showing an inclination towards impersonalization. A 
transition to the “market society” was initiated accompanied with the increasing 
requirement of “rule of law”. However, the emphasis on “rule of law” would probably 
not change the mixed nature of Chinese economy. The interaction between original 
social network and market mechanism is supposed to create a developmental network, 
which enables a constructive and effective re-embedding of market in the society. 
Given the main hypotheses of this dissertation, we can summarize the central ideas 
into the following questions. 
 
1. What kind of social system was the market embedded in during the last decades? 
2. Under which circumstances could the market be embedded in the social system? 
3. What was the impact of embedded market on the economic transition as well as 
economic growth? 
4. How did the individual sectors perform under an economic system with Chinese 
characteristics? 
5. What is the future perspective of the embedded market? 
 
To deal with these questions, the materials are arranged into ten chapters. The first 
one is introduction. The second chapter is devoted to a short categorization of the 
existing literatures on China’s economic reform and an introduction of the conceptual 
framework. Chapter three outlines the characteristics of Chinese cultures and shows 
how the relation-based culture ensures the economic transactions and preserves the 
cooperation. Besides, it also compares the relation-based trading system with the 
rule-based one and addresses the question why Chinese characteristics helped to 
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stabilize China’s transitional economy. Chapter four deals with the role of government. 
The federalist nature of China’s political system enables the application of gradualist 
strategies like dual-track approach and policy experimentation. It is of importance that 
the gradualist approach allows for the institutionalization of bottom-up practices, 
instead of the top-down imposed transition. Chapter five focuses on China’s 
agricultural sector. The household farming was introduced to replace the collective 
farming. Given the early stage of development of market and the government 
regulation with respect to the labor and land market, the household farming was the 
most efficient organizational form of production in the agricultural sector.  
 
Chapter six studies the rural industrialization. In China’s rural area, a great number of 
township and village enterprises (TVEs) emerged to contribute enormously to the 
overall economic growth. The rise of TVE sector puzzled the scholars because of the 
collective ownership of TVEs. It suggests that introducing the collectivism into the 
corporate governance might be an efficient solution to the resource allocation in an 
underdeveloped as well as regulated market. The rural industrialization is the first 
stage of development of China’s industrial sector. The second stage is the rise of the 
export sector, which is discussed in chapter seven. Because the relational system was 
handicapped at stimulating innovation and coordinating production on a big scale and 
across a wide range, Chinese economy shared the benefit generated from the 
accumulated knowledge and deep specialization through the so-called “institutional 
arbitrage” enabled by its integration into the global value chain. Chapter eight is 
devoted to the financial sector. The informal financial channel played an important 
role in supporting the private sector. Chapter nine discusses the co-evolvement of 
rule-based and relation-based governance and also draws some lessons from China’s 
economic miracle, both in theoretical and practical sense. Chapter ten concludes.  
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2. The Main Chinese Literature and the Conceptual Framework 
 
This chapter will first examine the existing literature in relation to China’s 
transformation, which can be categorized into four groups. Following the literature 
review, a conceptual framework will be introduced in support of the new account of 
China’s economic transformation in this thesis. Apart from the general understandings 
of institution, the conceptualization also takes into consideration several rarely-used 
terms such as “embeddedness” and “ideological change”.  
 
2.1 Overview of Mainstream Hypotheses 
 
Among the wealth of literature on China’s economic reform, economists propose 
different explanations ranging from factor accumulation, liberalization of market, and 
rise of migrant workers to export-oriented strategy. The majority of hypotheses focus 
on specific aspects of Chinese economic reform, which will be reviewed in later 
chapters. For now, it seems feasible to examine only those conveying a 
comprehensive understanding of China’s economic miracle by categorizing them into 
four groups. They are “late-developing advantage”, “market economy”, “government 
policy” and “revolution from periphery”.  
 
The concept of “late-developing advantage” can be traced back to Geschenkron 
(1962). He advanced the hypothesis to explain the economic take off of 
late-developers such as Germany and Russia after the Industrial Revolution. Lin 
(1996, 1999, 2003, 2009) applies the “late-developing advantage” theory to China’s 
economic growth. According to Lin, the economic growth depends on three factors: 
production factors, structure of production and technological innovation. For a 
late-developer, a high saving rate is favorable (Lewis, 1954). And China’s saving rate 
was sufficiently high to support the rapid factor accumulation. As to the structure of 
production, it should be adjusted accordingly when the economy grows. The 
production factors were shifted from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector to 
achieve a more efficient allocation of resources and thus improve the overall 
productivity. Among these three factors, technological innovation determines the 
production boundary. As suggested by growth theory, the ultimate engine of growth is 
technological innovation. Lin’s concept of technological innovation can be modeled 
and measured by R&D (research and development) activities. The cost of R&D is 
prohibitively high and only affordable by the big firms and the government of 
developed countries. Yet a late-developer could acquire advanced technologies and 
management skills at a much lower cost through licensing, learning and imitation. In 
some cases, the imitation was illegal or immoral in the context of modern intellectual 
property protection. That’s why the modernization process of late-developer’s 
industry was always accompanied by the criticisms on its ignorance of intellectual 
property protection. Yet the hunger for the new technologies diminishes the shame 
related to the intellectual property malpractice. 
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Besides the spillover effect of technology, Lin points out that the late-developers 
always have a comparative advantage in labor cost. Lewis (1954) develops a model to 
explain the urbanization process with unlimited labor supply. Because of the wage 
gap between the agricultural and industrial sector, a massive migration from rural to 
urban area is expected. Accompanied with the urbanization process, the structure of 
production is also changed and income per capita increases. In China’s case, the wage 
gap across sectors also existed. And due to the increasing size of the market, the 
inflow of foreign capital and the rising export demand, numerous manufacturing jobs 
were created to bring about the labor transfer across sectors. The great number of 
migrant workers shows China’s comparative advantage in supplying cheap labor in 
the world market. On the other side, China’s success also owes to the globalization 
process. The comparative advantage in labor cost, the globalization of world market 
and the cheap imitation of advanced technologies make China one of world’s 
economic superpower in only three decades. The “late-developing advantage” theory 
is useful to explain how China succeeds in economic development but it fails to 
answer the question why China’s potential was only unleashed after the reform had 
been taken place. It is observed that the “late-developing advantage” school only pays 
attention to the resource constrains faced by developing countries but omits the 
importance of institutional constrains.  
 
Unlike those who argue for “late-developing advantage” theory, the “market economy” 
school, among which Wu (2010) was the most determined proponent (he was once 
called “Market Wu” for his insistence on transition to market), shifts the focus to the 
institutional constrains. According to the “market economy” school, China’s 
economic success is ascribed to the liberalization of market. Without the free market 
and secure property right, the prices are not to be formed to direct the resources to 
where they generate highest value and the incentives not to be provided to the 
economic actors. Let us go back to the debate over efficiency of central planning and 
market system during 1930s and 1940s. The economists formed two groups 
supporting the market and command economy respectively. O. Lange was the 
representative figure among those who believed in the potential of human-devised 
computational system. He argued that the central calculation can displace price 
mechanism in total. In such a system, the task of pricing is assigned to a central 
planning body. Hayek, as a radical opponent of central planning system, pointed out 
the weakness of Lange’s idea. In the market system, the pricing is a decentralized 
process drawing on the scattered local information only accessible to individual 
economic actors. It could not be done by a central calculation body with no access to 
the local information. Even with all the necessary information available, the central 
planning bureau is not capable of processing such big stock of information. Hence, 
the cost of pricing is actually prohibitively high for a centrally-planned economy. And 
the signal guiding the resource allocation is highly distorted. In addition to the 
information problem, there is an incentive problem. The public ownership 
undermined the incentive of individual economic actors to maximize the value of the 
resources, including the central planning bureau, to which the calculation of prices is 
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solely a political task but not a profitable business.  
 
Hayek’s attack on the centrally planned economy was paid attention to in the 
policymaking. In line with his theory, China abolished the central planning system 
and re-introduced market mechanism to determine the resource allocation. And the 
market force was so impressive that the important role of market was repeatedly 
mentioned and confirmed in official documents. However, the return to “market 
economy” is not the complete answer to the puzzle of China’s economic miracle. 
Alongside China, Russia also pursued a transition from command economy to market 
economy. Compared to China’s experimentalist and gradualist approach, Russia 
sought a big bang in privatization and liberalization. But the result was not as good as 
expected. It seems that the liberalization of market did not bring much benefit to 
Russia’s economy.  
 
To deal with the problem mentioned above, economists (Qian, Xu, 1993; Qian, 
Weingast, 1997; Qian, Roland, 1998; Cao, Qian and Weigast, 1999, Jin, Qian and 
Weingast, 2005) began to study how a nation’s political system and reform strategies 
affects the transition. They are enthusiastic about the comparative analysis of reform 
strategies across transitional economies, especially the comparison between China’s 
gradualist approach and Russia’s shock therapy. Murrell (1993) argues that the shock 
therapy represents a mechanical view of transition while the gradualist strategy 
exhibits an evolutionary view of transition. Russia’s reform policy is derived from the 
foreign blueprint while China’s is based on the trial and error methods. But it does not 
mean that Russia should have gone or is able to go China’s way. The choice of reform 
strategy is constrained by the then-existing political system. The dual-track pricing 
approach and policy experimentation method are policy innovations only possible 
under China’s federalist political system. The policy innovations affect the way that 
the reform was carried out and thus the effectiveness of the reform. Furthermore, the 
reform process affects the way that market functions.  
 
However, the policy mentioned above only facilitated the process of institutional 
innovation but was not the source of innovation. What is innovative at the 
government level is the method to consolidate innovation, as the policy 
experimentation method allowed for the institutionalization of bottom-up spontaneous 
practice. The spontaneous practice was the source of innovation. For example, the 
household responsibility system originated from the practice in contradiction to policy. 
Wang and Coase (2013) propose the concept of “revolution from periphery” to 
describe the institutional innovation started as a trial program in the periphery of the 
society. These innovations were not intended by the central government but emerged 
from the interactions among individuals, firms and local governments through an 
experimental process. Drawing lessons from Russia’s failure, the transition to the 
market economy was too complex a process to be designed comprehensively prior to 
its implementation. According to the “revolution from periphery” school, the 
transition should be decentralized and incremental. Given that the governmental 
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control diminished from center to margin, it is not difficult to find out that the 
experimental programs were usually started in the periphery of society. As experience 
in relation to the innovation accumulated, the “revolution from periphery” proceeded 
to be the national policy.  
 
All these four hypotheses discussed are puzzle pieces that should fit into a large 
picture. The “late-developing advantage” school shows that China, as a late-developer, 
had the potential to pursue a rapid growth but fails to explain why the economic 
performance of the same country are so different before and after reform. The 
disciples of “market economy” point out that institutions matter. So the key factor of 
reform is to establish a well-functioning market system. However, the institutional 
comparative analysis captures the advantage of the market over central plan but lacks 
the dynamic dimension. It does not address the issue of how the transition was carried 
out. Some economists pay attention to the role of political system and reform strategy 
in the transitional economy and find out that the success of reform depends largely on 
the strategy adopted. Compared to Russia’s shock therapy, China’s gradualist and 
experimentalist approach led to a more efficient structure of market. But the 
gradualist strategy is a top-down imposed framework for the reform and institutional 
innovation. The innovation was actually driven by the bottom-up practices, which was 
called “revolution from periphery”.  
 
It seems that the picture of China’s economic miracle is so far complete. However, in 
this picture, the puzzle piece of culture is missing. The majority of literature pays no 
attention to the role of culture. Yet culture would be the salient institution if it 
out-competes the formal institution in promoting the economic growth and facilitating 
the establishment of rules governing market exchange (Herrmann-Pillath, 2016). 
 
2.2 A Conceptual Framework 
 
The concept of institution 
 
To build a solid foundation for institutional studies, economists conceptualize 
institution from various perspectives. Aoki finds that economists have three different, 
yet interrelated views of institutions. His formulation draws on a game-theoretic 
perspective: 
 
“In the analogy of the economic process with a game, economists have regarded an 
institution as comparable to either players of a game, the rules of a game, or 
equilibrium strategies of the players in a game. (Aoki, 2001)” 
 
The first view of an institution is supposed to be derived from the conventional use of 
the word “institution”. For example, the Merriam-Webster dictionary describes 
institution as “an established organization or corporation (as a bank or a university) 
especially of a public character”. In short, the institution is referred to as organization. 
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In the game-theoretic model, an organization is usually treated as a game player. Of 
course, the organization could also be equilibrium strategy of the game yet only when 
the game is about the collective action towards the establishment of organization. 
Obviously this is not the case that the dictionary refers to. For the purpose of this 
study it is not very useful to adopt the conventional usage of the word “institution”. 
Instead a reference should be made to the definition given by John Commons (1934), 
the representative figure of the original school of institutional economics. He defines 
institution as “collective action in control of individual action”. By collective action 
he mainly refers to organizations and customs. Though his simultaneous use of 
actions, organizations and customs makes the definition difficult to understand, the 
term “collective action” captures the most important feature of the institution. The 
institution is indeed, if not exactly the same thing as the “collective action”, a solution 
to the collective action. 
 
The second view of institution is to regard institution as the rule of a game. Douglas 
North (1990) indicates that institution sets a constraint on human choices. In that 
sense, institution can be law, social norm, convention, custom, be any rule that 
regulates human behavior. As the rule of a game, institution is exogenously 
determined. In a game-theoretic model, the rule of a game is externally given for 
game players. Viewing the institution as rule is convenient for the cost-benefit 
analysis of a specific institution. Through institutional comparative analysis, we can 
examine how strategies and related economic outcomes are affected by different 
institutions. But it raises the question where rules come from. Is institution man-made, 
or, as Hayek put it, a spontaneous order? 1  
 
Challenged by this question, economists form two groups. Some of them are 
interested in the mechanism design (Hurwicz, 1973, 1987; Hurwicz, Reiter, 2008). 
Institutions are thought to be outcomes of human design. It is the triumph of the 
overwhelming reasoning ability of human beings. In fact, the economists have 
designed various auction mechanisms that work very well. The key point is that the 
human-devised institution needs to be incentive-compatible. However, the failure of 
command economy suggests that more problems exist than the incentive problem 
with respect to the institutional design. For example, the information problem, which 
might be perfectly solved for the small-scale auction, forms a major obstacle to the 
large-scale replacement of price signal with central plan. Emerging under the certain 
conditions that allow active human interactions, institution generally shows 
behavioral rationality and could turn to be highly irrational when those conditions 
change significantly.  
 
To understand the institution as a spontaneous order, we need to develop an 
equilibrium view of institution. The origin of institution-as-equilibrium perspective 
can be traced back to Hume’s conceptualization of convention2. Hume’s account of 
                                                        
1 See Hayek, Friedrich A., The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, Page 6 
2 See Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, New Ed edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000 
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convention demonstrates that convention emerges from rational decision made by 
individual agents without assistance of ex ante agreement or external supervision. He 
presents the idea with a famous metaphor of rowing boat. The coordination problem 
arising from rowing boat is not solved by a mutual commitment or a third-party 
enforcement but the spontaneous synchronization among rowers, which is achieved 
through unconscious convention. Standing on the shoulder of earlier scholars (Hume, 
1738; Lewis, 1969), Schotter (1981) pioneered in developing an equilibrium view of 
institution. In his path-breaking book, he wrote “We view social institutions not as 
various sets of rules but as various and alternative standards of behavior that are 
elements of the equilibrium of the game.” The equilibrium view of institutions 
provides access to understanding the dynamic of institutional change. As long as the 
institution is modeled as an endogenous equilibrium, the institutional change can thus 
be depicted by a shift of equilibrium.  
 
It might be necessary to mention two approaches to model the emergence of the 
salient institution. They are the evolutionary game approach and repeated game 
approach. The representative figures of evolutionary game approach are Axelrod 
(1984), Sugden (1986), Young (1998), Bowles (2006). In evolutionary game approach, 
institution emerges spontaneously from the interactions of individual agents. Since the 
evolutionary pressure drives the evolution of institutions, the assumption of perfect 
rationality would be replaced by the internalization of belief. A good example is the 
dominance of “tit for tat” strategy over purely selfishness. As the ideological change 
is also the result of cultural diffusion, it can be modeled in a structure that 
evolutionary game theory offers. Repeated game approach is popularized by Greif 
(1989, 1994, 1998, 2006), Milgrom and Roberts (1990; 1992) and Weingast (with 
Milgrom and North, 1990; 1993, 1995). Repeated game approach is based on the 
refined concepts of game equilibrium such as sub-game perfect equilibrium. It differs 
from evolutionary game approach in the assumption of perfect rationality. The 
individual agent is assumed to be knowledged in strategy profiles and to be able to 
expect the next move of rival-player. Thus, the Pareto-inferior strategy is not ruled out 
by coercive power but avoided by rational calculation. Greif applies the repeated 
game approach to study the merchant guild and trade in Mediterranean Europe. He 
shows that the city governors and merchants abide by the commitment to cooperate 
under mutually credible threat. Also, by making the game repeat over time, a 
cooperative strategy could emerge due to a specific structure of interaction. Repeated 
game approach is proved to be useful in the study of salient institution.  
 
On top of these three views of institution, Aoki (2001) proposes a process view of 
institution. He views the institution as a process of strategic play involving both 
behavioral and cognitive dimensions. As he suggests, from the strategic play of 
individual agents emerge a recursive state of play characterizing the equilibrium. And 
the features of this equilibrium are summarized in a linguistic or symbolic manner 
into a so-called “public representation” to give signals to the individual agents. By 
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perceiving the signals, individual players form beliefs about equilibrium behavior 
patterns. Simply put, they think they know what others will do in the game. Then they 
adjust their behaviors in terms of changing strategies. If their behavior converges to 
the equilibrium behavior pattern, a closed circle is formed. The cognitive perception 
of the symbolized features of the equilibrium state reinforces players’ commitment to 
the equilibrium strategy. And recursive behavior pattern emerging from the individual 
playing of the equilibrium strategy exerts an influence on individual cognitive process 
of belief formation through symbolization. Thus, an institution emerges as a complex 
process involving the behavioral convergence and belief formation of such 
convergence. Though the concept is not easy to grasp, it is nevertheless beneficial to 
view the institution as process if we want to investigate the micro-mechanism of 
institutional change.  
 
We cannot tell which view of institution is superior. It depends on the purpose and 
methods of the research. Aoki’s process view of institution directs our attention to the 
cognitive dimension of institution such as expectations and common beliefs and thus 
helps us to understand the belief formation and change in the dynamic process of 
institution, which is very important for the analysis of how market economy is 
embedded in the social system. Such idea is also explored by the economists known 
as leaders of original institutional economics movement and furthered by the 
contemporary evolutionary-institutional economists (Veblen, [1904] 2015; Bush, 1987; 
Elsner, 2012; Elsner et al, 2014).3 This idea will be revisited in later chapters. So far 
we should bear in mind that the institution, as a complex system involving the 
interactions at social, behavioral and cognitive level, shows a structured pattern under 
certain conditions and should undergo a change as long as the underlying 
environment changes. 
 
The concept of embeddedness 
 
Besides the concept of institution, two further concepts deserve some attention. The 
first is “embeddedness”. In this context “embeddedness” is used to describe China’s 
transition to the so-called mixed economy. So it is of importance to introduce the 
concept before any analysis is conducted. 
 
As aforementioned, Karl Polanyi pioneered in using the concept to describe the 
relationship between the economic institution and the entire social system. According 
to him, the self-regulating market economy is a myth. The economic activities were 
embedded in the social system and governed by various motives but not only the 
monetary one. However, the modern state pushed changes in the institutional 
environment so that the market economy was dis-embedded from the social system 
and, conversely, dominated the entire society. His insight is profound if we compare 
his remarks on “market economy” with the rise of “Economics Imperialism”, which 
shows how economics, a knowledge system developed from the practice of modern 
                                                        
3 It was also explored by the original institutional economics as the value warrant and belief system.  
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economy, penetrates the way of thinking that social scientists and eventually normal 
people as well should follow. Interestingly, an anthropologist who studies the 
economic action in the primitive society shares the similar idea with Polanyi. Sahlins 
(1974) argues that the economic system adapts to the circumstance in a cultural way. 
And the rationality is not contrary to the culture but a reflection of culture. But the 
influence of culture is confined to the “stone age economy”. During the process of 
modernization, a new religion of the market is born.  
 
From a sociological perspective, Granovetter (1985) formulates the concept of 
embeddedness in a more specific context. He criticizes the over-socialized conception 
of human action. Social norms and values are considered internalized by a process of 
socialization (Parsons, 1951). Hence, there is no possibility and necessity for rational 
calculation in the decision-making. People are obedient to the internalized norms 
unconsciously as if there is a mental script guiding the behaviors. Contrasting to 
sociology, the basic assumption of neoclassical economics under-socialized human 
action. In economic models, the rationality dominates the process of decision-making 
and the social factors such as internalized norm exert little influence. For example, in 
a perfectly competitive market, numerous buyers and sellers exchange with each other 
in an anonymous way. The social relation finds no place in such models because the 
personal relationship is eliminated by the anonymity and the price contains all the 
information necessary for the successful exchange. Granovetter suggests that the 
over-socialized and under-socialized conception of human action both have 
shortcomings. He argues that the economic action is embedded in the social relations 
and draws on a study of labor market to support his hypothesis.  
 
In fact, the real question is not if the market economy is embedded in the social 
system or not, but in which social/institutional system the market economy is 
embedded. The so-called “market society” can be viewed as that the market system is 
embedded in a “rule-of-law” environment. The rule-of-law system was developed to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the impersonal market. However, the enormous 
global growth created the impression that the economic issue had been centered in the 
human society (actually it had been) and the market economy became seemingly 
self-regulating (in fact not the case). The fact is that the market economy is 
underpinned by a “rule-of-law” system.  
 
The literature review suggests that embeddedness involves a complex interaction 
among market, state and society. As shown by figure 2.1, the state is between market 
and society determining how the market is embedded in the social system. In 
Polanyi’s model, the market society is an outcome of state planning. The government 
policies can change the way how market interacts with society. But it also faces the 
so-called social counter-movement, which sometimes minimizes the effect of such 
policies. In the figure, the market takes the core position, which means that the market 
is not self-preserving. It requires an institutional foundation which can only be 
provided by the society. And the outer circle is the society. It stabilizes the entire 
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system by embedding the market and counter-effecting the radical changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The embedding of market in the society 
 
With respect to China’s transition, in a lack of rule-of-law tradition, the Chinese 
market economy was embedded in the relation-based culture. As Granovetter points 
out, the economic action is more or less affected by the social relation, even in a 
developed capitalist economy. But in China’s case, the social network provided a 
comprehensive solution to the information transmission, transaction security and 
contract enforcement. The personal relationship did not only affect the economic 
action as being complementary to the formal institution but replaced it to a 
remarkable degree. Moreover, the state adopted a experimentalist strategy and thus 
allowed the local institutional innovation, which provided an good environment for 
the embedded market. With the informal institution underpinning the market system 
from bottom up, China’s transition resulted in the miracle growth.  
 
The ideological change 
 
In recent years, economists become aware of the role of ideology in the institutional 
change. Among them, North addresses the importance of ideology in solving 
free-riding problem. Bromley (1989) argues that the institutional change is caused by 
the expectation of a preferred future state over the status quo. The concept of ideology 
also appears in the literature of transitional economy and economic history. Yao (2008) 
incorporates the ideological factors into a bounded-rationality-based model to analyze 
the implementation of the privatization policy. McCloskey (2007, 2011, 2016) claims 
that the industrial revolution was actually caused by the change of the attitude towards 
merchant class and business activity, reflected in the change of rhetoric. 
 
All these literatures suggest that the ideology matters, particularly for the institutional 
change. But what is ideology? It is helpful to define ideology in a broader sense as 
well as in a neutral way. For current purposes, the term of ideology is used to refer to 
a set of believes and values shared by a group of people. If we adopt the equilibrium 
view of institution, ideology and institution are different things. The ideology 
Society 
 State 
Market 
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concerns the ideas in mind and the institution is demonstrated by the patterns in 
behavior. If we refer to Aoki’s process view of institution, the common belief shared 
among the participants is an important component of the institutional dynamic. As 
mentioned above, some evolutionary-institutional economists (Bush, 1987; Elsner, 
2012) developing and furthering original institutional economics also holds the 
similar opinions on the role of value warrant and belief system in the institutional 
dynamic. For those institutions emerging from the reciprocal behaviors, the lacking of 
the common belief would directly result in the collapse of the entire system. Apart 
from the institutions sustained by the mutual commitment, the institution relying on 
the third-party enforcement is also affected by the common belief. If the participants 
do not expect punishment from third party or expect that other participants would not 
appeal to the third party, the institution would not be very effective. So in whatever 
sense, the ideological aspect of institution should be one of our focuses in the current 
study if we want to understand the institution accurately.  
 
Also, the belief formation and change is important to the institutional change. The 
ideology is to be changed when there is inconsistency between the experience and 
expectation. If what people believe is not found supported in reality, suspicion arises. 
Thus the ideological change may trigger the comprehensive transition. The most 
difficult part of the institutional change is how to coordinate the expectation of 
individual participants. Even if the shift to the new institution is beneficial to the 
entire group of participants, the individual is not ready to change his behavior pattern 
if he expects that others will stick to the tradition. So, the ideological change, and the 
value change as well, must take place alongside with the institutional change. A 
sufficiently large fraction of population must be under the influence of the new ideas 
and values.  
 
China’s great transformation was accompanied with the ideological change. If the 
interpretation of market were not liberalized in the early stage of the reform, the 
reform would not be carried out that far. Step by step, the perception of market has 
been changed among the policymakers and the ordinary people. The market was 
considered, at the beginning of the reform, a resource allocation mechanism 
complementary to the central plan, and then a major mechanism, and now the 
fundamental one. And so did private ownership and other basic concepts in relation to 
market economy. Since the ideology was so important when it comes to the 
embedding of market exchange in the culture or the transition from relation-based to 
mixed form of governance, the concept will be further examined in later chapters.  
 
2.3 Summary and Implications for Further Studies 
 
This chapter prepares for the analysis of China’s case in two steps. First, the literature 
is explored under four groups of hypotheses. All four schools present valid points to 
certain extent but the understanding can be always deepened and furthered. The late 
developing advantage explains why China accumulated factors and knowledge at an 
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unprecedented rate. The scholars emphasizing the role of market economy point out 
that establishing the market system is prerequisite to the realization of the late 
developing advantage. But the transition to market economy was then a question. The 
perspective from political system and reform strategy is offered to comprehend the 
gradualist and experimentalist nature of China’s transition, which is key to the success 
of the institutional change. Yet the source of the institutional innovation could not be 
found in the government side but in the periphery of society. China’s institutional 
innovation process drew on the local knowledge and trial-and-error-based 
experimental practice so that it was vital and sustainable.  
 
To further the analysis, an analytical framework from an “embeddedness” perspective 
is developed. The gist is that the market economy is embedded in a relation-based 
culture. The local institutional innovation is actually the innovation emerging from the 
interaction between the market and the culture (culture can be modeled as games on 
networks). That will be mainly discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Before any further analysis, there are several important concepts that should be 
clarified. First of all, since China’s great transformation is a sort of institutional 
change in nature, the conceptualization of institution is necessary. Of the four views 
of institution mentioned, three find application in analyze. In addition, the concepts of 
“embeddedness” and “ideology”, which are old theme of original institutional 
economics, also have their roles in this new context. The “embeddedness” approach 
constitutes the perspective from which the new account of China’s transition is 
developed and the “ideology” matters to the institutional substitution. 
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3. The Relational Culture and Relation-based Exchange System 
 
The aim of the socialist revolution is to reform the society thoroughly and develop the 
ideal model of human society out of the old, decaying order. So it requires “the 
capture of political power of the nation by the working class as opposed to the 
capitalist class (Thompson, 1903)”. For a developed country, the major task is to 
abolish the capitalist institution as soon as the working class occupies the political 
stage. But in China’s case, as the market was underdeveloped, the social revolution 
also aimed at the traditional culture. With the old culture being removed from social 
life, the vital, diversified and organic society was turned into a silent and mechanical 
block. Eventually the society was about to proceed to the destruction. Lingering on 
the edge of collapse, the Party decided to reorient the policy system towards a 
pragmatic perspective and shifted the focus from social revolution to economic 
construction. Thus the transition to the market economy was initiated.  
 
However, the situation demonstrated by Polanyi did not appear. According to Polanyi, 
in order to develop the market into a state of “self-regulating”, those modern state 
introduce a “rule of law” system to govern the market transaction. 4But China lacked 
the experience of rule-based governance. Moreover, the “rule of law” system could be 
too expensive for a small-sized market. So in its early stage of development, Chinese 
market sought a different foundation. And this foundation, as mentioned, was the 
traditional culture that the socialist revolution tended to eradicate but failed to do so. 
The relation-based culture underpinned the top-down imposed market system from 
bottom up. But it is not to say that other institutional resources such as “Mao’s legacy” 
were of no importance at all. For example, the Party’s organizational resources were 
highly important for the culture to penetrate the local economic system. And the 
federalist nature of China’s political system helped to develop a relation-based trading 
system by enabling the local institutional innovation, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
 
This “rule of relation” approach is normal in most of the less developed economies. 
As we know, one aim of the society is to enable cooperation. And cooperation 
requires trust among the cooperators. Obviously, the blood tie and geographical 
relationship minimize the cost of developing trust. However, the growing market 
requires the trust on an increasingly larger scale and wider range, i.e. the trust among 
strangers. So the rule-based governance is introduced to enable the massive 
cooperation. But in China’s great transformation, the market economy was largely 
governed by the relation-based culture. It reveals that the relation-based governance 
might be an effective institution even when what we face is a big economy in 
transition. So it is worth to discuss the advantage and disadvantage of relation-based 
governance with respect to a huge economy at various development stages.  
                                                        
4 The Anglo-American concept of the rule of law can be compared with the concept of “Rechtsstaat” in German 
jurisprudence. It is thought that the continental concept pays more attention to just than the Anglo-American one.  
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With a focus on the relation-based culture and the trading system based on it, this 
chapter is divided into three parts. The first part outlines some salient features of 
Chinese culture and shows that Chinese culture is largely relation-centered. The 
second part theorizes the mechanism through which personal relationships sustain 
cooperation. Part three is a comparative institutional analysis comparing the “rule of 
law” and the “rule of relation” systems.  
 
3.1 Some Features of Chinese Culture 
 
Two ideas of Confucianism  
 
China is an old country but the reform it undertakes is new. The old culture is revived 
in the modern market economy. As we know, Confucianism is the most influential 
philosophical thinking in ancient China. It also exerted significant influence on East 
Asian countries like Japan, Korea, Vietnam and Singapore. It might not be a 
coincidence that recent economic miracles occurred mostly in the East Asian, in the 
Confucian cultural sphere. It seems that the “rule of relation” culture shaped a 
market-preserving institutional environment.  
 
Two ideas embedded in the Confucianism provoke interest relating to the current 
research. First one is its emphasis on the social relation and the rights and 
responsibilities attached to it. Confucius stressed the importance of social relation and 
specified the rights and obligations across a variety of relationships. The major 
attention is devoted to the kinship. And the norms governing the kinship structure are 
also extended to be applied to the relationship between friends and between the 
superiors and subordinates. To develop and maintain the relationship, trust must be 
formed among family members, clan members, friends and colleagues (mostly 
referring to the colleagues in government departments). Apparently, Chinese society 
is based on the interwoven relationships. And Confucianism imposes a set of rules 
prescribing the behavior pattern for the specific relationships. Hence, as long as 
Confucianism constitutes the salient cultural belief, the trust can be formed and 
maintained within the specific relationships. If an individual in such a society does 
not fulfill the obligations imposed by one of his relationships, he receives the 
punishment in one way or another.  
 
The other idea is about the reciprocity. Confucian philosophy asserts that Ren 
(human-heartedness) and Yi (righteousness) are two major virtues that people should 
pursue. The fundamental idea of Ren is “loving others”. This love is not the love that 
God bestows upon people with equality, but arises due to human empathy. Confucius 
said, “Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself” and5 
 
                                                        
5 Kant’s reciprocity thesis on Morality and Freedom shows the similar conclusion. See Allison, Henry E., Kant’s 
Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.  
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The man of Ren is one who, desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring 
to develop himself, develops others. To be able from one’s own self to draw a parallel 
for the treatment of others; that may be called the way to practice Ren. 
 
Here, as Fei points out, “Confucius paid a lot of attention to the word tui (pushing or 
extending out), in the sense of ripples expanding out from the center.” 6One must 
love himself to be able to love his family members, thus to be able to love the friends 
and companies It is also emphasized by Confucius in his Analects, “Attaining control 
over one's inner self, one then can tui, can extend oneself out into other circles of 
human relationships.” 7Thus empathy is the emotional foundation for practicing Ren. 
However, Ren is not purely altruistic but reciprocal. Confucius agrees that improper 
action has to be punished and goodness has to be rewarded by goodness. The teaching 
of Confucius suggests a behavior pattern of tit-for-tat. It is not a strategy of 
cooperating unconditionally or cheating forever, but a way in between. A way in 
between is the way of Confucius. 
 
Confucianism is the symbolization, conceptualization and summarization of the 
fundamental features of Chinese culture which reflects the behavior patterns emerging 
from the adaption to the agricultural society and its environment. In Aoki’s dynamic 
model of institution, Confucianism is what could be termed “public presentation” of 
the adaptive institution and also delivers the signals continuously to reinforce the 
common belief so as to sustain the adaptive institution. So the studies of 
Confucianism could capture the essentials of Chinese culture. Digging into the 
Confucianism, we encounter the very nature of the Chinese society, that is, the 
relation-based structure and the principle of reciprocity underpinning that structure. 
 
The differential mode of association 
 
As aforementioned, in Chinese society, the relation-based social system is structured 
as the ripples extending from inner to outer circle. 8  Fei summarizes this 
ripples-shaped structure as the “differential mode of association”. In contrast to 
Chinese societal system, Western society is, however, patterned by the “organizational 
mode of association”. A neat demonstration of the “differential mode of association” 
can be found in the foreword to Fei’s book From the Soil: 
 
With differential mode of association, the society is composed not of discrete 
organizations but of overlapping networks of people linked together through 
                                                        
6 Fei, Xiaotong, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Xiangtu Zhongguo), translated by Gary G. 
Hamilton and Wang Zheng, University of California Press, Oakland, 1992, Page 66 
7 Ibid, Page 59 
8 In Mo-tzu, a classic book of Mohism, a dialogue between Wu ma zi, a Confucian scholar, and Mo Tzu who 
advocates “all-embracing love” is reported as follows: “I cannot practice all-embracing love. I love the men of 
Tsou (a nearby state) better than I love those of Yueh (a distant state). I love the men of Lu (his own state) more 
than I love those of Tsou. I love the men of my own district better than I love those of Lu. I love the members of 
my own clan better than I love those of my own district. I love my parents better than I love the men of my own 
clan. And I love myself better than I love my parents.” 
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differentially categorized social relationships.9 
 
In the traditional Chinese society, numerous different, yet interrelated and overlapped 
social networks were developed to meet the requirements of social governance. One 
striking feature of the social webs is that the social capital attached to the relationship 
diminished as the network expands outwards. The trust cannot be maintained if the 
frequency of interaction becomes low. So the relationship in the inner circle of the 
social network is close and generates sufficient trust to ensure long-term cooperation. 
In contrast, the relationship in the outer circle of the social network might not provide 
sufficient incentive to sustain the cooperation particularly in the case that a big 
amount of benefit is expected to be generated from the cooperation. The reason that 
the social network is ripples-shaped lies in the scarcity of resources spent on the 
cultivation of relationship. It is impossible to establish tight relationships among the 
entire population. So, the investment will be made to those relationships that have 
already been established or are less costly to be established and maintained. The close 
relationship will get closer due to this self-reinforcing effect. 
 
There is one more feature worth mentioning. As Fei put it: 
 
A society with a differential mode of association is composed of webs woven out of 
countless personal relationships. To each knot in these webs is attached a specific 
ethical principle. For this reason, the traditional moral system was incapable of 
producing a comprehensive moral concept.10 
 
In Chinese society, it used to be the case that the laws and norms were specified for 
the relationship involved. For example, in the ancient Chinese law, a father convicted 
of killing his son was free from punishment, but he could not escape the punishment 
for his killing of a stranger. Hence, Chinese society developed a segregated structure. 
The ripples-shaped character of social network resulted in the distinction between 
insider and outsider. It is no problem that the cooperation is sustained among insiders. 
But the cooperation between insider and outsider seems difficult and uncertain. 
Compared with the relational society, in an organization-based social system, the 
equality before the rules is sought by the entire membership of the organization. And 
the interpersonal trust, as a means to sustain the cooperation, is replaced with the 
commonly agreed coercive measures. So it could afford to coordinate an ever-big 
cooperative network.  
 
Family and Clan 
 
The inner circle of social network, as important as it is for the formation of social 
order, should be institutionalized and has been institutionalized into the family. The 
family is the basic organizational unit in a relational society. Despite this label of an 
                                                        
9 Ibid, Page 20 
10 Ibid, Page 78 
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organizational unit, the family is not an organization in terms of modern 
organizational law. The family is based on the blood tie and conjugal relationship, in 
which the rights and obligations are vaguely defined. By contrast, the modern 
organization, among others the firms, required a more precise formulation of rights 
and obligations of members. An explicit contract often sets the foundation of the 
modern organization. However, at the core of the family as an institution exits only an 
implicit contract which is largely embedded in the culture. Due to the vague, yet 
flexible nature of the implicit contract, the family is a versatile institution performing 
the functions such as household, collective production, social insurance and finance. 
Therefore, if the market is underdeveloped and thus cannot afford to maintain a high 
level of specialization, the family comes to play various roles in market transaction 
without introducing additional transaction cost. As shown by China’s experience, the 
household farming and household-run establishments were important elements of 
China’s economy particularly during the early stage of the development.  
 
One shortcoming of the institution of family is scale. Thus Chinese society developed 
a ripples-shaped structure to extend the trust network, at least from family to clan. 
Human brotherhood minimizes the transaction cost but seems to be a dream. Actually, 
the hostile attitude to strangers increases the survival chance in the ancient world but 
prevents the further development in the modern world. In view of the increasing 
benefit of cooperation, the clan offers a solution to facilitate greater cooperation. The 
clan is an enlarged family. Indeed, the ideal model of government demonstrated by 
Confucianism is to treat the nation as an enlarged family. However, the Legalism 
triumphed over the Confucianism as to the influence on the political practice. As  啊
result, the feudalism had been replaced by the centralized governance system. But in 
the countryside, the society was organized the way following the Confucian thoughts. 
The Confucian model of government was applicable because it was too costly for the 
empire to administer the village’s activities through the hierarchical bureaucratic 
system. Hence, the clan played a crucial role to stabilize the social structure from 
bottom up. 
 
As mentioned above, the family was too small to carry out the large project efficiently 
by itself. So there was a need to coordinate the provision of public goods such as 
irrigation systems, roads, education and even dispute resolution. The clan, as the 
enlarged family, took the responsibility to coordinate the public projects. The 
recurrent interactions ensured the continuous cooperation among clan members. The 
expansion of network served not only to increase the quantities of public goods to the 
efficient level but also to enable the further division of labor and the embedding of 
financial activities in the social relations. In agriculture, the institution of family could 
solve most problems in relation to the production. Yet industrialization required a 
significant amount of investment and the employment of a considerable number of 
workers. So the clan should play an increasingly important role in coordinating the 
industrial production. As shown by the practice, the collective TVEs and family 
business benefited a lot from the cohesiveness of the clan.  
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It is interesting to compare the societal organization across cultures. Greif and 
Tabellini (2010) examine the bifurcation in social institution of pre-modern Chinese 
and Europe. They argue that different societal organizations, for China the clan and 
for Europe the city, play relevant roles in sustaining the cooperation. The clan is 
kinship-based, be it actual or perceived kinship, and sustained by moral norms, 
whereas the city is rule-based and relies on the third-party enforcement. Greif’s 
analysis shed some light on how culture interacts with the economic system. Under 
the influence of its culture, the Chinese economy ended up in a segregated structure 
while the Western economy proceeded to an integrated structure, to be discussed 
below. 
 
Contractual relationship vs. relational contract 
 
As suggested by the differential mode of association, the inner circle of social 
network is governed by the principle of reciprocity, whereas the outer circle indicates 
an inclination towards the impersonal transaction. China, relying on agriculture most 
of the time during its long history, confined the development of social institution 
within the limits of the inner circle of social network. That was the origin of relational 
culture, which is more other-regarding and embodies the principle of equality, as 
contrary to the individualistic feature of Western culture.  
 
However, the cultural bifurcation does not necessarily suggest the different natures 
and qualities across human races. In his two great books The Wealth of Nations and 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith regards the human nature as being 
self-interest as well as other-regarding.11 These two contradictory views of human 
nature can be reconciled by making them context-dependent. Vernon Smith (2007) 
differentiates between the personalized exchange and the extended order of market. 
The personalized exchange involves acquaintance and recurrent interaction. In this 
kind of social context, the contract underlying the transaction is regarded as a 
relational contract. The relational contract differs from the formal contract in two 
aspects. First, the relational contract is vaguely formulated and highly flexible. In an 
environment full of uncertainty, the ex ante agreement is replaced with the ex post 
negotiation as long as the cost of re-negotiation is sufficiently low. And the tight 
relationship minimizes the cost of re-negotiation as well as the risk of hold-up 
behavior. To gain a full understanding, we shall move to the second aspect. The 
relational contract is not enforced by a third-party but by the mutual commitment. 
Three mechanisms are supposed to contribute: the reciprocity, reputation and 
interlinked social domains, which will be discussed in the next part. Besides, the 
internalization of social norms also helps to sustain the cooperation. The social norms 
                                                        
11 See Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776, recent edition, 
Random House, New York, 1994; Smith, Adam, A Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759, recent edition, Penguin 
Classics, New York, 2010 
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are presentations of adaptive behavior pattern so that it is efficient to follow the social 
norm without applying rational calculation if the environment is not changing.  
 
As to the extended order of market, the anonymity of market exchange requires 
institutionalization of contractual relationship and an external sanction system to 
enforce it. A well-received definition of contract is as follows: “A contract is an 
agreement having a lawful object entered into voluntarily by two or more parties, 
each of whom intends to create one or more legal obligations between them.”12 
Hence, a contractual relationship is a legal relationship. It exists only within a legal 
framework, being created under and defined by the law. In fact, it is a re-construction 
of inter-personal relationships by eradicating the uncertain part and specifying the 
right and obligation in relation to the object involved. In order to be enforceable by 
third party, also in favor of the cooperation in the context of specialization, the formal 
contract must be precisely formulated and also confined to a limited object.  
 
Collectivist culture 
 
It is observed that Chinese society is characterized by collectivism while Western 
culture tends to be individualistic. It may be surprising that from the relation-based 
social structure emerged a collectivist culture. The relational culture seems to offer a 
lot of freedom to the individuals as it solely demonstrates several vaguely defined 
guidelines for the society. But if we study the culture more carefully, it turns out that 
the tightly interwoven social ties offer little freedom to the participants. The lacking 
of freedom should contribute to the emergence of the collectivist culture. 
 
First, unlike the contractual relationship that is free to enter and exit, most of the 
valuable personal relationship is predetermined. It is not free for people to choose 
their relatives and countrymen. And it is also very difficult for people to withdraw 
from the ongoing relationship because they can hardly move into a new relationship 
and will be punished for the betrayal. 
 
Second, the individualistic culture shows an inclination towards “explicit rules”. In an 
individualistic society, the social norms are mostly institutionalized into formal rules. 
Only when a person violates the institutionalized rules will he be punished. In that 
sense, the individualistic culture is anti-culture. By contrast, the relational culture 
favors the “implicit rules”. These informal rules govern most aspects of social 
exchange acting like an “invisible hand” to grasp the entire society. Since the social 
activity is always embedded in the relation, the informal rules also comes as attached 
to the relationship. Besides, the asymmetry of power in the relationship might result 
in the rise of the authoritarianism.  
 
Hence, the collectivist culture dominates a relational society. The individuals serve 
the collective interest at their own expense. Actually, they do it because they try to 
                                                        
12 It is a definition widely used by the law firms. See http://www.hitchenslaw.com/contracts/ 
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avoid punishment or generate benefit in the future. The extensive social network 
encourages people to reciprocate the seemingly altruistic activities and cooperate in 
the collective action. It is merely a way to coordinate the cooperation away from the 
rule-based approach.  
 
The table below conveniently summarizes some of the different characteristics of 
Chinese and Western culture. 
 
 China Western Countries 
Dominating philosophy 
and religion 
Confucianism Christian Religion 
Social governance Relation-based Rule-based 
Societal organization Clan City 
Enforcement 
Mechanism 
Self-enforcement 
Third-party 
enforcement 
Culture 
Collectivist 
culture 
Individualistic 
culture 
 
Table 3.1 Different characteristics of Chinese and Western culture 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, Confucianism defines the characteristics of Chinese mentality 
while Christianity exerts the fundamental influence on Western mindset. The major 
thoughts of Confucianism constitute the “public presentation” of the relation-based 
institution. Therefore, as Confucianism suggests, the relational society develops a 
ripples-shaped structure (differential mode of association) based on the principle of 
reciprocity. Moreover, in a relational society, the clan plays a fundamental role in 
coordinating the cooperation compared to the role of the city in Western social system. 
The people act according to their predetermined position in various interrelated and 
overlapping social networks as if they are driven by a collectivist culture. It is 
immaterial whether they really believe in the collectivism so long as their behavior 
conforms to such norms. Thus far it is clear that the Chinese society is governed by 
the social relation. Yet, why is the social network an effective means to preserve the 
cooperation? It seems difficult to enforce the contract in an environment absent of 
authorized third-party coercion. There must be a self-enforcement mechanism with 
respect to the relational contract.  
 
3.2 The Social Network as a Cooperation-preserving Mechanism 
 
The rule-based trading system requires the institutionalization of the third-party 
punishment. Now the question is how can the transaction be ensured without the 
external coercion. Three mechanisms emerge from the networked environment and 
they preserve the cooperation in such environment. These three mechanisms are direct 
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity (reputation) and interlinked interaction across social 
domains.  
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Direct reciprocity 
 
In a world where people are self-interested and the institution of third-party 
enforcement is not available, exchange is threatened by treachery and betrayal. For 
example, a person takes the good without paying. In doing so, he maximizes his own 
income and do harm to the trading partner. And the partner who predicts his defective 
behavior gives up the opportunity to trade with him. Both of them are rational, but 
rational action results in the mutually undesirable outcome. The most famous example 
is the prisoner’s dilemma. It is a “start point” for the transitional economy. And the 
aim of transition is to move out of the “start point” and establish an efficient 
economic order.  
 
Direct reciprocity is supposed to be the oldest and also one of the most efficient 
solutions to the prisoner’s dilemma. It is a guideline for the social interaction among 
human beings. Its core idea is that of “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”. I 
do you a favor in the expectation that you will help me in the future. Correspondingly, 
you are ready to reciprocate the favor when you accept the help. The principle of 
reciprocity finds application only when the interaction occurs recurrently between two 
parties. The difference between the one-shot game and repeated game is that the later 
one involves the future income which provides the incentive to cooperate and enables 
the punishment for non-cooperative behaviors. If an individual player defects in the 
game of exchange, his trading partner would probably terminate the cooperative 
relationship and stop playing exchange game with him. Therefore, the player must be 
aware that the cost of defection is the current value of the entire future income. The 
punishment for the defection is much harsher compared with that in a one-shot game. 
So, when market exchange is embedded in a long-term social relation, future income 
is taken into consideration in the strategic calculation so that the prison’s dilemma is 
transformed into a cooperative equilibrium.  
 
A basic model suffices to show how reciprocity fosters the cooperation in an infinitely 
repeated game. We start with a typical prisoner’s dilemma with a structure of 
d>a>c>b and then extend the one-shot game to be a repeated one.  
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 cooperate defect 
cooperate (a, a) (b, d) 
defect (d, b) (c, c) 
 
 
 
 cooperate defect 
cooperate (a/σ, a/σ) (b, d) 
defect (d, b) (c, c) 
 
Figure 3.2 The repeated game as a solution to the prisoner’s dilemma 
 
σ denotes the discount rate. Now, the benefit generated from cooperation increases 
substantially compared to that in a one-shot game. We assume that the players lack 
information and play each strategy with 50%. Hence, if a/σ+b-c>d holds, the expected 
payoff of cooperation is higher than that of defection and the strategy combination 
(a/σ, a/σ) would be the new equilibrium. However, as the game is extended over time, 
it is possible that a player tries to take advantage by defecting in one round and 
resuming the cooperation in next round. To avoid being exploited by the opponent, 
the player has to reciprocate the opponent’s defection with the defective strategy. So 
the law of action in this game is “to do what the other player does”. You should 
always cooperate at first. In the next rounds of the game, if the opponent cooperates, 
you cooperate; if the opponent defects, you defect. It is called “tit for tat”, a strategic 
form of reciprocity. Judging from the result, the prevalence of reciprocity fosters the 
cooperation. As Ken Binmore (2005) put it, the reciprocity is the glue that holds 
human societies together.13 
 
However, the glue is sometimes not so effective. To keep the glue effective, first of all, 
the discount rate should not be high. A high discount rate reduces the current value of 
the entire future income and thus undermines the effectiveness of punishment, unless 
the player is going to punish the defector at additional cost. It is what scholars (Fehr et 
al, 2002; Bowles and Gintis, 2000) called strong reciprocity. Not everyone needs to be 
the strong reciprocator. A certain share of strong reciprocators in the population 
ensures the cooperation. It is not rational for an individual to be a strong reciprocator. 
However, to have a certain share of strong reciprocators in the population is 
ecologically rational. In other words, it is an adaptive strategy in the evolutionary 
                                                        
13 See Binmore, Ken, Natural Justice, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005 
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stable equilibrium. 
 
Second, the game should be infinitely repeated. That means players don’t know which 
round is the end of the game. If they do, then the strategy combination (defect, defect) 
would be a sub-game perfect equilibrium. If the game has an end, it is rational for an 
individual player to defect at last round of game. And the other player expects that he 
would defect at last round and defects pre-emptively at the second last round, and so 
on and so forth. A game of finite rounds is similar to a one-shot game. Both of them 
result in the prisoner’s dilemma. To presume an infinitely repeated game does not 
only serve the theoretical interest, but also finds application in the practice. In the real 
world, social relation is inheritable. A person’s social relation is his offspring’s 
resource. Especially in a relational society like China, a person’s success relies not 
only on the tangible wealth inherited from his parents but also the intangible social 
relations established by his parents. It is not surprising that sociologists regard social 
relations as a kind of social capital. Consequently, it is safe to assume that the game is 
played over generations.  
 
Third, the cooperative equilibrium should be a salient one. The principle of 
reciprocity helps to preserve the cooperation when cooperation is expected from both 
sides. But it does not help to cause a shift in equilibrium when players are trapped in 
the defective equilibrium. In a repeated game-theoretic model, it is beyond player’s 
capacity to shift from one equilibrium to another. To understand the dynamic of shift 
in equilibrium, we have to view the interaction among players as a competition of 
survival. Hence, the evolutionary game theory will provide a better analytical tool. 
The individu\ 
 
al player is presumed to be influenced by the culture and internalize the social norms. 
So it is habitual for him to choose a specific strategy whatever his opponent plays. 
The assumption of absolute rationality is relaxed and the role of culture is introduced 
into the model, with the strategy being treated as the cultural trait. In an evolutionary 
game-theoretic model, different cultural traits compete for prevalence. For example, 
we can assume that a population comprises cooperators, defectors and reciprocators. 
Cooperator always cooperates, defector always defects and reciprocator goes with “tit 
for tat”. And we’ll find that reciprocators, under certain condition, can invade the 
group of defectors and go flourish in equilibrium. So, as the evolutionary 
game-theoretic model suggests, the cooperation can emerge from an environment full 
of cheaters.14 
 
It is worth mentioning that biology also offers theories and empirical studies in 
relation to reciprocity. Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) develops the “inclusive fitness” 
theory to explain the cooperation among the creatures that are biological related. 
Moreover, Trivers (1971) proposes the concept of “reciprocal altruism” to explain the 
                                                        
14 The equilibrium can be a dynamic one because cooperators outcompete reciprocators and defectors outcompete 
cooperators.  
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evolution of cooperation. His concept of “reciprocal altruism” is close to the “tit for 
tat” strategy introduced by Anatol Rapoport.15 “Reciprocal altruist” stops cooperation 
when opponent defects. “Tit for tat” replicates the opponent’s previous action and can 
restore cooperation even when the cooperation has been once broken down. In the 
model formulated above, “reciprocal altruism” is equivalent to the “tit for tat”. Once 
trapped in defective equilibrium, there is no possibility to restore the cooperation. But 
if forgiveness or forgetfulness is introduced in the model, these two forms of 
reciprocity will make a difference. 
 
Indirect reciprocity 
 
The direct reciprocity only fosters the cooperation between the trading parties. The 
indirect reciprocity holds the entire social network together. It is based on human’s 
ability to memorize experience of exchange and transmit the information within the 
social network. As a result, participants of the same social network share a reputation 
system. The reputation determines if a person is trustworthy with respect to the 
market transaction. By delivering the signal throughout the social network, the 
reputation system enables the collective punishment and thus decreases the incentive 
to cheat. In order to gain more trade opportunity, a person must be prudent with his 
reputation and try to avoid any improper action that can undermine the reputation. In 
the theoretical model, we will see that even the minimum use of reputation is of 
importance to the cooperation. An individual player only needs to know opponents’ 
strategy in the last round. If opponent cooperates in last round, he can be labeled with 
the identity of cooperator. But if he defects in last round, he is considered a defector. 
The strategy of the players is to trade with cooperators and avoid defectors (in the 
behavior sense).  
 
To analyze the effect of reputation, it is helpful to shift from a repeated 
game-theoretic model to an evolutionary one for two reasons. First, the reputation is 
sufficient to ensure the cooperation even when the repeated nature is removed from 
the model; second, it illustrate how culture affects the cooperation. We start with a 
fitness structure as follows: 
 
 cooperate defect 
cooperate (a, a) (b, d) 
defect (d, b) (c, c) 
 
Figure 3.3 The fitness structure in an evolutionary game-theoretic model 
 
Assume that there is a population comprising reciprocators and defectors. 
                                                        
15 See Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, revised edition, Basic book, New York, 2006 
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Reciprocators account for λ percent of the population, and defectors 1-λ. The 
behavioral pattern is generically determined and does not involve morality. The 
payoff matrix is given above. But the concept of income is replaced by the concept of 
fitness which measure the reproduction rate of phenotypes. We assume that an 
individual player encounters an opponent randomly and the game lasts only for one 
round. Given the assumptions, the expected fitness of reciprocators is λa+(1-λ)b while 
the expected fieness of defectors is λd+(1-λ)c. Therefore, the condition under which 
the reciprocation is a superior genetic feature is: 
 
λa+(1-λ)b > λd+(1-λ)c 
 
And it can be rewritten as: 
 
λ<(c-b)/((a+c)-(b+d)) 
 
The condition does not hold when the game is a simple prisoner’s dilemma with 
d>a>c>b. 
 
 
 
The Figure shows that direct reciprocity cannot overcome the problem of defection in 
one-shot game.16 The average fitness of defectors is higher than that of reciprocators. 
If we assume the game is repeated for n rounds, the fitness structure is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 For more details please look at Thomas Schelling’s remarkable work, Micromotives and 
Macrobehavior, Norton, New York, 1978. 
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 cooperate Defect 
cooperate (na, na) (d+(n-1)c, b+(n-1)c) 
defect (b+(n-1)c, d+(n-1)c) (nc, nc) 
 
Figure 3.5 The fitness structure in a n-rounds game 
 
The condition is transformed to be (discount rate is not taken into consideration): 
 
λ>(c-d)/(n(a-c)-(b+d)+2c) 
 
Hence, in the repeated game, reciprocators dominate the population if the rounds of 
game exceed the threshold value: 
 
n>(b-c)/(a-c) 
 
If the game is played over more than (b-c)/(a-c) rounds, the cultural trait “reciprocity” 
is definitely advantageous over the “defection”. The reason is that cooperation, once 
established, can be sustained for more than one round while defection would be 
punished by defection at the rest but first rounds of game. Therefore, the more rounds 
the game lasts for, the higher is the average fitness for reciprocators. With the increase 
in repeated rounds of the game, the game is transformed from the prisoner’s dilemma 
to a cooperative game (Axelrod, 1984; Schelling, 1978; Sigmund, 1993).   
 
 
 
The evolutionary game-theoretic model tells us that the direct reciprocity only plays a 
relevant role in the repeated game. The conclusion resembles that of the model based 
on super-rationality. But there is a difference. The later model requires that the 
interaction should be infinitely repeated while the former only requires that the game 
should be played over certain rounds. So, interestingly, if we presume the bounded 
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rationality instead of super-rationality, the cooperation is easier to attain. It shows that 
the constructivist rationality (super-rationality) is used for only the short-term 
decision-making while the ecological rationality (bounded rationality) is essential to 
the understanding of the long-term prevalence of customs, social norms and cultures. 
To establish a relationship with someone or not is a job assigned to the rationality. Yet 
the prevalence of reciprocating strategy must be the outcome of interaction among a 
large population over a long time span.  
 
This demonstrates that the prevalence of reciprocating strategy among the population 
in a bounded-rationality-based model. The aim is to lay a foundation for 
understanding the role of reputation in fostering cooperation. The core idea of indirect 
reciprocity is that of “you scratch my back and others who know that you scratch my 
back will scratch your back”. Obviously the key factor that enables the indirect 
reciprocity is information transmission. An individual expecting one good deed 
deserves another must firstly convince others that he is a reciprocator. Social relation 
provides a good information channel and helps to establish a reputation system. 
 
However, the model above assumes that the player cannot change the opponent he 
plays with for at least n rounds. It is not quite problematic for those who establish the 
cooperative relationship with the opponents because playing with a new opponent 
cannot improve the average benefit. But if a player encounters a defector at the first 
round of game, he may probably seek a new partner. Now reputation is introduced 
into the model while the players are allowed to change the opponent every round. 
First, as assumed in the model above, the population comprises reciprocators and 
defectors. Reciprocators account for λ ( 0≦λ≦1) of population and defectors 1 − λ. 
According to the assumption, reciprocators meet reciprocators with possibility λ$, 
and meet defectors with possibility λ(1 − λ) . Defectors meet defectors with 
possibility (1 − λ)$. Players meet each other randomly at beginning of every round 
of game. They can choose to play or change the opponent. The fitness structure is 
similar to that of a prisoner’s dilemma.  
 
 reciprocate defect 
reciprocate (a, a) (d, b) 
defect (b, d) (c, c) 
 
Figure 3.7 The fitness structure of the model with reputation 
 
To be a prisoner’s dilemma, the fitness structure needs to be b>a>c>d. Because the 
game is not repeatedly played by the same players, the direct reciprocity loses the 
efficacy of the glue. The indirect reciprocity comes to play a role. Those defectors 
who meet reciprocators in the game would be labeled and remembered forever. Their 
cultural traits become known to others. As a result, reciprocators punish defectors 
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collectively in the way that they avoid defectors in the game of exchange. The 
reputation of individual players delivers sufficient information to influence the pattern 
of interaction. And also those hidden defectors avoid playing with the known 
defectors, because it is more profitable to play with an unknown player than with a 
defector. So, at next rounds of game, λ(1-λ) of population is excluded from the game. 
They may go extinct or they just live in a totally isolated group. 
 
Due to the exclusion of the known defectors, the players that move to the next round 
of game are reciprocators and hidden defectors. And at the end of this round of game, 
the group of reciprocators and hidden defectors grows at the rate of α(a, d) and β(b, 
c). The growth rate is determined by the expected fitness of players. The expected 
fitness of a reciprocator is λ(𝒶𝒶 + (1 − λ()𝒹𝒹	while the expected fitness of a defector is 
λ(𝒷𝒷 + (1 − λ()𝒸𝒸. λ(	denotes the share of reciprocators in the population at the round t 
of the game. So, the reproduction rate of defectors is always higher than that of the 
reciprocators.  
 
In sum, there are two balancing forces for replication dynamics. On one hand, the 
exclusion of the known defectors increases the return for cooperation; on the other 
hand, the higher growth rate of hidden defectors reduces the return for cooperation. 
So, the equilibrium is reached when the equitation λ( = λ∗  holds. And λ∗  is 
determined by the following equation: 
λ∗ α∗ (λ∗α∗ +（1 − λ∗）
$
β∗)⁄ = λ∗ 
By solving the equation, we have three equilibrium values. They are λ∗ = 1；λ∗ = 0；
λ∗ = （β∗ − α∗） β∗4 .	Nowak (2006) conducts a similar analysis. A similar figure can 
be used here to illustrate the equilibrium. 
 
λ∗ = 1	and	λ∗ = 0 are stable equilibriums. In the case that a specific phenotype has 
dominated the population, the invasion of other phenotype is impossible. If defectors 
dominate the population, the reputation is of little use. The size of group of 
reciprocators is too small so that only a small fraction of defectors can be recognized. 
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If reciprocators go flourish, the newly arrived defectors would be labeled and 
removed from the game as soon as possible. However,	λ∗ = （β∗ − α∗） β∗4  is not 
stable. A slight deviation from this equilibrium would lead to a shift towards two other 
equilibriums. As shown by the figure, if an external shock makes 	λ∗ slightly smaller 
than（β∗ − α∗） β∗4 , 	λ∗ = 0	is the new equilibrium. And if the shock makes 	λ∗ 
slightly larger than (β∗ − α∗） β∗4 , λ∗ = 1  is the new equilibrium. Hence, 
（β∗ − α∗） β∗4  is the threshold share of reciprocators in the population. The share 
of reciprocators in the population needs to exceed （β∗ − α∗） β∗4  to ensure the 
domination of cooperation.  
 
The aim of the model is to show that the cooperation is attained in the presence of 
inter-personal communication. Through communication, the reputation system is 
established enabling the collective punishment of improper actions and thus 
enhancing the cooperation-preserving feature of the reciprocal culture. If the 
replication rate of the reciprocal culture is close to that of the defective culture, the 
former proceeds to dominate the human mentalities, as is the case in Chinese society. 
That is the major contribution of this model to the understanding of reciprocity as the 
glue holding human society together. 
 
However, this model is purely theoretical and makes some unrealistic assumptions. 
The unrealistic part of the model lies in assuming interaction between randomly 
matched players and real-time communication among the entire population. Hence, it 
is possible to revise the model accordingly to approximate the real world. First, the 
social relation can be introduced into the model to decrease the frequency of random 
matching. In the original model, only the defector is branded and only the known 
defector can be avoided in the transaction. However, there are plenty of reasons that 
the reciprocator should also be branded. An individual player who plays with a 
reciprocator sees no reason to change the opponent in the future. What they would 
probably do is to develop a long-term cooperative relationship. Introducing the social 
relation in the model allows individual players to decide whether they want to 
continue playing with the same opponent or prefer to change the opponent. And there 
is only one situation by which a pair of players would mutually agree to continue 
playing with each other. It is the situation of reciprocator-meeting-reciprocator. A pair 
of reciprocators are incentivized to develop a long-term relationship because their 
expected fitness is improved to be	"a" for the rest rounds of the game, whereas the 
expected fitness of a reciprocator searching for a reliable opponent is λ(a + (1 − λ()d. 
If we assume that the social relation is inheritable, the reciprocators would certainly 
dominate the population. But we also find that all the relationships are stable over 
time and the room for searching and matching disappear.  
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The second point is that communication is costly. So communication only occurs 
when it generates sufficient benefit. The best strategy is to communicate actively 
within a group, but not with the entire population. If we confine the interactions to a 
middle-sized group, a two-layer structure emerges. At the first layer, the story unfolds 
as the one discussed above. Whether the reciprocal culture or defective culture 
dominates depends on the initial condition of share of reciprocator and defector in the 
individual group. At the second layer, the selection act to the level of the group. It 
favors the reciprocal culture over the defective culture. Let us assume a city occupied 
by the defectors like Sodom and Gomorrah. A city of that sort would probably be 
destroyed by the city governed by the reciprocators because the latter benefits 
enormously from cooperation. So, under selection pressure, the reciprocal culture 
improves the average fitness and thus triumphs over the defective culture. However, if 
the group grows into a big one and is no longer efficient in distributing information, 
the defective culture can invade. So, in the equilibrium, there exist some middle-sized 
groups or networks. And the intra-group interactions and communications are more 
frequent than the inter-group interactions and communications. 
 
Interlinked interactions across social domains 
 
Reciprocity emerges due to the time extension of interactions while the indirect 
reciprocity is enabled by the spatial extension of interactions. There is one more 
extension, the domain extension, to be addressed. Aoki (2001) points out that an 
individual may interact with the opponent across various social domains. Using an 
example of constructing irrigation system from feudal Japan, he shows that linking 
the social exchange game with the public good game provides a solution to the 
free-rider problem intrinsic to the provision of public good. In his book on China’s 
transition, Wang (2009) demonstrates a similar idea arguing that various sorts of 
transaction occur between the same trading parties particularly in the small-sized 
market. As we may notice, the emergence of various social domains is the result of 
functional differentiation of modern society. The specialization is one of the sources 
of functional differentiation. An emerging market cannot afford the transaction cost 
caused by the specialization. Thus the social relation comes as an informal institution 
to ensure the market transaction. However, one result of adopting the “rule of relation” 
system, eventually a goal as well, is that most economic activities are embedded in 
the social relation. And it is economical to embed as many transactions as possible in 
an individual relationship. As a result, it is easy to link different sorts of transaction 
between two players or within a group. It has an advantage that the incentive to defect 
in one game would be undermined due to the mix-up of payoffs of two or more 
different games.  
 
The idea is best explicated with two examples. The first example is an interlinked 
game, as mentioned, consisting of the components of social exchange and public 
goods provision. The players engage in the social exchange with each other and 
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contribute to the public goods provision collectively. If one is resident in a densely 
populated city, it is highly possible that social exchange and public goods provision 
are two games independent from each other. One can always choose whatever the best 
strategy is for one game without considering the effect of his choice on the playing of 
the second game. To maximize the utility, he would be decent in the social exchange 
and immoral as to the public goods provision, by which I mean he contributes less to 
the public goods provision as required. So in a city, a third party is demanded to 
impose the tax on the inhabitants to finance the public goods provision. However, in a 
small village, the player who attempts to escape the obligation to contribute to public 
goods provision, to which he is incentivized, would be threatened by the collective 
punishment in the social exchange domain. He could even be expelled from the 
village. In this model, the social relation provides an intermediary to link different 
games and enables the collective punishment across social domains.  
 
Furthermore, as the second example will suggest, social relation also enables 
information channeling. Allowing information to flow across two games may affect 
player’s strategy and thus the emerging equilibrium in the individual games. A good 
example can be found in the rural sector. Assume that a landlord and a tenant play two 
games in sequence. At stage one, the landlord and the tenant cooperate in the farming 
and share the income according to the ratio of marginal return to land and that to labor. 
At stage two, to raise his child, the tenant borrows a loan from the landlord. The 
landlord agrees to lend him money because he knows the tenant’s ability to repay the 
loan. He acquires the information from the cooperation with the tenant in the 
production domain, and makes use of the information in the financial domain. If these 
two games are independent, the tenant cooperates with the landlord in farming and 
borrows a loan from the bank. Then his application for the loan would probably 
turned down because the bank requires the information verifiable for a third party, for 
example the real estate documents, to assess the tenant’s repaying ability. But the 
tenant is not able to provide such information and thus has no access to formal 
financial system. It was very common that private firms and household-run 
establishments could not get the credit from the bank. As a result, an informal 
financial system emerged to meet the financial demand of private sectors. 
 
This part shows how social relation preserves the cooperation in the absence of any 
authoritative third-party. The reciprocity, reputation and interlinked interaction across 
social domains are three major cooperation-preserving mechanisms enabled by the 
social network. However, though it is not very costly to embed the economic 
activities in the social relation due to the prevailing common belief in the culture, the 
scale and scope of the cooperation would be limited by the segregated nature of social 
network when the market grows continuously.  
 
3.3 A Theory of Relation-based Exchange System 
 
This last part investigates the cooperation-preserving nature of the social network. 
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Then the remaining questions are how the market transaction is embedded in the 
social network and what advantages the “rule of relation” system may enjoy over the 
“rule of law” system. This part is devoted to address both questions, which are 
intrinsically related to each other.  
 
The relation-based trading system  
 
The market transaction can be broken down into three stages, namely, the matching, 
contracting and enforcing stage. If one of these stages involves prohibitively high 
transaction cost, then the market fails. In that sense, the aim of embedding the market 
transaction in an institutional environment is to minimize the transaction cost. It is 
pertinent to investigate how social relation affects these three stages of market 
transaction and its role in the minimization of transaction cost. Furthermore, in the 
analysis, the “rule of law” system makes an alternative institution compared to the 
“rule of relation” system with respect to the economical way to preserve the 
cooperation.  
 
First, because the market is a free trade system, it is necessary to make the buyer meet 
seller or the transaction would never occur. This is the matching process. In an 
impersonal market, the way to solve matching problem is to render some of market 
participants specialized in processing market information. They perform the function 
of the market intermediaries to search for the potential demand and supply and match 
them. For example, some consulting firms search outsourcing vendors for IT firms. 
Headhunting firms are active in the human resource market. Market makers match 
buyers and sellers in the security market. So the matching problem can be solved by 
the specialization of intermediaries in processing information. Such specialization 
reduces the information cost substantially, therefore making the matching mechanism 
an affordable burden for all market participants. But the story does not end here. 
There must be a third-party to verify the information provided by those market 
intermediaries, even though competition should eradicate most of motivations to cheat. 
As for a “rule of law” system, the rules regulating the market activities are codified 
and enacted by the legislative bodies. The violation of laws causes punishment from 
the judicial authority. Moreover, the government is also entitled to supervise and 
regulate market activities in relation to information processing.  
 
However, for a “rule of relation” system, the specialization is not a mainstream 
solution to the matching problem. One fallacy of the economic theory is the 
assumption of self-organizing market (Bowles, 2004). Walrasian equilibrium is 
neutral to institution. In such an equilibrium, the market system requires no 
supporting institutions and operates independently. In fact, the perfect market 
illustrates an ideal state that only exits in the thought experiment. The institution that 
market is embedded in has virtually effect on how the decentralized coordination is 
achieved. As to the matching part of market process, the rule of relational system 
offers a different solution which requires the social relation to perform the function of 
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information intermediary. Two significant features of the social relation must be taken 
into consideration. The more distant one’s information source is from him, the more 
one must pay for to get this information. Moreover, the reliability of information 
diminishes with the increase of distance between information source and information 
consumer because the marginal cost of establishing and maintaining relationship 
increases with the expansion of one’s social network. The increase of marginal cost 
means the diminishing return to the investment in a relationship. Hence, “the 
differential mode of association” emerges. One may trust the information sources in 
the inner circle of social network but consider the information sources in the outer 
circle of social network less reliable, because the cost of lying to an acquaintance is 
much higher than doing the same thing to a stranger.  
 
 
So, a market participant who searches for a trading partner through the social network 
faces a problem of constrained choice set. Where advanced communication and 
transportation technology is not available, most of information is generated and 
exchanged within the social network. In that case, the scope of social network defines 
the outer limits of the search area. Consequently, for a market participant who takes 
the social network as the definite information source, the possibility to match with the 
most beneficial trading partner is lower. There are two kinds of approach to the 
creation and distribution of market information. The first one is the market approach, 
which means that, in an impersonal market economy, resources are directed to the 
“information sector”. The second one is the relational way. In a relational system, a 
market participant develops the social network to accomplish a similar goal. Hence, 
the “rule of law” system may out-compete the “rule of relation” system with respect 
to the efficiency of matching mechanism if the market is sufficiently large.  
 
There is another problem regarding the matching process. As mentioned above, the 
investment is not made to develop a new relationship but rather made to strengthen an 
existing relationship because the cost of switching from the ongoing relationship to a 
seemingly more profitable, yet less reliable one is quite high. As a result, the 
relationship is stable over time. It is not necessary to search for new trading partners 
and any effort to search for new market opportunities might be taken as an offensive 
act so as to undermine the ongoing relationship. In that regard, in a networked 
environment, the searching and matching mechanism will not develop fully. And the 
efficiency of information processing is not as high as that in an economy with high 
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level of specialization. But the spending on the creation and distribution of market 
information is significantly saved. This low-cost-low-output setting is proper to a 
small-sized market. 
 
Following the matching stage is the contracting stage. At this stage, the contractual 
terms governing the future transactions, rights and obligations in relation to the 
specific issues are to be formulated. But the future is uncertain. As Hart (1995) argues, 
the contract is incomplete for it cannot deal with the uncertainty with detailed 
formulations. The incompleteness of contract gives rise to the problem of efficient 
contracting. To understand this problem, we distinguish among three kinds of 
information: private information, observable information and verifiable information 
(Dixit, 2004; Li, 2003). Private information is only accessible to the person who 
produces the information. Observable information refers to the information which can 
be observed only by the people involved. For example, if two trading parties only 
have an oral contract, then the content of contract can be categorized as observable 
information as no third party can verify the existence and authenticity of such 
information. Finally, the verifiable information refers to the information accessible to 
a third-party. For example, where a signed written contract is required to be uploaded 
to the Internet by a trading authority, then the contractual relationship between two 
trading parties is the verifiable information for all Internet users.  
 
In a relational system, the contract is not intended for third party enforcement. The 
market participants seek enforcement on the basis of the mutual agreement. Hence, 
the effort to ensure the verifiability of the information is saved. There is no need to 
formulate numerous detailed terms. Accordingly, the relational contract is “light” in 
content. A considerable amount of relational contract even takes an oral form. Taking 
into consideration the potentially enormous cost of contract formulation, reflected by 
for example the income of law firms therein, a relational economy, by making use of 
observable information efficiently, avoids developing a highly complex system to 
address the formulation of contract. 
 
What Kester (1992) writes on the Japanese economy is an excellent demonstration of 
the relational contract: 
 
In Japan, supply contracts are established by a ‘basic agreement,’ which is a short 
(often only three or four pages), written document that is little more than a legal 
‘boilerplate’ stipulating that the supplier and assembler are entering into a 
commercial relationship, will operate on a basis of mutual respect for each other’s 
autonomy, and will endeavor in good faith to maintain an atmosphere of mutual trust 
in their business dealings…. Japanese contracts often do not even state definitely the 
transactions at stake so as not to restrict the flexibility considered necessary to modify 
the supply agreement over time [p. 28]. In America, you have many rules [to govern 
business transactions]. Here in Japan, everything is very fluid. There may be rules, 
but they are constantly changing to suit the environment . . . The overall benefits of an 
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ongoing relationship is what really matters.17 
 
Chinese contracts often share similar features with their Japanese counterparts. Still, 
there is one more question. If the contract is informal and basic, how can people deal 
with the uncertainty? In fact, in the relational economy, the re-negotiation ex post 
replaces the formulation ex ante. Facing the uncertainty, they prefer the re-negotiation 
over an exhaustive formulation. There are two reasons behind such a preference. The 
first is the stability of the relationship. As aforementioned, once a relationship is 
established, it is not easily broken down. One must consider the cost of replacing the 
old relationship with a new one. And he must take the reputation damage into 
consideration if the termination of a relationship is viewed as an immoral act. It is 
always the case to associate social convention with morality. As long as the 
relationship is hard to break, the possibility that the re-negotiation fails is low.  
 
It is worth noting that the trust generated from the long-term business relationship is 
also a sort of capital in the economy governed by the rules. For example, compared to 
the commodity purchase contract, the service contract prefers the long-term structure. 
Hence, the master service contract is reached between parties to permit the quick 
negotiation of future transactions. The informal contract, with fewer terms than the 
master contract, represents an extreme case that provides an operations platform 
solely on the basis of trust. 
 
The second reason is also related to the moral dimension of the contractual 
relationship. According to the Chinese culture, any intention to formulate a detailed 
contract contains distrust in it. The effort to pre-delineate the rights and obligations in 
relation to the subject of contract turns out to be a negative act to destroy the 
foundation of relational contract. As Kester (1992) points out, the parties enter into an 
informal contract on the basis of mutual trust. If the trust vanishes, the informal 
contract is dissolved. So people prefer a basic agreement or even an oral agreement as 
long as they want to maintain a long-term cooperation. 
 
The third stage of a market transaction is the enforcement. In the modern world, the 
delivery of commodity and payment may not happen at the same moment due to the 
increasing market size. And it leads to the enforcement problem threatening the 
further growth of market for the security of transaction is a prerequisite to the market 
exchange. However, a contract is not self-enforcing. A contract is either enforced by a 
third-party whose authority over enforcement is accepted overall or by the social 
relation that ties the trading parties together.  
 
                                                        
17 See Kester, W. Carl, Industrial Groups as Systems of Contractual Governance, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1992, Page 30; See also Li, John Shuhe, Relation-based versus Rule-based Governance: An 
Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis, Review of International Economics, Volume 11, Issue 4, 
September 2003, pages 651–673,  
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Let us compare between these two different enforcement mechanisms. The third-party 
punishment mechanism is also based on the idea of specialization. In a society 
governed by the formal rules, a fraction of total labor force is trained into legal 
professionals and engages to make and practice laws. On the contrary, the “rule of 
relation” system is based on the idea of embedding the enforcement in the relation. 
Thus, in a relation-based governance system, the enforcement mechanism is not a 
public good but relies on the mutual trust. Hence, the cost structure of these two 
mechanisms is totally different. And this difference explains partially the smooth 
embedment of an emerging market in the relational system and the superior 
performance of the impersonal market economy compared to the relational economy.  
 
As Li (2003) points out, the rule-based governance involves high fixed cost and low 
marginal cost. First, the establishment and maintenance of a legal system is costly. 
The market system is not a free lunch. As mentioned, a considerable number of 
people need to be specialized in law-making, policing and dispute resolution. And the 
opportunity cost of the human resources diverted to the “legal sector” should also 
include the educational cost. Law schools are formed to provide the legal training and 
they also need to employ staff to offer courses. Only through education is the human 
capital produced to sustain the operation of the “legal sector”. Hence, the third-party 
punishment system involves significant cost. The market needs to be sufficiently large 
to afford the cost of third party enforcement. 
 
Two kinds of cost need to be distinguished here. The legal system performs a dual 
function of a signal-giver and a dispute-solver. As a signal-giver, the legal system is 
formed to attract the attentions of market participants to the punishment against 
improper acts. Upon the signal delivered by the existence of a legal system, the 
common expectation is formed and reinforced. The signal-giving function is what 
Aoki called the “public presentation” of the institution. One striking feature of signal 
is the non-rivalry with respect to the consumption. So the cost of establishing a legal 
system is not associated with the size of population that it plans to influence. In that 
sense, a large share of the cost that the third party enforcement system involves is 
fixed cost. 
 
The second role of the legal system is the dispute-solver, which involves the positive 
marginal cost. Dispute resolution is not a non-rivalrous service. It means that the 
amount of resources that a legal system demands increases when the economy grows. 
For example, the number of disputes increases when more transaction takes place. So 
more jobs in relation to legal issues will be created. However, the “legal sector” 
benefits from specialization so that the cost increases at a lower rate compared to the 
overall growth rate of the economy featuring constant return to scale. Hence, as Li 
argues, the marginal cost of the legal services is low and, if not decreasing, at least 
constant. So, the legal system, playing the role of a signal-giver and a dispute-solver, 
features a high fixed cost and a low marginal cost. Hence, the average cost of using a 
legal system declines when the market grows. 
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Contrary to the rule-based governance, the relation-based governance involves high 
marginal cost and low fixed cost. There is no formal institution declaring the essential 
role of a social relation. The common belief of social relation is preserved in the 
culture. Therefore, the “public presentation” of the informal institution is made in the 
form of culture. Culture, once it exists, involves little cost to maintain its further 
existence. Hence, it is not costly to form the common expectation that sanction is 
imposed on improper acts through the social relation. The cultural belief suffices to 
ensure the stability of the relation-based trading system. Hence the conclusion that the 
relational system involves little fixed cost.  
 
However, unlike the “rule of law” system, the common belief of social relation alone 
cannot ensure the contract enforcement and the transaction security. In addition to the 
belief, the personal relationship must be developed to carry out such functions. The 
effectiveness of the relation-based governance depends largely on the quantity and 
quality of the personal relationship established. Hence, a lot of resources are used to 
establish, develop, cultivate and strengthen the personal relationships. These resources 
flow into a ritual system to accomplish the goal through the ritualization of social 
exchange. At first glance, the Chinese gift exchange tradition is wasteful and 
non-productive at first glance. For example, moon cakes are popular gifts among 
relatives and friends. But a lot of moon cakes would never be consumed but serve 
merely as an intermediary of showing kindness. Such gifts are essential to the 
operation of the social network because the relationship should be continuously 
reinforced by the ritual actions. Also, the over-consumption of liquor in formal 
dinners seems to be irrational but is a ritual that helps to establish tight personal 
relationships. And the relationship features the diminishing return because the 
relationship is a means to promote the cooperation but not to generate products itself. 
Hence, the relational economy develops a specific structure to minimize the effect of 
the increasing marginal cost.  
 
3.4 A Formal Model 
 
With this foundation of the understanding of the three stages of market transaction 
under the relation-based and rule-based governance respectively in place, it is 
important to investigate how these two types of governance affects the market 
structure and growth as well. The objective here is to ascertain the structure of 
economy under the influence of the different institutional environment. Moreover, the 
development pattern may also be affected by the institutions that govern the 
transactions.  
 
As regards the three stages of market transaction, they all suggest one fundamental 
difference between the rule-based and relation-based governance. And this difference 
is key to the modeling of these two types of economies, the impersonal market 
economy and the relational economy. The “rule of law” system is, as aforementioned, 
developed upon the idea and practice of specialization. A fraction of total resources 
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(including human resources) are exclusively used to provide the legal services to the 
entire economic system. Let us go through all three stages of market transaction that 
we have discussed above to see if the specialized activities are carried out at each 
stage. The first stage is the matching stage. An “information sector” emerges to 
minimize the information cost for the market participants. It improves the efficiency 
of matching process and thus the efficiency of transaction as well. Today, the internet 
technology enables a finer matching of demands and supply. And it is not surprising 
that a lot of resources are diverted to the e-commerce platform under the guidance of 
market signals.  
 
Once a market participant identifies a partner and decides to work with him, the two 
of them enter into the contracting stage. At this stage, the contract will be signed to 
govern the future transactions with deal-specific terms. Under the rule-based 
governance, the verifiability of information is necessary to the communication. So the 
contractual terms are formulated in a way that the verifiability is ensured for the 
authoritative third party. The vague idea in relation to the arrangement of future 
transaction must be transformed into some deal-specific terms using the language 
only understood by the professionals. In doing so, the cost of verifying information is 
reduced. Hence, the contract formulation is also a service that is provided by 
specialists and thus requires significant specialization.  
 
The third stage of the transaction is the enforcement of contract, which has been 
examined in some detail above. The contract is not enforced due to the persisting 
mutual trust but due to the credible threat made by an authoritative third party. Hence, 
a significant volume of resources should be used to maintain the impression that 
inescapable punishment is being imposed on any improper act. The third party must 
also meet the demand when dispute arises and requires resolution. Again, 
specialization is the superior way to economize on the enforcement of contract.  
 
As shown by the analysis above, the idea of specialization permeates the rule-based 
governance with the aim to minimize the transaction cost caused by the 
impersonalization of the transaction. However, as Adam Smith and Young (1928) 
point out, the division of labor is limited by the extent of market. And the extent of 
market also depends partially on the division of labor. Hence, for an impersonal 
market, there is a threshold extent that the specialization is continuously deepened and 
the market grows as well.  
 
Contrary to the idea of specialization underlying the rule-based governance, the idea 
underlying the relation-based governance is to embed as many economic activities as 
possible in the social relation. So the practice follows the principle of integration 
instead of that of specialization. For example, the information is created and 
circulated within the social network. Every member is an information intermediary. 
The job in relation to information processing is not assigned to the specialists. And at 
the contracting stage, the terms governing future transaction is open to the 
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re-negotiation on the basis of mutual trust. Because the information needs not to be 
verifiable, the cost of information verification is largely saved, including the cost 
caused by the accurate formulation of contract and the verification process. Instead, 
the contract is informal and fluid being embedded in and framed by the social relation. 
At the third stage, namely, the enforcing stage, the contract seeks enforcement 
through the long-term relationships. The reciprocal nature of the relationship ensures 
that it is beneficial (full rationality) or survival-advantageous (bounded rationality) for 
people to enforce the contract as it imposes the collective punishment on improper 
acts. From the interwoven network of long-term relationships emerges a collectivist 
culture. Hence, no additional forces are needed to implement the enforcement other 
than the collective will to preserve the cooperation. Only the cost of coordinating the 
collective punishment increases rapidly with the extent of market. Hence, the 
relational embedding of the economic activities solves the problem of enforcement at 
a low cost if the extent of market is below a threshold value, in direct contrast to the 
case where the specialization-based approach is applicable. 
 
In what follows a model will be presented to capture the nature of relation-based 
governance in comparison with that of rule-based governance. The aim of a 
mathematical model is to clarify the circumstances under which the economy is 
embedded in the social relations or otherwise shows a preference over the impersonal 
transaction. For this purpose, a model with as simple a structure as possible is 
desirable. The focus is on two processes: the production process and the institutional 
process. It is easy to understand that through the production process the factors are 
transformed into consumer goods. The assumption is the presence of the market with 
the efficient resource allocation achieved. So the production process is not only 
related to the physical transformation but also to the institutional surrounding. 
However, the operation of market is not costless. There is a cost imposed on the 
economic system due to the institutional process. The institutional process refers to 
the dynamic of the institution preserving the market. In our case, there are two types 
of institution that have been discussed thoroughly in this chapter. In the model, the 
output of the institutional process is given. It is to say that the resources are always 
efficiently allocated so that the production is carried out along the production 
possibility frontier. Yet the transaction cost varies while different institution is adopted 
to govern the market transaction.  
 
First, taking the rule-based governance as benchmark, the assumption is that there is 
only one good available in the model. It is a consumer good and production factor as 
well. In fact, this good is multiplied through a production process. It is not an 
assumption remote from the reality. The so-called production is to arrange, combine, 
integrate and disintegrate the factors into some specific forms. It is a process of 
self-multiplication if human resources are taken into account. In order to simplify the 
model, therefore, the assumption is that one representative good exits. And the cost is 
also measured in terms of the representative goods. As the rule-based governance 
involves high fixed cost and low marginal cost, the overall production function is as 
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follows: 
 
              y = ;
0																																											if	x < C/(1 − c)		
fC(1 − c)x − CD													if	x > C/(1 − c)
           (1) 
 
Where x denotes the factors, y denotes output (consumer goods), c denotes the 
coefficient of marginal cost and satisfies 0 < c <	1. C denotes fixed cost and is 
fixed. When the market, at its primitive stage, cannot afford the transaction cost 
caused by the rule-based governance, the economic system is trapped in the 
equilibrium of non-production. Only when there is surplus left for future production is 
the equilibrium shifted from the non-production to consistent growth.  
 
Another assumption to be made is the increasing return to scale on the ground of the 
specialization. As mentioned earlier, the degree of specialization is limited by the 
extent of the market. Hence, with the extent of market increased, a higher degree of 
specialization is enabled; with the specialization deepened, the growth is accelerated. 
In mathematical terms, we have 
FG
FH
> 0 and 
F JG
FHJ
> 0. The dynamic of the model is 
demonstrated with the following figure.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 highlights three implications. First, the “rule of law” system is not an 
institution suited for the market governance in a transitional economy because the size 
of market is small at the beginning stage of transition. The cost of rule-based 
governance is not affordable for the market participants so that they would not choose 
to govern the transaction in that fashion. Second, the economy grows on account of 
the increasing return to scale. Because the marginal cost of rule-based governance is 
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small, the economic system can benefit from the specialization consistently. Third, the 
rule-based market economy indicates an integrated structure. The average cost of 
rule-based governance decreases while the economy grows. Hence, the cost is not an 
obstacle to the integration. On the other hand, the integration is the prerequisite to the 
specialization. So if the benefit generated from the specialization is enormous and 
cost is small, the integration occurs.  
 
The model next addresses the dynamic of the economy in which the transaction is 
governed by social relation. The relation-based governance involves low fixed cost 
and high marginal cost. It is assumed that the marginal cost of developing 
relationships is increasing. Thus the total cost is affected by the extent of market 
because more relationships are required to sustain the cooperation as the market 
grows. If the marginal cost is increasing, there is a point where the benefit of market 
expansion (benefit of specialization) is equal to its cost (cost of relationship). Based 
on what we have assumed, the production function for a relational economy is as 
follows: 
 
                           y = f(x) − c(x)                        (2) 
 
Where x denotes the quantity of factors, y denotes quantity of output (consumer 
goods), c denotes the marginal cost and 	c(x) satisfies 
FK
FH
> 0 and 
F JK
FHJ
> 0. The 
equilibrium is reached when the following equation holds: 
 
                              
FG
FH
=
FK
FH
                            (3) 
 
The right side of the equation is the marginal output of the economic system while the 
left side of the equation is the marginal cost of sustaining such system. If the growth 
rate of marginal output is lower than that of marginal cost and the total cost is 
sufficiently low at the beginning, there is a feasible solution to the equation (3). 
Contrary to the rule-based governance that requires a minimum size of market, the 
relation-based governance confines the market to a limited size. Though the size of an 
individual market is defined by the equation (3), it is possible that more than one 
market emerges. A segregated structure ensures the consistent growth under the 
relation-based governance. This is demonstrated with the following figure.  
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Figure 3.11 shows the dynamic of market growth under the relation-based governance. 
The areas denoted by the number 1, 2, 3 expands infinitely as the market is 
continuously growing. Each area represents an individual market and is identical to 
the others. The most efficient size of the market is reached in the highest point where 
the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. And so is the size of social network. 
However, there is not only one market allowed for the resource allocation and 
utilization. The excessive resources flow into a new market until it reaches the 
equilibrium, too. The process repeats itself as the market grows and sees no end. If we 
regard the individual area in figure 3.11 as a separated market, we can say that the 
relation-based exchange system ends up in a segregated structure.  
 
When the two systems are juxtaposed with each other, the conclusion is 
straightforward. The relation-based governance is superior whenever the market is 
small in size. And the rule-based governance is advantageous if the size of market is 
sufficiently large. The turning point is defined by: 
 
                   f((1 − c)x − C) = (
H
H∗
)(f(x∗) − c(x∗))               (4) 
 
Where x∗ denotes the efficient size of the market governed by social relations, a 
solution to the equation (3), assuming that the model is so structured that x>>x∗.From 
the equation (4), it can been observed that the difficulty of rule-based governance lies 
in the large amount of overhead cost, which makes the formal institution burdensome 
at the early stage of transition. And the shortcoming of relation-based governance is 
that it confines the market to a limited size so that the benefit of specialization cannot 
be fully realized. On account of the increasing return to scale enabled by the 
specialization, the bigger the size of market is, the faster the growth is. Hence, the 
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rule-based governance is superior with respect to the long-run growth. Although the 
rule-based trading system may bring more benefit in the long-run, the development is, 
however, path-dependent. It was very convenient for the Chinese economy to be 
embedded in the social relations for a number of reasons. First, the institutional cost 
incurred was low given the small size of market; second, the common belief was 
directed towards social relation due to the persistency of traditional culture; third, the 
market was liberalized and thus demanded any sort of institution to govern the 
transaction. Therefore, at the early stage of transition, the market transaction is 
inevitably embedded in the social relations. The relational embedding of the market 
activities is a source of the so-called Chinese characteristics. It is the design of the 
following part to describe the Chinese characteristics with respect to individual 
sectors. The following is a short, yet comprehensive introduction, with a full analysis 
to be conducted by later chapters.  
  
3.5 The “Chinese Characteristics”: A Network Analysis of Embedded Market 
 
The model above is conducted from a macroeconomic, more accurately a growth 
perspective, taking the economy as a whole. Subsequent chapters of this dissertation 
will address the question how the relational culture affects the individual sectors. An 
overview is helpful here to facilitate the understanding of the following chapters. 
Chinese mainstream media like to emphasize the distinctive features of China’s 
transition to a market economy. The factors that make the Chinese market economy 
distinctive are called the Chinese characteristics. The concept does not only serve the 
propaganda purpose. It is also widely-accepted among scholars that China’s 
development strategy deviates from the textbook examples. As illustrated in the 
models above, the Chinese characteristics stem from the embedding of the market 
transaction in the social relations. The relational culture affects the development of 
individual sectors in different ways characterizing the economy as a Chinese-style one. 
The following table provides a short summary. 
 
Sector Chinese characteristics Relational culture 
Agricultural 
Sector 
Household responsibility system Institution of family 
Industrial Sector 
Township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) 
Collectivist culture 
Export-led growth Institutional arbitrage 
Industrial clustering Localized trust 
Financial Sector 
Private lending 
Differential mode of 
association 
Interaction between formal and 
informal financial system 
Information gap 
 
Table 3.12 The Chinese characteristics across sectors 
The first sector undergoing the reform was the agricultural sector. Among the human 
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demands, the demand on nourishment is the most fundamental. Hence, the low supply 
of food caused an urgent demand of restructuring the agricultural sector. Yet it was 
not the government policy determining the direction of the reform. The institutional 
innovation started as a trial program carried out by the peasants spontaneously. The 
aim of the spontaneous innovative acts was to restore the household farming. It tried 
to put the family back to its central role in the agricultural production. Due to the high 
transaction cost caused by the disintegrated nature of agricultural production, the 
household farming is a solution superior to the collective, contractual and corporate 
farming as long as the land to labor ratio remains low and the size of market remains 
small. 
 
Following the reform of the agricultural sector came the emergence of the non-state 
industrial sector. Due to the implementation of dual-track pricing strategy, the 
resources under the control of central planning authority and its branches flew from 
plan track to the market track. The liberalization of market allowed the development 
of the non-state industrial sector. However, it was difficult to start up a private 
business at the early stage of the reform. The attempt to run a private business was 
undermined by the problems such as the ideological obstacle, the lack of capital, 
non-access to the factors and the high risk of market transactions. The rise of the TVE 
sector provided an unexpected solution to all these problems. The TVEs were 
collectively owned and governed by the collectivist culture. Where a private firm 
could hardly survive, a collective enterprise might prosper. Due to the collective 
nature, it obtained access to the supply of factors and to capital as well. The 
vaguely-defined collective ownership was established to, at first glance, overcome the 
ideological obstacle. However, it also provided a platform for the embedding of 
corporate activities in the collectivist culture and thus sustains the cooperation in the 
corporate form. So the non-state sector experienced a strong growth at the early stage 
of transition. The collectivist culture plays a role of glue holding the resources 
together in the non-state sector. It was very important because China’s economic 
success relies largely on the emergence of a new non-state sector and not on the 
privatization of the state-sector. If the TVEs were not there, it would take much longer 
for the non-state sector to prosper and China could have missed the opportunity for 
the high-speed development. 
 
China’s reform policy comprises two parts. One is to liberalize the market so that the 
resource allocation becomes more efficient. The other is to remove the barrier to 
international trade and integrate China’s manufacturing sector into the world market. 
Over the first two decades following the reform, the major source of growth was the 
liberalization of market. As mentioned, the emergence of a non-state sector accounted 
for the majority of China’s unprecedented growth. The transition from the central 
planning system to the market system succeeded and brought enormous benefit to the 
Chinese economy. However, as long as the new equilibrium concerning the resource 
allocation was reached, the growth rate may decline. Yet there was a chance provided 
by globalization to enable resource re-allocation on a bigger scale and across a wider 
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range. Globalization reallocates the resources through the international trade. And 
China was competitive in providing cheap labor forces. So the export-led strategy was 
adopted as a major means to accomplish the goal of growth. Moreover, the 
international trade is not merely an exchange of consumer goods and factors. It 
concerns the institutional environment also. The relation-based governance is not 
favorable to the creation of knowledge. Without the ability to innovate, Chinese 
economy might grow slowly after exhausting the potential of institutional change. But 
by participating in the international trade, China was involved in the international 
division of labor and thus took the advantage of the innovation overseas. We must 
take into account that such innovation was mostly achieved in a “rule of law” 
environment. This can be termed as “institutional arbitrage”, referring to the situation 
that it is not necessary for China to endeavor to develop a “rule of law” system but 
instead to leverage such system and high rate of innovation across the economies that 
governed by rules. Hence, during first decade after the entry into WTO, Chinese 
economy benefited significantly from the resource reallocation at global level. And it 
is anticipated that the Chinese economy, while continuing to take advantage of the 
innovation capacity of the developed countries, also seeks to create an 
innovation-driven sector.  
 
As regards the financial sector, which is also important to the growth of a big 
economy, two systems were introduced. One was the formal institutions such as banks, 
cooperatives and stock market. However, they did not like to serve the non-state 
sector due to the information gap between them，not to mention the totally different 
incentive structure. But the non-state sector could not grow into a big size without the 
contribution of financial intermediaries. Hence, a private lending sector emerged to 
provide liquidity to the non-state sector and households as well. The private lending is 
governed by the differential mode of association. The financial risk increases from the 
inner circle to the outer circle of social network. And the interest rate increases 
accordingly until it cannot compensate for the roaring risk. Hence, the problem was 
that the ability of private lending sector to finance the private firms was limited. So 
the private firms also sought the access to the banks. They formed an alliance to 
guarantee for each other. The cross-guarantee was based on the social relation 
whereas the lending was made upon the formal rules. The information gap between 
relation-based and rule-based trading system gave rise to the instability of the 
financial system. It should be acknowledged that the underground financial system 
contributes enormously to the growth of China’s non-state sector. But the increasing 
financial demand cannot be met by such a system and the risk would eventually 
become too high to tolerate without upsetting the economy.  
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigates the relational culture, relation-based governance and its 
influence on the economic structure and growth. First, it shows that the Chinese 
culture is a relational culture characterized by the principle of reciprocity, collectivism 
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and differential mode of association. The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to the 
relational culture. As China’s most influential philosophy, the Confucianism 
acknowledges the importance of reciprocity to govern the long-term relationship. It 
also regards the family as the basic social unit. The model of family was applied to 
the collective actions so the clan and the family-state were enlarged families to carry 
out various social functions. Two patterns are of particular interest to the current study. 
First, a collectivist culture emerged to govern the social interaction in an 
indirect-reciprocal way. Second, the differential mode of association outlined the 
distinctive feature of social network that the benefit of cultivating a relationship 
diminished from the inner circle to outer circle of social network.  
 
The second part analyses how the relational culture preserves cooperation. Three 
mechanisms, namely the direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and interlinked 
interactions across social domains, ensure the cooperation in a networked 
environment. The principle of reciprocity is applied in the recurrent interactions. So it 
concerns the time extension of interactions. And if the interaction occurs not only 
between two trading parties but among a group, the indirect reciprocity plays a role in 
prompting cooperation. The key point of collective punishment is information. Hence, 
the reputation mechanism is essential to the success of spatial extension of 
interactions. Beside the time and spatial extension of interaction, the domain 
extension of interaction is also usual when the extent of market is limited. The mix-up 
of settings of two different games may change the best strategies the players choose to 
play. Hence, under certain circumstance, it is Pareto-improving to interlink the 
interactions across different social domains.  
 
Part three shows that the relation-based governance is superior to the rule-based one 
during the early stage of the growth of market. What it aims to explain is why the 
market transaction was embedded in the social relation during the early stage of 
China’s transition. In the pre-industrialization era, the personalized transaction is 
thought to dominate the economy owing to the small size of market and low 
frequency of transaction. China, during the early stage of the reform, faced a problem 
of re-establishing the market system. If the transition to the market system was in its 
very beginning, it was not reasonable to rely on the extensive order of the market. 
China’s transitional economy was in a situation bearing resemblance to that of 
pre-industrialization economy. So it sought a solution other than the rule-based 
approach in order to preserve the market. As mentioned in part one, the Chinese 
society has been consistently influenced by the relational culture. A large amount of 
social capital was formed during the course of history, which indicates that the fixed 
cost of relation-based governance was sufficiently low. So it was natural for China to 
make utilization of the relation-based governance to preserve market.  
 
The last part of the chapter provides a brief overview of the so-called Chinese 
characteristics. The impact of relational culture on the operation of individual sectors 
is significant to the effect that the orthodox theory cannot explain the astonishing 
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success of China’s transition. So the “Chinese characteristics” is a concept to illustrate 
the inexplicable part of China’s transition. In fact, the relational embedding of market 
transaction resulted in the rise of Chinese characteristics that characterized the 
operation of individual sectors.  
 
As the design of this dissertation suggests, the following chapters should investigate 
how the relational culture affected the transition with respect to the individual sectors. 
They are elaborations of the part on Chinese characteristics. But before any further 
investigation is made, a chapter will be devoted to the role of state in the great 
transformation. The prerequisite to the relational embedding of market transaction is 
the political tolerance. The spontaneous innovative practice from bottom up should 
not only be allowed but also institutionalized from the governmental side. Therefore, 
the next chapter attempts to explain how the government and its reform strategies 
affect the approach to the transition.  
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4. The Top Down Mechanisms: How China7s Politics Effects Institutional 
Innovation  
 
The literature relating to “government policy” and “revolution from periphery” 
suggests that there are two forces affecting China’s transition to market economy. The 
top-down imposed policy determines the scope within which the reform operates. The 
cultural force from bottom-up ensures a smooth transition to market economy by 
embedding the economic activities in the social relations. It is worth noting that the 
appropriate policy is the prerequisite to the success of transition as it provides the 
opportunities for the bottom-up institutional innovation to emerge. If the policy is to, 
for example, privatize the state sector, like what Russia did in the big bang scheme, it 
would be difficult for the households, local institutions and resources to participate in 
the transition. Thus the plan for this chapter is to investigate China’s reform strategy 
and the political system that make such strategies possible, prior to any further study 
of the effect of cultural embedding on the establishment of the market order with 
Chinese characteristics.   
 
This chapter is divided in three parts. The first part addresses the question of how 
China’s government is structured. In their well-received works, some scholars argue 
that China’s political system features a multi-layer structure. This quasi-federalist 
structure explains China’s capability to apply a gradualist approach to reform. The 
federalist political system is based on the fiscal decentralization. It is therefore logical 
to examine the development of China’s fiscal system and its implications for political 
decentralization and re-centralization.  
 
Part Two of this chapter analyzes the distinctive features of gradualist strategy 
compared to the “Shock Therapy”. The gradualist strategy that China undertakes is 
composed of two parts. The first is to allow the coexistence of central planning 
system and market system in order to avoid the macroeconomic instability and to 
make China’s reform “a reform without losers”. The dual-track pricing system is the 
most notable manifestation of such an approach. The second part of the strategy is 
policy experimentation. By establishing special economic zones, the central authority 
could monitor and evaluate the effect of policies. The reversible nature of policy 
experimentation improves governmental control over local institutional innovations 
while leaving open the door for wider adoption if appropriate. 
 
Part three discusses the Party’s effort to establish the “rule of law” system. The 
practice and its outcome may appear disappointing as China’s legal system failed to 
meet its duty over last thirty year. The recent official documents still refers to the 
importance of “rule of law” showing that the legal system is not really that important 
yet. But there is also trend indicating the increasing importance of the legal system. 
 
4.1 China’s Political System: The Chinese-style Federalism  
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China’s approach to socialism was inspired by the Soviet model. The Soviet Union’s 
strategy of constructing a socialist system (first phase of communism) was to 
corporatize the entire country. Lenin points out that in the first phase of communist 
society:  
 
All citizens are transformed into hired employees of the state, which consists of the 
armed workers. All citizens become employees and workers of a single countrywide 
state “syndicate”. All that is required is that they should work equally, do their proper 
share of work, and get equal pay.18 
 
As we know, the core idea of Marxism is to abolish the capitalist mode of production 
and replace the private ownership system with the public ownership system. Yet，
unlike private ownership, public ownership requires a decision-making mechanism to 
deal with the allocation of resources to different ends. It is because, in general, 
without any private control over resources, the rent generated from use of resources is 
to be dissipated (Gordon, 1968; Cheung, 1974). Under the Soviet-Union-style 
socialist system, the state exercises the control over the resources to avoid the rent 
dissipation. Following that strategy, the state engaged to transform the society into a 
huge corporation. All social functions were compressed in a “state-syndicate”, which 
Lenin, while interpreting Marxism, considered it to be the most appropriate form of 
socialist system. China imported this approach from the Soviet Union. Yet at the same 
time Chinese characteristics were introduced into the Soviet model, which included, 
among others, the decentralization of authority, resulting in the creation of a 
federalist-natured system. As Qian and Xu (1993) put it: 
 
“Unlike Soviet Union’s unitary hierarchical structure based on functional or 
specialization principles (the U-form), China's hierarchical economy has been the 
multi-layer-multi-regional one mainly based on territorial principle (the deep M-form, 
or briefly, the M-form)”.19 
 
Following Leninism, the Soviet Union developed a unitary and functionally 
differentiated system. The control of the central authority extended to the local level 
along the functional lines. The ministries acquired direct control over the production 
and corroded local autonomy. The local authorities were nothing more than a branch 
of the central authority and did not function in an independent way. The information 
flew vertically from the SOEs and local bureaus to the ministries which were 
responsible for the decision-making while the local authorities were only assigned the 
job of information processing. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has a 
multi-layer-multi-regional political system. The proper functioning of such a political 
system requires a certain level of local autonomy. The local governments must be 
granted the fiscal authority and be allowed to manage the local affairs independently. 
                                                        
18 Lenin, Vladimir, The State and Revolution (1917), 
https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/lenin/state-and-revolution.pdf 
19 Qian, Yingyi, Chenggang Xu, Why China's economic reforms differ: the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion 
of the non-state sector, Economics of Transition, Volume 1, Issue 2, June 1993, Pages 135–170, 
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Incidentally, the political structure is fashioned in such a way that local governments 
were administratively subordinate to the central government, yet organizationally 
independent and self-preserving. For example, the regional bureau of commerce is a 
department of the regional government. Though it is ordered to implement the policy 
formulated by the Ministry of Commerce, it is not directly supervised by the Ministry 
of Commerce. A popular political term “Kuai Da Yu Tiao” indicates that the local 
governments are regarded as more important and powerful than the ministries.  
 
A unitary system has one obvious advantage. A unitary system ensures that the policy 
is developed and implemented from a global view. Thus, the pursuit of local benefits 
is not tolerated in achieving maximization of global benefits. But this advantage does 
not outweigh its disadvantage. Solving resource allocation with a “state syndicate” 
raises the transaction cost, among others the information cost and coordination cost. 
Hayek argues in his remarkable article “The use of knowledge in society” that the 
centralized decision-making is inefficient due to the central authority’s inability to 
utilize the local knowledge. Besides, the principal-agent problem becomes more 
severe as it is more difficult for ordinary people to monitor the central authority. 
However, recent research (Cockshott, Cottrell, 2008) suggests that the modern 
information technology may overcome the shortcomings of socialist system. In short,  
the key point of economic planning is calculation capacity. The computer technology 
and Internet provides enormous calculation capacity thus making the operation of 
economic planning system possible.  
 
The M-form of government is more flexible. First, compared to the central authority, 
the local authorities have better access to the local information so that they fit better 
into the role of decision-makers with regard to the local affairs. Moreover, because of 
their control over the information channeling, the local authorities could either refine 
the policy or manipulate the information to convince the central authority of the 
effectiveness of the policy, or its ineffectiveness as the case may be. Bolstered with 
the discretionary power, the local authorities are free to choose whether to implement 
the central policy or not. They could also keep quiet on spontaneous institutional 
experimentations that would not be allowed under the central policy. Furthermore, the 
local governments are much more invested in local interests promoting local 
development and shielding it from any sort of interference. Hence, the local autonomy 
is the key to the success of the economic reform. Due to the cooperation of the local 
authorities, the informal culture could be integrated into the institutionalized practice 
so as to reduce the transaction cost and stabilize the market system in its early stage. 
Moreover, the M-form of government also ensures a rapid response to the changes so 
that the wrong policies could be avoided.  
 
Ideally a balance should be achieved with respect to the central-local interaction. The 
over-decentralization of power would result in the lack of control over local 
authorities with a number of consequences. First, the coordination of cross-regional 
projects becomes more difficult. Although the local authorities could reach consensus 
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through the negotiation, they could also fail to agree in some cases. Second, the local 
protectionism may rise to impair market competition. Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) 
argue that in Russia: 
 
Local governments have been captured by the initial rent holders, primarily by the old 
firms that dominated the Russian economy before the transition. In this view, local 
governments have worked both to generate transfers to these firms, and to protect 
them from competition by new firms.20 
 
Moreover, “competition for rents by local officials” eliminates “incentives for new 
firms to enter”. As they find, in Russia, the local governments cooperated with the 
rent-holder, most of whom are the former high-rank officials of the Soviet Union and 
directors of SOEs. Once the local governments were “captured”, they would support 
the incumbent firms to monopolize the market and share the rent generated from the 
monopoly.  
 
As for China, local protectionism is also an obstacle to economic growth. The 
provincial governments, in order to shield local firms from competition, may restrict 
the sales of non-locally produced goods (Lee, 1998). According to Blanchard and 
Shleifer (2001), Russia’s problem was more serious. At least China’s local 
government contributes to the growth of new entrants. Scholars who emphasize the 
role of political decentralization in fostering the economic growth claim that “the 
competitive benefits of market-preserving federalism depend very much on political 
centralization”. China’s political system, featuring a high degree of decentralization, 
overcomes the problem of localism by centralizing the cadre management.  
 
China is a party-state. So there are two lines of political institution. One of them is the 
people’s government. As discussed above, the system of government is structured in a 
way that the administration is delegated to the different levels of government. Another 
one is the Party. The Party is tightly organized and centralizes the cadre management 
at the top of the hierarchical system. In principle, the head of provincial government 
is elected and appointed by the provincial people’s congress. In fact, the people’s 
congress merely performs the formality of confirming the person presented to them 
by the Party. The Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
decide the appointment and removal of the heads of provincial governments. And the 
organization department of the CPC Central Committee manages the promotion, 
removal and shuffle of all high-rank cadres thus exercising the tight control over the 
cadre management to eliminate any possibility of disintegration of the Party. In that 
regard, China’s political organization provides an effective counterweight to the 
over-decentralization of power and the rise of local protectionism.  
 
4.2 The Fiscal Decentralization 
                                                        
20 Blanchard, Olivier, Andrei Shleifer, Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia, 
IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 48, Special Issue, 2001, Pages 171-179 
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One major aspect of the political decentralization is the fiscal decentralization. This 
part is devoted to a case study of fiscal decentralization to offer an account for the 
dynamics of a changing political environment. Before 1978, China’s fiscal system 
was a centralized one. In 1950, a “tong shou tong zhi” fiscal system was introduced so 
that most of the government revenue was required to be submitted to the Ministry of 
Finance. And the State Council arranged the budget of the local governments. 
Between 1950 and 1978, in spite of several attempts to decentralize fiscal authority, 
the fiscal system remained largely centralized.  
 
However, the coexistence of the fiscal centralization and the multi-layer structure of 
government led to institutional tension. Following the idea of the “state syndicate”, 
the fiscal centralization was certainly the best strategy with respect to the budget 
management. But the M-form of government required the fiscal autonomy for the 
local authorities. Without the fiscal autonomy, the M-form of government would be 
significantly impeded in its function. Therefore, shortly after the Chinese government 
had shifted the attention to the economic development, fiscal reforms was carried out 
to release the tension by enhancing the local autonomy. Over the first period from 
1980 to 1993, a “fiscal responsibility system” was developed to create some sort of 
contractual relationships between the central and local authorities with respect to the 
fiscal revenue and expenditure. During this period, the fiscal autonomy was granted 
for the local authorities. Entering the second period, the State Council decided to 
increase the share of fiscal revenue allocated to the central authority and thus replaced 
the “fiscal responsibility system” with the “tax sharing system”, which might have 
caused a lot of problems affecting Chinese economy in one way or another. 
 
The fiscal responsibility system 
 
The major problem of the fiscal centralization was that, as Oi suggests, “Localities 
became independent fiscal entities that had both responsibilities for local expenditures 
and the unprecedented right to use the revenue that they retained.” With the fiscal 
autonomy being undermined, the local authorities were disadvantaged in the 
central-local bargaining. On the other side, with the increasing power, the central 
authority sought to interfere with the local policy innovation. The fiscal transfer was 
an effective measure to force the local authorities to be a trustworthy implementer of 
the central policy. However, once the function of policy innovation shifts upwards 
away from local levels, the innovation could not continue due to the lack of local 
knowledge and the organizational resources to mobilize the local institutional 
experimentation. This is one of the biggest concerns towards further reforms in China.  
 
The task of the first fiscal reform in 1980 was to define the scope of revenue shared 
between the central government and the local authorities. In practice, the government 
revenue was divided into three categories: the central fiscal revenue, the local fiscal 
revenue and the sharing revenue. The profit (including income tax) of central SOEs 
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and customs duties were sources of central authority’s revenue while the profit of 
local SOEs, salt tax, agricultural tax, corporate income tax and other local taxes went 
to the local authorities. Industrial-commercial tax (circulation tax) and profit of local 
SOEs managed directly by ministries were shared between central and local 
authorities.21 The adjustment of the sharing ratio would be made when local 
authorities had budget deficit or budget surplus.  
 
With the sources of revenue and sharing ratio determined, the central authority signed 
a fiscal contract with the local authorities. According to the contract, local authorities’ 
budget surplus should be shared between central and local authorities. The budget 
deficit was to be financed by the central authority’s share of the transaction tax. If the 
industrial-commercial tax was not sufficient to cover the budget deficit, any gap 
would be filled by the fiscal transfer payment. The sharing ratio and transfer payment 
rate was fixed for the next five years, hardening the soft budget constraint for the 
local authorities.  
 
The fiscal responsibility system was amended several times. Between 1980 and 1985, 
a reform was carried on to regulate the distribution of the SOE profits. Prior to the 
reform, in addition to the profit tax, the governments also claimed a share of the SOE 
profits as a revenue source. To avoid the improper appropriation of the corporate 
profits, the source of government revenue was limited to the profit tax. Against that 
background, a new regulation concerning the fiscal system was enacted in 1985. The 
amendment was minor and aimed mainly to delineate the income right of the 
governments.  
 
Further fiscal reform came in 1988. The fiscal contracting system brought the fiscal 
decentralization to the extreme. Oi (1999) gives a summary of the fiscal contracting 
system: 
 
Revenue sharing is a process in which local governments down to the level of the 
township have the responsibility for collecting all nationally set taxes and then 
turning over a portion of this revenue to the next higher level. Those who have 
increased their tax revenues are allowed to keep the major portion of the increase. 
The more a locality collects, the more it can keep. The provisions of revenue sharing 
are formalized in fiscal contracts between the central state and each of its provinces, 
between each province and its prefectures, between each prefecture and its counties, 
and between each county and its townships. The terms of the contracts vary. Some 
areas employ an overall ratio, such as 70:30; the level of government from which the 
taxes are collected keeps 70 percent and 30 percent is sent to the next higher level. In 
other cases, a level of government pays a fixed lump-sum quota to the next higher 
level, but, once that quota is met, the level of government that has collected the 
revenue retains all, or the bulk, of the over-quota tax revenues. Regardless of the 
                                                        
21See Regulation on implementation of a “hua fen shou zhi, fen ji bao gan” (define scope of revenue and 
expenditure, enforce fiscal contract) fiscal system. The text of regulation is available in: 
http://fgk.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfg/198002/19800200268001.shtml 
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system of revenue sharing in effect, increased tax collection guarantees a locality an 
increase in retained tax revenues.22 
 
There were six models of fiscal contracting. The first one was incremental revenue 
sharing. Given the expected growth rate of revenue in the fiscal contract, the expected 
incremental revenue was shared between the central and local authorities at a fixed 
ratio, regardless of whether the expected growth rate was realized or not. But, if the 
real growth rate was higher than the expected one, the surplus was retained by the 
local authorities. The second one was revenue sharing. The sharing ratio was 
calculated based on the ratio of the expected expenditure to the expected revenue. The 
third model was a combination of the former two models. The localities submitted a 
fixed proportion of the total revenue and a fixed proportion of incremental revenue to 
the upper level. This model was only applied to three cities, namely Dalian, Qingdao 
and Wuhan. For example, the sharing ratio of revenue was 27.74% and that of 
incremental revenue 27.26% for Dalian. The fourth one was the progressive quota of 
revenue. Guangdong and Hunan provinces paid a set quota to the central government. 
But the quota increased at an annual rate agreed by both sides. The fifth one was the 
fixed quota of revenue. This model was similar to the fourth one. The only difference 
was that the quota paid to the uppers was fixed over time. The sixth one was the fixed 
subsidy. The underdeveloped provinces received the fiscal transfer payments from the 
central government to finance the necessary expenditure covering the salary of state 
cadres and the provision of basic public services such as education and medical care.  
 
As argued by some scholars (Oi 1992, Lin 2000, Qian 1997), the fiscal contracting 
system was very effective in promoting the local economic growth as it provided the 
local authorities with the incentive as well as the ability to promote the local economy. 
Oi (1992) develops a term of “local government corporatism” indicating that Chinese 
local authorities bear resemblance to corporations. They contributed to the local 
growth and shared the outcome acting as a shareholder of the local economy. The 
fiscal autonomy created a lot of motivation for the local authorities to promote the 
local growth. Moreover, in practice, the government revenue could be divided into 
two categories with respect to the sources. One was within-budget revenue which was 
shared between localities and uppers. The other was extra-budgetary revenue which 
was exclusively retained by the local authorities. And the major source of 
extra-budgetary revenue was the profit of township and village enterprises. Hence, the 
local authorities were incentivized to develop the TVE sector. They would not prey on 
the TVEs because they are interested in the long-term benefit. The fiscal 
decentralization is one of the factors contributing to the rural industrialization and the 
rise of the TVE sector. The major reason was that it enabled the local authorities to 
draw on the local institutional innovation to develop an adaptive growth pattern. As 
long as the government policy was to liberalize the market, the utilization of cultural 
resources and social capital could be maximized to ensure the growth.  
                                                        
22 Oi, Jean C., Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform, University of California 
Press, Berkeley · Los Angeles · Oxford, 1999, Pages 29-30 
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The growth also generated benefits for individual cadres. First, they could increase 
their own salaries and on-job consumptions such as bigger offices, luxury cars and 
better lunches. Second, more fiscal revenue meant more political power. The 
coordination and mobilization ability of the local authorities relied on their budget. A 
local authority would lose the influence if it had a tight budget. Third, the rapid 
economic growth increased the promotion opportunity for the cadres. A harsh 
competition for promotion existed among the cadres due to the scarcity of high offices. 
The competition turned into a rat-race that forced every cadre to work hard to survive 
and expand the budget they control(Zhou，2007). Since the contribution of the 
individual cadres was measured by the economic performance, they would make all 
the efforts to help the economy grow.  
 
The tax sharing system 
 
In 1993, the leadership of the CPC decided to replace “fiscal responsibility system” 
with “tax sharing system”. The purpose of this fiscal reform was to eliminate the 
negative effects of fiscal responsibility system. One of the negative effects was that 
the fiscal responsibility system produced a weak central authority and strong local 
authorities. The revenue submitted to the central authority was quite small. 
Sometimes the real annual growth rate of the central fiscal revenue was even negative 
due to inflation (Wu, 2010). For example, as estimated by Ye and Liang (1999), in 
1988, the central government only received 3.3% of the incremental revenue while 
local governments took 96.7% of them. The sharing ratio remained almost the same 
for the year after that. As a result, the central authority gradually edged into a fiscal 
crisis and borrowed money from provincial governments for several times. The tight 
budget restricted the ability of the central authority to coordinate the infrastructure 
construction. Yet, the rapid economic growth called upon the central government to 
invest more in the infrastructures such as railways, electricity grid, water supply and 
so on. The inadequately financed central governance was having a stifling effect on 
the economy. 
 
Another major negative effect of the fiscal responsibility system was the rise of local 
protectionism (Bai et al, 2004; Hu and Zhang, 2005; Lee, 1998; Wu, 2010). Often the 
best strategy to protect profit is to prevent competition. Consequently the local 
authorities imposed barriers on access to the regional market so that the competition 
from outside the region was eliminated. Bai et al (2004) finds that local authorities 
had strong incentive to protect industries with high tax-plus-profit margins and high 
share of state ownership. This finding is consistent with the analysis of the fiscal 
responsibility system. The purpose of protectionism was to share more revenue from 
the local firms. So these firms should be made cash cows and also be easy to control. 
The local protectionism formed a prisoner’s dilemma and diverted the entire 
economic system away from the global maximization of the efficiency. Hence, it must 
be handled with the political centralization. Moreover, the central authority felt like 
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losing control over the local authorities as they pursued independence and did not 
quite follow the instruction from the upper. The local authorities’ pursuit of 
independence provoked the Politburo and Central Committee, who decided to change 
it.  
 
1993 was the year of significance with respect to tax reform. . To obtain the bigger 
share of the total fiscal revenue and to curb local protectionism, the State Council 
issued the “decision on introducing the tax sharing system”. The policy encountered 
considerable resistance from local authorities for it cut down their fiscal revenues and 
thus weakened their political powers. The then Premier Zhu Rongji, spent several 
months persuading the heads of provincial governments to accept the decision. 
Eventually he succeeded due to the strong leadership of the CPC. The new policy 
reformed the tax system and re-allocated the revenue sources between the central and 
local authorities. 
 
Two critical strategic moves were taken by the central government to increase central 
fiscal revenue. One was to re-allocate the value-added tax between central and local 
authorities with the sharing ratio of 3:1. The central authorities took 75% of total 
amount of the value-added tax while the local authorities retained 25%. The 
value-added tax was once known as the industrial-commercial tax. In 1984, the 
industrial-commercial tax was abolished and instead tax authority began to collect 
value-added tax and sales tax. The former was raised on products and the latter on 
services. In the beginning of the economic reform, the corporate income tax was the 
major source of the fiscal revenue. The corporate income tax could be compared with 
the share of profit paid to the government in the central planning system. However, as 
the reform moved forward, market competition lowered the average profit rate 
whereas the ever-deeper specialization increased the frequency of market transaction. 
As a result, the circulation tax became the major revenue source. As shown by 
statistics, in 1985, the total amount of value-added tax reached 14.77 billion Yuan 
while the amount of corporate income tax was 69.61 billion Yuan. However, in 1993, 
the year before the fiscal reform, the amount of value-added tax increased to 108.15 
billion Yuan, nearly twice of the corporate income tax.23 Since the value-added tax 
became the largest revenue source, the central government proposed a fixed sharing 
ratio for value-added tax and took the larger slice of the cake.  
 
The other strategy was institutional. Though the policy was important, how the policy 
would be implement was even more important. The institution of taxation should also 
be reformed while the tax policy was changed. The grasp of the central authority on 
the taxation system would not be promising as long as the taxation bureau remained a 
department of the local authorities. Thus, the reform separated the taxation bureau 
into two departments, the state taxation bureau and the local taxation bureau. The 
responsibility for taxation was also divided between these two bureaus. The state 
taxation bureau was responsible for the customs tax, consumption tax, central SOE 
                                                        
23 National bureau of statistic of China, China statistical yearbook 2013, China statistics press, Beijing, 2014 
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income tax and all the other taxes determined to be the revenue sources for the central 
authority. The local taxation bureau was responsible for sales tax, local SOE income 
tax, individual income tax and other taxes allowed to be retained for local expenditure. 
Unlike the local taxation bureau which was a branch of the local government, the state 
taxation bureau was subordinate only to the upper level of the bureau. By 
restructuring the taxation institution, the central government extended its control over 
revenue sources to the local level. The capacity of central government to raise revenue 
became ever strong. 
 
As shown by the statistics below, tax sharing system was very effective in centralizing 
the fiscal authority. There are two groups of figures that might indicate it. The first 
one is the growth rate of value-added tax (VAT). The amount of VAT jumped from 
108.15 billion Yuan of 1993 to 230.83 billion Yuan of 1994. It was doubled in one 
year, showing that the central authority’s ability to raise revenue was improved by 
reforming the institution of taxation. Another group of numbers is the gap between 
central and local fiscal revenue. The diagram shows that after the first fiscal reform 
the local authorities were wealthier than the central authorities and the gap was 
widened throughout the 1980s. It was until 1994 that the central authority recovered 
from its fiscal crisis. And since 1994, the central authority has taken control over the 
major revenue sources and has had a superior bargaining position against local 
authorities. 
 
 
Chart 4.1: The central and local fiscal revenue from 1981 to 2000 
 
Not surprisingly, the tax sharing system caused some problems. Because of the fiscal 
centralization, less revenue was retained by the local authorities. It seems that the 
local authorities would seek to raise the extra-budgetary revenue and have eventually 
no difficulty to balance the budget despite the fiscal reform. One of the major sources 
of the extra-budgetary revenue was the profit of TVEs. However, the tax sharing 
system also affects the incentive of local authorities to develop the TVE sector. 
Chinese scholars (Sun and Zhou, 2013; Zhou, 2012) point out that the revenue that 
the local authorities took from TVEs decreased with the fiscal centralization. The 
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value-added tax was raised on the market transaction, regardless of whether 
enterprises made profit or not. The central authority took 75% of total amount of the 
value-added tax but did not bear the risk of operation of the TVEs. The local 
authorities, however, retained only 25% of VAT but shouldered full responsibility for 
supporting the TVEs such as providing financial access, transferring resources from 
plan-track to market-track and avoiding potential risk of bankruptcy. With the 
increasing number of new entrants, the market competition became intensive and thus 
lowered the average profit rate. By the end of 1984, there were more than 6 million 
TVEs, among which 4 million were new entrants. And the number was doubled in 
1985. With more and more capital and work forces entering the rural industrial sector, 
the marginal profit fell quickly and so did the average profit. Correspondingly the 
marginal benefit of developing TVEs also diminished over time. Moreover, the 
increasing market value of those TVEs that survived the harsh competition created the 
temptation for TVE leaders to appropriate the collective property through 
privatization. 
 
The fiscal burden forced local authorities to search for a new non-tax revenue source. 
And this new source turned out to be the land assignment fees (Zhou, 2006). In 
socialist China, the land is either state-owned or collectively-owned. So, the 
governments were entitled to charge fees from the land assignment. But the 
underlying mechanism was more complicated than the simple auction of land use 
right. As Cheung (2009) suggests, a revenue-sharing system emerged as the result of 
interaction of governments and enterprises in the presence of public land ownership. 
In Cheung’s model, the county governments made use of two tools to influence the 
economic growth. One of them was tax. The other was land use rights. The local 
authorities offered the land and shared the profits in the form of tax. Cheung 
compares the revenue-sharing with the sharecropping. The county governments 
maximize the revenue by setting the land transfer fee and tax rate. And they share the 
revenue with lower and upper level of governments so that the entire administrative 
system was woven into a revenue-sharing web and provided the incentive to preserve 
the market system. Given the reality that taxation income must be shared with the 
uppers, the local authorities might try to maximize the value of land rights, which 
resulted in the Chinese-style “land finance”. The controversy over the effect of “land 
finance” awaits further academic analysis. Apart from the regular analysis, Peter Ho 
(2005, 2013) offers a new theoretical perspective to understand the logic of China’s 
land reform. He applies the institutional functionalism to Chinese-style urban-rural 
land system and argues that the land property right is intended to be vaguely defined. 
The structure of land tenure system is context-specific. So the complicated 
arrangement that we so far discussed is adaptive to a transitional economy like China. 
According to Peter Ho, it is an outcome of endogenous spontaneously ordered 
development and therefore, in spite of its perverse nature, is sustainable and also 
efficient while considering the social context it is embedded in.  
 
The other noteworthy effect of the tax sharing system is that it produced an 
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ever-strong central government. Because the local government expenditure is 
financed through the fiscal transfer, the right to formulate the industrial policies falls 
into the hands of ministries. The details of expenditure of the revenue transferred to 
the local authorities would be dictated by the official documents from the ministries. 
With increasing fiscal revenue, the central government regained the control over the 
local authorities. But the danger is that the spontaneous practice from bottom up 
would no longer be institutionalized through the efforts of the local authorities. On the 
contrary, any whimsical idea from officials of the ministries might find its way into 
implementation in areas far removed from the central government. The local 
authorities, while relying on the fiscal transfer, had no other choice but to implement 
ministerial policies, sound or otherwise. So there is a danger that the tax sharing 
system limits the local autonomy to the extent that it might damage the vital 
component of the Chinese economy, namely the spontaneous practices in a free and 
competitive environment, which was both based upon and contributory to the 
extensive use of the local information and institutional resources. In that sense, how to 
handle the central-local relationship is of particular importance to China’s sustainable 
growth.  
 
4.3 China’s Gradualist Approach to Reform 
 
Socialism is one of the most significant social experiments in human history. But the 
economic part of this experiment is prone to failure because the central planning 
system is not efficient in processing the information. Hence, socialist nations that 
once followed the Soviet model eventually start the transition from the centrally 
planned economy to the market economy. The central question is how to initiate and 
complete the transition. Russia applied the “shock therapy”, implementing a set of 
radical reform policies in a short time with the aim to complete the transition in a “big 
bang”. As Murrell (1993) suggests, the big bang strategy presents a mechanical view 
of transition. Armed with the knowledge of economics, the Russian technocrats 
transformed themselves into the social engineers leading the big bang transition from 
top down. But they failed in the same way that the central planning system failed. It 
was beyond individual’s ability to control the economic system either in equilibrium 
or in transition. The politicians and technocrats were preoccupied by the idea that the 
market system, once introduced, could solve the resources allocation in an extremely 
efficient way. However, the institutional environment that the market system was 
introduced into was not prepared for the introduction of market. People lacked the 
knowledge of market. The makers and implementers of policies lacked the capacity of 
supervision. The market transactions lacked legal enforcement and protection. In that 
kind of environment, the huge rent generated from the reform might be appropriated 
by the privileged class. And the distribution of initial rent might affect the working of 
economic system in a profound way, as illustrated in the model below. 
 
Unlike the design-based reform unfolded in Russia, China’s transition was driven by 
the spontaneous practice from bottom up. It was known as the gradualist approach to 
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reform. Contrary to the idea of an intended slowdown of the pace of transition, 
China’s reform was much more a de-centralized one based on trial and error. The 
multi-layer political system enabled the top-down institutionalization of the 
bottom-up best practices of the households and firms and other entities. China’s 
transition to market economy was not foreordained but attained as a result of 
interactions among the governments, collectives and individuals. The aim, direction 
and strategy of the transition was only determined during the transition.  
 
So the Chinese-style gradualist approach presents an evolutionary view of transition. 
Differing from the mechanical view of transition, the evolutionary view of transition 
affords significance to the pace of the transition and the way it unfolds. Trial and error 
is the philosophy governing the process of transition. In practice, two strategies were 
implemented. One was the policy experimentation and the other was the introduction 
of the dual-track pricing system. Contrary to the shock therapy abolishing the central 
planning system entirely, the gradualist strategy opened, besides the plan track, a price 
track for the resource allocation. In that way, the market mechanism was introduced to 
replace the central planning gradually. The comparison below of the shock therapy 
with the dual-track approach will illustrate how China’s gradualist reform came to be 
“a reform without loser”.  
 
Big bang strategy vs. Dual-track pricing system  
 
The major idea of shock therapy was to establish the market system through the 
fast-privatization and liberalization. However, the market was “captured” by the 
“initiate rent holders” due to the information asymmetry and failure in coordination, 
which did not only influence the distribution of incomes but also affect the economic 
efficiency. As a result, the market was dominated by a few monopolistic firms. And 
they were motivated to cut production and raise price. The model is illustrated by the 
following figure.  
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Assuming that the planned quantity of products is xL, and the corresponding price is 
set to be pL. Suppose that the economy experiences a big bang transformation. The 
price is liberalized and moves upward along the supply curve. Normally, the supply 
should respond to the rising price. However, it did not respond sufficiently due to 
what can be described as an insider-outsider discrepancy. The big bang transformation 
divided people into two groups, insiders and outsiders. Insiders were former Soviet 
political and industrial elites. Outsiders referred to the normal people who neither had 
access to the information about the reform nor could influence the reform policy. The 
big bang transformation aggravated the asymmetry of information and triggered a 
“capture” effect. The insiders knew how to seek opportunities in the transitional 
economy and even to create such opportunities. On the contrary, ordinary people, 
having lived so long under the central planning system, knew nothing about the new 
life imposed on them. They were forced to participate in the reform and could do 
nothing to change it. For example, to restructure the SOEs, Russia’s government 
launched a project of “voucher privatization”. Vouchers were distributed equally 
among the population to exchange for shares of SOEs or to be sold in open market. 
Not well-informed of the value of vouchers, many Russian sold them underpriced. 
The insiders, however, bought the shares of the SOEs and exploit the opportunities 
offered by the chaotic privatization. This example shows that, if the government 
attempted to create a private sector through the restructuring of SOEs, it was very 
probable that the state-owned assets were transferred to the private hand of a few 
political and industrial elites who were the “initial rent holders”. Unfortunately, this 
was not solely a problem of initial condition. The rise of the oligarchs also affects the 
efficiency of market as they monopolized the market. Moreover, as mentioned, 
Russia’s governments were captured by those “initial rent holders” and protected 
them from competition by new entrants. It was a nightmarish combination that any 
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emerging market could do without.  
 
In the figure, the new equilibrium that the transition leads to shows a monopolistic 
feature. The market price pN is higher than the price that clears the market. To 
maintain the price pN and thus maximize the monopoly rent, the supply of products 
is limited. So the market grows slowly. Russian economy ran into a low-growth trap 
and came only slowly out of it. The welfare of the entire population was sacrificed in 
exchange for the rise of several oligarchs.  
 
China’s strategy was to allow the coexistence of the central planning and the market. 
The presence of dual track, a plan track and a price track for resource allocation, 
caused the diversion of resources from SOEs to private sector. Russia privatized the 
SOEs with the attempt to create the incentives to maximize the efficiency of the 
resources allocation. However, the monopoly rent was far more attractive than the 
profit generated from the production and exchange under competition. So the initial 
rent holder “captured” the market and introduced monopoly. China did not restructure 
the SOEs until the 1990s, while the private sector gradually developed from the 
beginning of the reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thanks to the dual-track 
system, the resources were transferred from the plan track to the price track and 
ultimately into the private sector so that the private sector could grow rapidly. 
 
 
There is a representative commodity x. For the plan track, the price is set to be pL, 
and the quantity of product to be xL to achieve the efficiency. For the price track, 
market price is determined by demand and supply and is pN in this model. So, the 
quantity of good x sold at the market price is xN − xL. And, producers, mainly the 
SOEs, get production surplus of pLoc plus bac. For the SOEs, because they can sell 
excessive products and retain the profit, they expand production to make more profit. 
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Moreover, they strive to increase the share of price-track products in the production 
plan to maximize the profit. In doing so, the share of price track in dual track system 
is expanded and share of plan track is diminished. Besides, the political and industrial 
elites endeavored to acquire the rent of pLpNbc by bringing the plan-track products 
to market. This is the so-called “state speculation”. These corruptive activities, 
together with inflation, gave rise to the political instability that forced the central 
government to accelerate the reform process. Although the “state speculation” was 
immoral and illegal, the price signal was less distorted through the speculation. 
Moreover, for the non-state-owned firms such as TVEs and private firms, they had a 
better access to resources. They could get the resources from SOEs or from the “state 
speculators” if SOEs refused to sell production factors to them. So, the dual-track 
price system facilitated the transition to the market economy and promoted the 
development of the private sector.  
 
The big bang transformation did not fulfill the great expectation while the gradualist 
strategy, which was neither a well-prepared reform scheme nor a textbook transitional 
policy, succeeded. Why should it happen? The answer lay largely in the privatization 
strategy. The aim of the shock therapy was to privatize then-existing SOEs while the 
introduction of the dual-track pricing system resulted in the rise of a new private 
sector rivaling the state sector. So, Russia’s political elites sought rents by acquiring 
the ownership of SOEs. To the contrast, China’s political elites acquire rents by 
transferring resources from plan track to price track, thus facilitating the liberalization 
of prices.  
 
Controversies persisted over the question of how former political and industrial elites 
could be compensated for their commitment to the reform. It was a very pragmatic 
question, yet often not one for open discussion due to its questionable morality. The 
political and industrial elites, if not compensated properly, would transform the 
reform into a rent-generating source instead of an efficiency-improving one. The 
essence of an acceptable compromise was that the compensation should take a form 
that did not affect economic efficiency. The dual-track pricing system, though 
producing serious corruption, did not impose any barrier to the liberalization of 
market. On the contrary, it did promote the growth of the private sector. 
 
Policy experimentation 
 
The concept of policy experimentation might be unfamiliar to a Western ear, but is 
frequently used in the Chinese official documents. The policy experimentation, in 
Chinese political context, refers to the policy innovation through the experimentation 
preceding to the institutionalization of the experimental program into the national 
policy. The superiority of the policy experimentation method is to obtain the 
experience about the policy innovation without risking any instability or crisis to the 
entire system. It minimizes the risk of the policy innovation by enabling the 
reversibility of policy change. And the cost of such trial and error process was 
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lowered as well.  
 
In the capitalist democratic system, the policy process usually contains three stages: 
formulation, legislation and implementation. Yet, the legislation as a necessary 
component of policy cycle rules out the possibility of policy experimentation 
(Heilmann, 2008). The state-level policy innovation in federalist countries also relies 
on the legislation and is small-scale in most cases. It cannot be compared with the 
Chinese-style decentralized policy innovation that aims to impose a transformative 
change to the national economy. One distinctive feature of the Chinese political 
system is that the administrative authority is superior to the legislative and judicial 
authorities and is offered an enormous discretionary power with respect to the 
legislative and judicial issues. In China’s legal system, the central government 
regulation forms a source of law and is potent without the approval of the legislative 
authority. For example, the State Council has the authority to issue administrative 
regulations. And various regulations, rules, and measures formulated and issued by 
the ministries are also accepted as formal sources of law. Besides, according to the 
administrative law, the local government regulations are coercive and effective upon 
punishment. They are indeed sort of “quasi-law”. Under such circumstances, the 
policy experimentation could be a very effective and economic means to accomplish 
the policy and institutional innovation and it also enables the informal institution to 
penetrate the market in a way that the deficient formal institution cannot.  
 
According to Heilmann (2008), the Chinese-style policy experimentation takes three 
forms: experimental regulation, “experimental points” and “experimental zones”. I 
will go through these three forms to show how the policy innovation mechanism 
works in China. The literal meaning of experimental regulation indicates that some of 
Chinese government policy was provisional and experimental. Heilmann finds out 
that, during the first two decades of the reform, over 30% of regulatory documents 
contained the term “provisional” and “experimental” in the titles or specifies the issue 
relating to the experimental points or zones. So he comes to the conclusion that 
Chinese government adopted an experimentalist approach to the policy innovation. 
Only after the sufficient experience is obtained through the implementation of the 
experimental program, the experimental policy will be finalized and institutionalized. 
The statistic shows that the share of experimental policy in total regulations issued 
declined in recent years. It fell to 13% in 2006. Heilmann ascribes the decline to the 
growing institutionalization of experimental policies and the participation in the WTO. 
There is one more point worth mentioning. Putting the government law (Tiao Lie) 
aside, according to the protocol on drafting regulatory documents, the term 
“provisional” and “experimental” has to be marked in the titles of regulatory 
documents if the regulatory issue is mentioned in the official documents for the first 
time. In principle, the regulations with the experimental status are effective for two or 
three years. After three years, they will be abolished or revised and finalized and 
effective for another five years. In that sense, the “final” regulations are not final, but 
merely less experimental than the “experimental” ones. Unlike the laws, the 
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government regulations are usually more flexible (Shleifer). And Chinese government 
transforms regulatory document into a simple and effective tool of governance. They 
are short-term and based on the quick response to the changing environment. On the 
one hand, three or five years is the time required to obtain the sufficient experience 
about the policies to see if it is beneficial to continue with the exiting policy. On the 
other, every three or five years the opportunities are provided to revise and fix the old 
policies that turn out to be deficient and non-adaptive in the fast-changing 
environment. Moreover, in the extreme and urgent case, regulations taking effect 
today can be abolished tomorrow if it caused some disastrous results. So a significant 
share of Chinese government regulations is “experimental”. This political setting is 
adaptive to the transitional economy, yet also leads to the government’s tight control 
over the economy.  
 
The second form of the experimentalist approach to policy innovation is the 
“experimental points”. The “experimental points”, unlike the concrete experimental 
regulations and zones, is a philosophical term or as Heilmann put it, a technical 
concept. As he points out, the term “experimental points” or “proceeding from point 
to surface” indicates “experimentation with new policies or institutions limited to a 
certain policy area or economic sector and carried out in limited experimental 
units”.24 The underlying idea is that the experimentalist approach is universally 
applicable with respect to introducing the new policy or imposing the transformative 
change. The object of the experimental program can be a zone, a sector or even a unit. 
For example, the experimentation limited to a specified area is the well-known 
strategy of experimental zones. The reform to replace the business tax with 
value-added tax started as a trial program in several industries such as transportation 
and IT and was universalized after several years of incremental experimentation. And 
the restructuring took place in selected SOEs before the entire SOE sector underwent 
the restructuring. In sum, the institutionalization of the method of “proceeding from 
point to surface” shows that the experimentalist approach is fundamental to China’s 
policy innovation and the transformative change initiative.  
 
The last form of experimentalist strategy is the experimental zones. The experimental 
zones refer to geographical units where the policies inconsistent with the existing 
laws and regulations are allowed to be developed and implemented. The origin of 
experimental zones is the “opening up policy” which was implemented in an 
incremental way. In 1979, four cities, Shen Zheng, Zhu Hai, Shan Tou and Xia Men, 
were picked and announced to be the special export zones with the aim to attract 
investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. In the next year, the special export 
zone was renamed to the special economic zone (SEZ). Shortly after that, Guangdong 
province was added to the list of SEZs. The SEZ experiment facilitated the inflow of 
the foreign capital by innovating the policies towards the fair treatments of foreign 
capital. Due to its effectiveness, the experimental zones method was institutionalized 
                                                        
24 Heilmann, Sebastian, Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise, Studies in Comparative International 
Development, Volume 43, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 1–26 
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and various types of experimental zones were designated to handle different 
development issue. Among them, the most famous and striking one is Shanghai 
Pudong New Area. The innovative policy there turned acres of farmland into the most 
active business districts and technological parks. Recently, China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone was considered a preparation for the deeper integration into the 
international economy. The experience obtained from the new experimental zone will 
be shared with the rest of the country, also in an incremental way.  
 
As mentioned above, the policy experimentation method relies largely on the existing 
political system, particularly the central-local relationship. In a federalist system, the 
federal-state relationship is not shaped in a way that the state-level innovative policy 
can be universalized at the federal level. The independence of the state forms an 
obstacle and the institutionalization of policy involves the legislation, which almost 
eliminates the reversibility feature of the experimentalist approach. On the contrary, 
China’s central government is capable of ordering the policy experimentation and 
universalize the policies at national level as the central government is bestowed the 
right to enact the law and the lower level of government the right to develop the 
“quasi-law”.  
 
The central-local relationship is key to the understanding of Chinese-style policy 
experimentation. China’s employing the policy experimentation can be divided into 
two stages. Throughout these two stages, though the policy process remains the same, 
the underlying central-local interaction has changed. In the first stage, the 
considerable independence of the local governments enabled the bottom-up policy 
experimentation, which means that the policy experimentation was indeed not ordered 
by the central government but spontaneously carried out by the local organizations. 
And the spontaneous practice was imitated across regions. Finally, the central 
government institutionalized the practice at the national level. The household 
responsibility system, township and village enterprises and various local policy 
initiatives were integrated into the formal institution in that way. During this stage, the 
use of local knowledge and the learning process dominated the policy innovation. 
Even the experimental program ordered by the central government was designed and 
conducted by the local governments. However, in the second stage, with the fiscal 
autonomy undermined by the tax reform, the local authorities were worse off in the 
central-local bargaining. The ministerial control penetrated the policy experimentation. 
On the one hand, as the initiator of the policy experimentation, the bottom-up 
spontaneous practice was replaced by the top-down mechanism design. It deterred the 
use of local knowledge in the policy process. On the other, less discretionary power 
was bestowed upon the implementer of the experimental program. The coordination 
difficulty increased. Moreover, the policy process became more formalized and the 
legislative authorization was required to ensure the legitimacy of policy-making. 
Taking China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone as an example, the legislative 
authority authorized the State Council to amend the law in relation to the 
administrative issue. And the implementer of the experimental program, the managing 
74 
 
committee of China Pilot Free Trade Zone, must apply for the approval of the central 
government bodies prior to the implementation of policy innovation initiative. So the 
ministries exercised a tight control over the experimentation.  
 
The success of policy experimentation rested on incorporating the local knowledge 
into the national policy through the institutionalization of the adaptive practice. Hence, 
an institutional barrier is imposed on the innovation freedom for the local authorities 
if the ministries tighten the control over policy-making in the case that they acquire a 
superior position in central-local negotiation. As a result, the institutional adaptation 
to the economic development, which should be a result of the interaction among 
individuals, households, firms and central and local governments, would be disturbed.  
 
4.4 Transplanting a Legal System 
 
Though following the philosophy of “crossing the river by groping the stones”, China 
did not stop imposing the Western blueprint and developing the modern economic 
institution. The relation-based governance came in the form as the common beliefs 
and conventions but not formalized and institutionalized. On the contrary, China 
attempted to transplant the entire “rule of law” system from the Western country into 
Chinese social context. In the short run, the attempt failed because of the imperfect 
transplantation and also the conflict between the transplanted system and the existing 
society. In the long run, the growing market will drive the transition from the 
relation-based to rule-based governance. And the transplantation of legal system is 
necessary for pursuing the “rule of law” in a networked environment. Yet, as we may 
expect, Chinese legal system would not be a purely transplanted one but a blend of 
foreign blueprint and Chinese characteristics.  
 
A legal system consists of three parts. They are laws, legal organizations and legal 
professionals. With respect to laws, during the early stage of the reform, the 
legislature focused on the regulations in relation to the government bodies and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This sort of law was largely the heritage of command 
economy. It was reasonable to formulate and enact such laws because the economic 
activity outside of the state-controlled domain was not usual. During the 1980s, the 
legislative practice was affected both by the idea of state syndicate and the idea of 
market economy. As Clarke et al (2008) point out, the law enacted during the early 
stage of reform centered on the SOEs, including economic contract law (1981), 
enterprises bankruptcy law (1986) and law on the enterprises owned by the whole 
people (1988). Yet, with the private sector growing rapidly, the focus of lawmaking 
shifted to the free market transaction. There were two types of law governing the 
foreign-related and domestic economic issues, respectively. It shows that Chinese 
government regulated the foreign-related economic issue and the domestic market in 
different ways. However, when Chinese economy was deeply integrated into the 
world economy, the legislature sought the unification of laws governing the firms and 
economic activities. For example, contract law passed in 1999 replacing the economic 
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contract law (regulating the contractual relationship between domestic companies), 
foreign-related economic contract law (applicable when one of the party was foreign 
investor) and technological contract law. As Clarks et al point out, law coevolves with 
economy. The role of private sector in national economy has been changing over time. 
Accordingly, the regulations in relation to the private sector were amended for several 
times. So, the Chinese legal system, which started as a governance tool in the Soviet 
model, was gradually modernized to meet the requirement of the free market 
economy. 
 
With respect to legal organizations, there are three major ones in China. People’s 
congress is the legislative body, people’s court the judicial body and people’s 
procuratorate the public prosecutor office. Though the organizational configuration of 
the legal system bears the resemblance to the Western model, the underlying power 
structure is not the same. The cadre ranking system displayed the inferior position of 
judicial authority in comparison with legislative and administrative authority. The 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, who is the 
head of legislature, is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC 
Central Committee, currently ranked immediately after the President and the Premier. 
Yet the chief justice of the Supreme People’s Court and the chief procurator of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate are ranked as equal to vice-premiers only. They are 
not members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, let alone the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo. In that regard, the Chinese political system is not a 
system of “checks and balances” based on trias politica principle. Moreover, within 
the judicial system, the judges are also differently ranked and the lower ranked is 
subordinate to the higher ranked as the lower level of court is subordinate to the upper 
level. The judicial branch’s lack of independence may cause several problems that 
limit its role in the economic domain. Compared to the legal system, it was easy for 
the government to put its regulations into effect. As a result, the administrative branch 
took over some of legislative and judicial functions. And under such circumstances, 
the judicial branch may act “cooperatively” in favor of the interest of the 
administrative branch. As the judiciary fails to maintain judicial independence, the 
“rule of law” system is not ready to be formed. 
 
The third problem that China’s legal system faces is the shortage of legal 
professionals. The laws and legal organizations can be transplanted, but not the 
professionals. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s higher education was 
suspended. Little legal education resource was available when the law schools were 
reopened. Amidst desperate shortage of qualified legal professionals, a lot of 
demobilized soldiers and other untrained personnel were appointed as judges (He, 
1997). Unsurprisingly great difficulty ensued with the obvious lack of expertise and 
training. In recent years, the Ministry of Justice imposed a threshold for the entry into 
legal professions. It is necessary to have passed the National Judicial Examination to 
qualify for the position of judges. And the number of legal practitioners increased 
continuously. The number of students graduated from law schools has increased by 
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100 times over the last three decades. There were only 60,000 judges in 1981, which 
meant that every 10,000 Chinese shared 6.08 judges. In 2002, the number of judges 
had risen to 200,000. And after the reform, the number of judges decreased to 190,000 
in 2004. Every 10,000 Chinese shared 14.69 judges. In many regard the number of 
judges has increased and may be seen as sufficient. However, some studies suggest 
that only half of the judges are actually trial judges. The non-trial judges are largely 
busy with administration and personnel management. The expectation is that the trial 
judges should deal with many more cases with the awareness of international standard 
practices.  
 
The eroded judicial independence and the lack of professionals explains partially the 
marginalization of the “rule of law” system. However, the origin of the problems is 
the incompatibility between the transplanted legal system and the existing society. 
During the early stage of the development, it was too costly to initiate a transition 
from the relation-based governance to the rule-based one. The relation-based trading 
system was shaped to be in accordance with the local circumstances, serving well to 
secure the market transaction and lower the transaction cost. Moreover, the common 
belief in the “rule of relation” was formed and thus made a focal point in coordinating 
the expectation. So the equilibrium is highly stable and resistant to the moderate 
shock. In some cases, the legal practice was also affected by the networked 
environment. It was reported that the judges came out of office and sought the 
disputes in the rural areas or in factories (He, 1997). The aim of this practice is to 
make the judge look like a friend than a detached enforcer of justice, though the latter 
image is what the “rule of law” system found suitable. And sometimes a good 
relationship with the judges enhanced the prospect of winning a lawsuit. Over the last 
three decades, the legal system was of less importance than one may expect. Yet the 
shortcoming of the “rule of relation” system will amount to a significant obstacle to 
the further development as the market keeps growing. In the fullness of time, the 
institutional change will take place. Prior to the comprehensive transformative change, 
China’s legal system has been experiencing a great improvement. Greater 
independence, transparency and professionalism have been introduced into the legal 
system. It is hoped that the legal system will contribute more to China’s growth. 
 
4.5 Summary and Implications for the Further studies 
 
This part is entirely devoted to introducing China’s political system and its impact on 
the economic transition. As shown by the model of embedded market, the state is 
supposed to be between market and society. Given this intermediary role, the state 
determines how market is embedded in the social system. If the state takes a position 
against the endogenous/spontaneous institutional support to the operation of market 
from the social system, the market and society may both react strategically to the 
policies and changes the way they interact. However, without the institutional 
underpinning from bottom up, the market might not be able to grow to a considerable 
extent. In that sense, the state plays non-negligible and irreplaceable function in the 
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transitional economy and therefore should receive particular attention in the academic 
research. 
 
While state is a highly abstract term, we understand it as consisting of two parts, 
namely, how the government is organized and the policy it implements. First, China’s 
political system was characterized by a federalism with rather peculiar characteristics. 
The Chinese-style federalism is thought to be market-preserving as it introduced great 
local autonomy. Compared to the central authority, the local authorities had better 
access to the local information and thus were capable of innovating the policies or 
institutionalize the local best practice into the policies. 25  However, the 
over-decentralization of power could lead to the rise of the local protectionism. So 
China, as a party-state, solved the problem by exercising the tight control over the 
cadre management. The Party did not abolish the old system totally but mobilized the 
organizational resources inherited from the communist China to minimize the risk of 
instability. The decentralization of power was actually based on the fiscal 
decentralization. After the introduction of the fiscal responsibility system, the amount 
of fiscal revenue retained by the local authorities increased enormously. It re-defined 
the central-local relationship and furthered the decentralization. In the first half of 
1990s, unsatisfied with the low revenue and weak voice in the central-local 
bargaining, the central authority reformed the tax system and introduced a new tax 
sharing scheme to adjust the allocation ratio. One consequence of the tax reform was 
that the ministerial control penetrated the local economy through the fiscal transfer. 
So a trend of centralization appeared to influence the economy in a negative way.  
 
Following the discussion on the organizational feature of Chinese government, the 
policy that Chinese government is investigated in the second half of this chapter. The 
multi-layer structure of government enabled China’s application of gradualist strategy 
which differed sharply from the big bang strategy adopted by Russia. China’s 
gradualist approach to reform consists of two methods: the dual-track pricing method 
and the policy experimentation method. The dual-track approach allowed the 
coexistence of central planning system and market system and transferred the 
resources gradually from the state sector to an emerging private sector. Contrary to the 
massive privatization of SOEs resulting in creating a few oligarchs, the dual track 
pricing system only allowed the privileged class to generate the benefit from the 
resource transfer from plan track to price track. And the “state speculation” facilitated 
the transition to the free market objectively. The lesson from China and Russia’s 
experience is that transferring resources to an emerging private sector is a better 
strategy than developing the private sector directly from the state sector.  
 
                                                        
25 Theoretically, the central government has a better access to global information. But in some cases, the 
information available to the central government is collected by the local governments, therefore is not as reliable 
as the information at the local level as the local governments are motivated to filter or make changes to the original 
information. Of course the central government also set up the branches that are under its direct control. But it is 
costly for the central government to get information that way. The interaction between central and local 
government with respect to the information channeling is highly dynamic. And the strategy that both parties take 
varies in the concrete cases.  
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The second method is the policy experimentation. Thanks to the M-form of 
government, the policy experimentation could be limited to a zone, a sector or even a 
unit. The aim of introducing experimentalist approach is to control the risk of 
innovation and minimize the cost of trial and error. The experimental regulation, 
experimental point and experimental zone are three major forms of policy 
experimentation. In general, the policy experimentation method facilitates the 
institutionalization of bottom-up practice and incorporates the local knowledge into 
the policy process. However, as the ministerial control has been extended over the 
experimental programs, the policy experimentation might not be as effective as it 
once was.  
 
It may be observed that China’s political system as well as the reform strategy is quite 
well-designed for the local institutional innovation. It provides the opportunities that 
the relation-based governance took over the economic domain. As a result of the 
persisting culture and also the strong government, the legal institution was suppressed. 
Besides the eroded judicial independence and lacking of professionals, the 
transplanted nature of the legal system prevented itself from functioning effectively. 
However, as the market grows and the advantage of rule-based governance outweighs 
that of relation-based governance, the legal system will gain more importance and 
experience continuous improvement.  
 
China’s experience shows that the political system and the way it develops policies 
profoundly affect the transition into a market economy. In Imperial China, during the 
early stage of a new empire, the economic-freedom-enhancing policy was always the 
most popular one for its effectiveness in recovering the economy destroyed by the war. 
In 1978, China faced the similar question: how could the freedom be given to the 
economic actors and draw on their practice to develop effective economic institutions 
without affecting the reign of the government. As Deng put it, “whoever catches rat is 
good cat”, “crossing the river by groping the stones”, the governing party went 
through it with trial and error. So a free atmosphere was created and a variety of 
institutional innovation emerged from the interaction of various economic actors. This 
unique experience deserves further studying and should be a reference point of 
development strategies to the developing world.  
 
Now we have finished part one “general characteristics of Chinese-style relational 
economy”. This part has four chapters. The first chapter is an introduction addressing 
the questions we want to deal with. We argue that the relational culture plays a 
relevant role in smoothing the economic transition. Chapter two reviews four groups 
of literature and provides a conceptual framework for the later analysis. Chapter three 
shows how the relational system promotes cooperation and compare the relational 
system with the rule of law system. Chapter four is devoted to analyze China’s 
political system and its impact on the transition. By dealing with Chinese-style 
relational economy from theoretical perspective and also its surrounding institutional 
environment (the government policy and the structure behind the policy-making), we 
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further and deepen our understanding of how the embedding of market in the 
relational system leads to the economic success, as China did in last three decades. 
And in the later chapters, we will study it from an empirical perspective. We pay 
attention to individual sectors and see how the relational culture affects the reform of 
these sectors and makes them prosper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
5. China7s Agricultural Reform: From Collective Farming to Household Farming 
 
China’s transition to the market economy was initiated in the agricultural sector. The 
reason was simple. Agriculture met the basic demand of human beings. The Chinese 
could not afford a total collapse of the agricultural sector. It was a question of “to be 
or not to be”. The famine during 1956-1958 indicated the horrible consequence of 
wrong policy. China’s agricultural policy followed the idea of Leninism and drew on 
the practice of the Soviet Union, pursuing the centralization and collectivization of 
agricultural production. In the late 1950s, the radical policy eradicated the household 
farming. The collective farming system did not produce information as efficiently as 
the decentralized market to guide resource allocation. It also did not provide the 
peasants with sufficient incentives to work. Due to the institutional defection, China’s 
agricultural sector had grown slowly over the period of 1958-1978. During that time, 
political movement came one after another, destroying the production order to a 
considerable degree. By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, the national 
economy was on the edge of collapse. In response, the agricultural sector took a 
spontaneous move towards reform with the aim to resume household farming. 
Judging the outcome of the reform, the leadership dropped the insistence on collective 
farming and endured institutional diversification. As a result, household farming was 
legitimated, taking the form of the household responsibility system.  
 
In fact, the household responsibility system is not new to the scholars. Many 
academic contributions to the understanding of China’s agricultural reform can be 
found in existing literature. However, most research focused on the effect of policies. 
Less effort has been made to deepen our understanding of the transition and its 
influence. So, my point is to find out why the transition to the household farming 
system was possible and how the household farming system affected the economy.  
 
This chapter, as I said above, is devoted to the study of China’s agricultural reform. In 
the first part, I review the working of the collective farming system in the pre-reform 
era. I focus on the institution of the people’s commune. The scale of this social 
experiment has no precedent in history. Part two addresses the questions mentioned 
above. First, I try to understand the dynamic of transition to the household farming 
system. Second, I analyze the advantage of household farming over the alternative 
production modes. In addition, I discuss the role of institutional change in promoting 
growth, comparing the technological as well as market factors. In part three, I draw on 
a case study of the land market, which aims to offer evidence that social relation 
affects the market transaction. It also shows the limits of relation-based governance 
and the increasing importance of impersonal market. Part four shows the shortcoming 
of the household farming system and predicts the further evolution of the structure of 
agricultural production. At the end, part five summarizes and makes some suggestions 
for further study. 
 
 
81 
 
5.1 China’s Agricultural Sector in the Pre-Reform Era: People’s Commune and 
Collective Farming 
 
From the ancient times up to 1949, land had virtually been privately owned in China. 
A few landlords took control over a large proportion of land. The aggregation of 
landholding was necessary and inevitable for economic purpose. Many peasants were 
turned into tenants who worked for the landlords, and were rewarded by a fixed share 
of the grain yield. Before the land reform carried out by the CPC, the landlords, only 
5% of the population, owned 40% of the farmland (Chen et al, 2009). Hence, the 
desire for land was rooted deeply in the heart of Chinese peasants. When the CPC 
promised a future of “everyone is a landlord and work for himself”, the desire became 
a great incentive to help the CPC win the civil war.   
 
After the founding of P.R. China, the communist party was ready to fulfill the promise. 
In 1950, the land reform was launched. In general, the land reform was no more than 
taking land from landlords and distributing it equally among tenants. This movement 
aimed to destroy the class of landlords. In 1952, the movement was near its 
completion. About 300 million peasants were entitled to farmland. The land policy 
equalized the position of individual households. However, the peasants working on 
the self-owned land were ill-treated in the movement, not to mention the landlords 
identified as the leisure class. By the end of the reform, land was segmented into 
small pieces and allocated to the individual households.  
 
However, two problems arose thereafter. One of them was technical. The households 
were not able to afford the massive mechanization of agricultural production, which 
created a barrier to further improvement of productivity. The second problem was 
ideological. Socialism was based on the public ownership. The private ownership of 
land must be replaced by the public one. Moreover, the trend of polarization 
concerned the leadership. After the land reform, some peasants bought land from the 
market and employed landless peasants while some sold land and became tenants, 
again. Thereby, the disappeared class of landlords and tenants came back. As shown 
by an investigation report of Shanxi province, 19.5% of 42215 households sold their 
land due to the low living standard, disease, or natural catastrophe (Chen et al, 2009). 
That was a signal that the land reform failed. It was impossible for the leadership to 
swallow the failure. To prevent stratification, the leadership decided to accelerate the 
process of collectivization. 
 
The first round of land reform was a one-shot redistribution of land among 
households. According to the Edgeworth box, which was later stressed by Coase 
Theorem, bargaining leads to economic efficiency regardless of the initial allocation 
of property, if the transaction cost is sufficiently low. What happened after the equal 
distribution is several rounds of bargaining and transaction. Hence, the leadership 
intended to introduce the collective farming system so that the market mechanism did 
not work anymore. The coercive institutional change raised the transaction cost and 
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the behavior of peasants changed accordingly. In particular, the people’s commune 
was established, on the one hand, to replace the land tenure right with the public 
ownership of land. On the other hand, it should implement the economic plan from 
the top down and make decisions instead of households. The management of 
agricultural production was centralized so that the scattered local knowledge could 
not be used any more. In addition, not only was production made a part of the 
centrally planned system, but also the transaction. The state procurement system 
controlled the transaction of the agricultural products.  
 
There were three stages of the collectivization movement. In the first stage, the 
primitive form of collective farming was established. The freedom to enter and exit 
had not been deprived. In stage two, the people’s commune was formed. The utopian 
“communal dining system” was turned into a formal institution for a short time and 
ended up in a miserable famine. In stage three, a more pragmatic “work points system” 
replaced the utopian institution. However, although it rescued the agricultural sector 
from a total collapse, it could not ensure its growth. 
 
People’s Commune 
 
In 1953, the official document with the title “Decision on the mutual-aid in the 
agricultural production” was issued. Different types of mutual-aid teams were formed 
to improve the efficiency of agricultural production. During the early stage of 
collectivization, peasants were allowed to form the primary farmer cooperative. They 
offered land and capital for public use and were recognized as shareholders of the 
cooperatives. And they joined and exited the cooperative freely. In 1955, a scheme of 
“advanced farmer cooperative” was on the agenda. Compared with the primary 
farmer cooperative, the advanced farmer cooperative abolished the private ownership 
of land and capital such as cattle and machinery. The members of the advanced farmer 
cooperative were solely employees and only received a fixed wage for their labor.  
 
The collectivization movement was too radical.26 Besides the ideological need, the 
leadership also sought eagerly the road to a strong modern country, and came to the 
conclusion that capital should be transferred from the agricultural to industrial sectors 
to promote the industrialization. A state-owned or collectively-owned agricultural 
sector was much easier to control. That thought also motivated the leadership to go 
such a radical way.  
 
With an over-optimistic attitude towards the collectivization, in 1958 the leadership 
decided to merge several cooperatives into a people’s commune. A people’s commune 
                                                        
26 The increase rate of units of advanced farmer cooperative was high. The turning point was the year of 1956. In 
that year, the advanced farmer cooperative became ranked as the most popular type of production unit. And in 
1957, most of the primary farmer cooperatives were also turned to be advanced one. Actually, during the first 
phase of the collectivization movement, the overall productivity of agricultural sector was improved. The 
collective farming was thus thought to be more efficient compared to the household farming. The advantage of 
collective farming was the increasing capability to coordinate the public project. Besides, the collective farming 
also benefited from the scale of economy and the specialization, though not that much.  
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features a big size, collective ownership, and centralization. 27  Behind such 
institutional change imposed from the top down, we can find the idea of the “state 
syndicate”. The leadership thought that agricultural production could be organized in 
the same way as industrial production. What happened afterward told us that they 
were absolutely wrong.  
 
In a people’s commune, individual households owned minimal resources. Most of the 
resources were controlled by the commune. Production and consumption were 
centralized. Thousands of peasants worked together following the plan proposed by 
cadres. However, the agricultural centralization did not yield better results, but caused 
a decline in production efficiency. Moreover, the practice of consumption-sharing was 
also highly irrational. During that most radical period of collectivization, the so-called 
“communal dining room” was set up. Commune members had free meals in the 
public dining room. This income-pooling, consumption-sharing structure of the 
commune was disastrous. Income-pooling created a lot of motivation for the farmers 
to shirk and thus output declined. Meanwhile, consumption-sharing resulted in 
overconsumption. The commune members did not allocate consumption over time, 
but maximized current consumption.28 The decline in output, the overconsumption 
and the urban bias in the distribution of grain gave rise to a severe famine. 
 
Lin, in his seminal paper (1990) on collective farming, has pointed out that the 
implementation of a new policy marked the turning point of the collectivization 
movement. Thereafter, the productivity of the agricultural sector fell and never came 
back to the original level until the 1980s. This policy was the deprivation of the right 
to withdraw from the commune. At the initial stage of collectivization, farmers had 
the right to join the cooperative or withdraw the membership freely. But after the 
cooperative had been transformed into the commune, the right to quit from the 
collectivity was deprived. According to Lin, the compulsory nature of the people’s 
commune changed the way of interaction within it from a repeated to a one-shot game. 
The collective farming benefited from the economies of scale, but also increased the 
monitoring cost. However, if the individual households were allowed to withdraw 
from it whenever they want, the withdrawal of membership would be a punishment to 
the farmers who stayed in the cooperatives because it lowers the average return to 
scale. By imposing the sanction on the improper behaviors, the repeated game enables 
a self-enforcing mechanism. But a one-shot game changed it fundamentally.  
 
Based on the idea of Macleod (1988), Dong and Dow (1993) argued the opposite. 
They pointed out that it is the exit cost, not the right to exit, which prevented the 
shirking activities. Macleod indicated that households or firms entering into a 
contractual relationship should not be able to terminate it freely. The exit cost helps to 
                                                        
27 Mao Zedong said, “The people’s commune is big in size. And any outcome should be shared by all the 
members”.  
28 The peasants know that overconsumption was not the most beneficial strategy. However, they were not sure if 
the others would reserve enough grain for the future. So, in the face of risk, the peasant raced to consume more 
grain until the marginal utility became negative. It is a stag-hunt game and the non-cooperative strategy is chose by 
both sides in the equilibrium.  
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sustain the cooperation. Otherwise, the cheater could always play the strategy of “hit 
and run”, cheating by the end of the game and running away. It is right to say that 
contract enforcement is key to the success of market transactions. But the prerequisite 
is that an individual enters a contractual relationship freely. He must also be informed 
of the possible consequences of entering into such a relationship, including the exit 
cost. The people’s commune was different in two aspects. One was that peasants were 
forced to join the commune. The other one was that the exit cost was prohibitively 
high. As a matter of fact, the contract was incomplete. Considering the environmental 
change, not enforcing a contract could be sometimes mutually beneficiary. And the 
trading party is willing to pay the exit cost. But the right to pay such a cost was also 
deprived. Macleod and his proponents did not capture the nature of Leninism, the 
philosophy of the “state syndicate”. In Macleod’s model, the cheater exploits the 
fellow farmers for only one time. But in Lin’s model, a Nash-equilibrium dominates 
over time. The mutual punishment continues not due to the evil nature of human 
beings, but due to the disastrous institutional design. 
 
Scholars used to focus on the incentive problem arising from the enforcement of 
collective ownership. However, the commune was also a kind of fragile institution for 
its malfunctioning management system. It centralized the management at the top and 
was big in size. Hence, one of the problems was that local information could not be 
channeled to the top. In most of the communes, the cadres knew little about farming 
work, but proposed the production plans. They were also not familiar with the ability 
of the individual peasants. But the peasants could only follow the decision they made, 
and saw things go wrong. If the peasants made suggestions, the information was only 
slowly forwarded to the cadres. The village formed a unitary system with a simple 
hierarchical structure replacing the original network structure and its ability to process 
information was not as good as before. The big size of the production unit made the 
situation worse. Not only did channeling of information involved higher cost, but the 
monitoring cost increased enormously with the size of the organization. In sum, the 
people’s commune turned out to be totally irrational. 
 
A moderate version of people’s commune 
 
The radical collectivization movement caused a sharp decline in agricultural output. 
The shortage of grain, together with the urban bias in grain distribution intended by 
the authority to promote the radical industrialization, the so-called “Great leap 
forward” movement, resulted in a severe famine in rural areas. It gave the CPC 
leadership a lesson so that they had to acknowledge that there was a law governing 
the economic system. The institution governing the agricultural production should 
cope with the specific feature of agriculture. Family/kin-based culture was a tradition 
supporting the operation of agricultural society. However, the collectivization 
undermined the role of family and established a hierarchical system based on the 
received individualistic culture. The practice shows that the economic efficiency 
diminished with the increasing centralization. Hence, reform was carried out to avoid 
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the further collapse of the agricultural sector. 
 
One of the reform strategies was to downsize the people’s commune into production 
brigades and teams. 29  Perkins and Yusuf (1984) suggested that separating the 
commune into small accounting units could improve the efficiency. As 
aforementioned, the use of local information became more efficient when the size of 
the production unit decreases. In fact, a multi-layer system was developed to 
substitute the unitary system. Moreover, in a smaller organization, supervision 
became easier and thus involved a lower cost.  
 
The other reform strategy was to address the incentive problem. The “work points 
system” was introduced to make the wage dependent on the contribution. The team 
distributed the total income among households twice a year, after summer harvest and 
by the end of the year. The accountant calculated the value of one labor-day, which 
was ten work points, by dividing the total income by the sum of total work points. 
The household multiplied the work points it earned with the value of one labor-day. It 
was the total income for a household. The calculation method and the distribution 
mechanism were simple. The difficult part of this system was how to measure the 
contribution of individual peasants. They used two proxy values, the quality of labor 
and the difficulty degree of the task. In fact, the “work points” did improve the 
productivity and made the agricultural sector recover from the crisis.  
 
However, the “work points system” was not perfect. Using proxy values to evaluate 
the effort gave rise to incentive problems. First, the market competition was, to some 
degree, replaced by the competition for work points. It created motivation for 
individual households to bargain for more work points in the commune meetings. In 
order to avoid disputes, only the basic criteria such as gender and age were used to 
evaluate the quality of labor. Talent and special ability would not be priced in the 
system. Moreover, because the number of work points was associated with the 
number of tasks, peasants were motivated to do as many tasks as they can, yet paid 
little attention to the quality of tasks that they had done. Hence, more labor time might 
result in less achievement. A case study (Zhang, 1998; Zhang 2007) showed that, in 
Zhejiang province, the peasants spent a lot of time on farming. But the output was not 
                                                        
29 In 1960, the central committee of the CPC issued an urgent instruction in relation to people’s commune, 
indicating that the basic accounting unit was production brigade. A people’s commune consisted of three levels of 
organizations. They were people’s commune, production brigade and production team. After the reform, 
production brigade was the basic accounting unit while production team the basic production unit. Production 
factors such as land, cattle, labor forces and tools was owned by the brigade. And the team was allowed to lend 
them from the brigade. However, production brigade as an accounting unit would equalize the income of the teams. 
So, the production teams had little incentive to expand production because the excessive output would be 
distributed equally among the teams subordinated to the same brigade. A production team should maximize the 
income derived from other teams’ contribution to the production and minimize the loss caused by the excessive 
production. For a team, to be conservative toward the production was a superior strategy. But for a commune, it 
was not good news that every team produces conservatively. So, in 1962, the central authority decided to take one 
more step toward decentralization. The production team became both the accounting unit and production unit，
responsible for the organization of production (resources allocation) and income distribution. This 
production-team-based system operated smoothly until the economic reform in 1978. 
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as high as one might have expected.30 
State procurement system  
 
Besides the collectivization movement, a state procurement system was established to 
make the exchange of grain under the control of the central planning bureau. The state 
procurement system was first established in 1953 to solve the shortage of grain in the 
urban areas. Before the state took over the allocation of agricultural products, there 
existed a free market for grain and other products. However, the output of the 
agricultural sector was not sufficient to feed the whole country. Particularly in 1953, 
the volume of grain yield declined due to the natural catastrophe and the institutional 
defection. The peasants increased the family grain reserve and refused to sell grain 
and other agricultural products to the state. Therefore, the urban areas, relying on the 
food supply of the agricultural sector, suffered from malnutrition. To remedy the 
situation, the government developed the procurement into a policy. It cut the food 
supply in the rural areas and transported the grain to the urban areas.  
 
This policy was originally a temporary one to deal with one incident. However, it was 
not abolished after the recovery of the agricultural sector. To the contrary, it was 
institutionalized into a state procurement system. The aim of the policy was also 
changed. With the quick increase in the urban population, the shortage of grain and 
other agricultural products became a severe problem. Furthermore, the 
industrialization required quick accumulation of capital. The state procurement 
system was one of the very efficient political means to shift resources from the 
agricultural to the industrial sector. In such a system, peasants were obliged to sell 
nearly all the products to the state at a low price set by the policy. They were only 
allowed to consume a small part of the output and suffered from starvation. In doing 
so, the output of the agricultural sector was transferred to the industrial sector at a 
very low price that was significantly lower than the market price. The nature of the 
distribution system was a rationing system. The consumption of agricultural products 
had to be rationed in the absence of a price mechanism to balance supply and demand. 
The peasants, as mentioned, were allowed to retain a small part of the output to feed 
themselves. Urban inhabitants received coupons to exchange with agricultural 
products. The total volume of the grain and other products consumed by urban 
inhabitants, as well as peasants, were determined by the central plan.  
 
The collectivization movement had destroyed the peasants’ incentive once, and the 
urban bias underlying the distribution system destroyed their incentive for the second 
time. According to the study of two scholars (Xu and Shen, 1993), the value of output 
                                                        
30It may also remind of the centralized production system in former Soviet Union. The plan plays a central role in 
allocating resources. As a result, the workers attempt to fulfill the plan in a most efficient way. For example, the 
plan said that one ton of a certain gadget must be produced in a day. The worker would produce the large-sized 
gadget so that they only needed to produce fewer. However, the small-sized gadget may be demanded urgently 
while the large-sized one useless. It can be also compared with the “publish or perish” pattern in Chinese academic 
circle. The scholars needed to publish papers in exchange for “work points”. So they never tried to handle the 
difficult problems. The number of papers published increased while the true contribution was never made.    
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transferred from the agricultural to the industrial sector reached 44.81 billion Yuan.31 
The experts from the ministry of agriculture also confirmed that price scissors 
deterred the development of towns and villages. They estimated that the value of 
property owned by the people’s communes was 27.16 million Yuan, 80% of which 
was contributed by the farming land. The average value of property owned by a 
household was no more than 550 Yuan, and the average annual income per peasant 
was only 70 Yuan.32 The peasants contributed to the growth of the industrial sector at 
their own expense, and the income gap between farmers and urban inhabitants 
(employed in the industrial and service sectors) was widened from 1:2.6 to 1:2.9. In 
that sense, the peasants were sacrificed for the industrialization.   
 
5.2 The Household Responsibility System 
 
In China, household farming was an old tradition until the collectivization movement 
destroyed it. The collectivization movement had almost fully destroyed the 
agricultural sector. To cope with the irrational policy, in 1956 some villages practiced 
household farming again. In the advanced farmer cooperative, the measurement of 
individual contributions was a problem. To deal with it, the size of the accounting unit 
was slimmed down several times, from the cooperative to the team level, from the 
team to the household level. At last, the household took control over agricultural 
production. Household farming resumed in the Anhui, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Hebei and Guangdong provinces. However, in the following year, the central 
committee of the CPC, holding the opinion that the household farming was 
anti-collectivization, eradicated the practice. 
 
Yet, it was difficult to eradicate the culture as it implied the rationalization of human 
behaviors. In the summer of 1959, the “Great leap forward” mania faded. The 
disappointment from the decline in grain yield turned into the incentive to change it. 
Once again, the principle of “absolute equality” towards income distribution was 
questioned. In some villages, households were granted autonomous rights. But the 
practice ended up in failure. As long as the ideological bias persisted, the practice of 
household farming would not be legitimate. Hence, the tension between spontaneous 
actions and ridiculous policy lasted over the period of collectivization.  
 
In 1978, a famous event unveiled the drama of the agricultural reform. In that year, a 
severe drought devastated grain in Anhui province. In that environment, 18 peasants 
in Xiaogang village signed a secret contract to allocate the collectively-owned land 
and other resources among households. They committed to enforce the contract by 
pressing the blood fingerprint on the document. Among these 18 peasants were also 
                                                        
31Xu, Chongcai, Taiji Shen, Lun Woguo Gongnong Chanpin Maoyi Tiaojian ji qi Wanshan: Jianlun Woguo 
Gongnongye Xietiao Fazhan de Duiche (On the condition for the trade in industrial and agricultural products in 
China: also on the strategy for balancing the development of industrial and agricultural sectors), Caimao Jinji 
(Finance and Trade Economics), Issue 12, 1993, Pages 45-51 
32 Tang, Renjian, Yanxin Huang, Zhonghai Wang, Xinhui Zhang, Zhongguo Nongye Zhengce Gaige de Xitong 
Kaocha (The systematic investigation on the reform of China’s agricultural policy), Nongye Jingji Wenti (The 
Agricultural Issues), Issue 9, 1992, Pages 46-52 
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cadres standing out to share the risk. By the end of 1979, in Xiaogang village the 
volume of grain yield reached 133 thousand kilograms, which was equal to the total 
volume of grain yielded between 1955 and 1970. The annual income per capita was 
400 Yuan, much higher than that in 1978, which was only 22 Yuan.33 
 
The story of Xiaogang village became exaggerated over time. But the truth was not 
any less exciting. Anhui was the first province to engage in the agricultural reform. 
Three reasons explained the bold actions towards reform. The first reason was the 
drought. The natural catastrophe drove the farmers to the edge of survival, so they 
could not think of the political consequence of their illegal practice. The second 
reason was the participation of the cadres. They could practice household farming 
without drawing the attention from the upper level of the administration. The village 
was in the political mist, and the peasants were further incentivized while sharing risk 
with the cadres. The third reason was the ideological change. Wan Li, then the first 
secretary to the Anhui committee of the communist party, acknowledged the success 
of household farming and did not stick to the political correctness of collectivization. 
Moreover, he reported the success of household farming to the central authority. After 
the Cultural Revolution, the conservative wing of the party seized the power. The 
radical interpretation of communism was replaced by a pragmatic one. The leadership 
embraced the new idea that could help China to recover from the economic recession 
caused by the political movements. As Deng Xiaoping put it, “Some comrades are 
concerned if allowing the household farming would have a negative effect on the 
collective economy. I think this concern has no reason.”34 Deng focused on the 
improvement of productivity and did not discriminate among various organizational 
forms of production. Household farming was legitimated and institutionalized firstly 
in Anhui province, then the whole country. In 1982, the central committee of the CPC 
issued a document, pointing out that “the establishment of responsibility system 
overcomes the free-rider problem in the collective economy, and also the problem 
caused by the over-centralization in management.”35 In the following year, the 
central committee issued a second document on household farming, announcing, 
“Responsibility system has the property of centralization and decentralization, 
providing the peasants with an incentive to produce while retaining the public 
ownership over resources.”36 What the Party documents said on the household 
farming can be compared with Lange’s argument in the debate dated back to the 
1920s. Lange (1936) had argued that the Socialism can develop a trial-error-based 
method to find price in a simulated competitive market. What he said implies that 
                                                        
33The statistic is available under: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64387/10345382.html. It is the website of 
People daily, the official newspaper of the government.  
34Deng, Xiaoping, Selected papers of Deng Xiaoping, People’s press, 1983, p275 
35Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, 
Development Research Center of the State Council, Xinshiqi Nongye he Nongcun Gongzhuo Zhongyao Wenxian 
Xuanbian (The selection of documents in relation to the agriculture and village), Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 
(Central Documents Press), Beijing, 1992, pp115-116 
36Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, 
Development Research Center of the State Council, Xinshiqi Nongye he Nongcun Gongzhuo Zhongyao Wenxian 
Xuanbian (The selection of documents in relation to the agriculture and village), Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 
(Central Documents Press), Beijing, 1992, p165.  
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market is not incompatible with Socialism. But to make the simulated market operate, 
the economic freedom should be given to individual actors, including families, firms 
and consumers. And in that circumstance, the central planning body can calculate 
prices properly using trial-error methods.37 
 
What Lange proposed find eventually an experimental place. As indicated by the 
official documents, it was different from the traditional model in some aspects. China 
was a socialist nation so the household farming system had to contain socialist 
elements. It was distinctive by the collective ownership of farming land. In the 
practice, the land use right was transferred to households through contracting. The 
households had to pay the tax and fees to the state and handed over a fixed part of 
grain yield to the collectivity. The rest of the output went to the household. That was, 
in nature, a share-cropping contract. The Chinese characteristic here was that the 
collectivity was the landlord, so the village committee was granted the right to 
re-distribute the land if necessary.  
 
Anyway, the household responsibility system succeeded. Taking Anhui province as an 
example, the number of production teams that reverted to household farming totaled 
1200 in 1978. In the next year, the number jumped to 38,000, about 10% of the total 
number of teams. By the end of 1980, 70% of the production teams in Anhui province 
had shifted from collective farming to household farming. Other provinces like 
Sichuan, Guizhou, and Gansu also began to accept the advantage of household 
farming. In 1980, 20% of the production teams in the whole country reverted to 
household farming. The ratio increased to 50% in 1981 and 95% in 1983. Within five 
years, household farming triumphed over collective farming.38 
 
The dynamic of transition to the household responsibility system  
 
The household responsibility system emerged from the practice of the peasants. It was 
a spontaneous institutional innovation from the bottom up. The authority legitimated 
and rationalized the institutional innovation from the top down. Lin distinguished 
between induced and imposed institutional change. Induced innovation was the main 
source for institutional change while the approval of the state helped to 
institutionalize the informal practice into a stable equilibrium. In fact, if the state 
opposed the induced institutional change, it would have raised the cost of institutional 
change politically. The CPC had practiced it for several times with the aim to 
eradicate the cultural endowment. But the ideological change, if not driven by the 
environmental change, was slow (Aoki, 2001). So I will show the interaction between 
the state and the households leading to the re-introduction of the household farming 
system. The model I present here is not a regular economic model, but involves 
consideration of the political dimension.  
                                                        
37 Lange, Oskar, On the economic theory of socialism: part one, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 
(Oct., 1936), pp. 53-71. 
38 Chen, Xiwen, Yang Zhao, Dan Luo, Zhongguo Nongcun Gaige 30 Nian Huigu yu Zhanwang (On the history 
and future of China’s rural reform during 30 years), People’s press, Beijing, 2008  
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One of the most relevant features of the hierarchical system is that information is 
asymmetrically distributed across different levels of administration. Meanwhile, the 
goal also differs among households, local authorities, and the central authority. Hence, 
I assume that the households, the local authorities, and the central authority have 
different information sources and goal functions. The households choose the level of 
effort to maximize the output. However, the freedom to choose is limited for 
households in the model. The households’ only response to the institutional 
environment is shaped by the government policy. Hence, the level of effort is 
determined by the institutional factor. Further, the institutional factors affect the 
output not only by influencing the incentive of households, but also by changing the 
organizational form of production. Thus, the function of the output is as follows: 
 
                            	𝑌𝑌 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒(𝐼𝐼), 𝐼𝐼)                         (1) 
 
Where 	𝑒𝑒 denotes the effort, 𝐼𝐼 denotes the institutional factors and 𝑌𝑌 denotes the 
output. The institutional factor 𝐼𝐼 is chosen by the central authority. But the policy is 
to be implemented by the local authorities. They can decide to which degree they 
implement the policy thus influencing the value of 𝐼𝐼. Given the value of 𝐼𝐼, the 
household chooses the level of effort 𝑒𝑒. Only when the local authorities cover up the 
practice of the households can they deviate from the collectivization policy.  
 
The local authorities cannot observe effort, but only the amount of output. They are 
much more an information intermediary than a decision-maker. They neither choose 
the level of effort nor the value of institutional factor. Their job is to pass the local 
information to the central authority and implement the policy developed by the central 
authority. However, playing the role of information intermediary, they are able to 
filter information and thus influence the decision-making at the top level. I assume 
that the local authorities don’t understand the policy. They implement the policy 
because they would be punished if they don’t. And if the monitoring is not perfect, the 
local authorities can tacitly approve the reversion to the household farming if it helps 
to increase the output. In their goal function, they pay as much attention to the output 
level as the households do. So the goal function is described as follows: 
 
                       	𝐻𝐻 = V
𝑌𝑌(𝐼𝐼)															𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼X = 𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌(𝐼𝐼X) − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎			𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝐼𝐼X < 𝐼𝐼
                    (2) 
 
Where 𝑎𝑎  denotes the punishment imposed by the central authority if the local 
authorities have not implemented the policy; 𝑎𝑎  denotes the probability of the 
punishment; 𝐼𝐼X denotes the level of centralization chosen by the local authorities. 
The output level concerns the local authorities since they would be under great 
pressure if the grain is not sufficiently provided. On the other side, if they turn a blind 
eye to the improper practice, they would be punished by the central authority. 
However, the local authorities can filter the information channeled to the central 
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authority and allow the households to engage in some practices contrary to the policy. 
So the central authority may not know what happens with the probability 𝑎𝑎. 𝑎𝑎 varies 
across the local authorities. In general, the parameter 𝑎𝑎 is affected by the cooperation 
between households and local authorities. Thus, 𝑎𝑎 was low if the traditional culture 
persisted in the area. The common cultural belief created more motivation for the 
local authority to cover up the return to the household farming. And those “red zones” 
during the civil war featured a higher 𝑎𝑎. In some cases, 𝑎𝑎 is so high that 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑌𝑌(𝐼𝐼)	 
is the function that the local authorities would choose to follow.  
 
Given the goal function of the local authorities, we can reformulate the goal function 
of the households as follows: 
                       𝑌𝑌 = V
𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒(𝐼𝐼X), 𝐼𝐼X)			𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓		𝐼𝐼X < 𝐼𝐼	
𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒(𝐼𝐼), 𝐼𝐼)								𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓		𝐼𝐼X = 𝐼𝐼	
                   (3) 
 
The equation (3) shows that the households would revert to the household farming as 
soon as the local authorities allow them to do so. If the insistence on the ideology 
hurts the economic performance, the households would probably drop it. So the only 
way to make the households not to deviate from the state policy is to exercise external 
monitoring and eventually the coercive power as well.  
 
On the top of the hierarchical system is the central authority. As aforementioned, 
China’s political system features an M-form. In general, the central authority receives 
the information from local sources and develops policies based on such information. 
The goal function of central authority consists of two parts. First, the central authority 
pays attention to the economic performance on the ground that the economic 
recession would cause the crisis of governance. Second, the CPC was formed to build 
a communist paradise. So the policy also serves to pursue the political goal. Hence, 
the goal function of the central authority is as follows: 
 
                      𝐺𝐺 = 𝑌𝑌(𝐼𝐼) + 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼), 
]^
]_
> 0,
]`
]_
> 0                 (4) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑃 denotes the political goal. And I assume that the economic and political 
goals are independent of each other. To analyze the political dynamic with the model, 
we should, at first place, clarify what the institutional factor refers to. In the model, 
the institutional factor is specified to be the degree of collectivization. The strategy of 
collectivization, on the one hand, is used to improve the economic efficiency. The 
central authority learned economics from the Soviet Union and tried to transplant the 
industrial production mode to the agricultural sector. So, creating a huge-sized 
commune was the best development strategy they could image. On the other hand, the 
collectivization was thought to be the early stage of the development of the 
communist society. Hence, the strategy of collectivization is necessary to accomplish 
the political goal. 
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So, at the first round of interaction, the central authority thinks that the 
collectivization promotes both the economic and political goals. It takes the first move 
and centralizes agricultural production to the maximum degree. Here I assume that the 
maximum degree of centralization is externally given. The local authorities fully 
implement the policy. So, the value of 𝐼𝐼 is maximized for the goal function of local 
authority and households. However, the households find that the output declines after 
the collectivization due to the distorted incentive structure and information structure. 
Figure 5.1 shows the outcome of the first round of the interactions. 
 
The downward sloping curve illustrates the relationship between the collectivization 
and the level of output in the reality, while the upward sloping curve shows how the 
central authority perceives the same relationship. So, the central authority and the 
households have a different optimal degree of centralization. For the central authority, 
the maximum output, 𝑌𝑌NbH , will be achieved by increasing the degree of 
collectivization to 𝐼𝐼NbH . However, for the peasants, the over-centralization of 
production results in the decline in the volume of output. The actual volume of output 
is 𝑌𝑌Ncd. There is a large gap between 𝑌𝑌NbH and 𝑌𝑌Ncd. During the “Great leap 
forward” period, the press broadcasted that the productivity of the agricultural sector 
had improved rapidly. The central authority was satisfied with the great achievement 
and furthered the irrational practice. On the other side, the peasants suffered from the 
shortage of the food and some died of malnutrition.  
 
The local authorities, conscious of the institutional flaws and its disastrous 
consequence, responded in order to mitigate the crisis in the second round of 
interaction. They responded in two ways. First, they provided fake information to the 
central authority showing that the collectivization was a successful policy. In doing so, 
they attempted to avoid punishment from the central authority. Second, they relaxed 
the restriction on the household farming to mitigate the production crisis. But they 
only did this when the probability of being punished was sufficiently low and the 
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benefit generated from the institutional shift was sufficiently high. Under certain 
circumstances, it was rational for the local authorities to bear the risk of reverting to 
the household farming. The following figure provides a detailed explanation. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the second round of interaction. The local authorities find that 
the productivity declines sharply due to the collectivization. Contrary to their 
predictions, the collectivization movement generates an economic recession. Hence, 
the local authorities try to slow down the implementation of the radical policy. The 
cost of covering up the spontaneous practice of households is the punishment from the 
top down. Only when the benefit of institutional deviation exceeds the cost incurred 
by the punishment, would the local authorities choose to bear the political risk. The 
point 𝐼𝐼e presents a threshold value. If the value of 𝐼𝐼 chosen by the central authority 
is higher than 𝐼𝐼e, the local authorities would choose to cooperate with the households 
and allow them to engage in household farming. If the value of 𝐼𝐼 is lower than 𝐼𝐼e, 
the local authority would implement the policy without any attempt to deviate from it. 
So, as mentioned earlier, the parameter 𝑎𝑎 is important as it determines the value of 
𝐼𝐼e . Implicitly, it measures the degree to which the authority can endure the 
consequence of the collectivization policy. In the case of the high probability of being 
punished, combined with the harsh punishment, the local authority would not betray 
the ideology of communism. Figure 5.3 illustrates that kind of cases. However, if they 
decide to deviate from the instruction, they would introduce the household farming 
system, but not put forward a moderate reform scheme, which means they choose the 
point T as the new equilibrium.  
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Let us compare the model economy with the real economy. First, the parameter a 
varies across the local authorities. As aforementioned, the value of a depends on the 
degree to which the local authorities were captured by the rural communities. If they 
cooperated tightly, the local authorities were willing to bear the risk of deviating from 
the instructions from the top down. However, the traditional order was in fact 
replaced by the communist organization, which changed the link between households 
and local authorities fundamentally. In that kind of environment, the value of a was 
supposed to increase. Anyway, the tension resulted in the temporary reversion to 
household farming. From 1956 to 1962, China experienced three waves of bottom-up 
institutional transition from collective farming to household farming. The Anhui, 
Sichuan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hebei and Guangdong provinces engaged in this 
“underground” agricultural reform. In most areas, the household farming system was 
re-introduced. And in some areas, the reform was moderate. They only decentralized 
the production to the team level.  
 
An economic system works usually on the basis of a set of widely accepted rules. 
They can be laws, social norms, etiquette, and something like that. But, a collective 
farming system was enforced by the coercive policing power. There was no common 
belief formed from the working of the collective farming system as long as the gap 
between 𝐼𝐼X and 𝐼𝐼 existed. And the direction of institutional change depends largely 
on the decision of the central authority. However, the practice of households and local 
authorities forms a source of information that is also important to the decision-making 
of the central authority. At the third round of interaction, the central authority comes 
to realize two truths by the observation. First, the relationship between the 
collectivization and the productivity should be negative. Second, the low efficiency 
underlying the commune-style collectivization created a lot of motivation for the rural 
households and local authorities to deviate from the state policy. They would 
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challenge the policy again and again as long as the degree of collectivization exceeds 
the average threshold value. But some of the local authorities, while having a high 
value of 𝑎𝑎, choose to go on with the collective farming and end up in the sharp 
decline of grain yield. Hence, the central authority realizes that the collectivization 
affects the productivity in a negative way and thus modifies the goal function. To 
maximize the modified goal function, the central authority should choose the value of 
I that meets the following condition: 
 
−
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌
𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼
=
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼
 
 
Let 𝐼𝐼g  denote the degree of collectivization in equilibrium. If the political 
achievement accounts for a small share in the goal function, 𝐼𝐼g is probably smaller 
than 𝐼𝐼e . In that case, the central authority would choose a moderate degree of 
collectivization and the local authorities would also follow. However, as a matter of 
fact, the institution of the people’s commune is not a way to, but a part of the 
communist dream. So, the share of the political concern in the goal function could be 
sufficiently high so that 𝐼𝐼g  is higher than 𝐼𝐼e . Interestingly, though the central 
authority wants to fashion an institution with more collectivist elements, it would 
accept a moderate scheme in practice because the over-collectivization creates the 
motivation for the households and local authorities to revert to the household farming. 
China experienced it three times and learned that a moderate scheme might be 
acceptable for both central and local authorities. If the central authority chooses 𝐼𝐼e, 
there is no reason for local authorities to move away from this point. 
 
Compared to the model, the collectivization movement in China showed a similar 
pattern. After several years of experimenting with the people’s commune, the central 
authority acknowledged the failure of the over-collectivization. The reform was 
carried out in two ways to deal with the institutional flaws. First, the production unit 
was slimmed down to the team. Thus, monitoring and management costs were 
reduced enormously. Second, the work points system was introduced to create 
incentives for the peasants. In doing so, productivity was moderately improved. This 
less radical strategy of collectivization generated a stable equilibrium. Further 
decentralization was not allowed by the central committee of the CPC. According to 
Mao, slimming down the production unit to the team solved the efficiency problem 
perfectly. It was not necessary to slim it down further to the household. Any form of 
further decentralization would shake the foundation of the collectivist economy.  
 
So, the households must await the ideological change. In 1978, the conservative wing 
of the CPC decided to terminate the Cultural Revolution and focus on economic 
development. Deng suggested that economic development should not be affected by 
the controversy over the ideology. He pointed out sophisticatedly that household 
farming was not necessarily associated with capitalism. Thus, the central authority 
removed 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼) from the goal function and allowed the households to take the 
96 
 
responsibility of production. As a result, the household responsibility system emerged.  
 
This model has several implications. First, the decentralized form of economy is the 
most efficient as it maximizes the utilization of the local information. Second, the 
ideology affects the economic performance. In some cases, specific ideology is 
conducive to the economy, for example, the protestant ethic, while in some other 
cases economic growth is deterred by the ideology. So the model suggests the 
significance of ideological change to the economic reform. In China’s case, the sharp 
turn to the pragmatism removed the political obstacle to the market reform so that the 
reform could be furthered without disturbing the social order. Third, the local 
authorities play an important role with respect to the information channeling and 
policy implementation. More autonomous right is granted to the local authorities, 
more flexibility is added to the political system as well as the economic system to 
avoid the impact of irrational policy made on the top of the hierarchical system. Mao 
strove to decentralize the political power and ended up in creating an M-form political 
system. Yet, this multi-layer structure produced an obstacle for the implementation of 
his own policy. At last, Mao, the most powerful leader ever, compromised while 
facing the uproar among the local authorities and households.  
 
The advantage of household farming  
 
After relaxing ideological control and approving the agricultural reform from the 
bottom up, the central authority institutionalized the spontaneous practice of 
households into the household responsibility system. Given the institutional resources 
and social capital available in the early stage of development of the market, household 
farming was the most efficient production method for Chinese agriculture. I will 
conduct a theoretical analysis comparing the different production methods, and 
discuss the role of household farming in the context of the Chinese economy in the 
1980s. 
 
According to simplistic neoclassical dichotomy, there are two ways to organize 
production: the market and firm. For agriculture, the household seems to be the third 
way featuring a network cooperative structure. Household farming is an old tradition 
that can be traced back thousands of years. From a viewpoint of behavioral rationality, 
it must be adaptive to the nature of agricultural production. Hence, household farming 
is supposed to outperform other forms of production methods in most cases. I will 
show the advantages of household farming by comparing it with contractual farming 
(more a hypothetical approach, not often practiced) and corporate farming. 
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Figure 5.4 illustrates three different ways to organize agricultural production. The first 
row presents household farming. Household farming is a decentralized and segregated 
form of agricultural production, and also the most popular one in human history. 
Households are the basic production units. They produce and sell grains, vegetables, 
meats and other agricultural products, receiving income as a return for their labor and 
to the ownership of land, if they also own the land. If the land is owned by a landlord, 
the income is separated according to the land/labor productivity ratio. Collaboration 
between households is not necessary, except for the construction of irrigation systems, 
the building of roads, and other public projects, which used to be organized by the 
clan in China. So, this production system features a high degree of decentralization 
and involves low transaction costs. 
 
The second column illustrates contractual farming. By the term “contractual farming,” 
I refer to the production method where production is broken into different stages and 
coordinated by a spectrum of contractual relationships. Breaking the production into 
different stages enables a high level of specialization. Moreover, the entire production 
process is coordinated through price signals. So the cost of management and 
monitoring (the visible hand) should be low. 
 
However, contractual farming is not a practical production method. The specialization 
is based on the prerequisite that different stages of production are independent of each 
other. For example, a worker can assemble a smartphone without mastering the 
knowledge of CPU development. A worker focuses on a limited scope of products or 
services and that is enough. However, agriculture is different. Taking growing grains 
as an example, there is continuity between sowing and harvest. The continuity in 
information is very important for the peasants to take care of the grains. So, the 
household farming takes advantage of a spill-over effect of production chain 
integration and the benefit of the integration may outweigh that of the specialization, 
especially when the market is less developed. 
 
Besides, the cost of specialization is high for agriculture. First, it is very difficult to 
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break agricultural production into different stages as it involves no intermediary 
products. In other words, agricultural production is not modular-based while 
industrial production is. Second, most farming tasks must be done in time sequence. 
This also raises the cost of specialization. Thus, promoting specialization in the 
agricultural sector is more difficult than in the industrial sector. So, contractual 
farming may not be efficient because of the low benefit and high cost. 
 
The third one is corporate farming. A company owns a large area of land and employs 
peasants to work on it. We should clarify if it is beneficial to assemble thousands of 
peasants in a firm and make them work together. Corporate farming brings about two 
kinds of benefits: it can increase the degree of specialization and benefit from 
economies of scale. The price for that is the creation of an incentive to shirk. In the 
industrial sector, one can control the quality of intermediary products instead of 
monitoring individual employees. However, because agricultural production involves 
no intermediary products, it is not possible to avoid a shirking problem by controlling 
the quality of the intermediary products. Also, an hourly wage does not provide the 
workers with sufficient incentive to maximize their efforts.  
 
In practice, there are two ways to solve the shirking problem (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Bazel, 1997; Williamson, 
1985). The first one is monitoring. According to Alchian and Demsetz, the firm 
emerges to manage the cooperative teams and solve the shirking problem which may 
destroy the cooperation. Without the price of intermediary products, the question of 
how to measure the marginal productivity of individual peasant becomes a problem. 
Hence, the nature of the shirking problem is informational, and monitoring is a 
mechanism to collect the information. Although monitoring economizes the 
information cost, the cost of monitoring may outweigh the benefit of corporate 
farming. Corporate farming will be beneficial for a specific area of agriculture, such 
as hog production, only when the firm is big enough. 
 
The second way to solve the shirking problem is to increase the cost of shirking. As 
Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model shows, the firm can pay the peasants more than the 
average wage. So, if the peasants get the sack for their shirking behavior, their next 
job may not offer them an equally high wage. In that way, the incentive wage raises 
the cost of shirking. It also depends on the intensity of competition in the labor market. 
In practice, the combination of both strategies is preferred over a single one. It 
resembles a “carrot and stick” strategy.  
 
In summary, compared to contractual farming, household farming maintains only a 
minimum degree of specialization and generates the benefits from the so-called 
“spill-over” effect of integration of production. Due to the special nature of 
agriculture, the cost of specialization is probably higher than the benefit it generates. 
In that regard, the market is not the best way to coordinate agricultural production. In 
that sense, household farming is superior to contractual farming. On the other hand, 
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compared to corporate farming, household farming solves the incentive problem in a 
more efficient way.  
 
In most cultures, people are taught to be altruistic to their family members. Hence, the 
incentive to shirk is minimized if the scope of the cooperative team is limited to the 
household. As the other regarding behavior is embedded in the culture, there is no 
additional cost to be paid for solving the incentive problem. Household farming 
minimizes the monitoring cost, yet does not benefit from economies of scale. On the 
contrary, corporate farming generates the benefit from large-scale cooperation, yet it 
needs to afford to pay the cost of monitoring. Hence, it is possible that the big-sized 
firms coexist with numerous small households in specific areas of agriculture.   
 
However, the coexistence of corporate and household farming is only possible when 
the size of a market is sufficiently large. Besides, the factor market must be liberalized 
to ensure free allocation of factors such as labor and land. The annoying point is that 
the Chinese market was neither big nor liberalized in the 1980s. As regards to the 
labor market, the household registration system caused isolation between the rural and 
urban populations and restricted the mobility of labor across regions. Therefore, it 
fragmented the labor market. 
 
Moreover, the labor market was embedded in the relation-based culture. An 
impersonal labor market requires the common understanding of the modern business 
model, including the formal employment contract, the negotiation of wages, and the 
third-party enforcement of the contract. It was impossible to establish a labor market 
of that sort while the traditional culture persisted. Indeed, the informal culture 
impeded the development of the labor market. For the peasants, employment changed 
the personal relationship into a cold, contractual relationship, which means repeated 
interactions were broken into many independent one-shot interactions. As mentioned 
earlier, in a fully developed large-sized market, it is beneficial to switch from the 
relation-based culture to the impersonal market. However, if the market is less 
developed and “thin”, the best strategy for the peasants is to be loyal to the culture. 
Moreover, the institutional change involves a coordination problem. If the common 
belief among the population is not to be changed, it is not beneficial for an individual 
to be a “pagan”. In practice, the peasants would be accused of hiring their relatives or 
countrymen.39 
 
The conflict can also be understood from a contractual perspective. It is a choice 
between the implicit contract (personal relationship) and the explicit contract 
(employment contract). The explicit contract has a narrow and specific scope with 
detailed terms while the implicit contract is general and vague. The implicit contract 
cannot be replaced by the explicit one if the economic system is embedded in the 
networked environment. It was considered unfriendly to employ a peasant from 
                                                        
39 In an interview, a peasant denied the suggestion of employing the farmers who were his relatives, although he 
could expand production in that way. He said that, if he did so, he would destroy his status in the village forever. 
He could ask his relatives to help by offering a gift but could not be the boss of his relatives. 
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outside the village without asking the relatives. In a relation-based system, the 
relatives had the privilege to share the excessive benefit and new opportunities. The 
same principle also applied to the land market. 
 
So, on one hand, the household registration policy restricted geographic mobility and 
thus impeded the development of the labor market. On the other hand, the prevalence 
of the relation-based culture imposed a barrier to the dis-embedding of the labor 
market from the networked environment. Therefore, in the early stage of the 
economic reform, the labor market was not fully developed and could not support 
production methods other than household farming. 
 
Similar to the labor market, the land market was also regulated and embedded in the 
social relation. The major problem was the collective land tenure system. It enabled 
the village authorities to redistribute the land among households, which was a big 
problem for the free exchange of land. Besides, land leasing and another form of land 
transfer were also embedded in the social relation, and the collective land tenure 
system reinforced the embedment. I will discuss it later with some sampling data. 
 
Contrary to household farming, more complicated production methods such as 
corporate farming and contractual farming rely significantly on the efficient working 
of the land and labor markets. Yet, household farming requires only the culture as its 
foundation. As the culture had been already available, it was not very costly to 
re-introduce household farming system for the production order in the agricultural 
sector.  
 
5.3 The Collective Land Tenure System  
 
The communal system was abolished while the collective land tenure system was 
retained. It was retained because it was thought to be the foundation of the socialist 
economy. Collective land ownership differs from private ownership. However, they 
share some structures in common. In general, there are three basic elements of the 
ownership right: the use right, the right to transfer, and the income right.  
 
First, under the collective land tenure system, the land use right is contracted to rural 
households. It seems that households have exclusive land use rights. However, the use 
of land must be aligned with the government policy. In particular, households are not 
allowed to use the farmland for purposes other than farming. Second, the right to 
transfer land is incomplete. The mutual agreement is insufficient to complete the land 
transfer. A land transfer contract is only effective when approved by the landowner, as 
here referring to the collective, and registered with the land authority. Yet, the land 
use right can also be transferred through social relation without getting the formal 
institution involved. Third, the income generated from the use of farmland goes to the 
households. This arrangement creates the incentive for rural households to maximize 
the efforts.  
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With respect to these three basic elements of property right, the collective land tenure 
system seems to be similar to a private one, though more or less regulated and 
distorted in some aspects. However, there is still a major difference. The regulatory 
authority realized the importance of ensuring long-term private control over land to 
maximize the production efficiency, so they enacted the law to extend the land leasing 
for another 30 years. Indeed, if the land leasing was eternal, there would be almost no 
difference between the collective land tenure system and the private one. However, in 
practice, the village needed to tie up the share of collective land ownership with the 
membership of the community to enforce the collective ownership. Therefore, the 
village authority was under pressure to redistribute the land among households if the 
population changed. The frequent redistribution destabilized the contractual 
relationship between the collectives and the households, thus undermining the 
incentive of peasants to invest in land cultivation. Moreover, the government was 
granted the right to expropriate the farmland. The abuse of the powers of 
expropriation aggravated the problem of incomplete ownership. 
 
To minimize the negative impact of redistribution of farmland on a regular basis, 
households tended to conclude short-term land transfer contracts. Further, they also 
relied on the social relations and cultural norms to solve the issues in relation to land 
because it involved low costs in that kind of environment. As mentioned earlier, under 
a relation-based trading system, the contract can be enforced by the credible threats of 
terminating a long-term relationship, the reputation, and the collective punishment. As 
long as the common cultural belief has been formed, there is not much additional cost 
involved to solve a dispute. However, the lawsuit is a risk-dominant strategy. It is too 
costly for a contract of low value, and those who try to seek protection of the formal 
institution would also be discredited. So, the institutional transition is only possible 
when the market value of land rises and the common cultural belief disintegrates. 
 
I draw on some empirical studies to show that the land market was embedded in the 
relation-based culture. In 2005, Renmin University and RDI conducted a sample 
survey in the rural areas of 17 provinces, covering 90% of China’s rural population. 
The research team received 1962 questionnaires from 1773 villages. Their findings 
(Ye, Jiang and Feng, 2006; Ye et al, 2006; Zhu et al, 2006) reflected four features of 
the Chinese rural land market. First, the rural land market was not very active. The 
survey findings suggested that 67% of the peasants were never involved in land 
transfers. Among those who had experience of land leasing, 65% only transferred the 
use right of a part of the land they hold. As the research team estimated, only 
one-third of the peasants and 10% of total farmland was involved in the land 
circulation. About half the transfers were not commercial, but occurred between 
relatives or friends, taking the form of oral contracts and required no monetary 
payment. They were part of the “gift exchange system”, not the modern market 
economy.  
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Second, the price of land use rights was affected by non-market factors. About 87.6% 
of farmland was transferred to relatives or acquaintances. According to the cultural 
norm, it is shameful for the peasants to require monetary compensation from relatives 
or acquaintances for the land transfer. Thus, about half the land transfer contracts 
contained no payment. However, the peasants did require payment when transferring 
land to strangers. The rent of land was affected by the “differential mode of 
association”. The peasants took the personal relationships into consideration while 
transferring the land use rights.  
 
Third, the leasing time was not specified in the contract. 46% of the peasants who had 
leased farmland to others had open contracts, with 27% of them signing a one-year 
contract. Only 6% of the land transfer contracts specified a leasing period of over 10 
years. The open contract was popular because, under the relation-based trading 
system, ex-post renegotiation was more efficient than ex-ante contract specification. 
As the land use right was not secure, the peasants preferred short-term contracts over 
long-term ones. Compared to the 2001 survey findings, the number of long-term 
contracts rose and the number of open contracts declined, although they still 
dominated. 
 
Fourth, most (86%) of the land transfer contracts were oral. If a contract was not 
intended to be enforced by the legal system, it was not necessary for parties to have a 
contract in written form. Among the contracts in written form, 46% were formulated 
by both parties and 22% were formulated by third parties, among others, the lawyers. 
It was not necessary for the parties to buy the services from lawyers because the 
contracts were obviously meant for the eyes of the parties and countrymen. The 
language used to formulate the contract might be significantly different from that used 
in the formal legal document. The rhetoric has already divided the society into 
different classes.  
 
As shown above, the empirical study suggested strongly that the land market was 
embedded in the relation-based culture. One major reason was that the land rights 
were more secure under the relation-based trading system than under the rule-based 
one. As mentioned, to enforce the collective land ownership, the local authorities 
redistributed the land among households when the population changed. In that kind of 
environment, open land transfer contracts were more efficient. Besides, the land 
transfer should be approved by the collectives and registered with the land authorities. 
It would also form an obstacle to the free exchange of land use rights. In practice, 
most of the land transfer contracts were executed without the approval of the 
collectives. As long as the personal relationship ensured the effectiveness of the land 
transfer contracts, it was more beneficial for the peasants to avoid the interference of 
the collectives. Embedding the land transfer in the networked environment minimized 
the negative impact of collective land ownership, as the collective land ownership was 
a part of a formal institution. 
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There were two forces dis-embedding the land market from the relation-based culture. 
One was the change in the institutional environment. Realizing that insecure land 
rights affected economic performance negatively, the central government introduced a 
policy to protect the long-term contracts between collectives and households and 
prohibited the redistribution of land. Contracts would be preserved in written form 
and land certificates were issued to the households. The survey found out that the 
peasants holding the contract documents and land certificates tended to increase the 
investment in land cultivation, which shows the effectiveness of the policy. If the 
formal institution protected the land rights effectively, it would become beneficial for 
peasants to follow the formal rules. The other force is the rising value of land. As I 
have argued above, the money incentive could crowd out other incentives. If the land 
use right was priced high enough, the peasant might seek the institutionalized 
protection over the land transfer contract to ensure the maximization of benefit. A 
comparison between the land markets in 2005 and 2008 shows the change.  
 
In 2008, Renmin University and RDI conducted another survey using the same 
method and in the same areas (Ye et al, 2010). They found that the size of the land 
market, measured in term of households which had ever involved in the land transfer, 
remained unchanged compared to 2005. The oral contract, the open contract, and the 
transfer between relatives were still popular. For example, about 80% of the transfers 
were not registered by, and without the consent of the collectives. 
 
The survey in 2008 also suggested some changes. Among others, the share of 
“gift-style” land transfer fell sharply from 50.9% in 2005 to 38.6% in 2008. It 
suggested that the value of land increased so much that the peasants were incentivized 
to impose the formal institution to ensure the land transfer. In fact, the average price 
of a Chinese acre of land was 248 Yuan per year in 2008, much higher than 133 Yuan 
in 2005. Moreover, the number of the long-term contracts which cover a period of 
more than 10 years increased. However, the impact of personal relationships on land 
transfers should not be underestimated. After all, as long as the expectation was 
formed and the social network established, it was quite natural and convenient to rely 
on the personal relationships. Yet the shift to the formal institution involved a painful 
learning process. 
 
5.4 The Success of the Household Responsibility System 
 
As we may deduce, the introduction of the household responsibility system helped to 
improve the production efficiency in the rural sector. However, was it the only factor 
explaining the rapid growth of the rural sector? Lin (1991) named several possible 
reasons, among others, technological improvement (including the adoption of hybrid 
rice), massive use of fertilizer, and increasing state procurement prices. He came to 
the similar conclusion as Wen and Macmillan that institutional change played the 
most relevant role in achieving the quick growth.  
 
104 
 
Carter and Zhang (1994) suggested that during 1978-1989, Eastern Europe, although 
not carrying out as deep a privatization reform as China, also improved agricultural 
production efficiency to a degree comparable to that achieved by China. Thus, they 
argued that China’s attempt to replace collective farming with household farming did 
not contribute a lot to the improvement of efficiency in the agricultural sector. 
According to them, the reason for the strong growth during the 1980s was the 
expanded supply of factors. However, Csaki (1992) indicated that there are three 
waves of reform in central Eastern Europe. The first wave of reform occurred shortly 
after the collectivization of the agricultural sector. The recession that accompanied the 
collectivization movement induced a policy reversal to decentralization. However, the 
policy was more explored than implemented. The second wave of reform occurred in 
the second half of the 1970s. The output of the agricultural sector could not meet 
consumer demand. Under the pressure of the shortage of crops, the policy explored in 
the first wave of reform was implemented, albeit partially. The third wave of reform 
took place during 1985-1989. Csaki summarized the central objectives of reforms as 
follows: 
 
l Improve efficiency and quality over mere quantitative production increases; 
l Move towards a price policy that reflected real production costs; 
l Increase the role of financial incentives; 
l Augment firm’s decision making autonomy; 
l Widen the possibilities for private agricultural production. 
 
I will check these five policies with China’s similar strategies. The first deals with the 
shirking problem arising from the difficulty in monitoring the efforts, which I have 
already discussed in the part on the “work points system”. The second can be 
compared with China’s increasing of the state procurement price, which was also one 
of the reasons to explain the agricultural growth. The third has yet to be discussed 
because Chinese peasants have limited access to financial institutions. I will discuss it 
in the chapter on the financial sector. The fourth is to break communes into teams and 
further into households. The last policy is to transform the collective ownership 
system into a quasi-private one. So, the policies implemented in Central Eastern 
Europe were by nature not very different from China’s policies explored and 
implemented at the same time. They both had to solve the problem arising from 
distorted information and the incentive structure underlying the collective production 
system. They solved it in the same way. So, the conclusion that the privatization 
reform played no relevant role in restoring the efficiency of the agriculture is not very 
persuasive. 
 
Carter and Zhang claimed that the prevalence of many cooperatives after the reform is 
evidence for the non-importance of institutional reform. Collectivization was not the 
reason for the economic tragedy. But as Lin argued, collective farming could be 
efficient if the right to exit from the commune is granted. As a result, the one-shot 
game is transformed to be a repeated game. In that sense, the cooperative equilibrium 
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is sustainable for collective farming and the collective system has the advantage in 
coordinating large projects involving high fixed costs. Then it could survive the 
competition with the household farming system. In China, there are also towns and 
villages insisting on the collective economic system. Some of them were successful 
with regard to the rural industrialization. 
 
Some scholars were positioned in between. They acknowledged the importance of 
institutional reform but did not think that it was fundamental to the rapid growth of 
agriculture. Huang and Rozelle (1996) indicated technology adoption as the most 
important determinant of rice yield growth using data from China’s 13 rice-growing 
provinces. 
 
During 1978-1984, technology adoption and institutional change accounted for 40 
percent and 30 percent of the growth respectively. During 1985-1990, technology 
adoption accounted for all the growth in rice yield. Their argument is open to 
criticism. The most controversial part of their argument was to consider the 
institutional reform as working at the same level as the adoption of technology. Lin 
(1991) made an inquiry to see the impact of institutional change on technology 
adoption. He studied the adoption of hybrid rice under the collective and household 
farming systems, testing the hypothesis against the time-series cross-county data on 
hybrid rice diffusion in Hunan province during 1976-1986. He came to the conclusion 
that during the collectivist period, the adoption behavior was not consistent with the 
institutional background due to the political pressure on the diffusion of hybrid rice. 
For the household farming system, the adoption behavior was consistent with the 
prediction of the model. The diffusion of hybrid rice was beneficial when it was a 
result of the economic calculation under the household farming system, rather than 
the political pressure under the collective farming system. China’s practice showed 
that the adoption of hybrid rice will be beneficial if the land-labor ratio is low 
(Janaiah and Hossain, 2003).  
 
Although the institutional change was not the only source for the growth, it was a 
prerequisite. The role of institutional change was not equal to that of technological 
improvement, massive use of fertilizer or development of hybrid rice. It introduced a 
new way to organize and coordinate production. It provided farmers with incentives 
and facilitated the use of information. Under the new rules of the game, farmers had 
the incentive to use advanced technologies, fertilizers, and any other means that could 
improve the production efficiency. So, the implication for development policy is that 
the institutional factor is more important than the technological factor. The technology 
can only be integrated into the production system when the institution encourages it. 
 
5.5 Summary and Implications for Further Studies 
 
During the 1950s, the Chinese government engaged to replace the household farming 
system with the collective farming system. In a short time, it was developed into an 
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irrational “communal dining system”. The demand-based distribution scheme was 
introduced to replace the contribution-based scheme, which unexpectedly created a lot 
of motivation for the peasants to shirk. Ironically, the enthusiasm towards the ideal 
commune evolved into a monstrous social wave carrying the Chinese economy into a 
desperate crisis. During the “Great Leap Forward” period, a terrible famine killed 
millions of people. To alleviate the crisis, a compromise was made. 
 
First, the commune was broken into production brigades and further into production 
teams. The slimming down of the production unit improved the efficiency of decision 
making and thus productivity as well. Second, a scheme of work points was 
introduced to provide farmers with incentives. It was a strategy to corporatize the 
agricultural sector. However, due to the continuity nature of agricultural production, 
the inaccurate measurement of the contribution of individual farmers could not create 
sufficient incentives.  
 
After the Cultural Revolution, the central authority relaxed its ideological control and 
institutionalized the spontaneous practice of household farming. The household 
farming system economized the information cost, thus taking the advantage over 
corporate and contractual farming, especially in the early stage of the reform where 
the network size was small and the factor market not liberalized. So, the shift to the 
household farming was fairly rational for the Chinese rural sector.  
 
The introduction of the household responsibility system did not merely improve the 
productivity in the rural sector. It had several consequences affecting the further 
reform. First, the household responsibility system was supposed to be responsible for 
land fragmentation, which imposed an obstacle to the mechanization of agricultural 
production. However, the low ratio of land to labor should be ascribed to the 
underdeveloped economy and its odd structure. As the industrialization proceeded, the 
transfer of labor from rural sector to industrial sector solved the problem.  
 
Second, controversy persisted over the collective land tenure system. According to the 
neoclassical theory, the collective land tenure system should be further reformed into 
a quasi-private, if not a genuine private system, so as to maximize the value of land. 
However, the opponents (Polanyi, 1944; He, 2010) argued that land cannot be 
considered merely a production factor but a means of social insurance. If the migrant 
workers cannot settle in the urban area, they can always go back to the villages and 
work on the responsible farmland. The argument of that sort is not quite pervasive. 
The perfect rationality implies that individuals always make the right decisions and so 
they should be granted the freedom to choose. However, in practice, processing 
information requires knowledge and efforts. A farmer may not be as far-sighted as the 
theory expects, not that far compared to homo economicus. Hence, in the early stage 
of the reform, it might be better to enforce the collective land ownership by 
associating it with the membership of a community. In fact, the economic model 
oversimplifies the practice. Under certain circumstances, liberalizing land market is 
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beneficial. But when and how can we carry out the further reform to liberalize the 
land market in total? It is a question that deserves a deep and wide study. 
 
Third, the introduction of the household responsibility system affected the 
coordination and mobilization ability of the rural communities. As aforementioned, 
the local authorities in areas where the control of the CPC was established late 
demonstrated enthusiasm towards the implementation of the national policy. In doing 
so, they gave the signal of their loyalty to the leadership. So, the peasants in those 
areas suffered more because of the strict implementation of the irrational policy. The 
culture was not integrated into the formal institution, but disintegrated into distrust. 
Hence, when the economic crisis came, the peasants in those areas were the first to 
choose to return to household farming. Lacking trust against public administration, 
they decided to distribute the collectively-owned resources to individual households 
and rely totally on themselves. It was generally fine when it only came to the 
agricultural production. However, the local authorities also lost the ability to mobilize 
the resources and coordinate the public projects. Conversely, some other collectives 
where the trust persisted went the way of rural industrialization, which fueled China’s 
growth enormously. 
 
In sum, the household responsibility system serves as first step of the great 
transformation. It is an institution of household farming in nature and is not new if we 
compare it with the traditional Chinese farming system. What interests us is how 
Chinese peasants decide to deviate from the collective farming system and go back to 
the household farming. Moreover, their interaction with local and central authorities 
results in an innovative form of household farming with the collective land right 
unchanged. It creates a dual-system to make the land right stable at the lower level on 
the one hand and make households the central production unit on the other. Hence, 
this system provides both insurance and incentive to the peasants.  
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6. Rural Industrialization and TVEs in China 
 
Only the recovery of the agricultural sector could not ensure the high speed of 
economic growth. As shown by the experience of advanced economies, 
industrialization is the only option for creating an economic superpower. For China at 
that time, the state-owned sector, which had advantages as well as privileges in the 
economic hierarchical system, was supposed to perform this task. However, due to a 
lack of incentives the performance of the state-owned sector was only average.40 
Compared to the limited contribution of the state-owned sector, rural industrialization 
succeeded and played a relevant role in transforming the Chinese economy from a 
fully planned to a mixed economy. 
 
Rural industrialization is considered an option for developing countries to accelerate 
the process of industrialization. It has several advantages for the local economy. First, 
it utilizes idle or underemployed labor in the agricultural sector, improving the 
efficiency of agricultural production and the average income for the peasants 
employed in the non-farm and farm sectors. Second, it turns peasants into industrial 
workers. Workers require not only the skills, but the understanding of massive 
collaboration. Rural industrial firms offer opportunities for training peasants. Third, 
rural industrial firms are supposed to perform a supporting role in agricultural 
production. Some of them are established with the aim to produce fertilizer, 
machinery and equipment necessary for agricultural production. Due to these 
advantages, rural industrialization was popular in Asia. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Taiwan were engaged in the development of the rural industry. Some of them 
succeeded and others failed. In rural Indonesia, the clustered microenterprises 
performed a seedbed function for industrial development (Weijland, 1999). In Taiwan, 
the industry grew up in rural areas and extended households thrived. (Lavely, 1990). 
Contrary to the success in Indonesia and Taiwan, due to some institutional barriers, 
the output and employment of rural industrial sector was rather stagnant in India 
(Mukherjee and Zhang, 2007). At any rate, they could not be compared with the rural 
industrialization in China with regard to scope and scale and the overall impact on the 
economy. Further, China’s practice was complicated by the fact that its rural 
industrialization occurred in a transitional economy. We may ask how could 
industrialization be initiated and succeeded in the rural areas lacking institutional 
resources as well as physical capital. This question raises a challenge to the existing 
economic theory. 
 
The experience of China’s rural industrialization was unique as it was a spontaneous 
strategy not intended from the top down, and was carried out exclusively by the 
township and village enterprises (TVEs). The rise of TVEs was the most astonishing 
and unexpected event during China’s economic transition. Three questions are to be 
addressed. First, the emergence of TVEs was not anticipated. The rural 
                                                        
40 See Harvie, Charles, China's township and village enterprises and their evolving business alliances and 
organizational change, Working Paper 99-6, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, 1999 
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industrialization was a coordination problem in nature and it was perfectly solved. 
Second, the persistence of common property institutions needs explanation because 
they were not supposed to be incentive-compatible. In reality, they survived and 
prospered. Third, besides survival, TVEs adapted to the transitional economy and 
contributed significantly to industrialization and economic growth - a success worthy 
of more attention. 
 
6.1 What are TVEs? 
 
Before any further analysis, we should first examine the nature of TVEs. The literal 
meaning of a TVE depicts its geographical feature. A TVE should be located in a 
town or village. Further, we can find this term in the official document enacted in 
1996, called the Codes on TVEs. In it, TVEs refer to enterprises collectively owned or 
invested by peasants performing a supporting role in agricultural production. Towns, 
villages, or individual peasants should either own more than 50% of a TVE or be able 
to control and manage it. With respect to operation sites, TVEs can be divided into 
two categories, the township enterprise and the village enterprise, which may differ in 
some aspects. It is assumed that the association of village enterprises with the local 
authority is not as tight as that of township enterprises because the village committee 
is not a government body. 
 
Hence, according to the general understanding, TVEs were distinctive by its operation 
sites as well as the ownership structure. First, TVEs were supposed to operate in rural 
areas, with most employees being peasants. As the TVEs grew, some might establish a 
presence in urban areas, such as sales departments. However, they were still identified 
as TVEs as they were headquartered in the rural areas and controlled by the rural 
community or households. 
 
The second character of the TVEs is associated with its ownership structure. Under 
the impact of market reform and governmental policy, the organizational form of 
TVEs was highly diversified. During the early stage of rural industrialization, most 
TVEs were collective properties. However, as the economy continued to grow, a 
tendency towards privatization appeared. First, more rural households quit farming 
and opened up private establishments. The proportion of household-run and 
multi-household-run establishments in TVEs increased continuously. Second, “red 
cap” TVEs emerged. Individuals invested in and controlled these TVEs, but the TVEs 
were registered as collectively owned enterprises. The “red cap” provided political 
safety and additional access to resources, but also invited government intervention. 
Therefore, a more sophisticated strategy was used to avoid punishment by the 
government. A hybrid form of ownership was invented to create a balance between 
public and individual interests, called the corporate cooperative. By the end of the 
1990s, as a combined result of market development and a radical turn of 
governmental policy, the majority of the collectively owned TVEs were privatized. 
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There were three types of TVE ownership. The first one is collective ownership. 
Some economists considered the TVE a vaguely defined cooperative because of its 
collective nature. Although nominal ownership was assigned to the entire members of 
a village or town, the TVE employees were authorized to use resources according to 
the specified rules, sharing something in common with private ownership. However, 
as “shareholders” of the TVE, members were deprived of the right to transfer their 
“shares” to others. Also, their claim to the income was not complete because they did 
not know the exact amount of shares held. Actually, the principle of egalitarianism 
was applied to income distribution without or with limited attention to the individual 
contribution. Members must stay in the community to possess a share of the 
ownership, which was withdrawn once they leave the community. In short, the 
collective ownership was attached to the membership of collectivity. In that sense, the 
ownership of TVEs was not clearly defined. However, this may provide some 
advantages for an emerging market. 
 
The second type of TVE ownership is hybrid ownership. In the Wenzhou area, a 
special form of TVEs emerged. I call it the “corporate cooperative”. The community 
was entitled to a specific number of shares, with the remaining shares distributed 
among the individual peasants according to their contribution to the investment. I call 
it “corporate” because of the acknowledgement of the private holding of ownership 
shares. Apart from the capital structure, labor supply was restricted as well, and only 
those who contributed to the investment were allowed to have a job. Although similar 
to collective TVEs because of its cooperative nature, economic incentive was 
provided through the private holding of ownership shares. 
 
The third type of TVE ownership is private ownership. At first, private ownership had 
no advantage over collective ownership. On the contrary, even private enterprises 
competed for a “red cap” to avoid possible political interference. They paid fees to the 
local authority in exchange for the “red cap”. However, they were not discriminated 
as “true” collective TVEs needed to pay the fees as well. In 1984, the central authority 
issued two documents acknowledging the legitimacy of the household-run and 
multi-household-run establishments. In a short time, the household-run establishments 
accounted for the majority of TVEs. Other organizational forms such as companies 
with limited liability and corporations also emerged in the TVE sector and played an 
increasingly important role. 
 
The coexistence of various ownership structures reveals the origin of the debate on 
the nature of TVEs. Some scholars have argued that the success of TVEs invites 
further discussion because they were vaguely defined cooperatives. Others thought 
that TVEs were quasi-private enterprises and the rapid growth of the Chinese 
economy could be easily explained by the existing theory. Before I join the debate, I 
will introduce the short history of TVEs and highlight the economic achievement of 
the TVE sector. 
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6.2 Development Pattern and Economic Performance of TVEs 
 
Shortly after the start of the economic reform, communal enterprises were 
transformed into TVEs. Prior to the reform, the people’s commune was the only unit 
to organize production and distribute income. As we know, China’s industrial policy 
was to promote the industrial sector in urban areas. To accomplish that goal, the state 
transferred resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. As a result, the 
peasants had no access to the manufactured products, including intermediary and 
consumer goods. It is natural that the commune attempted to have its own factory, 
which could provide diversified products and create jobs for idle labor. However, 
communal enterprises were regulated under a strict policy. They were only allowed to 
operate locally, use local resources, produce locally and sell the products in the local 
market. Wu (2010) indicated that communal enterprises were part of the “natural 
traditional sector”, not part of the “modern industrial sector”. 
 
The end of the Cultural Revolution results in the re-birth of communal enterprises. 
With the abolishment of the people’s commune, communal enterprises were 
transformed to be TVEs. Besides just a change in name, the most important change 
was that TVEs operated in a market-based environment, unlike the communal 
enterprises in a centrally planned economy. The potential of TVEs was tremendous. 
The figures below demonstrate the success of TVEs. 
 
Year 
Value added of 
TVEs (hundred 
million RMB) 
Value added of 
TVE/GDP (%) 
Export of 
TVEs 
(hundred 
million RMB) 
Export of TVEs/ 
national export 
(%) 
Employee of 
TVEs (ten 
thousand 
person) 
Employees of 
TVEs/Employees 
nationwide (%) 
1978 208.30 5.7 - - 2827 7.1 
1980 263.92 6.3 - - 3000 7.2 
1985 602.88 8.6 - - 6979 14.0 
1990 1205.58 13.5 233.8 16.3 9262 14.3 
1995 4093.97 24.9 1513.18 45.3 12861 18.9 
2000 7662.53 30.4 2502.65 42.9 12820 17.8 
2002 9333.14 31.6 3332.39 42.9 13288 17.9 
 
Table 6.1 Value added, export and employees of TVEs41 
 
From the above table, we find that at the beginning of the reform, the value added of 
TVEs was only 5.7% of total GDP. Then, the reform took place and the value added 
of TVEs doubled during the first 5 years of the 1980s, and doubled again in the next 5 
years. 1990 marked another turning point, with the growth rate of TVEs faster than 
that of GDP. The value added of TVEs tripled during 1990-1995 and accounted for 
                                                        
41Yu, Li, Chunhai Jiang and Shu Li, Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye de Guoqu, Xianzai he Weilai (TVEs’ Past, Present 
and Future), The development perspective, volume 8, 2004. The data is collected from Chinese statistical yearbook 
and yearbook of statistics on Chinese TVEs. All the monetary data is adjusted based on the consumer price index 
of 1978 to minimize the impact of inflation and deflation. 
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nearly 25% of GDP. The export of TVEs grew at an unprecedented rate during that 
time. In 1995, TVEs contributed nearly 50% to the total value of exports. They 
employed 120-130 million workers, accounting for 18% of total employed labor. 
Comparing 18% to 30%, the contribution of TVEs to GDP, we find that the 
productivity of the rural industrial sector was above average. 
 
In 1985, the economic reform achieved remarkable progress. More economic 
organizations were established and market transactions were more active. The number 
of TVEs increased to 12.2 million in 1985. During that time, TVEs prospered. 1990s 
was a golden age for TVEs. About 20 million TVEs were active in the market and 
contributed enormously to overall economic growth. Although the development pace 
of TVEs has slowed down in the last 10 years, their contribution to GDP amounted to 
24.3% for the year of 2011.42 These figures suggest that TVEs created a powerful 
non-state sector, served as a major engine of fast economic growth, and thus were the 
backbone of the Chinese economy. 
 
Apart from the economic achievements of the TVE sector, the figures associated with 
change of ownership structure of TVEs are of interest as well. The number of 
collective TVEs stayed constant during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. In 
1978, there were about 1.52 million collective TVEs while in 1996 the figure was 
1.55 million. After 1996, an intended privatization was initiated against the collective 
TVEs and their numbers fell, to 1.29 million and 1.07 million in 1997 and 1998 
respectively. In the new millennium, the advantages of collective ownership 
disappeared due to the quick development of the market system. As a result, few 
TVEs remained collectively owned. The number of collective TVEs fell from 0.4 
million in 2003 to 0.1 million in 2010, after being flooded by the private sector. Their 
contribution to the total value added of TVE sector also fell from 10% in 2003 to 5% 
in 2006 and further to 2% in 2010. The situation of corporate cooperatives is even 
worse. “TVE” is now a dead word given the irrelevance of collective TVEs. 
 
With respect to the private TVEs, the TVE statistical yearbook calls them TVEs at 
village level before 1997. In 1986, there were 13.63 million of such TVEs compared 
with 1.52 million collective TVEs. Unlike collective TVEs, their number increased to 
20.41 million in 1995. In 1997, the term “private TVEs” was used in the yearbook to 
replace the vague term “TVEs at village level”. Afterwards, it was divided further into 
different categories such as private enterprises, household-run establishments, 
companies with limited liability, corporations and foreign-invested firms.43 
 
Though large in number, private TVEs were not as competitive as collective TVEs. 
Before the carrying out of the privatization policy, the contribution of collective TVEs 
to the total value added of the TVE sector was much higher than that of private TVEs. 
The establishment of the TVE sector and to some degree the establishment of the 
                                                        
42The value-added of TVE sector is not available in the TVE statistical yearbook of 2012. Based on the statistics of 
the previous years, the ratio of value-added to the value of output is about 25%. So I use 25% to do the estimation. 
43 All the figures are to be found in the TVE statistical yearbooks 1978-2012. 
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entire private sector owed much to the sudden rise of collective TVEs. Considering 
the role of collective TVEs in the economic transition, I will devote the major part of 
this chapter to the analysis of collective TVEs. 
 
The following graphic is from Fan and Chen (2005), which offers a landscape of the 
ownership structure of TVEs. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 is easy to read. However, Fan and Chen made several mistakes that deserve 
to be discussed. The first mistake they made was that private TVEs were not born 
from the privatization of the non-private sector. As shown by the statistics, individual 
household created and managed the majority of private TVEs. In fact, collective 
TVEs coexisted private TVEs, household-run establishments and corporate 
cooperatives. Only the red caps were virtually restructured to be corporate 
cooperatives as a combined result of government policy and local institutional 
innovation. Moreover, during the early stage of reform, collective TVEs turned out to 
be more efficient compared with small-sized private TVEs and household-run 
establishments. Therefore, ranking private TVEs above collective TVEs is not 
reasonable without referring to the institutional environment they faced. Fan and 
Chen agree that the collective ownership system was adaptive to the then-existing 
institutional environment. Yet, the growth of the TVE sector drove a shift in policy 
from anti-privatization to pro-privatization. The shift in policy resulted in the 
restructuring of collective TVEs. 
 
6.3 Some Existing Explanations of the Rise of TVEs 
 
Regarding the role of TVEs in China’s transitional economy, scholars proposed 
different hypotheses to explain the rise and success of TVEs. The first and simplest 
explanation is that communal enterprises laid foundation for the growth of TVEs. It 
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was not wrong for the assets and capitals of communal enterprises to be fully 
transferred to TVEs. However, the form and the purpose of these two organizations 
were very different. Communal enterprises were established to solve the problem of 
shortage and improve the competitiveness of individual communes. TVEs were 
established for economic purposes - to create jobs and promote local growth. With 
respect to the purpose of organization and the constraints they faced, the two 
organizations are not the same. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the key feature of TVEs is the “collective” ownership. Scholars 
differ in defining this type of ownership. Some (Peng, 1992; Sachs and Woo, 1997) 
argued that “informal private property right” is an appropriate term to describe the 
distinctive property right arrangement of TVEs. The informal privatization approach 
attempted to solve the paradox arising from the “progress without privatization”. Peng 
(1992) summarized that the informal private property right evolved from two 
institutional changes: profit sharing and managerial contracting. Through these two 
changes, TVE managers were granted large autonomy to manage the operation of 
enterprises. Moreover, profit sharing solved the incentive problem and limited 
government predation. Indeed, these institutional changes resulted in the separation of 
ownership and control for TVEs, which undermined the impact of a collective nature 
on the corporate governance. Sachs and Woo (1997) studied the cases in the Wenzhou 
area and concluded that most TVEs were actually “red caps”. “Red caps” were private 
enterprises that paid administration fees to grant political safety. Thus, the collective 
ownership was only a superficial camouflage for TVEs. 
 
Some scholars have proposed more complicated hypotheses than the informal 
privatization approach. Nee (1992) employed a term called “hybrid organizational 
form” to describe the nature of TVEs. According to him, as long as there are political 
discrimination and market imperfection, the hybrid organizational form is superior to 
the pure private one. Li (1995) argued that “ambiguous property right” was necessary 
given the grayness and imperfection of markets. During the early stage of the 
transition, the state monopolized access to resources. The dual-track pricing system 
only permitted the market transaction of excessive products. Most products, assets 
and capital were controlled by the state through a central planning system. Hence, 
development of an informal relationship with the local government was an issue of 
survival for TVEs. Enmeshing the local government into a regional web helped to 
avoid any predatory government regulation and ensured access to resources. Smyth 
(1997) called it “new regionalism”. Tian (1996) proposed a similar hypothesis called 
“endogenous property right” to capture the nature of vaguely defined ownership. Che 
and Qian (1998a) propose a concept of “local government ownership” arguing that it 
was superior to private ownership and state ownership during the early stage of the 
transition. While expressed differently, they share the common understanding that the 
seemingly ill-defined institutional arrangement of TVEs was efficient given the 
imperfect market. Also, the market was gray and imperfect as long as the 
administrative authority was not limited by constitutional rules and the legal system 
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was not established to enforce the private property right externally.  
 
As such, it is not surprising that scholars (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Oi, 1992, 1995, 
1999; Walder, 1995) paid much attention to the role of the government in the socialist 
transformation. According to them, the decentralized character of the Chinese 
political system enabled a distinctive form of state-led growth, which Oi termed 
“local state corporatism”. Strong competition among regions emerged as a result of 
decentralization of administrative and economic authority into the locality. Hence, it 
was a better strategy for local governments to work with collective and eventually 
private enterprises than to prey on them. Facing increasing competition among 
regions, local governments and TVEs formed corporatist alliances and supported each 
other. To some degree, commercial competition resulted in institutional competition. 
The corporatist alliance was an institutional innovation intended to maximize the 
productive potential locally. 
 
All these hypotheses focused mainly on the macro environment for TVEs. The 
micro-mechanism remains unexplored. For example, some scholars put high value on 
entrepreneurship (Xin, 2004; Wen, 2010). As reported in many case studies, cadre 
entrepreneurs contributed significantly to the growth of the TVE sector. In the social 
network perspective, they were important nodes, coordinating the information 
transmission and resource flows. As the CEO trusted by the shareholders, a cadre 
entrepreneur must be trusted by the community members and he or she must have the 
sensitive political antennae and be talented in doing business. 
 
But, how could this cadre-centered network work so well? As mentioned, the rural 
industrialization was a coordination game in nature during its early stage. An 
interesting explanation developed by Pan (2005) is not included in the mainstream 
understanding of the rise of TVEs. He argued that the socialist nature of the rural 
collective organization was key to the expansion of the rural industrial sector. 
According to him, the household responsibility system had a negative impact on rural 
industrialization for the collective resources were totally distributed among 
households. But industrialization required significant investment and it was hard to 
coordinate individual households to invest in such projects. If the community could 
retain the collective ownership of resources, the decision to invest would be 
centralized and thus involve lower transaction costs. In that regard, the cadre-centered 
network, which Pan calls the legacy of socialist tradition, provides an institutional 
foundation for the development of TVEs. It produced the common belief among 
residents, which evolved to be an informal institution coordinating the collective 
actions. In short, informal institution and social ties, combined with existing 
organizational resources, shaped an environment well suited for industrialization. 
 
There is one more question. If the socialist tradition could sustain the cooperation 
among community members, why did the people’s commune fail? Taking form of the 
cadre-centered network, what Pan terms socialist tradition actually combines Party 
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discipline with traditional culture. The cadres are from Party while the network arises 
out of culture. Some cultural norms promoted the network-based cooperation. 
Weitzman and Xu (1994) proposed a hypothesis introducing a new factor that they 
termed “trust” to explain the success of TVEs. Chinese society, as they said, was 
characterized by a high degree of cooperation compared to a low degree of 
cooperation in Western societies. They tried to draw attention to the function of 
culture in promoting economic growth. However, their argument lacked a detailed 
analysis of what “trust” was and where it came from. Zhou (2005) viewed the process 
from a sociological perspective. According to him, in Chinese society the property 
right was protected by the stable relationship between the economic organization and 
the surrounding environment including the government. Social relation and informal 
institution maintained a specific form of ownership and control over resources. 
Instead of using the term “ambiguous property right”, he developed a new term called 
“relational property right” to capture the nature of China’s informal property right 
system. His viewpoint is fresh, new, and inspiring. Zheng, Chen and Ruan (2011) 
argued that the growth of the TVE sector made “village-corporations” into “corporate 
villages”. 44  In the case study of Yonglian village, they found that TVEs has 
increasing influence in the local affairs. And the local governments tended to 
cooperate with TVEs. 
 
As shown above, existing literature tries to understand the rise of TVEs in terms of 
the property right system. Only a small number of scholars saw no difference between 
TVEs and private enterprises. They ignored the transformation of the ownership 
structure of TVEs. The rest acknowledged the collective nature of TVEs, tried to find 
out, and proposed factors that made collective TVEs into well-performing economic 
organizations. However, based on what they have done, we can still deepen our 
understanding of TVEs by focusing on the interaction between TVEs and the market, 
which the existing literature pays less attention to. 
 
6.4 Explaining the Rise of TVEs 
 
Economists used to focus on two kinds of institution solving the problem of resource 
allocation, market and central planning. However, the success of collective TVEs can 
neither be explained by the theory of the market economy or by that of the command 
economy. The theory of community governance provides a strong analytical tool. 
Ostrom (1990) studied a number of cases involving community governance and found 
that the community could solve the coordination problem without introducing private 
property rights. Many scholars supported her findings and emphasized the role of 
social capital and community governance in the economic system. However, the 
theory of community governance invites challenges while facing the case of TVEs. 
There were certainly cases indicating the efficiency of community governance under 
certain circumstances. Yet, the massive emergence of collectively owned enterprises 
                                                        
44 “Village-corporation” refers to that government run the village like a corporation while “corporate village” 
means that the corporation takes control over village. The line between TVE and village is melting. 
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during a short time had no precedent. In what follows I attempt to understand the rise 
and success of TVEs from an institutional perspective. First, I will explain the 
circumstances a rural community could, and would choose the strategy of rural 
industrialization. Second, I will turn to the question of how TVEs, as vaguely defined 
cooperatives, solved the incentive problem so that they would not collapse from 
inside. Third, I will explain why TVEs performed better than private enterprises 
during the early stage of transition and then declined. 
 
The rise of TVEs and the role of collectivist culture 
 
We can only understand the rise of TVEs in the historical context. Pan presented an 
analytical framework to explain the diversified development strategies across regions. 
As he asserted, during the early stage of the reform Chinese rural communities faced 
two choices, to implement the strategy of household farming or to launch rural 
industrialization. The household responsibility system was by nature a privatization 
strategy. It distributed the usage rights of land and assets to individual households. By 
contrast, retaining collective ownership over land and capital would be necessary for 
industrialization because industrialization required a significant amount of investment, 
which individual households could not afford. 
 
In short, the strategy of industrialization involved high risk and high profits compared 
to low risk and low profits for the strategy of household farming. Although there is a 
tradeoff between the two strategies, the latter is risk-dominant. Thus, the 
implementation of an industrialization strategy required a coordinating mechanism, 
which Pan termed “socialist tradition”.45 Socialist tradition has two dimensions, an 
organizational and a psychological dimension. First, with respect to the organizational 
dimension, organizational resources were available during the early stage of transition. 
The former socialist institutions were not abolished, but preserved to facilitate the 
market transactions once the major mission of the state changed from revolution to 
economic growth. Second, even after the liberalization of the market, collectivism 
still exerted enormous influence on market participants. Collectivism is not an 
unreasonable belief, but a culture evolved from the interactions among members in 
the same group with an emphasis on the significance of groups, and requires that the 
individual should serve the group interest.. The socialist movement did not result in 
cultural disintegration, which was actually intended, but made the collectivist culture 
a component of Chinese-style socialism.  
 
Hence, in a village where socialist tradition was preserved and the local authority had 
high prestige among peasants, coordinating the rural industrialization involved less 
difficulty and low risk. However, without the collectivism maintaining collaboration 
among peasants, they would choose to distribute the collectively owned land and 
capital. There was still a problem. In a people’s commune, political power maintained 
the high status of cadres and other socialist norms. The type of relationship between 
                                                        
45Oi call it Maoist legacy. Both terms share something in common. 
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cadres and peasants was what Oi defined as a “patron-client” relationship. Cadres had 
the authority to allocate resources and peasants could only accept what the cadres had 
decided. Peasants could only stay compliant to their patrons’ wishes and probably be 
rewarded for it. It was a top-down relationship showing the asymmetry in the political 
power. However, after the reform the socialist tradition could no longer be preserved 
by the political power but by economic performance. 
 
After the collapse of the communal system, the household responsibility system 
emerged as an alternative to the peasants. If the peasants were not satisfied with the 
performance of local authorities, they undermined the relationship with the town and 
village by partitioning the collective property. The legitimacy of governance was no 
longer generated from the coercive power from the top down, but from the consensus 
of peasants from the bottom up. Thus, the “patron-client” relationship became a 
“principal-agent” relationship. The right to exit was given to peasants so that their 
bargaining power increased. Although household farming was a risk-dominant 
strategy that threatened the collaboration necessary for rural industrialization, it 
provided a filtering mechanism to amplify the impact of collectivist culture. In fact, 
the household responsibility system did not only decentralize the control over land 
and other resources, but also destroyed the socialist tradition by decreasing the 
significance of groups. In doing so, it tested all the rural communities for 
cohesiveness. The level of cohesiveness is positively associated with the impact of 
collectivist culture. 
 
I will discuss a representative case reported by Pan (2003) in his doctoral thesis. 
Zhaojiabao village was known for its mania towards collectivization movement. The 
villagers worked hard, but earned little. To solve the poverty problem, the party 
committee decided to set up several factories to create an additional source of income. 
By the end of 1978, the annual revenue made by the communal enterprise was 80 
thousand Yuan, which was a lot of money at that time. Therefore, in 1980, when 
household farming became popular again, the community managed to preserve the 
collective ownership over the means of production. The “socialist tradition” was 
strong because of the large amount of common property. Community leaders were 
able to coordinate the expectation of individual peasants by showing the ability to 
manage business operations. However, market risk could not be avoided. The leaders 
made the wrong decision to open a paper-producing factory, polluting the water in the 
irrigation system, which drew the attention of the environment agency. Paper quality 
was also low and the products could not find any consumers. The bankruptcy of the 
paper factory gave rise to a panic and caused distrust among peasants. As a response 
to the trust crisis, the party committee held an urgent meeting with the entire village 
and committed to recover the loss. Afterwards, they began to produce radiators and 
the increasing sales revenue proved that their choice was right. 
 
In 1984, the upper level of the government urged the village committee to distribute 
land to the peasants. Some peasants supported the shift to household farming and 
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suggested that the assets of the radiator factory be distributed to individual households. 
On the other side, the relatives of the leaders tried to persuade them to appropriate the 
residual income. However, the community leaders insisted on community governance, 
stating that the household farming was not wealth generating and privatization could 
result in the unjust distribution of income. Only the collective ownership ensured an 
inclusive growth. Most villagers ultimately supported their decision. 
 
The emerging choice of household farming had dual impacts on the collective 
economy. It corroded the unhealthy part, but strengthened the healthy part of the 
collective economy. As illustrated, both the government and peasants wanted the 
partition of property. The aim of the government was to increase the amount of grain 
yield. They had not yet imaged the success of rural industrialization. If the discount 
rate is high to peasants, the return to household farming might be estimated as higher 
than the return to industrial production. Peasants with high impatience to consume 
would vote against community governance of TVEs and thus shift the coordinated 
equilibrium.46 To solve the problem, two kinds of incentives were generated under 
the socialist tradition. They were the monetary and moral incentives. The monetary 
incentive refers to the expectation of increasing welfare for individual households. 
Peasants anticipated that a well-performing TVE generated higher income than the 
average income in the farming sector and thus expected a share of the welfare 
improvement that TVEs had promised. In the case of Zhaojiabao village, once the 
performance of TVEs was not as good as expected, suspicion arose among peasants. 
When they made big revenues, the community leaders regained prestige. 
 
As shown above, the monetary incentive acted against the division of property and 
shifting of resources to household farming. However, as the total value of TVE 
increased, the incentive to appropriate the wealth would be stronger, particularly for 
those who manage the business operation. Therefore, the moral incentive was 
introduced to resist privatization. It concerned the distribution of income, an issue of 
equality and justice. While facing increasing profits, the TVE leaders were supposed 
to resist the temptation of wealth and not to benefit themselves by improper 
appropriation. If they did so, the community would fall apart. The leader of 
Zhaojiabao village said that 2300 villagers must share the profit of TVEs and rejected 
the proposal to appropriate a large share of profits through managerial contracting. In 
Huaxi village, the salary of TVE leaders was lower than that of workers.47 In the 
extreme case, the regulations specified the principle of equality and outlined that the 
maximum wage of managers was not allowed to be twice high as the wage of workers. 
In that regard, both the monetary and moral incentives drove able men. Judging by 
collectivist culture, virtues such as selflessness, sacrifice, honesty, and loyalty were 
highly appreciated. Hence, the moral character of the TVE leaders was very important 
in sustaining the cooperation in the system and making themselves respected. Some 
                                                        
46And if the community fell apart, the re-establishment of common property institution was difficult and costly, if 
not impossible. I will come to it in later part. 
47The salary of engineers is higher than that of normal workers because otherwise the engineers would change the 
employer. Outside the village is a free market. This is an important point to understand the downfall of TVEs. 
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scholars have called these TVE leaders “Confucian entrepreneurs”. This special title 
contains a consideration of the moral dimension of entrepreneurship in the TVE 
sector. 
 
I also wish to mention that both TVE leaders and villagers abided by the moral norm. 
The moral norm was a defined set of rules that regulated the behavior of peasants. 
They were supposed to contribute to the common welfare and include the 
improvement of common welfare into their utility function. For example, the majority 
of TVEs’ profits was re-invested for capital expansion, resulting in no bonus for the 
peasants for a long period. Moreover, under certain circumstances the wage rate 
would be lower than the marginal return to labor. The low wage rate could be 
considered an investment made by individual peasants to the TVE with expectation of 
higher returns in the future. The strong preference of investment over consumption 
shows that morality decreased the discount rate and discouraged short-term behavior. 
 
In summary, rural industrialization was a stag-hunt type of coordination game. If the 
coordination failed, the household responsibility system would be used to direct 
resources to the farming sector. If the coordination equilibrium was reached, the TVEs 
would be established and resources were shifted to the rural industrial sector. Both the 
monetary incentive and moral incentives were created to enlarge the attraction basin 
of the coordination equilibrium (Sen, 1967). If the rural industrialization occurred in 
the rural social context, the “socialist tradition” including organizational resources 
such as cadre-centered network and collectivist culture lowered the risk and cost of 
coordinating the rural industrialization, making the whole system move towards the 
coordination equilibrium. Hence, the embedding of economic activities in the cultural 
system was essential to the success of rural industrialization. 
 
Understanding the common property institution 
 
Although the collectivist culture promoted rural industrialization, the collective nature 
of TVEs was supposed to lower the efficiency of the economic system. According to 
the orthodox economic theory, the common ownership could not provide individuals 
with sufficient incentive, resulting in rent dissipation. Thus, the highest value of 
resources could not be achieved. However, alternative means other than the market 
institution would be introduced to minimize rent dissipation. In this case, the common 
property institution developed a specific structure to lower transaction costs. 
Information on the behavioral pattern generated from this specific structure was 
compressed into cultural norms, which were further internalized into a cultural trait of 
individuals and thus reinforced the common property institution. Therefore, to explain 
the persistence of common property institution, I will study the cooperation-fostering 
mechanism underlying the structure of interactions in a community and the informal 
rules governing this interaction. 
 
Standing on the shoulders of other scholars will make things easier. Ostrom (1990) 
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developed a framework to understand the community governance of common-pool 
resources. She summarized several principles for enduring common property 
institutions. In my opinion, these principles concern four most important aspects of 
the common property institution: boundary, rule, monitoring, and punishment. 
Besides, Bowles and Gintis (1998) developed a similar, yet more technical model to 
demonstrate the moral economy of the community. They focused on four aspects: 
reputation, retaliation, segmentation and parochialism. What Ostrom and Bowles, and 
Gintis proposed to explain moral economy share something in common. For example, 
clearly defined boundaries could result in parochialism. The multilateral reputation 
system enabled a monitoring mechanism and retaliation is similar to punishment. In 
addition, segmentation affects monitoring and punishment. I will approach the 
understanding of the persistence of TVEs from a perspective inspired by their 
contributions. 
 
Boundaries 
 
The problem of boundary is essential to the community governance. Ostrom 
distinguished between two boundaries: the boundary of a pool of resources and the 
boundary of users of resources. The latter one is of interest. In the case of TVEs, the 
boundary of users of resources is equivalent to the membership of a community. The 
introduction of the membership system was to restrict access to resources so that they 
would not be over-consumed or depleted within a short period. Che and Qian (1998b) 
also express the similar idea and suggest to interpret the boundary of TVEs at 
community level instead of at enterprise level.  
 
Bowles and Gintis incorporated the idea of boundaries into their definition of a 
community. As to them, a community is a “structure of social interaction 
characterized by high entry and exit cost and non-anonymous relationships among 
members”. This definition implies that a community is a quasi-closed group due to 
the presence of high entry and exit costs. We must notice that entry and exit costs 
could be raised by those who form a group to occupy public resources with intention, 
to prevent someone else from consuming the resources other than the group members. 
It means that the community is self-organizing. Besides the potential risk of 
overconsumption, the frequent entry and exit of members would also impose a 
negative impact on community governance, for example, increasing the cost of 
monitoring and punishment. As Bowles and Gintis indicated, the community is 
characterized by the non-anonymous interaction among members. Only when the high 
entry and exit costs lowered the mobility of members would long-term and 
non-anonymous relationships be developed from the recurrent and frequent 
interaction among members. The existence of non-anonymous relationships enables 
the mechanism of reputation, retaliation and segmentation, thus preventing the 
community from falling apart. Moreover, parochialism as a cognitive bias arising 
from the differentiation between members and non-members underpinned the 
self-isolation of the community. A cognitive barrier to entry and exit was imposed to 
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reinforce the common property institution. 
 
With respect to an enterprise, the boundary was to be defined by the contract in 
relation to its founding and capital structure and employment, with the applicable 
contract law. In the case of TVEs, the contract and contract law was missing. We 
should note that running TVEs was a strategy based on the consensus of the entire 
members of the rural community. Every resident had the right to claim a share of 
common property. Moreover, Chen argued that the local authorities influenced the 
decision-making of TVEs and aligned the corporate and community interests. In that 
regard, the boundary of ownership of TVEs was blurred.48 Hence, the de facto 
boundary of TVE was defined by the territory of villages and towns.49 Users of 
resources were limited to the members of the community, and membership was based 
on the kinship and demographic relationship thus imposing barriers to entry and exit. 
A person coming from a remote area would not be allowed to share common property 
in the community. He or she could only establish the employment relationship with 
the local companies, but had no share of ownership and would be not allowed to 
influence the decision-making in TVEs. This was because of a lack of trust between 
the residents and migrants. The reputation system did not work as there was little 
information about the migrants. The mobility rate of migrants was expected to be high 
so that they could escape the punishment with low cost. The social capital only 
existed among the community members and the lack of social capital meant that 
community governance could not be extended to a wider range. 
 
Huaxi village, which ran a huge corporate group, divided the workers into three 
categories, core villagers, the villagers who lived nearby and migrant workers. Due to 
rapid growth, Huaxi village merged several nearby villages and thus expanded the 
human resource pool. However, it could still not meet the increasing demand for labor, 
resulting in the employment of migrant workers, who were not equally treated. The 
community only referred to Huaxi village in its original territory, which showed the 
conflict between the optimal size of a community to generate social capital and the 
economy of scale. 
 
We also find evidence in land policy to support the argument. Only the village 
residents are entitled to farmland, the right of which was given up automatically when 
they leave the village. This principle was extended to other collectively owned 
resources. Once a resident’s relationship with the community broke down, the 
resident’s entitlement to common resources was removed. 
 
In addition, parochialism also prevailed in Chinese towns and villages. First, 
                                                        
48 See Chen, Jianbo, Xiangzhen Qiye de Chanquan Jiegou jiqi dui Ziyuan Peizhi Xiaolv de Yingxiang (The 
ownership structure of TVEs and its impact on efficiency of resource allocation), Economic Research Journal, 
Issue 9, 1995, Pages 30 
49 Yin studies the case of Nanjie village and comes to the similar conclusion. See Yin, Desheng, The Empirical 
Observation and Analytical interpretation of Nanjie Village Mode: A Case Study of Changing of a TVE’s 
Ownership System, Management World, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 173-179 
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population mobility was low in the rural areas. Settlement such as towns and villages 
emerged because of the human need for cooperation. The cooperation was maintained 
by recurrent interaction enabled by geographical stability. Therefore, if residents leave 
the settlement, they could no longer benefit from the cooperation and their attempt to 
reside in another settlement would involve high costs. Once the communities were 
formed, the population mobility would be lowered. Second, government policy 
fostered parochialism. At that time, the household registration system restricted labor 
flow from the rural to urban areas. The mobility of labor was thus low, if not 
non-existent. As a result, the demographic stability of a rural community was 
reinforced, and the networked nature of a social environment in which the common 
property institution was embedded. Quasi-closed communities were formed and the 
membership was quasi-permanent and inheritable if not withdrawn. 
 
Networks 
 
Network is something that was rarely discussed with respect to common property 
institution. The boundary only defines the group that has access to the resources, but 
does not indicate how the group is organized. In economics, two kinds of 
organizational form receive a lot of attention. One of them are the focus of 
neoclassical economics, which Demsatz terms highly decentralized structure. Market 
has such a structure while coordinating individual actions by creating and transmitting 
price signals. The other one is to the contrary, featuring a highly-centralized structure. 
A typical one is the hierarchical structure which is adopted by state and firms. 
Instructions flowing from top to bottom are the major means maintaining the 
operation of the system.  
 
These two organizational forms can be also understood from a network perspective. 
The market in the neoclassical sense (perfect competitive market) is a network 
without a focal point. Every node weighs alike. But if the market shows a 
monopolistic structure, it is a network with key nodes. The hierarchical system has a 
stratified structure with the nodes connected only with the nodes above and below. 
These two kinds of network, the totally decentralized one and stratified one, has the 
advantage to coordinate actions on a large scale. A market can connect the producers 
and consumers across the world. Also, a government could have million employees 
and still work without big problem. However, if we look at what happens at local 
level, we could probably find that a third kind of network is also of importance. Aside 
from the decentralized network or the network with an absolute top, the network with 
key nodes shows both flexibility and coordination ability.  
 
In such a network, key nodes are those nodes which has the relationships with most of 
other nodes and thus making the network overall connected. As Watts (2003) 
indicates, even when the number of nodes is extremely large, the distance, measured 
in individual relationship, between two nodes is not long. But the quality of 
relationship diminishes as it is getting longer. It changes from a strong tie to a weak 
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tie if we are talking about the friend of a friend. Taking function as a focal point, the 
key nodes develop the direct relationship with most of other nodes thus making a 
medium-sized network operational. In the traditional society, a clan’s patriarch was a 
key node in the network. After the socialist revolution, the cadres occupied the 
vacuum position left by the patriarchs. As a result, the cadre-centered network 
emerged. As one may see, every successful story of an individual TVE begins with an 
entrepreneur who was former cadre or still cadre by then. These cadre-entrepreneurs 
were praised for their business talents and innovative spirits. But the network aspects 
of their virtue are also interesting. As the key nodes in the network, they were doing 
two things with lower cost. First, while gathering and processing information 
necessary for the industrialization at the top, they centralize the decision-making with 
respect to the commonly owned resources. They make better decisions when it comes 
to a large amount of resources, like managers in the private firms. Second, they have 
high social statue and are trusted by villagers. In that kind of circumstance, they are 
able to coordinate the expectations and actions of peasants and start the 
industrialization project. Certainly, the prerequisite to the emergence of 
cadre-centered network is the common property of resources.  
 
On the contrary, if the decentralized network such as the network enabled by 
household farming system dominates the social system, no center was maintained and 
it is difficult and highly risky for an individual family to run an industrial entity. Also, 
the cadres and village governments did not have sufficient capital to start such a 
program. As to the centralized network such as the network in people’s commune, the 
unidirectional feature of network would lead to the malfunction of information 
channeling mechanism. The presence of key nodes in the network does not mean that 
the entire network is controlled by these key nodes. It is more likely that the key 
nodes and normal nodes cooperate and function differently. Hence, the mechanisms, 
which will be discussed later, are developed to solidify their cooperative relationship 
thereby making the common property institution well-suited to the early stage of 
development of the embedded market.  
 
Before we set out to discuss the specific mechanisms, there is one more question 
about the emergence of cadre-centered network. The rise of such network lies not 
only in cadres’ prestige, but also in the resources they control. So if they start with a 
considerable amount of collectively-owned resources, the cadre-centered network is 
more likely to rise. In this case, the function of social capital was enhanced by the 
physical capital and the common property institution, being underpinned by 
cadre-centered network, is self-generating as long as social capital as well as physical 
capital are available. 
 
Rules 
 
Once the boundary is drawn, the most important issue will be the rules. Ostrom called 
them “operational rules”. I will distinguish between two kinds of rules, the 
125 
 
constitutional rules and the operational rules. Of course, constitutional rules do not 
refer to the top-ranked laws of a nation. I use this term to refer to some fundamental 
rules about the allocation, use and transfer of common resources. These rules were 
fundamental because they determined the way of development for towns and villages. 
Hence, the creation of constitutional rules must be based on the participation of all 
members. Otherwise, the cohesiveness of the community would be damaged. 
 
Let us reconsider the case of Zhaojiabao village. After the unsuccessful investment in 
the paper manufacturing industry, the village committee was questioned about their 
easy decisions. A meeting was held by the party committee to handle the trust crisis, 
with the constitutional rules concerning the common resources announced. First, the 
radiator factory should remain controlled and managed by the collectivity while the 
management right of small factories and fruit gardens could be contracted to 
individuals. Second, some shares of the radiator factory were distributed to 
individuals given that the collectivity was the biggest shareholder. Third, the farmland 
was divided into two areas: one area was reserved for grain production, and the other 
used to produce cash crops. Fourth, the wage rate should be associated with the 
contribution. Hence, the salary of managers and engineers was higher than that of 
normal workers. The wage gap would not be big because the wage rate was 
determined by a non-market mechanism. These rules were the result of negotiation 
and compromise, and supported by most of the residents. As shown by this case, the 
most important function of constitutional rules is to produce the legitimacy for the 
initial allocation of common resources and the rules governing the allocation of 
common resources as well. 
 
Other than the constitutional rules, the operational rules specify the access to the 
resources and thus prevent inefficient usage. For TVEs, written rules governing the 
production process and management were drafted and “enacted” to maximize the 
output given the constraints. As shown by the case of the Yonglian steel 
manufacturing factory, there were regulations such as “regulations of quality control”, 
“regulations of civilized production”, “regulations of cost control” and “regulations of 
yielding rate”. In addition, various manufacturing contests were held among workers 
to provide greater incentive because the ranking in the contests affected the individual 
workers’ wage rate. Ownership of resources provided the owner with an incentive to 
protect it, use it efficiently and maximize the income it generated. However, in the 
absence of a clearly defined ownership, many regulations were introduced to perform 
a similar function. The quality and quantity of products were checked, production cost 
controlled, and attitude towards work assessed. The regulations were refined, updated 
and augmented to govern almost every aspect of the manufacturing and business 
process, with the aim of preventing free-riding, shirking and other opportunistic 
behaviors. It was a natural choice for a non-private organization that attempted to 
avoid rent dissipation. 
 
According to Ostrom, the participation of community members in making and 
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modifying rules should be ensured and the rules matched to the local condition. In the 
above cases, the community members tried to influence the making of rules. In that 
sense, the rule-making process was to some degree decentralized. Hence, most of the 
information critical to the matching of rules to the local conditions could be 
incorporated into the making of rules. That is very important for the survival of a 
non-market business organization. If rules could not be matched to the local 
conditions, the allocation of resources could be inefficient. Disputes over the rules 
might arise and resources would be put into their resolution. 
 
Monitoring 
 
Even if the rules were fully legitimate and matched to the local conditions, there 
would be an additional problem. If it was beneficial for individuals to break the rules 
and the cost of improper behavior was sufficiently low, they would, under the 
assumption of full rationality, break the rules. However, there was no external 
monitoring for the TVEs because the coercive power was removed from the rural 
areas. Therefore, the community must develop self-monitoring capabilities. I will 
examine two kinds of monitoring relationships. First, monitoring should be imposed 
on the managers due to the presence of “principal-agent” relationships. In the case of 
TVEs, the principals were not board directors, but community members who were 
conscious of their duty to monitor the performance of the managers even though they 
could not directly dismiss them. 
 
Yang had studied how individual workers try to influence personnel matters. He 
found that workers were eager to influence both the appointment and dismissal of 
general managers, as well as the distribution of income. At the same time, they paid 
little attention to the recruitment and assignment of jobs, which was the manager’s 
task. Managers also determined the wage rate and were responsible for product 
development. Besides, Yang found a negative relationship between the performance 
of TVEs and workers’ incentive to monitor the managers. In developed areas, workers 
did not pay as much attention to the appointment and dismissal of managers as 
opposed to the wage rate. However, in less developed areas, workers were eager to 
influence personnel matters.50 Yang’s study indicated a negative relationship between 
workers’ eagerness to influence personnel matters, the level of development, and 
labor mobility. 
 
Yang’s finding was interesting, and could be explained using the “voice-exit” theory 
developed by Hirschman (1970). In a private enterprise, most employees only pay 
attention to wages. If they were unsatisfied with the performance of the managers, 
they would “exit” and move to a new job to show their dissatisfaction. On the other 
hand, workers of TVEs would try to influence the personnel matters and express their 
dissatisfaction through their “voices”, because they were also “shareholders” of the 
                                                        
50 Aoki (1994) found that the employees in the Japanese firms also tended to influence the management. It was 
because they were lifetime employed. So, the Japanese firm was, to some degree, comparable with the community. 
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TVEs. The “exit” strategy was too costly for them due to the association between 
ownership and membership. Now, we can explain the findings described above. In 
developed areas, the private ownership dominated the economy and reduced the “exit” 
cost. Although the peasants respected and trusted the “able men”, the trust was 
generated from the good economic performance of the TVEs. Poor economic 
performance affected the peasants’ motivation to monitor the able men.51 If the local 
authority could not solve the problem of management, the workers would choose to 
return to the household farming. That was the ultimate threat and highly credible. 
 
Workers gave pressure to managers via their “voices”, while managers monitored 
workers by controlling the quantity and quality of products, and assessing the workers’ 
performance. As we know, the community was characterized by recurrent interaction 
among members. Hence, information cost was low for the community members. 
Should there be a high cost to assess product quality, the managers could use the 
information about the workers’ ability and attitude towards work instead. Owing to 
the low information cost, a reputation system was developed to brand the able, less 
able, and rule-breakers, maintaining the cooperation among community members. 
 
Interestingly, although the individual had an incentive to shirk, he/she also had an 
incentive to monitor. Also defectors will monitor, avoiding other defectors bilking out 
cooperator. And improper behaviors would decrease the welfare of community 
members as they were “shareholders” of the TVEs. Unlike the employees of 
state-owned enterprises, the individual had an incentive to increase overall 
productivity because it was associated with individual interests. Moreover, TVEs 
faced hard budget constraints. They would fail if they could not be competitive, 
unlike the SOEs which would be rescued by government bailouts. The collectively 
owned enterprises must develop a monitoring mechanism to increase productivity, 
with the size of rural communities being appropriate for using a reputation 
mechanism. 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Sanction, retaliation, and dispute resolution are of importance in sustaining the social 
order.52 However, I will rather put the discussion in a footnote and discuss the 
legitimacy problem threatening the existence of the TVE sector. There has been little 
discussion about the legitimacy of TVEs. During the transition era in China, 
legitimacy was generated from three sources: the attitude of authority, the economic 
performance, and the principle of egalitarianism. First, the outside authority should 
                                                        
51 I don’t mention the external monitor from the local government. Actually, the township government and village 
committee was a part of system. Sometimes the officials were the TVE managers. I will come to this issue later 
explaining the role of local government in the rise of TVEs. 
52 According to Ostrom, a graduated sanction scheme is optimal for the communities that try to manage the 
commons. A graduated sanction is appropriate given the nature and structure of personal ties. It must be avoided 
that personal ties were undermined due to harsh sanctions on some minor improper acts. And it should also be 
avoided that repeated opportunistic behaviors must be punished properly so that the community would not 
collapse. 
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respect the common property institution. It is also one of Ostrom’s principles for 
managing the commons. In China’s case, local governments worked closely with 
TVEs and protected them from the central authority’s interference. The central 
authority expected good economic performance of the entire system as a proof of 
success of the reform. Therefore, there was only a small chance that the outside 
authority would impede the rural industrialization. 
 
Second, economic performance of the TVE sector was far beyond everyone’s 
expectations. It created many jobs, promoted local growth, and provided a lot of taxes 
and fees to governments. As long as the TVEs were profit machines, everyone loved 
them. However, as mentioned earlier, if the expectation that the TVEs would make 
higher profits than farming was not fulfilled, the peasants would probably withdraw 
the industrialization plan and go back to the farming sector. The monetary incentive is 
of importance as long as the resource allocation is concerned. The TVE sector must 
ensure growth so that it could provide the participants with sufficient monetary 
incentives. On this point, the impersonal market economy coincided with the moral 
economy. 
 
There is a point that they may differ on. Instead of equality of opportunity, the moral 
economy showed a preference over the principle of egalitarianism, which resulted in 
the equal distribution of income and undermined the monetary incentive. Wen (2010) 
observed that in the rural areas of Jiangsu province, it was generally agreed that high 
income jobs created by TVEs be offered to low income families first. This is despite 
that they only had low-efficiency labor such as girls and young adults, which was one 
of the reasons why they were poor. TVE managers could easily find some strong 
adults elsewhere to replace them. The moral incentive must be generated to sustain 
the cohesion of social order in the rural areas. This was one of the difficulties that the 
moral economy faced. Although a balance between moral and monetary incentives 
must be achieved, the practice showed that such a balance could hardly be stable. For 
TVEs, we can find that the wage rate was in fact associated with the contribution in 
terms of market value. The suppression of the moral incentive by the monetary 
incentive resulted in the attempt to privatize the entire TVE sector. 
 
Considering all the aspects discussed above, the TVE sector has to be a part of the 
moral economy, which is not necessarily contradictory with the market economy. It 
may even be complementary to the market economy during some stages of 
development. Even when scholars acknowledge the existence of the moral economy, 
they usually think that it exists only in primitive societies. However, as I will suggest, 
a deeper understanding of the moral economy may help us find some key factors 
determining the success and failure of economic reform. In addition to 
well-researched terms such as capital accumulation, overall productivity, unlimited 
labor supply and so on, culture will be a new focus in the study of development 
policy. 
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The superiority of TVEs in the transitional economy 
 
I have shown that the common property institution could not fail because of the 
underlying self-preservation mechanism. However, this does not take into 
consideration the environment surrounding TVEs. A rabbit can survive in an 
environment where there are no wolves, but it cannot survive when the wolves enter 
the ecosystem.53 There were many cases suggesting the advantage of community 
governance of economic activities. Community governance is applied if the cost of 
defining property rights and finding prices is prohibitively high. For example, fishery, 
irrigation, and use of underground water are usually managed by the community 
because of the high cost of using the price mechanism. Despite the numerous cases of 
community governance, private enterprises significantly outnumber collectively 
owned enterprises in the economic domain, with the reason being that the market 
system develops various mechanisms to lower transaction costs. Hence, in most cases 
a private property system was the only efficient institution to solve resource allocation. 
In that sense, according to the economic theory the massive emergence of TVEs 
during the 1980s and 1990s was abnormal. According to my hypothesis, the key point 
to explain the emergence and success of TVEs is the interaction between the TVE 
sector and the institutional environment surrounding them. 
 
The special situation that the Chinese TVEs faced was the economic transition, which 
means that the market system was established from the very beginning. During the 
early stage of market development, transaction costs were extremely high, and 
different mechanisms were developed to lower such costs and also the uncertainty. 
For example, the regular marketplace provided a place for meeting and trading, and 
was the simplest way to coordinate the expectations of the trading parties. They could 
exchange information and negotiate the prices in a specified spot and at a specified 
time. Mechanisms had also undergone continuous development. The marketplace, 
personal networks, professional services and online auctions were different 
mechanisms with the same aim, to lower the costs incurred by market transactions. 
Should the cost of using such mechanisms be lower than the benefits they add to the 
economic system, resources would be diverted to their usage. Otherwise, market 
participants must endure the inconvenience until the market grew to a considerable 
size so that the economic system could afford the more expensive, yet more 
convenient mechanisms.54 
 
In that regard, the market was its own rival. During the early stage of development, 
the size of the market was limited by high transaction costs. In a small and segregated 
market, specialization and coordination could only generate a relatively small benefit 
compared with its enormous cost. Resources would therefore not be directed to such 
specialized activities which facilitate market transactions and reduce transaction 
                                                        
53 What I state about rabbit and wolf serves much more as a metaphor, but not a simplified model of real world. 
54 Indeed, they are only expensive to the small market. As the market grows, they become the economy ways to 
lower the transaction cost further. 
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costs.55 A primitive market system did not work as well as the integrated global 
market of today. The structure of the market was also quite different. According to 
Coase’s exposition, transaction costs involved mainly the cost of searching for, and 
negotiation of prices. Hence, one consequence of high transaction costs was the 
non-existence of price signals and a lack of market transactions, unless alternative 
mechanisms existed to lower transaction costs or coordinate the economic activities in 
a non-market way. 
 
To unravel the puzzle of the emergence of the market, we should review the history of 
human civilization. China’s transition provides a perfect research objective to see how 
the market system was established without any foundation, and what kind of problems 
it would encounter during the course of its development. First, as shown above, the 
underdeveloped market could only grow slowly and would develop a segregated 
structure. One important point was that the market for manufactured products grew 
faster than the factor market, including the labor market. This was unsurprising 
because price signals were transmitted along the line from manufactured products to 
factors. Second, people negotiated and determined the prices of manufactured 
products. These prices further determined the factor prices. As the factor market was a 
derivative market, the market for manufactured products and the factor market were 
established in sequence. In some extreme cases, the factor market could not be 
established in the short run equilibrium. Without the factor market, market 
transactions would have been extremely decentralized and segregated. 
 
China’s reform policy exacerbated the problem. During the transitional period, the 
market emerged as a result of the top-down imposed reform and bottom-up 
spontaneous actions. As the top-down strategy, the gradualist approach was applied, 
resulting in the slow-paced liberalization of the market. Looking at Russia’s 
experience, the introduction of a market system in an economy that had been 
governed by a central plan for a long time was a complex process. China handled this 
issue with more prudence and sophistication. However, the gradualist strategy slowed 
down the pace of price liberalization. When there was no price signal, no transactions 
were conducted. 
 
It was the dual-track pricing system that prevented a big-bang style of liberalization. 
However, it created an underground, corrupted market that involved crime, fraud and 
state speculative actions. SOEs monopolized the market during that time because they 
could take advantage of their superior position in the economy. By contrast, the 
non-state sector had little information on the market, such as information on demand, 
supply, and price. Information was mainly transmitted through an informal social 
network. This generated high risk for companies because their decision-making 
process was based on market information. Nevertheless, the market for manufactured 
products quickly grew. 
 
                                                        
55 The model in part three depicts such cases. 
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Compared to the growing market for manufactured products, the labor market was 
highly regulated and small in size. Demographic stability helped to define the 
boundary of the community. In turn, this clearly defined boundary lowered migration 
rates. Moreover, the policy did not encourage the mobility of labor. The household 
registration system, in its strictest form, almost eliminated the possibility of migration, 
not to mention that before 1984 it was illegal to have more than eight employees in a 
private business. The high migration cost slowed the growth of the labor market. 
Apart from regulatory issues, the culture impeded market-driven mobility and worker 
allocation. As mentioned earlier, personal relationships exclude formal contracts that 
require the formulation of rights and obligations in relation to a specific action. In the 
Chinese rural areas, the signing an employment contract was insulting both employee 
and employer.56 As such, labor market, at least in the rural sector, was not established 
or was only primitive with regards to scope and scale. Chen (1995) estimated that 
40.5% of total jobs created by TVEs were assigned to the peasants by the local 
government. Only 17% of workers were recruited from the market. 57  Various 
strategies were implemented to meet the demand for labor, for example, the merging 
of poor villages into the rich village. One of the consequences of a lacking labor 
market was that individuals did not know the value of labor, or the value of skills, 
experience and talent, as they were not priced. Although the wage rate in TVEs was 
associated with the contribution level, it was not based on market prices but on the 
consensus of residents. Hence, individuals were not motivated to define the ownership 
of the labor force. By being unaware of their market value, they did not oppose the 
pooling of human resources. Moreover, unlike the private property institution, the 
common property institution introduced the moral incentive. If the monetary incentive 
was not sufficient, the moral norms came to play a central role in sustaining the 
cooperation. Hence, dissatisfaction arising from the weak association between 
contribution and reward would be suppressed by the moral norms. 
 
Moreover, the land market, as mentioned in previous chapter, had not been 
established because the land ownership was not well defined. In China, land was 
collectively owned. The use right was assigned to individual households, which could 
be transferred partially. And individual households were not allowed to use farmland 
for industrial production unless the government issued the permit. Therefore, land 
market did not work well because of the incomplete land tenure right and the 
governmental intervention. In that kind of environment, the collective TVEs had the 
great advantages over the private firms. First, they were granted the full right to use 
collectively owned resources including land as long as they were collectively owned 
as well. Second, they had institutional ties with the local governments. So the land 
policy discriminated between collective TVEs and private firms. The former was 
                                                        
56 I have talked with a government official who tried to persuade his father to expand agricultural production. His 
father refused his suggestion and told him that it would be a shame to employ his brother. He could ask him to help 
and give him gifts as rewards but would never establish a cold contractual relationship between them. 
57 The figures demonstrate the job market in 1995. According to Chen, the figures indicate the governmental 
inference with the operation of TVEs. It should be avoided. I would argue the opposite. This kind of control 
reflects the embedding of economic activities in the social system. The local government watch the TVE 
management so that it will not further own interest. 
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better served.  
 
In addition, the collective TVEs had a better access to the capital. Actually, there were 
two financial market, a formal one and an informal one. In the informal market, 
market participants did not know the price of capital. The value of capital was the 
current value of total future incomes it generated. The market system was introduced 
to measure investment returns accurately and thus provide the investors with the 
incentive to invest. However, if market information was incomplete, investment 
returns could not be predicted. Investors were not willing to bear the high risk alone, 
but share it with others. Hence, the privatization of TVEs was not intended during the 
first few reform years. Relatives of the able man began to persuade him to appropriate 
the common property only after the sales channel had been established and profits 
granted.  
 
So the household-run establishments, which is categorized as private business, could 
only obtain starting up capitals from the relatives because only the information cost 
was low for relatives. Such information was not channeled in the market, as it was too 
costly to establish a market-base channel. In addition, an individual household cannot 
afford to borrow the loans with high interest rate. The situation was similar in the 
formal financial market. The collective TVEs, big in size and well served by the local 
authorities, had better access to the bank loans.  
 
In a lack of the factor market, how would resources be allocated and production 
organized? In his insightful paper of 1983, Cheung furthered Coase’s theory of the 
firm, arguing that the replacement of the market with the firm was a choice of 
different contractual forms. According to him, the contract for manufactured products 
or services was replaced by the contract for working time. However, during the early 
stage of transition it was not possible to coordinate the collaboration among a large 
number of participants via contracts of employment as the factor market was far from 
perfect. In China’s case, it was partially because the market was on the early stage of 
development and thus small in size, too small to afford the transaction cost. Another 
reason was that the factor market, including labor, land and capital market, was still 
highly regulated by the government. Because the transaction cost was 
overwhelmingly high and governmental intervention persisted, the market developed 
an extremely decentralized structure.  
 
I will illustrate it with the following equtation: 
 
𝑌𝑌(𝐿𝐿i, 𝐿𝐿$, . . . , 𝐿𝐿j, 𝐾𝐾) =
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿i
𝐿𝐿i +
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿$
𝐿𝐿$+. . . +
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿j
𝐿𝐿j +
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾
𝐾𝐾 
 
An integrated form of production requires a string of information of factor prices and 
the liberalization of factor market. If the case is to the contrary, a decentralized 
structure emerged. It implies that the production form of the society was transformed 
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to be 𝑌𝑌(𝐿𝐿i, 𝐾𝐾), 𝑌𝑌(𝐿𝐿$, 𝐾𝐾)… 𝑌𝑌(𝐿𝐿j, 𝐾𝐾). The production unit was slimmed down to the 
minimum size. Hence, information about the individual’s contribution, the incomplete 
land tenure right and the interest rate of capital was of no importance. With respect to 
the production side, the only necessary information was the price of manufactured 
products or services. Small businesses, most of them household-run establishments, 
were connected to the market via contracts for manufactured products or services. 
Statistical findings support this hypothesis. First, in the statistical yearbooks, TVEs 
that were not collectively owned were divided into two groups, the household-run 
business and the multi-household-run business. In 1984, collective TVEs accounted 
for 30.72% of all TVEs while the household-run and multi-household-run 
establishments accounted for 69.28%.58 It seems that private enterprises should be 
the objective of the research, but collective TVEs contributed to 71.37% of total 
revenue made by the TVE sector. Though large in number, the total contribution of 
the household-run establishments to the overall output was extremely low. The figures 
show that household-run establishments were small and weak. However, taking 
transaction costs into consideration the segregated structure was still efficient. 
 
However, in the case of China’s transformation, there was another way. The common 
property institution was able to coordinate the economic activities on a big scale and a 
wide range, yet at a low cost and in a non-market way. This non-market institution 
came to play a complementary role in the market system. The advantage of a common 
property institution could be summarized in two points - low costs and big scale. With 
respect to low costs, the work of a common property institution required no additional 
physical capital or labor force, but only the common beliefs among the community 
members. The community can be regarded as an enlarged household. However, 
compared with a household, a rural community was bigger in size and must develop 
some mechanisms to maintain the cooperation within, for example, the subordination 
to the collective interest, the monitoring system, defining the boundary, and creation 
of moral incentive. Chinese rural society had developed these mechanisms before the 
start of the economic reform, with institutional resources preserved by the socialist 
tradition. The culture, unlike physical capital and labor force, was the common belief 
and once it was formed, maintaining it incurred little marginal cost. 
 
The second advantage of the common property institution was its ability to coordinate 
the economic activities on a bigger scale and wider range than the private property 
institution, given the imperfect market system. This was because the common 
property institution did not need the prices to guide resource allocation and incentive 
provision. As shown above, the community showed a strong preference for 
egalitarianism. Under the “veil of ignorance”, maximizing the minimum income was 
a strategy preferred by the participants. As individuals did not have the access to 
information about marginal output, they were willing to share income equally to avoid 
bearing the extremely high risk by themselves. A household who thought it could 
                                                        
58If the household expected that total revenue made by the household-run establishment was higher than the 
revenue made by the household farming or by the collective production, he would choose to take the full market 
risk. 
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manage the risk would choose to run a small business. However, these small 
businesses were not only troubled by the shortage of information, but also faced 
competition from the cruisers (collective TVEs). Hence, a household would likely 
choose to participate in collective production over running its own business unless the 
market risk was substantially lower. 
 
Therefore, we have the following dynamic analysis. At the beginning phase of the 
transition, the common property institution emerged to coordinate rural 
industrialization. The industrialization prevented the resources to be directed to the 
low value added farming sector. Certainly, the prerequisite for the success of the 
industrialization was the participants’ self-subordination to the collective interest, with 
it being their best strategy compared to independent actions. As the industrialization 
proceeded, the market offered more opportunities to participants and transaction costs 
were lowered continuously. Hence, resources flowed from the community-controlled 
pool and the farming sector to the private industrial sector at an accelerating pace and 
on an increasing scale. However, the flow of resources was not random but patterned. 
Only households which had better access to capital, technologies and market 
information, with individuals who were educated, bold-spirited, talented in doing 
business, were able to, and willing to join the market competition by opening up a 
private establishment. When the market expanded, the risk and cost of running a 
private enterprise was lowered. In other words, the barrier to market entry was 
lowered. This generated two outcomes. First, more resources were attracted to the 
private sector. Second, household-run establishments survived with a higher 
probability and were able to grow to a relatively large size. 
 
However, experience tells us that although the barrier to market entry was removed, 
many people still preferred to find jobs in the firms instead of opening a new business. 
Hence, disadvantaged individuals would insist on working together in the collectively 
owned enterprises, only better off if they stay in an organization favoring the 
disadvantaged members. Counter-intuitively, the most able entrepreneurs would also 
work for the collective TVEs. As they could only maximize the value of talents while 
running resource-intensive entities, they would not easily give up their positions in the 
collective TVEs. Indeed, monetary return was not compared with the non-monetary 
return derived from running a big company and leading of hundreds of workers. It is 
worth noting that the non-monetary return was not only the inner feeling of 
satisfaction, but also valuable measured in the market terms. For example, great 
reputation would be gained from being the head of a big company and could turn into 
a monetary reward in the future. It was not surprising that there were a lot of stories 
about the able men. Only when the market was well developed and the mainstream 
rhetoric justified the behavior of free exchange and wealth accumulation, the strategy 
of privatization awoke the interest of TVE leaders and local government officials. 
Along with the privatization of TVEs, the labor force was freed from the control of 
the community and brought to the free market. 
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In summary, the common property institution enabled a big scale and wide range of 
economic cooperation within the rural industrial sector. The economies of scale were 
therefore realized for the collective TVEs and important to the survival of the infant 
rural industrial sector. We can say that, during the transitional period, the TVE sector 
captured the factor market and developed an integrated form of production, though 
the size of collective TVEs was still limited by the size of social network.  
 
6.5 State, Market and TVEs 
 
To gain a full understanding of the success of the TVE sector, we should not separate 
the TVEs from the surrounding environment, including the institutions they interacted 
with. Two kinds of relationships are of particular interest. First, the relationship 
between the state and the TVE sector was a popular topic among scholars. Without 
the support of the local authorities, the TVEs might not have grown so quickly and 
well. Also, although not as popular a topic as the interaction between the state and the 
TVE sector, the relationship between the market and the TVE sector is very important 
for understanding how a personalized transaction system worked. 
 
State and TVEs 
 
As a political organization, the state usually had a complicated structure, with 
different structures generating different policies and strategies. The Chinese political 
system had a multi-layered structure, which assigned two roles to the local authorities. 
They were simultaneously the local branch of the central government and the 
representative of the local interest. However, the roles were not always balanced. If 
the local authority was remote from the centrality in the hierarchical system, it would 
act more like the representative of local interest, particularly the village committee, 
which was elected by villagers but not appointed by the upper level of administration. 
The head of the village committee could not obtain promotion in the bureaucratic 
system because they were not cadres. Hence, they were only interested in the 
monetary rewards or non-monetary rewards such as reputation and high status. 
Although officials of the township government were tempted by the higher official 
positions, there was an almost non-existent chance of promotion. Moreover, the 
market reform showed Chinese officials the power of money. After the tax reform, the 
township government was strongly motivated to promote local economic growth and 
to collect more revenues. Individual officials also wanted to, and were able to benefit 
from the economic growth. 
 
Once the tight control imposed by the centralized governance institution had been 
abolished, the decentralized nature of the Chinese political system granted local 
authorities more autonomy so that they could introduce and implement policies which 
turned out to be effective to local issues. The local authorities tended to avoid the 
influence from the top down, and re-established the social order. The dual roles of the 
local authorities were very important to the re-establishment of social order, and thus 
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the success of rural industrialization. First, the organizational link between the local 
authorities and the state-owned sector enabled the establishment of a channel to shift 
information and resources from the state-owned sector to the TVE sector. Second, it 
provided the protection for the infant TVE sector. Li (1995) argued that the protection 
from the government was the key to the success of TVEs in an imperfect market. 
According to him, vaguely defined ownership was efficient because it motivated the 
local authority to help the TVEs. 
 
As to the role of channeling resources, I will show how the capital was provided to 
the TVEs with the help of the local authorities. Zhou et al (1987) studied the financial 
data collected from the sample TVEs across ten provinces. He found that the start-up 
capital of a TVE came from various sources, with more than 38% from the loan 
provided by the banks. Local governments provided 10% and part of the money was 
subject to payback. About 24% was collectively owned capital. Moreover, the TVEs’ 
demand for capital would not reduce during the development. Zhou observed that 
TVEs had a high debt to asset ratio around 55%. 50% of the debt was the loans made 
by the banks. The second biggest source of debt was the accounts payable, accounting 
for about 24%. According to the statistics, we can come to the conclusion that the 
starting up and further development of TVEs relied heavily on external financing, 
among others, the bank loans. However, TVEs did not possess many assets and their 
capacity to make profits was also unknown to the financial intermediaries. Therefore, 
it was difficult for TVEs to raise the start-up capital and obtain more capital whenever 
needed. 
 
Local authorities came to solve the problem. First, they financed the starting up of 
TVEs using government revenue. This was insufficient. Second, As Jiang (2000) 
pointed out, local authorities softened the budget of TVEs and also their commitment 
to repay the loans. They were able to interfere with the credit policy of the banks 
because the banking sector was under the control of the local administration. Because 
of the collective nature of TVEs, local authorities were highly motivated to promote 
the TVE sector, as they would take money from one pocket, the banks, into another 
pocket, the TVEs. Jiang argued that the aggressive expansion of TVEs (even more 
aggressive than SOEs) was the evidence for the prevalence of local corporatism. 
Conversely, the banks were willing to make loans to TVEs endorsed by the local 
authorities because the local authorities knew the performance of the TVEs well, and 
the TVEs that they supported must be the best ones among them. A single TVE might 
fail while the TVE sector as a whole could not. With their contribution, the growth of 
the market was strong and its expansion never seemed to slow down. It meant that 
there was no systematic risk which might have led to an economic crisis. This kind of 
soft budget was only good for the economy, at least during that “special” period. 
 
Local authorities established a relationship between the banking and manufacturing 
sectors, depicted by the following figures.59 In 1995, the debt to asset ratio of 
                                                        
59 See Jiang, Changyun, Xiangzhen Qiy Zijin Laiyuan yu Rongzi Jiegou de Dongtai Bianhua: Fenxi yu Sikao 
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collective TVEs was 62.84%, while that of private TVEs was 27.45%. The big gap 
could be partly explained by the different size of enterprises. However, size was not 
the only reason. What the banks were really concerned about was the loan applicants’ 
ability to make a profit. Such information was not observable for the banks. Hence, 
information delivered via the government was very important. In some cases, as 
mentioned, the local governments instructed the bank to make loans to the collective 
TVEs, based mainly on the information they had. Thus, collective TVEs had better 
access to financial services with their tight relationship with the local governments. 
Their debt to asset ratio was not lower than that of the SOEs. 
 
Besides capital, local authorities also helped the TVEs to gain access to other factors 
such as raw materials. The application of a gradualist approach meant that the door 
was opened slowly. Initially, the purchase of raw materials was very difficult for 
non-state-owned enterprises. In the command economy, the bargaining power of the 
local authorities was bigger than that of individuals. They were also familiar with the 
flaws of a central planning system and were able to get raw materials at a low cost. In 
1984, the dual-track pricing system was introduced to liberalize the market. Under 
this policy, the economic system was corrupted and the state-owned sector 
monopolized the supply of raw materials. “State speculation” appeared in the 
presence of a price gap between planned materials and marketable materials. 
High-ranked officials and the managers of SOEs made profits by shifting resources 
from the state-owned sector to the non-state-owned sector. Although corruption would 
harm economic efficiency in the long run, it accelerated the liberalization of the 
market in the short run. The resources flowed, like a waterfall, from the plan to the 
market. The institutional link between the local authorities and the state-owned sector 
was particularly useful in directing the resources to where they generated highest 
value, that is, to the TVEs.60 Besides, the local authorities also assisted the TVEs to 
access market information and to adopt the advanced technologies. For example, local 
authorities organized trade fairs where the TVEs could exchange market information 
and find trading partners. 
 
Another role of the local authorities was that of the protector. First, the local 
authorities protected the TVEs from political interference. The central authority could 
only know the happenings in the rural areas through the local agent because they had 
an advantage in accessing the local information. Conversely, the state policy was also 
made known to the ordinary people by the local authorities. The local authorities were 
the switch of information flows so that they could filter the information to change the 
political climate and further their own interests. Second, the local authorities protected 
the TVEs from market failure. Li argued that, in an imperfect market, the property 
right was not to be enforced and transaction security was not ensured due to what was 
                                                                                                                                                              
( Fund Resources of Township Enterprises and the Dynamic Change in Their Financing Structure: Analysis and 
Consideration), Economic Research Journal, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 34-39. The figures are found in financial data of 
TVEs(1994), the development of TVEs 1995-1998, A summary of Chinese statistics (1999). 
60Though TVEs could purchase the materials in the market, the price was much higher and it would lower the 
competitiveness of TVEs. But the local authorities might purchase the planned materials at lower prices through 
the institutional link though it was illegal. 
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lacking of the legal system. However, the government could solve the problem using 
administrative resources. Local authorities were supposed to be a market guard. 
 
Other than the protector role, local authorities also played the role of a facilitator. In a 
market system, the opening and closing of enterprises were subject to competition. In 
other words, the government did not need to regulate the market entry and exit, as the 
market is a self-regulating institution. Contrary to the decentralized market, China’s 
economic system was characterized by centralization. Without a market system to 
adjust the number of enterprises, the government came to play a similar role, but in a 
less effective way. The government imposed regulations and these regulations was 
very detailed, extending to almost every aspect of commercial activities. Let us have a 
look at the following case. Hengdian was a town famous for producing silk. In 1974, 
people there planned to set up a factory to reel silk, and spent five months to collect 
all the stamps required for starting up a new business. These stamps were scattered 
among a number of bureaus across different levels of administration. Chen (2000) 
argued that, in this case, personal relationships played a relevant role. However, 
applications were processed within the formal institution. Hence, the efficiency of 
personal relationships was not comparable with that of organizations. Without the 
support or participation of the local authorities, normal people could not collect all the 
stamps they needed to set up TVEs. It was the local authorities’ advantage to 
overcome the barrier to the market entry. 
 
Oi raised a hypothesis that she termed “local state corporatism” to explain the success 
of rural industrialization. She asserted that local authorities behaved like a corporation. 
Thanks to the shared taxation system, they were provided with incentives to promote 
rural industrialization and the TVE sector. On a slightly different line of argument, 
Walder also regarded the local authorities as industrial firms. According to them, rural 
industrialization was a government-led strategy. The above analysis could be a strong 
support for their hypotheses. However, if they were right, the local authorities were 
supposed to play the same role in the urban sector supporting the development of 
SOEs. However, the performance of SOEs was disappointing. As such, I would like to 
argue the opposite. Rural industrialization was not a government-led, but a 
community-led strategy. The truth is that local authorities were captured by the rural 
communities and served the interest of communities, not vice versa. It is why Chinese 
local authorities tended to be the protector and promoter of the TVE sector, but did 
not try to prey on it. Rural industrialization performed a filtering function. Local 
authorities who failed to serve the interests of the community would lose influence. 
On one hand, local authorities had less political power after the abolishment of the 
command system. On the other hand, the household farming system provided an 
option for individual peasants to undermine the tight relationships with the local 
administration. Under such circumstances, only the local authorities willing to, and 
able to serve the community could play an active role in the economic transition. 
There is another similar explanation. As suggested in many cases, an individual able 
man took control over the administrative body and the business unit at the same time. 
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He could thus align the corporate interest, government interest, with the community 
interest.61 Only when he did so, could he maintain the high status and prestige among 
residents. 
 
Market and TVEs 
 
Although the state’s role in economic growth was important, the market played a 
more important role. It is not controversial to state that China’s economic success was 
achieved through the establishment of a free economic exchange system. The success 
of TVEs could not be imagined without the liberalization of the market. At the same 
time, the scope and scale of the economy expanded as the result of the fast growth of 
the TVE sector. However, as shown above, the market system was far from perfect 
during the early stage of reform. It did not feature impersonal transactions, but was 
embedded in the social network. We find that the social network enabled a mechanism, 
making market transactions possible, particularly in the case that the market had not 
developed an impersonal mechanism to ensure the transactions. Two functions of the 
social network are to be considered. First, the social network carried the information 
to the very end it could reach. Resources would be directed to where they generate the 
highest value as the market information pointed out. Actually, the presence of the 
social network lowered transaction costs, including information costs. As I mentioned 
earlier, solving of the matching problem was essential to the completion of market 
transactions. However, an emerging market could not afford the transaction costs 
arising from the matching process. The social network came to provide a useful 
mechanism to coordinate the matching process without imposing additional cost 
burdens. No matter the existence of the market, the social network, as a part of the 
social system, existed and would exist further. Hence, to facilitate the matching 
process and lower transaction costs, the market transaction was inevitably embedded 
in the social network. 
 
The second function concerns the security of transactions. I have said that the local 
authorities could protect the interest of the trading parties. Sometimes, they also fail. 
A local government only had influence in the area under its jurisdiction. There were 
conflicts of interest among regions. They were not able to solve cross-regional 
conflicts. Local governments also tended to protect the indigenous enterprises. 
However, over-protection would infringe on the interest of the non-local enterprises. 
And, obviously, the rise of local protectionism would deter the growth of the market. 
Motivated by the enormous economic interest, the non-state-owned sector turned to 
the informal institution to search for a solution. The search ended up finding that 
social relationships could enhance people’s trust within the transaction. 
 
In a personalized exchange, the personal relationship lowered the information cost 
and generated trust between the trading parties. It is not controversial that the primary 
                                                        
61 Yin, Desheng, The Empirical Observation and Analytical interpretation of Nanjie Village Mode: A Case Study 
of Changing of a TVE’s Ownership System, Management World, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 173-179 
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function of a personal relationship is to transmit information. If the market is small, it 
is not economical to throw resources into some specialized activities that facilitate 
information transmission. However, without information flow, market transactions are 
not possible. Thus, personal ties can be used as an informal way to spread information. 
Chen (2000) records some cases in which the TVEs sought market opportunities and 
the access to technologies via the social network.62 The personal network was a very 
important information source next to the local authority. It lowers transaction costs 
without incurring additional cost. 
 
The second function of personal relationship is about transaction security. Through 
personal relationships, people knew each other better. However, sometimes an 
individual’s action could not be predicted based on what he did in the past. Lowering 
of the information cost was insufficient for transaction security. I regard the personal 
relationship as an informal, yet self-enforcing contract. The relationship was exclusive, 
by which I mean that once an individual had established the relationship with another 
individual with respect to a specific issue, he would not establish the same 
relationship with others., Monogamy is an excellent example, considering the 
conjugal relationship. Although it is not so strict in the business world, the 
relationship is comparable to marriage. The exclusivity arises from the high cost of 
entering the relationship. If the cost of entering the relationship was low, people 
tended to raise the cost until it was high enough to prevent any kind of betrayal. In 
China, there was a famous drinking culture. People over-consume alcohol during the 
business dinners. They highlight their friendship and loyalty by hurting themselves 
through overconsumption of alcohol. The drinking culture is only a symbol, which 
Aoki (2001) termed a compressed feature of the institution. Behind the drinking 
culture is the truth that the establishment of a relationship is costly. Therefore, if 
people exit from a relationship, he does not only forsake the future benefit generated 
from the relationship, but also must afford the cost of entering into a new relationship. 
The self-generating high entry cost reinforces the personal relationship and thus 
secures the transaction. 
 
There is a case showing the commercial value of personal relationships. During the 
rapid development of TVEs, an army of salesmen appeared. Over ten thousand of 
them were sent to every corner of the country to seek market opportunities.63 Playing 
actively within the market, the salesmen had soon learned the true value of market 
information. For them, the moral incentive was gradually crowded out by the 
monetary incentive because they felt remote from the community. However, they 
were close to the market and the market value of their contribution increased 
enormously. In the mid-1990s, TVEs signed so-called buyer contracts with salesmen. 
                                                        
62 In these cases, the information is usually passed between relatives and residents of the same village or town. 
The blood tie and demographic relationship provided the foundation for developing a social network. And in that 
sense, the economic activities were embedded in the social relations. 
63 See Chao. Dingshen, 130 thousands salesmen employed by the TVEs in Ningbo area travelled all over the 
country to seek market opportunities, Contemporary economy, 2000, issue 7. It is also reported by Gongmin Bao 
that, in 1995, there were over ten thousands salesmen in Wenzhou area. See Bao, Gongmin, The reason why TVEs 
succeeded, Sunan scientific development, 1997. 
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It means that salesmen bought the commodities from the TVEs and sold them to 
ultimate customers. The employment contract was replaced with the purchase 
contract. 64  In that regard, the impersonal market took dominance over the 
relationship between TVEs and salesmen. 
 
At the same time, a salesman could determine if his employer received the purchase 
order or not. The same case could not occur to a U.S. or European multinational firm. 
In an impersonal market, the clients do not pay a lot of attention to the change of 
salesmen. They focus only on the price and the quality of what they would purchase. 
Why did the salesmen have so much bargaining power? The answer lies in the 
relationship between the salesmen and clients. The client only trusted the salesman 
with whom he had established the personal relationship, but not the TVEs as an 
organization. As a result, talent hunting and job-hopping appeared in the group of 
salesmen. TVEs did it because it was worth doing so. The job market for salesmen 
emerged as a response to the increasing value of relationships. 
 
6.6 The Downfall of TVEs 
 
As discussed above, the community mobilized political and market resources to 
develop TVEs with the aim of improving local welfare. However, the community-led 
growth strategy was not stable in the long run. The TVE with a vaguely defined 
ownership was an efficient organizational form of production only during the 
development of the market. When the market expanded, the TVEs’ advantage over 
private enterprises became smaller. Pressure did not only come from the outside 
competition but also from the internal tension arising from the changing of the 
incentive structure. During the second half of the 1990s, the number of collective 
TVEs decreased substantially. Most collective TVEs were privatized and it became 
unnecessary to differentiate between the TVE and private sectors. 
 
There are two contrasting explanations. Some scholars argued that TVEs were “bad” 
and the privatization was “good”. They thought that throwing resources into the TVE 
sector was an interim strategy because the legitimacy of private ownership had been 
not totally ensured. Pan, as the representative figure of proponents of collective 
ownership, argued the opposite. According to him, TVEs were “good” and 
privatization was “bad”. He thought that the TVE was a great innovation and adaptive 
to China’s socioeconomic system. The TVE sector was destroyed by the privatization 
policy implemented from the top down. The misuse of the policy resulted in the sharp 
decline of collective TVEs. Both of them have several right points in their arguments. 
I will incorporate both of arguments into a new explanation, that is, the downfall of 
TVEs was ascribed to the weakness of community governance as well as the changing 
environment, among others, the expansion of the market. 
 
                                                        
64 The use of buyer contract is reported in an industry communication letter named Chinese TVE. See Jiang, 
Zhushen, The TVEs of Haimen county uses buyer contract, Chinese TVEs, 1995, issue 10; Cui, Yeping, The TVEs 
of Dafeng county uses buyer contract, Chinese TVEs, 1997, issue 2. 
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The weakness of community governance lies in the limited size of the community and 
the homogeneity of the members (Bowles and Gintis, 2000). In the case of a big 
community, such as a people’s commune, the interaction among members would not 
be sufficiently frequent to maintain the cooperation. There is an efficient size for the 
community. However, the boundary of the firm is not limited. Some multinational 
firms have 100 thousand employees. How can the community solve the problem when 
the TVEs grow too big? Some villages divided the population into three categories, 
core residents, peasants who lived nearby, and migrant workers. From the inner to the 
outer circle, the private governance substituted the community governance. For the 
residents, Huaxi village was a community. For the migrant workers, the village was 
only an employer. This circle-formed system overcame the constraint imposed by the 
size while maintaining the community governance in the center. However, it had a 
fragile structure due to the contrasting logic of the two institutions. 
 
The second weakness is the homogeneity of members. The prevalence of a collectivist 
culture leads to the homogeneity of community members. The ideology dominating 
the market for ideas must be highly unified. Taking Huaxi village as an example, the 
peasants were forbidden to have much entertainment. The entertainment was replaced 
with education to preserve the purity of the thoughts. It looked as if the whole village 
travelled through the time from the imperial era or the communist period into the 20th 
century. Putting the ethical problem aside, the closeness of the community would be a 
problem as the market favors diversity. In particular, the innovation is based on the 
diversity. TVEs may be good at imitating. However, when the imitating became less 
beneficial to the Chinese firms because of increasing labor costs, they were not able to 
turn to innovation so easily. Considering the increasing importance of innovation in 
the Chinese economy, the tension between population homogeneity and the diversity 
of thoughts might be getting greater. How we solve this problem could be essential to 
further development. 
 
Moreover, from the ethical perspective, life in Huaxi village was also controversial. 
The major question was the lack of freedom. If lifestyle freedom was regarded as 
generating significant utility, the life there was not attractive, so the commentators. 
Hever, they were not the villagers who might not have many choices while throwing 
into the market competition. So they might prefer the higher income to the so-called 
lifestyle freedom. We cannot solve the ethical problem here, but shall bear in the mind 
that sometimes only the economic analysis could not tell us the solution to a complex 
problem. 
 
We have discussed the weakness of community governance. And we will see how it 
led to the decline of the TVEs sector in a changing environment. By the changing 
environment I mean the expansion of the market. The expansion of the market 
reduced transaction costs.65 In particular, the cost of using the price system was 
lowered. The model above predicts that, when transaction costs decreased, the private 
                                                        
65 In fact, the total amount of transaction cost increased while the income to transaction cost ratio decreased. 
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property institution would take the dominance over the economy. As the market size 
kept growing, the advantage of collective TVEs over the private enterprises slowly 
disappeared. In the fully developed market, private enterprises have easy access to 
information and resources. Price is determined by the market process. Both labor and 
capital markets were established. Private enterprises only need to consider the market 
conditions they face. However, if collective TVEs want to grow, they must develop a 
multi-layer system and pay attention to the interests of the whole community. By 
contrast, private firms are able to grow without limit if the transaction cost is 
sufficiently low. 
 
Second, besides the strong competition from the private sector, the sustainability of 
the common property institution was also challenged by the environmental change. 
When the impersonal market dominated the economy, TVEs with vaguely defined 
ownership might collapse from inside. With the expansion of the market, it became 
possible to estimate the market value of resources accurately. The value gap between 
different resources would then be widened. This had a primary effect on the labor 
market. In the labor market, the value of human resources was measured by prices 
such as wages, salaries and bonus. However, in a community, the distribution of 
monetary income followed the principle of egalitarianism. Contribution was reflected 
in the status, prestige and other kinds of acknowledgement, which provided great 
moral incentive. However, when the value gap between different labor was widened 
according to market criterion, the monetary incentive began to crowd out the moral 
incentive. People who could receive much higher returns in the labor market would 
prefer to jump to the private sector. As for the TVEs leaders, they were also tempted 
by the huge economic benefit from the privatization of TVEs. During that time, 
management buyout was a popular strategy to privatize TVEs. They would be 
millionaires after acquiring the majority shareholding of the TVEs. Hence, the 
survival of TVEs depended on how strong the moral incentive was. The practice 
showed that the monetary incentive was generally stronger than the moral incentive 
after pursuing the economic interest had been justified by the prevailing ideology of 
the time. Only a few villages still retained the community governance system. The 
prerequisite was that the leaders must play the role of a sage and have a strong 
preference over moral rewards. Otherwise, the charisma of the leaders would be 
damaged due to the corrupt behavior. In today’s China, the remaining TVEs are those 
travelled through time from the past. They are fossils. Pan was too optimistic towards 
the TVEs and the community governance system. He thought that the privatization 
policy caused a sudden death of the TVEs and accelerate their downfall. In the well 
developed market, the advantage of a community governance system no longer exists. 
Furthermore, the increasing monetary incentive helps to disintegrate the community. 
 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
I spend a whole chapter to discuss the nature, the role and the development pattern of 
TVEs because the importance of TVEs cannot be overestimated. The experience of 
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the industrial countries indicates that the industrialization could only occur in the 
urban areas where there is high population density. Contrasting to the ordinary 
experience, China’s industrialization was carried out in the countryside. In the cities, 
the state-owned sector was troubled by the incentive problem and thus contributed 
little to the growth. The municipalities were watched by the central authority, and so 
they implemented reform policies with more prudence. On top of the tight regulations, 
the limited access to resources made the situation of the private firms even worse. 
Besides, in the presence of the policy barrier, the migration to urban areas was almost 
not possible during that time. As a result, the relationship between urbanization and 
industrialization was broken down. The ratio of city inhabitants to rural inhabitants 
was low, and there was no sufficient labor to support the industrialization in the urban 
areas. 
 
Then, unexpectedly, a spontaneous action was taken across the nation like a little fire 
burning the whole prairie. China turned to seek industrialization in the rural areas. 
The only question is whether rural entities or peasants had incentive as well as ability 
to pursue the industrialization. With respect to the incentive, the monetary incentive 
would be stronger if the profits generated from industrialization were higher than that 
generated from farming. The labor surplus in the agricultural sector demanded the 
further partition of land until the farmland was divided into small parcels. And the 
high labor-land ratio resulted in low efficiency. While the household responsibility 
system could only save the peasants from starvation, it was not a good way to 
accumulate wealth. If the rural community was able to implement the strategy of 
industrialization, they would. 
 
However, industrialization involved high risk as I have discussed above. Underpinned 
by the cadre-centered network and the underlying collectivist culture, rural 
communities were able to coordinate the industrial production at low cost and in 
relatively big scale. In practice, the collective TVEs emerged and contributed largely 
to the growth of the TVE sector. Compared with the household-run establishments, 
the collective TVEs were bigger in size, had better reputation, and better access to 
resources and capital. The rise of collective TVEs relied on two conditions. First, the 
common property institution should operate smoothly with the boundary defined, the 
network established, the mechanisms specified and the legal position recognized. 
Second, the embedded market was on the early stage of development so that it 
required an economic institution with more coordination and mobilization capability. 
As shown by the practice, the common property institution performed better than the 
private property institution with respect to the mobilization of large-amount resources. 
And cadres-turned entrepreneurs, as both the center and leader of the network, steered 
the collective TVEs skillfully in a market being embedded in the culture and socialist 
system.  
 
However, after the market had been well developed and transaction costs lowered, the 
common property institution began to fail. There were two reasons. One was the 
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increasing competition from the private sector. If the transaction cost was low, it was 
very easy to coordinate the industrial production in a big scale through the market. 
The other one was that the moral incentive was crowded out by the monetary 
incentive. The increasing value of labor and capital formed a strong monetary 
incentive, which helped to shift the labor and capital to the private sector. Furthermore, 
during that time, the social rhetoric was tailored to fit the free market thinking. As a 
result of combined effect of incentive as well as ideological shift, most of collective 
TVEs were privatized. And the society was ready to welcome a sharp turn to the 
mixed economy. 
 
Although TVE, once a word of great success, was gradually buried into oblivion, it 
still means a lot to the scholars who try to understand the Chinese economy. China’s 
economic growth could not be so fast without the contribution of TVEs. It laid the 
foundation for further development of the private sector as well. However, putting 
TVE’s role in the economy aside, there is an ethical issue worth discussing. 
Privatization seems to be unavoidable for the market economy. We all know that 
private ownership provided market participants with the incentive to engage in market 
transactions. Among numerous market interactions emerge the prices, which direct the 
resources where they generate the highest value. Then the utility could be maximized. 
However, in this pure economic model, we could not find out the meaning of the rise 
and downfall of TVEs to the society. The rise of TVEs required cohesive rural 
communities. And the communities accumulated and preserved wealth within the 
rural areas. With the success of rural industrialization, the towns and villages 
prospered. This kind of economic growth could be regarded as inclusive growth 
because the distribution of income was relatively equal and all the community 
members shared the benefit derived from the growth. 
 
However, the increasing monetary incentive destroyed the cohesiveness of the 
community. The majority of TVEs was privatized, sold, or merged if not bankrupted. 
With the replacement of the common property institution by the private property 
institution, the economic activities were dis-embedded from the rural social system. 
The market did not need communities anymore and was largely impersonalized. 
Peasants’ right to share the wealth derived from industrialization was deprived. What 
was left to them was only the ownership of their labor and use right of land. With the 
decreasing importance of the community-based business, there was no reason for the 
peasants to stay in the villages and towns as their only concern was the level of 
earnings. Hence, migrant workers appeared seeking jobs in the affluent coastal areas. 
They were the young labor, leaving the hometown for a better earning in the cities. 
Liberal economists may regard it as a natural market process, similar to Louise’s 
two-sector model. Certainly, the migrant workers earned more in the city than doing 
farming. But the price for the additional income was the sacrifice of a peaceful life 
with the family in the hometown. A series of social problems cropped up. Lacking 
parental care, children grew up with psychological problems. The suicide rate of 
elderly increased owing to the shortage of medical care. Villages and towns were 
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deserted. All of these negative impacts could not be priced and were not included in 
the cost-benefit calculation. With respect to the migrant workers, they contributed 
enormously to economic growth but were only rewarded with a small slice of the cake. 
The inequality was widened and served to solidify the social stratification. 
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7. The Export-led Growth, Institutional Arbitrage and Industrial Clustering  
 
The rural industrialization prepared a good foundation for further growth. TVEs 
trained industrial workers, established market networks and accumulated capital. 
They also contributed enormously to exports. During 1995-2000, the value of exports 
accounted for more than 30% of TVEs’ total revenue. China’s comparative advantage 
in labor cost drove the wheel of international trade. The foreign market became a 
significant part of the Chinese economy. When the political barrier to international 
trade was removed, the potential of exports was fully released and contributed 
tremendously to China’s industrial sector. 2001 marked the turning point as China 
participated in the WTO with a commitment to open its domestic market. In return, 
the world market also opened up for Chinese firms. Since then, China’s participation 
in international trade stepped into a new era. Chart 7.1 shows the rapid growth of the 
volume of international trade. 
 
 
Source: Chinese statistical yearbook 
 
Chart 7.1 China’s annual export value during 1978-2012 
 
During the 1990s, exports were on the growth track. In the new millennium, China’s 
entry into the WTO accelerated the growth of exports. The strong growth was 
interrupted by the financial crisis in 2008. During the several years following the 
crisis, the world economy gradually recovered. Exports re-achieved and exceeded 
pre-crisis levels. To put the noise aside, one thing is clear: China’s exports to the 
world had undergone fast growth during last two decades. The rising exports 
contributed not only to the growth, but also changed the industrial structure. This 
chapter will investigate in four parts how China harnessed the exports-led growth 
engine. The first part tries to find out if exports were really an important source of 
growth. The second part is devoted to explaining how China benefited from the 
integration into the world economy. The term “institutional arbitrage” is used to 
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capture the nature of the exports-led growth. Part three draws on some findings of 
empirical studies to support the hypothesis. The fourth part discusses industrial 
clustering. 
 
7.1 Is China Export-led? 
 
Is China actually export-led? Scholars are polarized on the issue. Some place a high 
value on the role of exports and their answer is a firm “yes”. They use the ratio 
between the volume of international trade and GDP to measure the degree of foreign 
trade dependence of the Chinese economy. The ratio is much higher than the average 
level. For a large economy, it is abnormal. According to official data, the value of 
exports at its peak accounted for more than 35% of total GDP. The conclusion is 
obvious: Export was a major engine driving China’s growth. However, the opponents 
attacked the statistical terms. Anderson (2007) argued that the export/GDP ratio 
compares two incompatible concepts. Export is measured in total turnover and GDP 
in value-added terms. According to him, the contribution of export to GDP is 
overestimated by solely using the export/GDP ratio. It is around 10% if the revised 
numbers are used.66 China’s export sector was not small. However, for the scholars 
sharing the similar opinion with Anderson, China’s export sector was by no means 
large. It only contributed moderately to the GDP growth. According to Anderson, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan are export-led, but China is definitely not. 
However, Anderson’s argument is not absolutely persuasive. Export is not a concept 
in relation to the sectors or different stages of production. So it is not quite possible 
that the value-added at different stages of production is repeatedly counted in the 
value of export. 
 
Hence, it is sufficient to use the domestic value-added in exports to show the actual 
contribution of the export sector to the overall growth. However, controversy persists 
over the estimates of domestic value-added in exports. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) 
developed a concept of “vertical specialization” and proposed a formula based on the 
concept to compute the share of domestic value-added in exports. They found that it 
was about 79% in 1990. Their method has been criticized for assuming the same rate 
of imported inputs in the processing exports and in the ordinary exports. Koopman, 
Wang and Wei (2012) tried to avoid the overestimation and calculated that the 
aggregate average share of domestic value-added in exports was about 50% before 
China’s entry into the WTO and had increased to 60% since then. Upward, Wang and 
Zhen (2013) also took the difference between processing exports and ordinary exports 
into account and modified the method proposed by Hummels et al. They found that 
the domestic content of China’s exports increased from 53% to 60% over the period 
from 2003 to 2006. Luo and Zhang (2014) used the OECD datasets to estimate the 
share of domestic contents of China’s export. According to their findings, the share of 
domestic contents declined from 88% in 1995 to 64% in 2006, and increased slightly 
                                                        
66 Anderson, Jonathan, Is China export-led, Asian focus, 27 September, 2007 
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to 67% in 2009. The sharp decline was attributed to the increasing volume of 
processing exports. The OECD has a similar estimate of domestic value-added in 
China’s gross exports. It declined from 66% in 1995 to 62% in 2000 and increased to 
68% in 2008. It is assumed that a V-form of fluctuation of share of domestic 
value-added in gross exports over the last two decades. Hence, I used the OECD 
estimates to obtain the ratio of domestic value-added in exports to GDP.  
 
 
Source: OECD, Chinese statistical yearbook 
 
Chart 7.2 The ratio of domestic value-added in export to GDP 
 
Chart 7.2 shows that the share of domestic content of export in the GDP started to 
increase in 2000, the year of China’s participation in the WTO. It rose to over 20% in 
a few years until the financial crisis slowed down the growth of China’s export. After 
recovering from the recession, China’s dependence on export decreased. Since 2008, 
the domestic market has played an increasingly important role. It is no doubt that 
membership in the WTO led to the enormous increase of export demand as well as the 
rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector. Exports also contributed enormously to 
China’s overall economic growth, particularly during the 2000s.  
 
Over the last two decades, China was known for its overwhelming manufacturing 
capacity. Products labeled “Made in China” were delivered all over the world. Due to 
the rising export demand, the industrial sector expanded rapidly. As most of the 
cross-border trade occurred in the manufacturing sector, I will compare the value of 
exports with the value-added of the industrial sector and investigate the relationship 
between rising exports and the expansion of the industrial sector. 
 
The following chart depicts the value of exports and value-added of industrial sector 
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since the reform. We can see that the growth trends of both variables are extremely 
similar. Both feature a downturn in 1998 and 1999 due to the Asian financial crisis. 
Then, growth speeded up after China joined the WTO in 2000, and was interrupted by 
the financial crisis in 2008. There might have been some other factors explaining the 
fluctuation of growth rate of the industrial sector, but none of them are as 
straightforward and pervasive as the rising exports.  
 
 
 
As shown in Chart 7.3, the full line illustrates how value of export increase from 1978 
to 2012 while the dotted line shows the growth of value-added of industrial sector. 
Rising export demand was an external shock to the Chinese economy. As Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) showed in a seminal paper, the shift in equilibrium should 
be the result of the simultaneous expansion of several sectors. However, the 
equilibrium position also shifts outwards if a sector is expanded due to the external 
demand, because it triggers a demand spillover effect. The liberalization of trade 
resulted in the expansion of the manufacturing sector, which, in turn, generated more 
demand for services provided by the service sector. The initial inflow of external 
demand led to the expansion of both the industrial and service sectors. If the opening 
up policy did not end up in entry into the WTO, China would not only have suffered 
from a shortage of foreign currency reserves, but also a slowdown of industrialization 
and urbanization. If the industrial sector had not grown quickly, the service sector 
would not have grown quickly as well, and there would have been insufficient jobs 
created to transfer the surplus labor from the rural to the industrial sector.67 
                                                        
67 Hausmann, Ricardo, César A. Hidalgo, The network structure of economic output, Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 2011, Pages 309-342 
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As shown above, the contribution of the export sector to China’s growth was more 
than 20% of its GDP. According to Murphy et al, the impact of exports was amplified 
through the demand spillover effect. So we can say that at this period China is 
“export-led”. If we agree that exports was the second engine for the growth (the first 
was rural industrialization, which I have discussed earlier), we ought to question how 
China’s manufacturing capacity is embedded in the global value chain. It seems that 
the answer to this question can be easily found in any of the standard textbooks. 
International trade takes place because of the uneven distribution of resources and 
differences in productivity. However, one point to explain the differences in 
productivity is not thoroughly discussed, yet is of interest and importance as well. I 
call it “institutional arbitrage”. It is a major mechanism that enabled the high-speed 
growth of a huge economy like China’s. The following section will be devoted to the 
discussion of “institutional arbitrage”.  
 
7.2 Trade, Integration of Market and Institutional Arbitrage 
 
Institutional arbitrage is not a widely used concept. Scholars interested in it did not 
share a common understanding of the concept. Chen (2013) proposed a concept of 
“institutional arbitrage”. He argued that “China compensates for its internal 
institutional deficits by leveraging the complexity of regulatory regimes across 
various countries, and thereby pursues its development strategy with unprecedented 
speed.”68 However, although the argument referred to general economic practice, his 
analysis focused on the capital market. Clausen (2014) studied the innovation practice 
of firms in Norway and argued that the “institutional arbitrage” is a source of 
innovation. Among those rare scholars who pay particular attention to “institutional 
arbitrage”, Aoki (1996) and Herrmann-Pillath (2004) develop the concepts that 
similar to what I try to explicate in this chapter. Aoki points out that a source of 
benefit of trade is the international organizational diversity while Herrmann-Pillath 
(2004) also shows that the institutional diversity provides the basis for competitive 
advantages. So far the institutional arbitrage seems not to receive enough attention. 
Yet, without full attention from the existing scholarship, the idea of “institutional 
arbitrage” may provide a new perspective for development economics. I will discuss 
how the mechanism works and what it meant to the Chinese economy and its 
unprecedented growth rate. 
 
Institutional arbitrage is only possible when two or more politically independent areas, 
usually different countries, interact in the economic domain. Moreover, these two 
countries must be very different in the institutional aspect. Through institutional 
arbitrage, the less developed economies benefit from the institutional resources that 
are formerly only accessible to the developed economies. Integration into the world 
                                                        
68 Chen, Weitseng, Institutional Arbitrage: China’s Economic Power Projection and International Capital Markets, 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 26, 2013  
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economy helped China to gain access to technological improvement and higher 
specialization enabled by the rule-based business pattern. 
 
According to the endogenous growth theory, resources are directed to a special branch 
of the economy, usually called the R&D sector. The output of the R&D sector is the 
improvement of technologies, introducing additional intermediate goods in the 
production process. The extension of the value chain means a higher level of 
specialization, with one major purpose of the R&D sector being to deepen the 
specialization. As long as the specialization is continuously deepened, the engine for 
economic growth will keep running. Since the industrial revolution, the world 
economy has grown at an unprecedented rate because the technological improvement 
became, instead of the factor accumulation, the primary factor bringing economic 
growth. China’s development pattern did not deviate from the normal configuration. 
The factor accumulation only accounted for part of China’s economic success. The 
complete explanation must include the consideration of the technological aspect. 
Scholars suggested that low cost imitation of advanced technologies had played an 
essential role in China’ growth. However, I will try to incorporate the institutional 
factors into the explanation of export-led growth. 
 
As shown above, the improvement of technologies results in the diversification of 
intermediate goods and thus the extension of the value chain. It gives occasion to the 
transaction, as well as the coordination problem: How can the efforts to produce 
knowledge be evaluated, priced and rewarded in market terms? How do we 
coordinate the increasing specialization? These two questions are associated with two 
critical points determining the success of technology-driven growth. They are the 
commodification of knowledge and the coordination of specialization, which is 
significantly influenced by the institutional environments.  
 
As to the institutional environment, a debate on the institutional aspects of trade and 
growth invites some discussion here. As we all know, the neoliberalism suggests a 
total and thorough liberalization of trade. On the opposite side, List (1930), among 
those who firstly come to idea of state planning for economic growth, asserts that the 
development policy of a specific industry should be sophisticatedly designed by the 
state. Chang (2002), referring to List, argues that the liberalization of trade is not what 
the developed countries really did in the capitalist history. In fact, the developed 
countries did not follow the rules and institutions that they suggest the developing 
countries to follow including the liberalization policy and high-level patent law. 
 
It is assumed that the benefit of trade is conditional. For example, a strict patent law 
can slow down the pace of learning for the developing country. But the 
commodification of knowledge is necessary to create and integrate the knowledge in 
the products. The significant scientific discoveries may be the result of the human 
curiosity, ambition and honors. We also need a lot of small discoveries, inventions and 
technological improvement. Parker (1984) points out that one feature of the Industrial 
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Revolution is the massive invention activities which took place in small scales. These 
small innovative activities need to be incentivized. In a developed country with a 
rule-based business environment, the innovation is made regularly and knowledge 
thus accumulated. And a developing country can benefit from what this developed 
country achieved with respect to knowledge creation through trade. It is not to say 
that the developing countries should establish the institutions that the developed 
countries urge them to. On the contrary, the developing country can benefit from the 
institutional diversity across the countries via international trade.  
 
One more question exists. Mazzucato (2013) points out that the government is behind 
the high-risk investment in the fundamental scientific research. Only when a big step 
is made in the innovation by the state, the private sector has the courage to invest in 
the similar areas. As the government takes the function of long term investment in the 
innovation, is it possible that the rise of China’s manufacturing sector is ascribed to 
the government’s investment in the technological improvement? This argument is not 
contradictory to the institutional arbitrage. The government is a hierarchical 
organization and can also be influenced by the relational culture. In a relation-based 
environment, the government’s contribution to the general technological improvement 
is not very large.  
 
The commodification of knowledge 
 
Knowledge, as a special kind of commodity, is intangible, non-rivalrous and 
sometimes non-exclusive. It is intangible, so it is difficult to define the extent of the 
specific knowledge. Moreover, knowledge is non-rivalrous. One’s occupation of 
knowledge does not exclude another’s occupation. Thus the use and transfer of 
knowledge involves little marginal cost. People would be highly motivated to copy 
knowledge and use it freely. Except for some special knowledge known as business 
secrets, most knowledge is non-exclusive. It is very difficult to limit free access to 
knowledge. Therefore, if an economic system manages to turn knowledge into a 
commodity, it must solve the incentive problem and provide an enforcement 
mechanism as well. First, a mechanism must be developed to define the extent of the 
specific knowledge and assign the ownership to individuals or entities. According to 
Coase’s exposition, the property right must be delineated to prepare for a market 
transaction. Second, the market mechanism must lower the transaction cost. 
Otherwise, the cost might outweigh the benefit. With respect to the transfer of 
knowledge, the major transaction cost is the cost of evaluating and pricing knowledge. 
Third, the contract must prescribe precisely the right to use, transfer and copy 
knowledge. Fourth, the contract must be enforced either by a self-enforcing collective 
punishment system or by a third-party punishment system, usually the state taking 
such function.  
 
These four dimensions, ownership, pricing, transaction and enforcement, determine if 
a R&D sector emerges or not. In different institutional settings, the answer will be 
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different. For the impersonal market, turning knowledge into a valuable commodity 
involves only moderate institutional cost. First, the ownership concept is introduced to 
the area of knowledge through legislation. Intellectual property law is enacted to 
ensure individuals’ or entities’ entitlement to specific knowledge. Intellectual property 
law is not a perfect mechanism for its monopolistic power. It is also a legitimated 
weapon to impose barrier to the further innovation and incurs a lot of additional cost. 
But a moderate protection over the intellectual property is necessary because the 
creative activities is not costless. And once ownership is established, the pricing and 
transferring of knowledge becomes an important issue. Unlike the trade of physical 
commodities, the trade of knowledge, such as technological transfer, ownership 
sharing and patent licensing, is structured. So, negotiation and precise formulation of 
contractual terms are necessary. To that point, some professional service providers are 
specialized in dealing with these problems. At first glance, the specialization increases 
the transaction cost because a section of total labor is allocated to the service sector. 
In fact, it lowers the transaction cost because the cost is so high that no transaction 
takes place before. Besieds, the enforcement issue is left to the legal system, or to the 
common belief in the legal system. The rule-based market system develops an entire 
set of mechanisms to turn the knowledge into commodities.  
 
However, reliance on the social network undermines the incentive to produce 
knowledge, because the ownership system is not established, the transaction is not 
structured and enforcement is not ensured. As mentioned earlier, unlike physical 
commodities, knowledge is intangible and the content of specific knowledge is 
difficult to define. Thus, disputes may arise frequently due to the misunderstanding of 
the content of contracts. Moreover, relational contracts are mostly informal and 
sometimes even in oral form. There are two reasons for informal contracts. First, the 
low cost re-negotiation ex post is preferred over the precise formulation of contractual 
terms ex ante. Second, the verifiability of information is not necessary for the 
self-enforcement mechanism. Yet, the informal contract will be a source of dispute if 
the trading object is something difficult to define. Such a dispute may destroy the 
trade. Further, a lack of common consensus may also lead to the failure of the 
self-enforcement mechanism. In a petrified networked system, the collective action 
requires common consensus among the network participants. There is no salient 
institution such as the legal system to coordinate their expectations. As such, 
enforcement is a big problem. The unauthorized use and transfer of knowledge would 
neither be punished by a third party which does not exist or performs only limited 
function, nor by the collective punishment due to the lack of consensus. It is difficult 
to reach an agreement on how to define “improper action” in relation to the trade of 
knowledge.  
 
In fact, knowledge is a brand new commodity in the Chinese economy. For instance, 
the TVEs used to improve technologies by employing professionals who had retired 
from SOEs. Purchase contracts of equipment and the employment contracts were used 
instead of the transferring of contracts or re-allocation of intellectual property rights. 
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Although all these contracts ensure the flow of technological factors, only the 
intellectual property right provides innovators with sufficient incentive because it 
ensures the exclusive right over knowledge. Certainly, the over-protection of 
intellectual property rights would lead to the so-called tragedy of “anti-commons”. 
The resources are underused because the owners of intellectual property right can 
block each other (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). China’s case was the under-protection 
of intellectual property rights. By then it still suffer from the tragedy of commons. No 
one innovates because the rewards to innovation was not clear. Although lacking the 
ability to innovate, China was able to leverage the innovation-friendly regulatory 
regime across the developed countries.  
 
The coordination of specialization 
 
Apart from not being friendly to innovation, the relation-based market system also 
fails to coordinate the increasing specialization. In a networked environment, market 
participants rely on personal relationships and thereby develop a self-regulating 
mechanism in relation with the transaction. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Li 
is the first scholar who came to the difference between relation-based governance and 
rule-based governance. Li, Park and Li (2003) described relation-based governance as 
follows: 
 
…Establishing relationships involves few fixed costs, but significant marginal costs. 
In relation-based governance, one needs to develop and nurture personal relations 
and to screen, test, and monitor every transaction partner, which could be very 
time-consuming. The relational information obtained by a party is implicit and 
individual-specific, which is neither publicly verifiable nor transferable. Therefore, 
the delegation of relation-based enforcement is very difficult, if not entirely impossible; 
that is, the head of a firm has to take care of all relations by her/himself. 
 
As a business expands, searching and monitoring costs increase, and relations 
become increasingly costly. Accordingly, further relations bring diminishing returns to 
a manager’s effort because of the increasing marginal costs in private monitoring. 
This explains the Asian principle of doing business first with one’s siblings, then with 
one’s cousins, then with people from one’s hometown or classmates, and finally (but 
reluctantly) with strangers. When the market is small and it involves a small number 
of transaction partners, the average transaction costs could be smaller in 
relation-based governance than in rule-based governance, because of the 
substantially lower fixed costs. 69 
 
Wang (2009) furthered Li’s narrative argument by developing a formal model. He 
discussed the role of relation-based governance in the transitional economy and 
suggested that relation-based governance is only efficient when the size of the market 
                                                        
69 Though Li’s idea of relation-based and rule-based governance is interesting and full of originality, his papers 
are published in some less influential journals. One consequence is that only a few scholars have read the papers.  
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is small and the level of specialization is low.  
 
I will draw on their arguments to explain why using personal relationships to regulate 
the highly specialized market is not efficient. First, according to Li, the personal 
relationship generates sufficient observable information to maintain the self-enforcing 
mechanism. However, that is the case when only a few trading parties are involved. If 
the value chain is extensively extended involving an increasing number of market 
participants, the self-enforcing mechanism may not work as well as it is in a small 
market. Demand for public information will increase due to the increasing difficulty 
in monitoring across the markets. However, the information related to the transaction 
is only observable to the members of trade network and is not verifiable to those 
outside the network. Therefore, the personal relationship is of less importance to the 
highly-specialized market.  
 
The second point is related to Wang’s argument. According to him, if the market is 
“thin”, the market participants interact with the same partner recurrently across 
different sections of the market. For example, a landlord may interact with a tenant in 
the labor, financial, and commodity markets. So, it is easy to establish a tight 
relationship with a trading partner there is much value in the relationship. However, 
when the market grows bigger and the level of specialization becomes higher, the 
relationship is not as tight as before and thereby the value of relationship decreases. It 
does not make much sense to stick to the same trading partner while the market 
becomes “thick”. Search costs decrease and search activities increase. It is difficult to 
maintain the personal relationship in a “thick” market characterized by a huge 
magnitude of interaction and specialization because the potential value of searching 
for a new partner is high. 
 
We can sum up by saying that relation-based governance is efficient only when the 
market is “thin”. Neither endogenous growth nor a “thick” market can provide an 
institutional environment friendly to innovation or able to coordinate the extensive 
specialization. Conversely, the increasing specialization that ends up in a “thick” 
market will undermine the importance of personal relationships. It is the limits of 
networked markets. Let us go back to the topic of “institutional arbitrage”. If we 
connect the networked market with the impersonal market, what will happen to both 
economies, for example, China and the developed economies? 
 
A formal model 
 
To illustrate the implications of different institutional settings to innovation and 
economic growth, we need a formal model. The model should handle the issue of 
specialization and endogenous growth. Romer’s endogenous growth model (1990) 
provides a good analytical framework. His model is based on the experience of 
developed countries. He assumed implicitly that the institutional arrangement ensures 
the return of the investment in creating knowledge which is non-rivalry and 
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non-excludable. A third party enforcement mechanism is developed to coordinate the 
expectations and activities of market participants. The assumption does not cause 
problems for the major implications of the model. According to Li’s hypothesis, the 
marginal cost of rule-based governance is low. Thus, it will not change the 
fundamental structure of the model if the transaction cost is not included in the model.  
 
Firstly, I introduce the endogenous growth model and use it as a benchmark. As 
shown above, it is a model describing the mechanism underlying the economic 
growth in a rule-based institutional environment. The functional form of the output is 
as follows: 
 
                   𝑌𝑌(𝐻𝐻^, 𝐿𝐿, 𝑥𝑥) = 𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o ∫ 𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖)iqnqo 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
∞
r
                 (1) 
 
The economy has two sectors. One sector focuses on producing consumer goods 
while the other one specializes in producing knowledge. 𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖) denotes various types 
of producer durables. Different types of durables are not perfect substitutes for each 
other. So, monopolistic competition exists in the market of durables. The total output 
is determined by four basic factors 𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿, 𝐾𝐾 and 𝐴𝐴. 𝐻𝐻 denotes human capital, 𝐿𝐿 
denotes labor, 𝐾𝐾 denotes physical capital, and 𝐴𝐴 denotes technologies.	𝐻𝐻^denotes 
the amount of capital allocated to the manufacturing sector and 𝐻𝐻t denotes the 
amount of human capital allocated to the innovation sector as human capital is 
allocated between these two sectors. The difference between human capital and labor 
is that human capital can be used for creating knowledge. The production function of 
knowledge is as follows: 
 
                              𝐴𝐴
.
= 𝛿𝛿𝐻𝐻t𝐴𝐴                           (2) 
 
The allocation ratio depends on the rental rate of human capital. The final output is 
consumer goods. According to Romer, technological improvement results in 
diversification of the producer durables and thus the higher level of specialization. 
Further, it is assumed that 𝜂𝜂 units of consumption are used to produce one unit of 
durables. From the symmetry in the model, it follows that all the producer durables 
are supplied at the same level 𝑥𝑥
_
, and 𝐴𝐴 determines the ranges of durables. Hence, 
equation (1) can be formulated as	𝑌𝑌 = 𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥
_
iqnqo. Now the aggregate demand for 
the durables can be derived from a maximization problem: 
 
                  max
y
∫ 𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖)iqnqo
z
{
− 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖) 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖                 (3) 
 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) denotes the price of durables. We solve the maximization problem and have an 
inverse demand function: 
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                     𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) = (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖)qnqo                 (4) 
 
The producers of durables have already invested in the new design and expect the 
highest return on the investment. And there is a monopolistic competition among 
durables as they are not perfectly substitute. Therefore, the producers can set prices to 
maximize the profits and take as much as they can to cover the fixed cost.  
 
                𝜋𝜋 = max
y
(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o𝑥𝑥(𝑖𝑖)iqnqo − 𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥              (5) 
 
𝑟𝑟 denotes the interest rate. Equation (5) illustrate the profit maximization problem for 
the producers of durables. It is assumed that firms face constant marginal cost and 
constant elasticity demand curve. Solving the equation (5) results in a monopoly price,  
	𝑝𝑝
_
= rη (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)⁄ . And the profit is 𝜋𝜋 = (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)	𝑝𝑝
_
	𝑥𝑥
_
. The profit needs to be 
sufficiently large to cover the cost of initial investment so that the producer is willing 
to invest in the innovation. It is assumed that the cost of initial investment is 𝑃𝑃t, 
which is constant. And the current value of the stream of net profit should be equal to 
the cost of initial investment: 
 
                            𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡)𝑃𝑃t                          (6) 
 
Substituting the expression of	𝜋𝜋 from 𝜋𝜋 = (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽)	𝑝𝑝
_
	𝑥𝑥
_
 and equation (4) yields: 
 
                    𝑃𝑃t =
nÑo
Ö
(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o𝑥𝑥
_ iqnqo
               (7) 
 
The wage in the innovation sector is determined by the price of new design. So the 
wage is 𝑃𝑃t	𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴. And in the equilibrium, the human capital allocated to the other sector 
should also be rewarded by the same wage rate: 
 
                    𝑤𝑤X = 𝑃𝑃t𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴 = αH^
nqi𝐿𝐿o𝑥𝑥
_ iqnqo
                   (8) 
 
Simplifying this equation yields: 
 
                          𝐻𝐻^ =
i
à
n
(iqnqo)(nÑo)
𝑟𝑟                       (9) 
 
The growth rate is 𝛿𝛿𝐻𝐻t, which illustrates the increase of range of durables. Given the 
value of 𝐻𝐻t = 𝐻𝐻 − 𝐻𝐻^, the growth rate is: 
 
                      𝑔𝑔ä = 𝛿𝛿𝐻𝐻t = 𝛿𝛿𝐻𝐻 −
n
(iqnqo)(nÑo)
𝑟𝑟                (10) 
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Equation (10) shows that the growth rate is related to the endowment of human 
capital, the productivity of human capital in innovation sector and the interest rate. 
This model is a benchmark describing the endogenous growth of an economy 
governed by formal rules. As Romer pointed out, monopolistic competition is 
introduced in the model to make the production of knowledge profitable, and a major 
amount of human capital is directed to the R&D sector. The key point of the model is 
that human capital should be used for creating knowledge instead of producing final 
output. In that way, immediate consumption is exchanged for a stream of net future 
benefit generated from improved productivity.  
 
However, as aforementioned, relation-based governance has two problems. The first 
problem is that personal relationships cannot develop a well-functioning mechanism 
to produce knowledge. As knowledge is non-rivalrous and eventually non-excludable, 
it is necessary to impose external punishment to deter the improper use, appropriation 
of, and transfer of knowledge. If the ownership of knowledge is not enforced, the 
incentive to produce knowledge would be undermined. In Romer’s endogenous 
growth model, the producer uses a new design or technology to produce a new 
durable and has the right to set a monopoly price because the durables are not 
perfectly substitutes. Although the new design or technology is not allowed to be used 
without permission of the producer, the knowledge embodied in the design or 
technology is available for everyone. So, there is a spillover effect of the knowledge. 
But controversy persists over this point for the owner of a new design can block the 
further improvement of his design, which undermines the spillover effect. It is a 
problem of how the intellectual property right should be defined. On the contrary, the 
relation-based exchange system only provides a limited mechanism to enforce the 
ownership of knowledge, which means that the new design might be imitated without 
cost. In that kind of environment, it is not possible to charge a monopoly price. If the 
producer faces a perfectly competitive market and is only able to charge the marginal 
cost, the investment in the research will not be made. 
 
That occurs only in some extreme cases. In fact, in a relation-based exchange system, 
the return on investment in the research is not zero. For example, the inventor of the 
new design or technology takes the first mover advantage, and exploits the benefit out 
of the temporary control over the specific knowledge before imitation takes place. 
Moreover, the design or technology, particularly those which can be kept as secret, 
may not be perfectly imitated. So, the difference between the original design and the 
imitated one generates the benefit for the owner of the original design. And for the 
social network, the intellectual property right is also enforced to some degree because 
the unpermitted imitation can be punished by the owner and part of social network 
which see the punishment as necessary. However, as the extent and range of 
knowledge is difficult to define, the social network may not be function so well to 
support an efficient system of knowledge production. In a relational system, the 
markup over the marginal cost is determined by the size, tightness and complexity of 
social network and cannot be higher than the markup in the monopoly price due to the 
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limited enforcement mechanism provided in the social network. So the innovation 
sector indicates underinvestment for the markup over the marginal cost is not 
sufficient to cover the interest cost of the investment at optimum level.  
 
Replacing the rule-based trading system with the relation-based one makes a change 
to the model. Equation (5) does not hold anymore as the innovators cannot charge 
monopoly price. Hence, equation (7) is 𝑃𝑃t <
nÑo
Ö
(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐻𝐻^
n𝐿𝐿o𝑥𝑥
_ iqnqo
. And 
more human capital is allocated to the manufacturing sector with 𝐻𝐻^ >
i
à
n
(iqnqo)(nÑo)
𝑟𝑟, which results in a decline in 𝑔𝑔ä with 𝑔𝑔ä < 𝛿𝛿𝐻𝐻 −
n
(iqnqo)(nÑo)
𝑟𝑟. 
This is what happens when the protection over the ownership of knowledge is not 
complete and the monopolistic competition among durables is limited. It may also 
have a side effect. For the production system, the parameter 𝛿𝛿 remains as it is. For 
the inventors, the expected benefit generated from the new design or technology is not 
as high as it is in the rule-based trading system. So it gives occasion to what I call 
“profit illusion”. The innovators perceive the low value of the new design or 
technology as if their effort was turned into output at a low rate. In other words, they 
contribute significantly and are only rewarded with a very narrowly defined right over 
the output. They only pay attention to what they may get from the innovation, but not 
take the increase in social welfare into account. Therefore, in their eyes, the value of 
𝛿𝛿 deceases to a lower value of 𝛿𝛿ã. With the decreasing value of 𝛿𝛿, less incentive is 
provided to divert human capital to the R&D sector.  
 
Apart from the low investment in the research, the relation-based trading system has 
another problem. It is difficult to use social network to coordinate the expectations 
and activities among the market participants from different groups, cultures, and 
nations. A common cultural belief is the foundation for the effective use of social 
networks. As such, the social network cannot be expanded from one cultural/ethnic 
group to another. Moreover, the expansion of a network increases the burden on the 
economic system. As we may recall, the marginal cost of using a relation-based 
governance system is high. Hence, the size of social networks should reach a 
maximum at some point. Certainly, a social network defined by the weak relationship 
can grow without limitation. But a social network with the consistent investment in 
individual relationship is a limited one and clusters. Considering these two features, 
the level of specialization also has a maximum. In the model, introducing more 
producer durables ends up in the expansion of the value chain. If there are limits to 
specialization, it is not beneficial to add more types of durables to the production line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
 
 
As shown in Figure 7.170, the range of durables is limited by a maximum value of 
𝐴𝐴(max) at a specific time point. Due to the low rate of knowledge accumulation, the 
convergence to 𝐴𝐴 takes a longer time than it does in the original model. Furthermore, 
the limit to growth does not exist in the original model. The coordination of economic 
activities through formal rules and the third-party enforcement system incurs little 
marginal cost.71 Hence, the increasing range of durables is not a significant burden to 
the system. 
 
After incorporating into the model the features we’ve discussed, the growth potential 
changes for the economy it models. First, the under-protection of innovation outcome 
leads to the distorted allocation of human capital between manufacturing sector and 
research sector. It is more beneficial to allocate the human capital to the 
manufacturing sector. Therefore, the overall growth rate is lower than that in a 
rule-based institutional environment. Moreover, the capacity to coordinate the 
specialization is measured by 𝐴𝐴(max), the maximum value of 𝐴𝐴 in the modified 
model. Under these new conditions, the dynamic of the model unfolds as follows. At 
the beginning, the economy grows at a slow rate because of the under-investment in 
research. The relation-based governance is responsible for the under-investment 
because it cannot ensure a sufficient return on investment. The cut in the research 
funding has a wide-ranged effect and decreases the social welfare which is not taken 
into the calculation of innovators. Nevertheless, the economy grows continuously 
until 𝐴𝐴(max) is reached. Then, the economy encounters the coordination problem. 
Technological improvement is not possible after the capacity to coordinate the usage 
of various types of durables has been exhausted. However, as the factors continue to 
                                                        
70 The	original	version	of	the	figure	is	in	Romer’s	seminal	paper	(1990)	on	endogenous	technological	
change.	
71 The network can also develop a third-party enforcement mechanism. But it works only within a specific 
network.  
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accumulate over time, the economy develops a segmented structure. The market is not 
as integrated as it is in the developed countries. There will be a number of 
sub-systems and every sub-system represents an individual social network. The 
networks are relatively isolated from each other. The maximum value of technological 
factor is 𝐴𝐴∗. The equilibrium is stable unless the resources, including human capital 
and labor, flows out of the network due to the external shock. 
 
The Chinese economy pursued a similar developmental pattern in the last two 
thousand years. There was little reward to the creation of new knowledge. Human 
capital was put in the administration sector. It is not surprising that there was slow 
increase in total productivity. The factor accumulation accounted for the majority of 
the growth. Income per capita did not improve significantly as a result of the low 
increase in total productivity.  
 
There is a difference if a relation-based exchange system is connected with a 
rule-based one. International trade ends up in the integration of the market. Now, one 
more choice is available for the participants of the social network. If the rule-based 
exchange system offers a higher wage of labor, labor in the relation-based economy 
will be diverted to the export sector. In the original model, the wage is defined by the 
following equation: 
 
                        𝑤𝑤å = βH^
n𝐿𝐿oqi𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥
_
iqnqo                      (11) 
 
I assume that the endowment of labor is the same in the two economies. If the labor 
flows from the underdeveloped economy to the developed economy, equation (6) is 
re-formulated as follows: 
 
                       𝑤𝑤å = βH^
n(2𝐿𝐿)oqi𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥
_
iqnqo                   （12） 
 
And the wage in the modified model is defined by the following equation: 
 
                     𝑤𝑤åã = βH^ã
n 𝐿𝐿oqi𝐴𝐴ã𝑥𝑥
_
iqnqo                    （13） 
 
The integration of markets occurs when 𝑤𝑤å > 𝑤𝑤åã holds. Comparing equations (12) 
and (13), there are three factors determining which wage is higher. First, human 
capital allocated to the manufacturing sector in equation (13), Héè, is larger than that 
in (12), H^. A decrease in units of human capital lowers the marginal output of labor. 
Second, the massive inflow of labor into the developed economy lowers the marginal 
output of labor as well. These two effects prevent interaction between two economies. 
However, the level of technology in equation (12), 𝐴𝐴, is higher than 𝐴𝐴ã in (13), due 
to the accumulation of knowledge at a lower rate given the relation-based institutional 
environment. Further, the coordination will probably fail if the network keeps 
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expanding. As time passes, the technological gap keeps being widened. If the gap is 
sufficiently wide, the benefit of joining the global value chain can be higher than the 
benefit of staying in the local network.  
 
The same applies to human capital. The rental rate of human capital in the 
manufacturing sector increases as the technology is improved. After a threshold point, 
human capital available in the less developed economy will be absorbed into the 
export sector because it is priced higher in the world market than in the domestic 
market.  
 
Further, we need to look into the welfare implication of international trade for the 
developed economy. Two effects are of importance. First, for the laborers, 
international trade is not good news because the inflow of labor lowers the average 
wage rate. In practice, the U.S. companies set up factories in China and enjoyed the 
reduction in labor cost with domestic factories closed and the rate of unemployment 
increased. The second effect is that more human capital is allocated to the research 
sector because the units of human capital necessary for manufacturing are provided 
overseas. It is likely that all units of human capital will be allocated to research, thus 
improving the balanced growth rate. This also happens in the real world. Chinese 
talent is cheap and they do work that is not extremely knowledge-intensive but 
requires a college degree. So, U.S. talent is freed from routine jobs and focus on the 
innovation that is knowledge-intensive and eventually generates higher returns. Of 
course, the flow of factors is manipulated through price. The labor unions may act 
against international trade and try to impose political barriers to it. However, the 
owners of producer durables (we may call them capitalists) embrace the change 
caused by international trade because they benefit from the supply of cheap labor 
overseas. 
 
For the economy governed by the personal relationship, the welfare implication is 
more profound. If the Chinese economy were an isolated island, the growth rate 
would be low and its economy would be stuck in stagnation. However, if the Chinese 
economy were integrated into the world economy, the growth rate would be improved 
and the limits to growth would be removed. Hence, a significant part of the resources 
are integrated in the global value chain because of the higher rate of return and 
employment. China’s opening-up policy resulted in a grand integration of markets 
worldwide. Its participation in the global value chain gave rise to a new wave of 
growth for the world economy. The developed economies benefited from the low-cost 
labor and human capital, while China benefited from the advanced technologies, the 
diversity of durables and a higher level of specialization. The increase in productivity 
was shared among the participants of the global value chain, although it is achieved 
through the investment in research which is made exclusively overseas.  
 
It is what I call “institutional arbitrage”. The model shows that, in the presence of 
institutional diversity across regions and nations, resources will be directed to where 
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the institution is most effective for generating the highest individual return. Certainly, 
the mobility of factors such as labor is not perfect. The trade in consumer goods, 
purchase of durables, transfer of technology, establishment of branches/production 
sites overseas, and migration are different means to accomplish the more efficient 
allocation of resources. In that way, the Pareto-improvement is achieved without 
introducing institutional change locally. Institutional change involves high costs and 
complex dynamics while international trade is not a problem if the political barrier is 
removed. The incentive is also provided by the new trade opportunities. So, through 
the integration of the market, institutional resources would be more evenly distributed 
across countries and regions. Also, resources flow from one system to another 
because the latter system is more productive.  
 
“Institutional arbitrage” minimizes the demand on local institutional resources. In the 
global value chain, China is responsible for the manufacturing end that involves low 
transaction costs and thus requires less institutional resources. Productivity increases 
rapidly, contributing to the majority of the growth. The rising productivity can be 
explained by the following four points: 
 
l By joining the global value chain more extensive than local production chain, 
China’s manufacturing firms became highly specialized.  
l Thanks to the access to the world market, Chinese firms could purchase and make 
use of various types of durables in the production process to increase 
productivity.  
l At little expense, Chinese firms gained access to a great stock of knowledge. 
l The manufacturing sector benefited from economies of scale due to the rising 
export demand. 
 
The first three points demonstrate different aspects of the impact of China’s 
integration into the world market. Only the last point is not addressed in the model. 
The impact can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, wages across different 
countries began to converge. The income gap between the underdeveloped country 
and the developed country, which was denoted by 𝑤𝑤å − 𝑤𝑤åã, was narrowed. The rate 
of convergence depends on the rate of increase in labor productivity. The difference in 
labor productivity across countries is not ascribed to labor quality, but to the level of 
specialization. Integrated into the global value chain, China’s manufacturing firms 
became highly specialized and various producer durables were available for the 
production process. The increase in productivity translated into strong growth. By 
participating in world trade, the Chinese economy was rewarded with a piece of cake 
that was significantly larger than what it could have done on its own. In the second 
stage of the growth, China’s growth rate was supposed to slow down. This happened 
recently. The growth rate of the Chinese economy should be similar to or even below 
that of the world economy. As shown by the model, the rate of innovation (investment 
in research) and the stock of knowledge determine the growth rate in the long run. So, 
China’s growth rate is also determined by the performance of the R&D sectors 
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worldwide because the output of the R&D sectors is shared among all market 
participants due to the integration of markets.  
 
The conclusion sounds encouraging for the Chinese economy. Without any efforts to 
change the institutional environment, economic growth could be achieved for a long 
period. However, when we consider the position of China’s manufacturing sector in 
the global value chain, we find that it depends largely on the performance of the 
developed economies. Moreover, it is not only the Chinese economy that provides 
cheap labor and human capital. East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Russia may join the 
competition providing low cost labor. The exclusive right over a specific intellectual 
property eliminates, to a considerable degree, the possibility of substitution. However, 
the right over labor does not. Thus, China’s bargaining power in international trade is 
weak and the income distributed to China is a minor part of the entire cake. If a nation 
does not have sufficient innovation capacity, it fails to lead the growth. Furthermore, 
capital owners in China are not satisfied with the return on investment. Without the 
ability to innovate, they are not able to acquire the monopoly rent. As long as they 
want to take part in the innovation, they would try to fashion an institution to enforce 
the exclusive right over the output of innovation. Hence, they may initiate and 
accelerate the process of institutional change by political as well as cultural means.  
 
One of the key points of “institutional arbitrage” is that the catching-up country like 
China prefer a wide flow of information and introduce a lax intellectual property 
protection policy. “Institutional arbitrage” requires that two economies are governed 
by different institutions. If China had ever imitated what was practiced overseas, the 
“institutional arbitrage” would not take place. The change of policy, which is pushed 
by domestic big companies, tends to undermine the effect of “Institutional arbitrage”. 
It is observed that the intellectual property protection is frequently mentioned in the 
official documents. 
 
In the future, the Chinese economy will not focus merely on low-end manufacturing 
work, but attempt to move up in the global value chain by improving its innovation 
capacity. Given the incentive embedded in the high return to innovation, it is 
predictable that the rule-based business culture will come to influence China’s 
economic ecosystem. Those Chinese multinational companies try to institutionalize 
such culture and benefit from the intellectual property protection. However, the rest of 
companies only want to have a moderate protection over the knowledge products. It 
will be a challenge for the policy-makers to balance the interest of these two groups.  
 
7.3 Export and Increase in Productivity 
 
In this part, I compare the model with the real economy. The major parameter we 
need to look into is total factor productivity (TFP). According to the neoclassical 
growth theory, there are two sources of growth: factor accumulation and increase in 
TFP. In theory, because of the diminishing marginal return and constant return to scale, 
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growth being driven by the factor accumulation ends up in a steady state. So, the 
economies converge if the factor accumulation is the only source of growth. In reality, 
some underdeveloped countries are catching up with the developed countries, but the 
income gap between other countries and developed countries has been widened. So, 
there must be “something else” (Easterly and Levine, 2002) accounting for the 
cross-countries and cross-time variation in growth. The TFP residual is thought to be 
this “something else”. Is technological improvement the only source of TFP growth? 
In a standard growth model, TFP is the rate with which the factors are converted into 
the outputs. Technological improvement certainly increases the TFP. There are also 
other possibilities. For example, due to institutional change, resources are re-allocated 
to improve efficiency and incentive is created for market participants. These factors 
receive less attention because the perfect market system is presumed implicitly in the 
standard model. So, we must bear in mind that China was in transition, while 
analyzing the TFP growth in the Chinese economy.  
 
To the existing scholarship, controversy persists over the TFP estimates. Most 
scholars (Peng, 2002; Zhang and Shi, 2003; Bosworth and Collins, 2008; Perkins and 
Rawski, 2008) obtained TFP estimates on a gross output basis. They suggested that 
TFP contributes to over half of China’s overall growth. In contrast, Young’s study 
showed modest results. He reduced the estimate of the TFP growth rate for the 
non-agricultural sector during 1978-1998 to a less impressive 1.4%. Brandt and Zhu 
(2010) constructed a three-sector model and studied the role of labor deepening in the 
non-agricultural sector, which is, according to Young, the major factor contributing to 
the growth. They showed that transferring the labor out of the agricultural sector had a 
modest effect on overall growth. Also, most gains from the labor reallocation between 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors were generated during the first decade of 
reform.  
 
We must admit that it is difficult to estimate the TFP growth rate. The methods, 
datasets and understanding of macroeconomic structure may affect the results 
obtained. Young focused on the non-agricultural sector, so he treated labor transfer as 
the labor deepening in the non-agricultural sector. However, if we estimate the overall 
productivity growth, the effect of labor deepening disappears. Yet, it is true that over 
the last three decades the growth rate was higher for the manufacturing than the 
service sector. So, the separation of the two sectors captures the structural features of 
the Chinese economy. Since the purpose is to find the relationship between rising 
exports and the TFP growth, it might be better to investigate firm-level data than the 
macroeconomic data. Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) obtained the estimate of 
TFP growth using firm-level data. Their empirical study provides an opportunity to 
compare between firm-level performance during the pre and post-WTO periods. As 
mentioned earlier, participation in the WTO resulted in rapid export growth. If a 
considerable increase in TFP is observed after China’s entry into the WTO, it is 
reasonable to associate the TFP growth with the rising export. Their finding is 
interesting. In 1999, the firm-level TFP growth rate averaged 2.9%. It rose to about 8% 
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in 2000 and declined to 2.8% again in 2001. In the period following China’s entry into 
the WTO, the TFP growth rate averaged around 12%, rising to 14% in 2005 and 
declining to 11.5% in 2007. The authors named four reasons to explain the impressive 
performance of the manufacturing sector. First, they considered it as a “cyclical 
upswing following the Asian financial crisis”. However, the Chinese economy was 
not deeply involved in the Asian financial crisis. The crisis only had a modest 
negative effect on China’s economic growth. Second, the manufacturing sector 
benefited from the rising export demand. In my point of view, it is the major reason 
accounting for the rapid TFP growth. Third, the restructuring of SOEs and 
collectively-owned enterprises improved the efficiency by solving the incentive 
problem. However, the authors may underestimate the performance of 
collectively-owned TVEs. In fact, unsuccessful restructuring could lower efficiency 
and lead to the closing of businesses. In the second half of the 1990s, many 
state-owned factories were shut down and millions of employees were laid off. Fourth, 
liberalization and competition in the manufacturing sector was more sufficient than in 
the service sector. Facing free market entry and exit and intensive competition, 
manufacturing firms needed to maximize their productivity. It may explain the 
difference in TFP growth across sectors, but it cannot explain the difference in TFP 
growth during the pre- and post-WTO periods.  
 
Among the four factors, China’s integration into the world economy is the major 
factor explaining the rising growth rate of TFP over the period from 2002-2007. As 
shown by the model, participation in the global value chain provided access to 
extensive specialization and continuous technological improvement. Given the great 
stock of knowledge and significant investment in the research overseas as two major 
sources of TFP growth, the labor productivity in China’s manufacturing sector 
increased at an extraordinary rate to narrow the wage gap between China and the 
developed countries.  
 
Besides, they found one more interesting point. They compared the contribution of 
incumbents and net-entrants and found that “creative destruction” （Schumpeter, 1942） 
had a positive effect on TFP growth. Between 1998 and 2001, the continuing firms 
contributed to 59% of TFP growth while the net entry contributed to 41%. The 
contributions of the two groups exchanged positions during the period from 2001 to 
2007. The net entry contributed to 62% of TFP while the continuing firms contributed 
to 38%. One possible explanation is that the firms entering the market in the 
post-WTO period were very structured so as to cope with export demand. Unlike the 
continuing firms, they were born to be part of the global value chain. Aware of the 
increasing export demand, entrepreneurs turned to seek market opportunities overseas 
and provided manufacturing to the world. Hence, the entrants were more integrated 
into the world market than the incumbents. Accordingly, their contribution to TFP 
growth was higher.  
 
Now we turn to the contribution of domestic R&D to TFP growth. The domestic 
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investment in research, not the export, may have been the engine for productivity 
growth. Hence, we need to look at gross spending on the R&D as shown in the 
following chart.  
 
 
In 2000, China’s spending on R&D was 0.898% of total GDP. It was significantly 
lower than the spending of the U.S.A., which was approximately 2.621%. 72 
Considering China’s large population, the difference in R&D spending per capita was 
even bigger. Low investment in R&D, combined with a low stock of knowledge, 
should have resulted in a low TFP growth rate. However, empirical studies argue the 
opposite. The truth is that productivity increased at an impressive rate between 2000 
and 2007 while the investment in R&D remained low. So, the contribution of the 
domestic R&D sector accounted only for a minor part of TFP growth.  
 
Despite China’s low R&D intensity, there is a trend worth paying attention to. In 
Figure 7.4, the gross expenditure on the R&D sector in the U.S.A. varied between 2.5% 
and 2.8% of GDP over the period of 2000 to 2014, indicating balanced 
technology-driven growth. In contrast, the gross spending on R&D in China has been 
increasing since the year 2000, with no end to the increase in sight. The analysis 
earlier predicts increasing spending on R&D. When other sources of TFP growth have 
been exhausted, investment in R&D would be the only option to sustain growth in the 
long run. Durable-owners would try to enforce exclusive rights over unique designs or 
technologies by making the third-party punishment system effective as well as 
creating a public opinion favorable to the monopoly arising from innovation. In that 
sense, the structure of the Chinese economy will be increasingly like that of the 
                                                        
72 As indicated by OECD, Gross domestic spending on R&D is defined as the total expenditure (current and 
capital) on R&D carried out by all resident companies, research institutes, university and government laboratories, 
etc., in a country. It includes R&D funded from abroad, but excludes domestic funds for R&D performed outside 
the domestic economy. This indicator is measured in million USD and as percentage of GDP 
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U.S.A.  
 
Besides China’s export-led growth, the relationship between trade and growth in 
general has also received increasing attention from the existing scholarships. Falvey, 
Foster and Greenaway (2002) conducted an empirical study using a sample of 5 
OECD donor countries and 52 developing recipient countries. Donor country refers to 
the country that provides technologies while a recipient country is a country that 
acquires technologies. In their empirical study, they took account of whether 
knowledge was a public or private good and found that it did not matter whether 
knowledge was a public or private good in donor countries. However, the spillover 
effect was enhanced when knowledge was treated as a public good in recipient 
countries. This finding shows that the institution matters. In a relation-based trading 
system, knowledge is treated as a public good. As a result, the incentive to produce 
knowledge is underprovided. However, it reduces the cost of transfer of knowledge. 
Free access to knowledge is ensured. Since knowledge as a commodity is non-rivalry, 
the free use and transfer of knowledge maximizes its value. So, the institutional 
difference between China and the developed countries enhanced the international 
knowledge spillover effect. Knowledge was treated as a private good in developed 
countries due to the established IP protection regime. The IP regime provided 
innovators with sufficient incentive. Moreover, as a result of reallocation of resources 
worldwide, the human capital in the developed countries might have been freed from 
the manufacturing sector and thrown into the R&D sector. The rate of innovation 
could have been even more rapid. For the recipient countries, it was better to treat 
knowledge as a public good because it is non-rivalry. Fortunately, the relation-based 
market system is incompatible with the privatization and commodification of 
knowledge. Given that kind of institutional environment, China maximized the 
international knowledge spillover effect and generated enormous benefits from it.  
 
7.4 Cluster-based Industrial Development Pattern 
 
So far, we have not investigated the changing of industrial structure in the post-WTO 
period. One of the characteristics of industrial structure is clustering. Export-oriented 
firms clustered mostly in coastal areas. Gordon and McCann (2000) proposed three 
ideal-typical models of clusters. Table 7.1 (Yeung, Dicken and Liu, 2006) shows the 
characteristics of the models.  
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Model of clusters Intellectual traditions External economies accrued to firms in clusters 
Pure 
agglomeration 
economies model 
Neoclassical 
economics after 
Alfred Marshall 
—A local pool of specialized labor (lower search 
costs)  
—Local provision of non-traded inputs (economies 
of scale)  
—Maximum flow of information and ideas 
(product and market knowledge) 
Industrial 
complex model 
Location theory after 
Alfred Weber 
—Lower transport and logistics costs —Greater 
certainty in transactions 
Social network 
model 
Embeddedness in 
new economic 
sociology 
—Localized trust and interpersonal relationships 
(relational assets) —Institutionalized practices, for 
example, conventions and norms (institutional 
thickness) 
Source: Yeung, Dicken and Liu, 2006 
 
Table 7.1 Three models of industrial clusters 
 
The pure agglomeration economies model suggests three advantages of clustering. 
First, a local pool of specialized labor is formed to lower search cost. In China, a huge 
group of migrant workers appeared to move from the less developed to the coastal 
areas because the export sector had the huge labor demand that could only be met by 
an inflow of labor. The emergence of migrant workers was a response to a nationwide 
reallocation of labor resources. Apparently, the flow of labor was directed by the price 
signals. Less apparently, it was also affected by the information transmitted through 
the social network. Migrant workers coming from the same village tended to search 
for jobs in the same region, city, industrial park, or even factory. Their migration was 
certainly motivated by economic interest. However, their choice of destination relied 
largely on the information shared by the relatives or countrymen they trusted. Due to 
the increasing density of population in the urban areas, the local labor market was 
developed and search costs were lowered by the social network. It was one of the 
advantages that clustered firms may have taken.  
 
Second, industrial agglomeration facilitates the local provision of non-traded inputs. 
Services are usually thought to be non-tradable. Clustering reduces the cost of 
services. However, the benefit is not critical. Third, industrial clustering enables the 
maximum flow of information and ideas. It is right, and I would also say that the free 
flow of information and knowledge prompts the industrial clustering by providing 
easy access to imitation. Besides, market information was shared among clustered 
firms to ensure that production capacity was exhausted. A reciprocal relationship was 
established among clustered firms. A firm transferred the purchase order to others if it 
could not complete the work due to its limited production capacity, with the 
expectation that other firms will do the same in the future. Hence, the maximum flow 
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of information is also one reason for clustering.73 
 
The industrial complex model focuses on the choice of location. According to the 
model, the advantage of clustering lies in lower transport and logistics costs, and 
greater certainty in transactions. This argument is not wrong, but has nothing to do 
with Chinese market characteristics. It is the general benefit that a firm may generate 
from the agglomeration. So I will not discuss it extensively here.  
 
The social network model interests us the most. My thesis suggests that the market 
transaction is embedded in the social relation. Localized trust as well as 
institutionalized practice was essential to the rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
sector. At least two kinds of benefits can be generated from the “relational asset”, 
including better access to credit and lower transaction cost. Ruan and Zhang (2008) 
studied a cashmere sweater cluster in a town named Puyuan and tried to explain 
China’s rapid industrialization in the absence of an efficient financial system. They 
came to the conclusion that the industrial clustering facilitated access to capital and 
credits. Taking a perspective from the social network model may help us to 
understand their findings.  
 
In the Puyuan cluster, self-financing and mutual financing came to substitute the 
underdeveloped financial system. As private firms had limited access to the formal 
financial system, most of their starting capital came from their founder’s savings or 
loans made by relatives or friends. Only a minor part of the starting capital was 
provided by banks. Besides the starting capital, clustered firms also demanded credits. 
Due to the high frequency of interactions among cluster-based firms, localized trust is 
formed. Therefore, the cluster-based firms were able to acquire trade credits from 
upstream or downstream firms. Moreover, the flexible payment alleviated the credit 
crunch. As reported by the authors, a considerable number of clustered firms chose to 
issue payment by their financial status. Debtors only paid off debts when they had 
sufficient capital or when creditors had urgent needs. Since the next chapter is 
devoted to China’s financial sector, I will come to this later.  
 
Another feature of the social network is the lower transaction cost in the absence of 
well-functioning formal institutions. According to Coase, the institutional diversity is 
a response to the transaction cost. So, if the formal institutions fail to lower the 
transaction cost, the alternative arrangement emerges to substitute the formal 
institutions. Over the last three decades, not only the financial market was inefficient, 
but the legal system was also far from perfect. So, in the case of Puyuan cluster, it was 
observed that the oral agreement was used and most conflicts were settled out of court. 
It was the so-called institutionalized cooperative practice allowed by the tight social 
ties.  
 
                                                        
73 The Silicon Valley is a good example for the benefit of clustering. See Saxenian, Annalee, Regional Advantage: 
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994.  
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These three models capture various features of industrial clustering. Among them, the 
social network model is particularly interesting. The social network evolves in any 
industrial cluster because clustering increases the interaction opportunity for 
cluster-based firms. If the well-developed formal institutions are available to the 
clusters, the social network may be solely used for channeling information. Yet, in the 
absence of the formal institution, the best practice implemented through social 
networks is institutionalized to underpin the rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
sector. In the real economy, the feature of China’s agricultural culture was amplified 
through the clustering. In turn, the industrial clustering was increasingly beneficial for 
the cluster-based firms.  
 
In that sense, clustering was a strategy appropriate for China’s manufacturing sector. 
Figure 7.2 summarizes why and how an industrial cluster emerges. First, it was 
impossible to integrate the production line into several large firms without a 
well-developed financial market. Instead, in the Puyuan cluster, numerous small and 
medium firms were founded and engaged in the specialized production activities. The 
specialization and collaboration through the market, not the vertical integration, 
characterized the structure of the industrial sector. Yet, the transaction cost incurred by 
using the market to coordinate the specialization had been a challenge to the cluster. 
To lower the transaction cost, the cooperative practice was institutionalized through 
the social network. And clustering facilitated the establishment of a social network.  
 
In fact, market has a network structure. And small world property of network make 
the long distance communication possible. But the quality of communication is 
subject to the distortion. It is to say that the communication between A and his friend 
B has a better quality than between A and C who is the friend of B. The diminishing 
quality of communication may not be able to support the long distance transaction. 
However, the government, as an intermediary of credit, can do something to facilitate 
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such long distance communication and unleash the potential of network structure of 
market. Actually, the Chinese government cares for the industrial parks in the urban 
planning and finance it with fiscal revenues. In doing so, a platform is provided for 
the emerging network structure. And the communication among different industrial 
parks across the regions is also encourage through policies. Thus the long distance 
communication is reinforced and make the entire system more networked than it was 
without the government policies.  
 
7.5 Summary and Implications for Further Studies 
 
China’s development came from two sources. The first is the liberalization of the 
market. On one hand, the efficiency of resource allocation has been improved. On the 
other, incentive were created for market participants. The second source is China’s 
integration into the world economy, which is known as the “opening up policy”. 
During the early stage of reform, the Chinese economy was a quasi-autarky economy. 
After a long period of isolation from the rest of the world, the re-connection with the 
world economy was slow at the beginning. Thus, the main source of growth was the 
economic reform. However, the benefit of reform would be exhausted in a short time, 
though the benefit was enormous. So, China had to find another growth engine. Its 
entry into WTO marked a turning point. Due to the rising export demand, the 
manufacturing sector experienced rapid expansion. The interaction between the two 
economies governed by different institutions enabled “institutional arbitrage”. China’s 
relation-based trading system did not do well at stimulating innovation as well as 
coordinating the production in a big scale and wide range. It implies that China was 
not able to maintain economic growth over the long run while remaining an autarky. 
However, through joining in the worldwide division of labor, China enjoyed access to 
a large stock of knowledge and continuous technological improvement. China 
leveraged the rule-based governance institution across the developed economies that 
took part in global value chain as well. It is what I call “institutional arbitrage”. As the 
evidence, despite the low gross spending on R&D, the firm-level TFP growth rate 
increased significantly during the post-WTO period. The last part of the chapter was 
devoted to the industrial structure. Clustering was a structural feature of the 
manufacturing sector. In the absence of well-developed formal institution, clustering 
helped to form localized trust and institutionalized the cooperative practice to lower 
the transaction cost incurred by coordination of specialized production activities.  
 
The analysis of export-driven growth has an important policy implication. One of the 
biggest questions that economics deals with is what Adam Smith called “wealth of 
nations”. Why are some countries wealthier and others poorer? Development and 
growth are always the hot topic of economics. Development economics suggest that 
industrialization and urbanization are effective means to promote growth. Institutional 
economics emphasizes the importance of the well-developed institution for growth. 
Some growth theorists prefer a high savings rate and some assert that policy should be 
developed and implemented to improve spending on R&D. In fact, participating in the 
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world economy might be the best strategic choice for an underdeveloped country. 
There are two reasons. It is not very costly to implement an opening up policy and its 
effect is highly predictable. On the contrary, fashioning a new institution or 
subsidizing the scientific research is costly and the effect of policy may be not as 
expected. Second, the opening-up policy has an immediate effect on growth. Other 
policies may take years to see if they work or not. Given the local institutional 
resources dealing with the coordination of production and transaction, a developing 
country should participate actively in the international trade and benefit not only from 
the technology and management spillover but also the institutional spillover by 
leveraging the advantage of the rule of law institution. This mixed economy supported 
by the two different institutional settings can thus grow at a considerable rate.  
 
Despite the great advantage of an export-oriented strategy, risks are also generated in 
the long run. In underdeveloped countries, their innovation capacity cannot be fully 
developed. As aforementioned, innovation-based monopoly is a risk-dominant 
strategy. Thus, the underdeveloped countries that focus on the manufacturing works 
occupy the positions at the low-end of the global value chain and have less bargaining 
power in the trade. It may further affect the landscape of political power across 
nations. Nevertheless, the opening-up policy is very effective in promoting growth, 
with the role of export to improve the growth potential of underdeveloped countries 
clearly deserving of more studies.  
 
So far we know that the export-driven strategy is good to growth. But how can a less 
developed country go that way? What the government has to do is to protect the 
emerging export sector which comprises numerous small establishments and thus 
make it vital and the growth sustainable. The aim of policy is to avoid the 
monopolization of market and make the information flow not be subject to the limited 
access to the innovation sources. Therefore, the government should be capable of 
distributing power to different classes and balance their interests. In that case, the 
policy is not influenced by the class interest and purely growth-oriented to make sure 
no business entities can change the policy to serve its purpose of monopolization. 
Otherwise, the flow of information and resources would be limited and export-driven 
strategy would be turned into a rent-generator for some oligarchs. So, besides the 
economic and institutional conditions, the government policy is also essential to the 
export-driven growth. As long as some less developed countries choose to follow the 
export strategy, they should also pay attention to the power structure and make sure 
that the flow of information and resources is not affected by the existing power 
structure.  
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8. Chinese Financial System: A Tale of Two Sectors 
 
The Chinese financial system may remind people of Kafka’s novel titled “The Castle”. 
People heard of the castle, talked about it, but never approached it. The formal 
financial system in China is a castle. I have mentioned that some private TVEs have 
red caps in order to approach the castle. For the private firms, the castle is mysterious 
and charming. However, they have no access to it. Personal relation may offer some 
opportunities but not maintain a tight cooperation between formal financial 
intermediaries and the private sector. Besides indirect finance, the stock and bond 
markets have also been established to meet the increasing financial demand. However, 
it is only a drop of water in the ocean. As reported by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC), direct finance only accounts for 20% of the financial market. Hence, the 
performance of the financial intermediary, among others the banks, should be 
responsible for the efficacy of the financial system. 
 
The formal banking system was a part of the state-owned economy. The bank is 
owned or controlled by the state, and the financial market is heavily regulated. The 
state-owned bank is not a profit-maximizing entity but pursues political ends. It is 
conservative towards credit risk and tends to lend to the state-owned enterprises 
endorsed by the government. In Chinese folk speech, they all eat from a common 
bowl. So, the bank is free from the risk of dead loans. The risk that should be borne 
by individual banks is turned into a systemic one for the state-owned sector. It is not 
whether the bank can survive, but if the system can survive or collapse as a whole. 
 
If the formal financial intermediaries cannot meet the large demand of the private 
sector, an informal financial system will emerge. The word “informal” shows that this 
kind of financial activities is underground and sometimes illegal. More precisely, it is 
in a gray zone, neither permitted nor prohibited by the state, and can hardly be 
discovered, tracked, or regulated. It relies significantly on the social network and 
contributes enormously to the rapid expansion of the private sector. The underground 
financial system is a spontaneous order that emerged due to the absence of financial 
support in the private sector. Besides the contribution it made, the risk it introduced is 
also worth looking into. 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I will introduce the formal banking 
system in China and explain why it fails to serve the private sector. The systematic 
risk underlying this system will also be discussed. The second part is devoted to the 
informal financial market in China. The culture, network, and relationships are 
supposed to be essential to the well-functioning of an informal financial market. I will 
also look into the risk it brings to the economy. In the third part, I will discuss the 
cross-guarantee system which enables the social network to gain access to the formal 
financial institutions. The last part concludes and makes predictions. The informal 
financial system merits further study and will deepen our understanding of how to 
facilitate financial transactions in a developing economy.  
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8.1 China’s Banking System: Reform and Risk 
 
1949 marked a turning point for China’s financial system. Before 1949, it was shaped 
mainly by the market competition. After 1949, commercial interest was replaced by 
political ends. The financial sector was nationalized as well as centralized. Shortly 
after China turned state-socialist, through the confiscation of private banks, the 
financial sector became integrated into the central planning system. Between 1949 
and 1978, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) was the only existing financial 
institution and controlled 93% of total financial assets in the country (Franklin, Qian 
and Qian, 2008). Essentially, China learned from Soviet model and brought the 
centralization to an extreme. This also happened in the financial sector. The PBC was 
responsible for the ordinary work of a central bank and the business of a commercial 
bank as well. On one hand, it issued currency and pursued the balance between 
macroeconomic stability and growth. On the other hand, it took savings and loaned to 
the firms. The PBC was subordinated to the Treasury Department and was set up to 
distribute the liquidity among the sectors and factories. It adjusted and distributed the 
liquidity to fulfill the need of the central plan. Ironically, the central planning system 
did not need any liquidity in the ideal situation. In socialist China, money was almost 
useless because the supply was rationed. Instead of money, coupons were used to 
distribute consumer goods. For example, there was the rice coupon for consumption 
of rice, and the oil coupon for consumption of oil.  
 
After the reform took place in 1978, reformation of the financial sector was also on 
the agenda but was not accomplished with a big bang. The PBC was disconnected 
with the Treasury Department and gained independence in 1979. Independence was 
necessary for the liberalization of the financial sector. Moreover, it was also necessary 
to separate the commercial banking division from the macroeconomic policy-related 
division of the PBC. In practice, four state-owned commercial banks were set up to 
take over the commercial banking division from the PBC. The Bank of China (BOC) 
was in charge of all the foreign-related business. The China Construction Bank (CCB) 
focused on financing investment in infrastructure and manufacturing sector. The 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) provided commercial banking services to the rural 
sector. The China Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC) was the latest and biggest 
one among the “big four”. After the first stage of financial reform, a dual banking 
system was established. The commercial banking division was separated from the 
central bank so that commercial interest could not influence monetary policy and 
disturb macroeconomic stability.  
 
After the dual banking system was established, the financial sector was continuously 
expanded. More financial institutions were formed. Economic growth was not 
balanced across the vast lands of China. To meet the specific demand for financial 
services, local governments were allowed to found regional banks. They were smaller, 
more flexible, and mainly handled local financial issues. At the same time, tiny 
financial entities such as rural credit cooperatives and urban credit cooperatives were 
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also founded. In doing so, the financial system was expanded to be a network of 
financial intermediaries ranging from the “big four” to numerous tiny entities, 
accessing almost every corner of the country.  
 
The non-bank financial institution was also formed and it performs similar financial 
functions. It was supposed to play a supplementary role to the banking system. The 
stock market was opened first in Shenzhen, then in Shanghai for public exchange of 
stocks. This event was thought to be exciting. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
stock market was only a secondary way to create liquidity. It could neither be 
compared with the formal banking system nor with the informal financial system. So, 
I will not investigate direct finance here. Liberalization of the financial sector 
involved more than one dimension. Allowing the founding of various types of banks 
was only the first stage of reform. However, all the banks were owned or at least 
controlled by the state. Hence, the further reform put an attack on the ownership 
structure. In 1996, the first private bank, Minsheng Bank, was established. About 85% 
of shares of Minsheng Bank were owned by private firms. Minsheng Bank was 
merely a trial program. Indeed, the liberalization reform proceeded slowly. It took 
decades to finish the last one-mile of the reform. In 2014, five private banks were 
formed. This was the first time that the state exited control over an individual bank. 
The financial sector was a less developed sector in the national economy and needed a 
fundamental reform towards market liberalization. 
 
Besides, liberalization of the financial sector for foreign capital was also an important 
issue. Not surprisingly, China’s participation in the WTO accelerated the liberalization 
of the financial sector. Although the barriers to entry were not removed all at once, a 
breach was created. At that time, there were three kinds of restrictions imposed on the 
foreign-invested banks, namely the geographical restriction, the restriction on 
customers, and the restriction on businesses. Step-by-step, China fulfilled the 
commitment to open the market, and abolished most of the restrictions. So, the 
foreign-invested banks almost achieved national treatment. It is predictable that in the 
near future, the boundary between the foreign and domestic banks will merit no 
attention.  
 
China’s banking system has experienced a transformation from a unitary system to a 
market-based one in three stages. In the first stage, the function of commercial 
banking was separated from the central bank. A dual banking system was established. 
In the second stage, the financial market was liberalized for private capital. As a result, 
the financial market became governed by commercial rules. Governmental control 
was not carried out in a direct way. In the third stage, instead of direct interference, 
the government drew the bottom-line for financial activities. The financial supervision 
institution was set up to monitor the improper practice of financial institutions. In 
general, external supervision replaced internal control. As shown by the practice so far, 
China’s financial system has been restructured to be compatible with the market order. 
However, “big four” is still the superpower in the Chinese financial market. This 
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means that the government still controls a significant share of the market. This has 
brought, is bringing, and will bring severe problems if the reform cannot change it. 
We will discuss it in the following part. It is worth mentioning that this chapter do not 
deal with currency issues of the RMB though it is a top interesting theme. Here we 
focus on the financial system itself.  
 
The Weakness of the Formal Financial System 
 
There are two kinds of risk inherent in China’s banking system. The first kind arises 
due to the coexistence of the state-owned and private sectors, though the 
heterogeneity also brings resilience to the system, while the second arises due to the 
coexistence of rule-based and relation-based governance. It is possible that systematic 
risk evolves into a financial crisis. If not, it could also deter economic growth. 
 
Chinese banks discriminate between the state-owned and private sectors. The loans 
made to private firms are extremely small compared with that made to SOEs (Gregory, 
Tenev and Wagle, 2000). Some scholars (Brandt and Zhu, 2000) argued that the 
discrimination reflects government policies to transfer resources from the private to 
the state-owned sector. In my opinion, the discrimination was not intended by the 
government, but a natural response to the existing institutional link and the 
requirement of risk control. 
 
First, the state-owned banks (SOBs) were not incentivized. Indeed, they paid more 
attention to risk control than the profit rate. Directors of SOBs could not be better off 
for raising revenues, but would get into a dangerous position if they failed to show an 
effort to minimize risk. Besides, interest rates as well as transaction fees were 
controlled. It was a kind of price control that discouraged profit-maximizing activities. 
Even if the banks tended to maximize profits, their strategy was significantly limited 
by the regulations. So, we must bear in the mind that profit maximization was 
replaced by risk minimization as the primary goal for the financial institutions. Hence, 
Chinese banks liked big firms because they were too big to fail. First, it was less 
difficult for big firms to meet the collateral requirement. Collateral provided the 
information on repaying ability and insurance. Second, some SOEs monopolized the 
market due to entry barriers imposed by governmental policy. Without competitors, 
SOEs were capable of making big profits. So, their ability to repay the loans could 
also be ensured. Furthermore, the biggest shareholder of SOEs was the government. 
Thus, the repaying ability of SOEs was associated with fiscal revenue. The loans 
borrowed by SOEs could be considered a kind of government-backed loan. Chinese 
banks believed that the government would not be neutral to the bankruptcy of SOEs. 
Kornai (1986) proposed a term for it - “the soft budget constraint”. The explicit soft 
budget disappeared after the restructuring of SOEs, but the implicit soft budget still 
existed as long as the institutional link between SOEs and the government existed. 
 
On the contrary, private firms did not have any advantage in winning the trust of 
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banks. They were small and unable to meet the collateral requirement due to the lack 
of assets. Further, the institutional link between private firms and the government was 
weak. The budget was “hard” for them. So, they faced stricter examination by banks 
before they could receive loans. Many loan applications were turned down due to the 
overestimated risk. Moreover, it was less profitable for banks to serve the small and 
medium enterprises. Xu (2001) reported that the borrowing frequency of SMEs was 
five times as much as that of big companies. However, the amount an individual SME 
borrows was much less than the loans borrowed by a big company. Xu estimated that 
the information and management costs caused by serving SMEs were 5-8 times as 
much as those caused by serving big companies.  
 
Moreover, the state-owned and private sectors face different institutional 
environments. The institutional gap also creates a barrier to access to the financial 
system for private firms. Information needed for loan lending decisions can be 
acquired through the inner-sector channel. So, SOBs can acquire the information of 
SOEs, but have no access to the information of private firms, particularly when the 
private firms have an incentive to lie to the banks. During the early stage of market 
reform, most market information was transmitted via personal relationships in the 
private sector, which was only observable to the insiders, but not verifiable to the 
outsiders such as financial intermediaries. For example, the existence of oral 
agreements was only known to the trading parties. Banks were not able to find out if a 
private firm actually had as much business as it claimed. Due to the distinctive 
information sources, it was very difficult to form mutual trust between SOBs and 
private firms. Moreover, communication between banks and private firms could also 
involve problems. As for the state-owned sector, information was expressed by SOEs 
in the way that could be understood by SOBs. However, the private sector was 
familiar with another rhetoric system. Some consulting firms were set up to bridge the 
financial demand of private firms and the supply of banks. They found that for the 
private firms, the key factor to show repaying ability was the size of its social network. 
The owner of a factory would tell the bank that he was in a good relationship with 
many other entrepreneurs. However, the bank could not find any relationship between 
the social network and repayment ability. They wanted to know the cash flow and 
profit rate and might not have noticed the role of the social network in securing the 
loan. SOBs knew formal business rules and were not familiar with informal practices. 
Communication failure also exacerbated bias in credit policy. In sum, due to the 
institutional gap, the private firms have limited access to the formal financial market.  
 
As a result, most of the liquidity produced by the banking system is sold to the 
state-owned sector. But the risk is underestimated for financial transactions. Instead of 
profit rate and cash flow, the institutional link is considered the most critical factor for 
risk control. Under this circumstance, the soft budget is further softened due to the 
underestimated risk. As it was not difficult to get loans, SOEs made easy investment 
decisions and expanded production blindly. It is fine when the economy is improving. 
However, when demand becomes insufficient compared with production capacity, 
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SOEs cannot receive the expected return on the investment which is mainly financed 
through bank loans. Hence, SOEs are not able to repay the loans. The whole system is 
vulnerable to such a crisis. This problem cannot be solved as long as the institutional 
link between financial institutions and production entities exists. Ironically, risk 
control resulted in the creation of a huge number of non-performing loans (NPLs).  
 
As evidence, China’s NPLs are much bigger than that of other countries (Allen, Qian 
and Qian, 2005). Official data shows that China’s NPLs increased rapidly from 1999 
to 2001. Particularly in 2000, it was as high as 22.5% of total GDP. The NPLs of the 
USA were only about 1% of GDP. Interestingly, Japan and Taiwan’s NDLs were also 
high during 1999-2002, reaching about 12% and 10% of GDP respectively. The high 
rate of NPLs was a result of the Asian financial crisis, which is supposed to be caused 
by the informal relationships between banks and firms. 
 
The problem of NPLs was not as severe as the figures suggest because the Chinese 
economy had undergone strong growth. With the increasing fiscal revenue, the 
government could assume the NPLs created by SOBs. So, the NPLs were not the 
major damage that the financial system did to the economy. The inefficiency of the 
financial system is not only reflected in the poor lending decisions made by SOBs but 
also in the crowding out effect on private investments. The private sector was the 
engine of the growth. However, private firms could not get bank loans when they 
needed liquidity. On the contrary, the state-owned sector, not lacking in liquidity, 
could still have bank loans to invest in various projects that could be done more 
efficiently by private firms. Lacking a liquidity redistribution system, the efficiency of 
the production and exchange in the private sector would be severely affected. But the 
story did not end here. As a response to the limited access to the financial market, the 
private sector developed an informal financial system. In that sense, China’s financial 
system features a dualism of the formal and informal sides.  
 
8.2 China’s Informal Financial System: The Differential Mode of Association 
 
Given the importance of the informal financial system, in this section, I will discuss 
the underlying mechanism to shed some light on the characteristics of the Chinese 
financial system. As mentioned, China’s formal financial sector preferred to lend to 
SOEs. This strategy had put the private sector in a disadvantaged place. Without the 
support of a well-developed financial system, private firms would have difficulties in 
obtaining lending. Therefore, the private sector developed some adaptive patterns to 
create liquidity that could be distributed among private firms. Innovation and 
experimentation resulted in the emergence of a private lending system. The private 
lending market is huge in China. The Survey and Research Center for China 
Household Finance at the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (2014) 
estimated that the amount of private lending was 5,280 billion Yuan in 2013. 22.3% of 
Chinese households borrowed loans through informal channels. 14.8% of them were 
interest-bearing loans. Among them, 750 billion Yuan were loans with high interest 
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rates. The average annual interest rate was 36.7%, significantly higher than that of the 
banks. The estimates may not be accurate due to the difficulty in collecting data from 
the household lending market. Much of the lending had been done among relatives 
and friends. Data was not available in detail because such informal lending had not 
been documented. So, the size of the private lending market was eventually 
underestimated. Even so, the size reported cannot be considered small. Loans made 
by banks were about 8,900 billion Yuan. The size of the private lending market was 
about 60% of the formal financial market.  
 
Although the size of the two markets is similar, the mechanism governing financial 
transactions is totally different. Given the great uncertainty embedded in financial 
transactions, it is extremely important for a financial intermediary to assess the 
repaying ability of individual firms and to ensure the security of financial transactions. 
In an impersonal market, the enforcement of contracts is outsourced to the legal 
institutions. Further, the risk control is accomplished through market mechanisms like 
interest rate markup, collateral requirement, external audit and other approaches.  
 
However, the informal financial system has limited access to the institutional 
resources available in the formal system. So, it must seek its own way to handle the 
issues of risk control and contract enforcement. In the underground economy, two 
means are of importance. They are the social network and interest rates. The social 
network, as a network of peer-to-peer relationships, provides the information channels 
and help to enforce financial contracts. In general, social networks lower transaction 
costs and thus decrease the risk arising from high transaction costs. Interest rates are 
another tool. As we know, the interest rate is the price determining the demand and 
supply of loans. According to Fisher, interest appears due to the impatience to 
consume and the opportunity cost to invest. The opportunity cost of lending is the 
utility generated from immediate consumption or the forgone income generated from 
other opportunities of investment. Hence, interest is demanded to compensate the 
opportunity cost. But the real world is full of risks. And the calculation of interest rate 
should also take the risk into account. In the Chinese economy, the interest rate is 
controlled for the banks. The Chinese financial laws provided that the interest rate in 
the private lending sector was only allowed to be four times as much as that charged 
by banks. Recently, the limit is relaxed and the maximum interest rate allowed is 36%. 
Yet, in the informal financial market, the contract is enforced by the long-term 
cooperation enabled by the social network. So, the informal financial market is more 
liberalized to address the demand involving high risks and urgent needs. In sum, 
social networks and interest rates are complementary tools to keep the informal 
financial market working.  
 
It is widely agreed (Karlan, 2007; Ghatak, 1999; Mordach and Karlan, 2011; 
Bastelaer, 2000; Yang, Chen and Zhu, 2011) that social networks play an important 
role in establishing and maintaining order in the informal financial market. Yet, to 
deepen the understanding of the mechanism underlying the informal sector, we must 
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take the structure of Chinese social networks into account. So, I will incorporate both 
the general function of social networks and Chinese characteristics into the model. In 
the previous chapter, I mentioned that the Chinese-style network of relationships is 
characterized by “differential mode of association”. It refers to a relational system in 
which the closeness of relationships is determined by the frequency of interactions. I 
interpret it in this way because biological and geographical ties provide more 
interaction opportunities for individuals. Such interaction produces the information 
available for future interaction. After many interactions, trust is gradually formed on 
the basis of perfect information and reinforces the relationship. However, an 
individual’s time and competitive capacity is limited. Individuals cannot develop 
numerous relationships with equal quality. So, blood and geographical ties, similar 
cultural backgrounds, similar tastes or world views are probably the focal points in 
telling a person which relationship is worth the investment. The emphasis on the 
family and community in Chinese traditional culture helps to form the “differential 
mode of association”. It can be compared with a system of concentric circles. At the 
core, there are the family and relatives. They have the closest relationship, and usually 
pool income or lend money to each other without requiring interest. In the middle, 
there are friends and countrymen. A low interest rate is demanded for them to lend to 
each other. In the outer space of the circle, there are acquaintances and friends of 
friends. The relationship is of the kind “I know you but do not trust you”. So, a high 
interest rate is required to compensate the risk.  
 
I will discuss this circle-formed financial system using a simple model. I assume that 
the interest rate is 𝑟𝑟
_
. 𝑟𝑟
_
 is the real interest rate not disturbed by monetary fluctuation. 
In the informal financial market, 𝑟𝑟
_
 is free to choose. It implies that the maximum 
interest rate provided by law is invalid for the private lending sector. Then, we take 
the risk into account and have the following equation: 
 
(1 + 𝑟𝑟
_
)𝐿𝐿 = 𝜌𝜌 ∗ 0 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐿𝐿               (1) 
 
This is an equation describing the lending decision. 𝐿𝐿	denotes the amount of loans. 
𝑟𝑟
_
	denotes the interest rate free from risk. 𝑟𝑟	denotes the interest rate affected by risk. 
𝜌𝜌  is the parameter of risk measuring the probability of NPLs. The individual 
receives	(1 + 𝑟𝑟
_
)𝐿𝐿 if he uses the monetary asset in a safe way and generates the 
interest in a risk-free business, for example, putting the money in a deposit account. In 
contrast, if the individual lends in a financial market full of risk, the loan will not be 
repaid with probability	𝜌𝜌. To compensate the risk, he requires a higher interest rate 𝑟𝑟. 
So, with probability 1 − 𝜌𝜌 , he receives(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐿𝐿 . Only when the risk can be 
compensated by the higher interest rate, would the individual decide to lend. The 
equation (1) can be transformed as follows: 
 
	𝑟𝑟 = (𝑟𝑟
_
+ 𝜌𝜌)/(1 − 𝜌𝜌)                         (2) 
 
This equation shows the calculation of interest rate in an environment full of risk. The 
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relationship between risk and interest rate is demonstrated in figure 8.1. 74 
 
 
The Inner Circle of Social Network: Private Lending  
 
In the center of the circle-formed social network, there are the tightest personal 
relationships such as family. The pooling of family income suggests that a family is a 
basic unit of financial intermediary. It is because the family-level relationship 
minimizes the transaction cost of liquidity distribution. Certainly, the relationship 
among relatives and friends also decreases the risk associated with financial 
transactions. In general, social networks affect risk as well as transaction cost in four 
ways. First, social networks help to provide information necessary for assessing the 
repaying ability of the borrowers. An individual or entity showing low repaying 
ability would be probably excluded from the financial network. For example, a person 
who likes to gamble will not get loans from his relatives and friends. The bad 
reputation would be also spread in the network. Second, social networks facilitate the 
lending process. Unlike the formal procedure, informal financial transactions required 
little paperwork and nearly no transaction fees. It is not necessary to transform the 
observable information to verifiable information. So, the lending process is simple 
and quick. Oral agreements are sometimes sufficient for completion of financial 
transactions. Third, payment is flexible. A formal lending contract usually prescribes 
                                                        
74 A similar figure is to be found in Xie and Li (2011). For the inner circle of social network, the interest rate is 
positive though we observe the existence of interest-free loans. It is because One can pay by gift or offer an 
interest-free loan in the future. The payment of interest is highly flexible.  
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the payment of principal and interest. However, in the informal financial market, 
payment takes a flexible form. It is observed that individuals who lend to relatives and 
friends require no payment of interest. According to the principle of reciprocity, 
lenders are granted the right to borrow interest free from relatives and friends in the 
future, or be rewarded by gifts from borrowers. The key point is that the contract must 
be informal and implicit so that the good relationship can be extended into the future. 
Last but not least, social networks are also a means to enforce the implicit contract. 
The enforcement mechanism has been already discussed in previous chapters. The 
closeness of the relationship determines the effectiveness of the relational 
enforcement mechanism. Exiting from a tight relationship, such as family, causes a 
prohibitively high cost that is unbearable for the members. A loan to a relative, in the 
normal case, involves only little risk. Also, the outer network is less valuable for 
networked individuals. Participants would exit from the network instead of repaying 
the loan. Therefore, if the relationship is not so close and valuable, the enforcement 
mechanism would be less effective. In sum, the risk and transaction cost would be 
lowered while the financial transaction is embedded in the social network. With the 
risk and cost controlled, the informal financial system survives. In fact, even in the 
presence of a well-developed financial market, the advantage of private lending 
would still exist and make it complementary to the formal financial market.  
 
As the economy grows, the financial market needs to grow as well. So, the volume of 
lending increases. As mentioned earlier, the growth of the market results in the 
dis-embedding of the transaction from social relation. If the volume of lending 
increases, the risk rises. On one hand, lenders attempt to establish a relationship with 
formal institutions to increase the security of transactions. A case study suggested that 
lending contracts involving more than 3000 Yuan usually took the written form. In 
doing so, information is preserved for verification in the future. On the other hand, 
they require a higher interest rate to compensate the rising risk. As mentioned, the 
interest rate is not controlled in the informal financial market. Hence, if the risk is 
significantly high, the interest rate would also be high. In practice, the annual interest 
rate can be more than 40%. Increasing risk is not the only factor accounting for the 
high interest rate. As the informal lending procedure is easy, the private lending sector 
is able to handle urgent financial demand and short-term loans. However, urgent 
demand increases the cost of liquidity. So it also accounts for a high interest rate. 
 
It is not unusual that formal contract is used among relatives and friends. Sometimes, 
instead of gifts, interest is also paid to the lenders. Yet, the interest rate could not be as 
high as the market interest rate, which does not take the benefit of long-term 
cooperation into account. The social network can be understood as a cooperative 
insurance. One contributes to the network and generates the benefit from the 
membership. Hence, the system enables an exchange of current with future benefit. In 
this regard, the social network adds flexibility to the financial system and makes 
lending for impersonal markets possible. However, as mentioned, the relational 
system is good at dealing with small financial demand. Moreover, the scope of the 
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informal financial market is too limited if it only enables financial transactions among 
relatives and friends. Actually, the financial network expands as shown in figure 8.1. 
 
Like households, firms also develop the financial network to finance and trade. In the 
case of Puyuan area (Ruan and Zhang, 2008), the initial capital was not only 
self-financed but also financed by the relatives. The amount of lending by the 
relatives was higher than the banks. So, the social relation substituted the formal 
institution to a considerable degree in prompting the growth of the private sector. 
Moreover, firms clustered with the aim to relax the credit rationing. Facing the 
working capital crunch, they depended heavily on two financing sources. Relatives 
and friends were the largest financing source. More than half the working capital 
came from the relatives and friends. The second largest source was the cluster-based 
firms. The so-called “trade credit” was provided to the firms in need by the upstream 
and downstream firms. Only the large-sized firms like logistic enterprises, finishing, 
and dyeing factories had a better chance to obtain bank loans. Therefore, the social 
network served particularly the SMEs with respect to the financial issue, and it helped 
extraordinarily to develop the infant private sector. Besides, the flexible payment 
performed the role of financial support as well. Some firms in the industry involving 
high market risk were allowed to fulfill the payment by the mutual financial status. In 
that kind of environment, social capital such as trust was very important in 
maintaining the market order. As we may predict, disputes arising from the payment 
would also be resolved out of court. Relation-based governance provided a 
one-fits-all solution to the financing problem, particularly for the SMEs in the private 
sector.  
 
The Outer Circle of the Social Network: Intermediated Lending and Private Lending 
Firms 
 
Compared to the inner circle of the social network, the outer circle involves “weak 
ties”. It is weak because the interactions between two parties are not as frequent as 
those required to maintain a “strong tie”. They may be acquaintances to each other, or 
are friends of friends. However, “weak ties” expand the social network. One cannot 
choose relatives. Hence, the inner circle of the network is to some degree fixed. But, 
the outer circle of the network involves some freedom to choose, so a private financial 
intermediary is formed to generate profit from matching financial demand and supply. 
Compared to the direct lending between relatives and friends, intermediated lending 
involves more market processes. A private lending firm requires a formal contract, 
loan guarantee, and interest. Due to the high cost of producing liquidity in the private 
sector, and the high risk, the interest rate is usually higher than that of banks. 
Moreover, private lending firms restrict access to the financial services they provide. 
Only those who are capable of lending a big sum of money are potential clients of the 
firms. Certainly, a person can also pool the money from relatives and friends to make 
lending to the firm, and the return will be shared. In most cases, lending services are 
provided to meet corporate financial demand. Most financial demand arises from the 
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expansion of production.  
 
In fact, private lending firms practice in the gray area. It is legal to form microloans 
firms. However, it is illegal for them to take savings, so there are a variety of private 
lending firms. Several private firms can establish microloans firms to share the 
liquidity among the clustered firms. Some private lending firms, however, take 
savings from individuals and lend to firms. It captures the nature of an intermediary. 
However, this practice is not protected by law, so they enforce the contracts by 
establishing a long-term cooperative relationship. Some private lending entities are 
underground banks. They are huge in size, covering many areas of banking services 
ranging from lending to currency exchange. However, their practice is illegal. The 
illegal practice makes them solely dependent on the web of relationships and 
eventually violence.  
 
At first glance, private lending firms are specialized financial intermediaries seeking 
to create institutional ties with the formal institution. However, although the 
intermediated lending is to some degree impersonalized, private lending firms still 
rely significantly on the social network given the imperfect market. After all, risk 
control is a big challenge for the private sector that is not perfectly embedded in the 
formal institution. If private lending firms make lending decisions based on the 
average estimated market risk, the problem of adverse selection may arise and destroy 
the informal financial market. In practice, a private lending firm does not provide 
services to an unknown client, because it only affords to acquire information through 
point-to-point relationships. Hence, they tend to select the trustworthy clients from the 
members of the social network. Figure 8.2 shows how adverse selection occurs. 
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If 𝜌𝜌 is equal to 100%, nobody will be lending. The interest rate becomes infinitely 
large when the probability of NPLs approaches 100%. If a financial intermediary does 
not have access to the information necessary for the lending decision, it would 
estimate an average value of the probability distribution of risk. In this case, I assume 
that the risk is distributed equally. So, the average risk is 50%, and the financial 
intermediary would require the interest rate	𝑟𝑟. But, all the individuals who would 
repay the loan with probability above 50% give up borrowing loans from the private 
financial sector because the interest rate is too high for them. Then, only the high risk 
loans exist in the market. The second round of estimation tells the lender that the 
average value of the probability distribution of risk is 75%. As a result, the interest 
rate is raised again and more borrowers quit the private lending market. This process 
continues until the market collapses.  
 
However, the lemon market is only a thought experiment. In fact, China’s informal 
financial market is embedded in social relations. The point-to-point relationship 
provides the access to information of individual borrowers and thus makes the risk 
estimate more accurate. Hence, a financial intermediary does not seek market 
opportunities from the group of unknown clients, but only provide services to the 
clients it has a relationship with. The adverse selection will not threaten the survival 
of the informal financial sector, as long as the financial transaction is carried out 
between networked market participants. The price is that private lending firms are 
trapped in the social network and are not able to grow. Any effort to develop business 
outside the social network would probably end up in rising risk that is uncontrollable 
for the informal financial sector. Establishing and maintaining long-term relationships 
is costly. A private lending firm must be small in size and hence is only able to offer 
small loans. 
 
Compared to the lending between relatives and friends, the emergence of the informal 
financial intermediary improves the efficiency of resource allocation. First, 
intermediated lending involves the matching of demand and supply. Those who have 
financial demand do not need to search for suppliers by themselves. As mentioned, 
private lending firms are specialized in providing a better match between demand and 
supply in the credit market. Specialization reduces the search cost. Moreover, the 
introduction of financial intermediary expands the financial network to meet the 
increasing demand. Second, it pools the savings by offering a higher risk, higher 
return option for investment and thus is able to lend a larger amount of loans 
compared with the lending ability of the inner circle of the social network. 
 
Due to the attributes of social relation, the informal financial network cannot grow 
without limits, and hence, end up mostly on a local network. The long-term 
relationship is more valuable for market participants. To minimize the high risk 
arising from the financial transaction, the best strategy is to serve several trustworthy 
clients. Frequent interaction between service providers and clients reinforces the 
cooperation. During the early stage of reform, the market was “thin”. It is difficult to 
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switch to new clients or service providers. So informal financial intermediaries and 
clients tend to develop long-term cooperative relationships. It is observed that private 
lending firms served several regular clients. The business relationship is highly stable 
as a response to the high risk associated with informal financial transactions. 
 
Hence, the informal financial sector features a decentralized structure. Numerous 
private lending firms emerged and developed a highly stable local network. The 
aggregate supply of liquidity is divided into small amounts and distributed by 
numerous financial intermediaries. This structure was adapted to the Chinese 
economy during the early stage of reform. In the TVE sector, the collective TVEs 
could be financed by the formal financial institutions such as village credit 
cooperatives or local banks, because they had institutional ties with local governments. 
However, those household-run establishments could not obtain loans from the formal 
financial institutions. At the very beginning, they could be funded by the inner circle 
of the social network. However, when they had grown into larger private enterprises, 
the small-scale financial network was not able to meet the increasing financial 
demand. So, the market mechanism was incorporated into the social network to 
fashion a new financial institution. The efforts ended up in the emergence of private 
lending firms which improves the efficiency of allocation of local financial resources. 
By the end, stable relationships were established between financial intermediaries, 
lenders, and borrowers. Those private firms obtained access to the local financial 
resource. The social network diverted the local financial capacity to meet the demand 
of the local private firms. The globally extremely decentralized, locally integrated 
economic system could handle the financial issue that China’s private sector faced. It 
was, in nature, a self-preserving and self-generating system. And the key factor was 
the social network.  
 
However, a relation-based financial system would become inefficient if the private 
firms keep growing. The financial demand would be very large, and thus beyond the 
financial capacity that could be generated from the local network. So, as the private 
sector keeps expanding, it would seek to obtain loans from formal financial 
institutions such as banks. The first reason is the limited financial capacity, and the 
second is risk control. This self-generating system works well in a developing 
economy. However, the integrated character of the local economic system makes it 
vulnerable to the crisis. The inner circle of the social network could control the risk by 
enabling the flexible payment. Yet, the outer circle of the social network, while being 
shocked by the crisis, would be disconnected and the participants would turn to the 
formal institution to protect themselves. Indeed, compared with the risk, financial 
capacity is a more important issue. In practice, cross-guarantee helps to solve the 
problem. However, the institutional gap between private sector and formal financial 
institutions may increase the systemic risk.  
 
Actually, there is one more form of intermediated lending. Besides those professional 
intermediaries, the big firms also carried out the function of financial nexus. They 
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provided loans to other small firms from the same areas. Because of the network 
which enables the long-term social exchange, the big firms were not only able to 
control the risk associated with the loans but also incentivized to make loans to the 
small firms and took benefits in the social exchange domain, which could be the 
information, the shared production capacity, the flexible payment and the increasing 
bargaining power in the local affairs. And the small firms, through the social network, 
gained access to the financial services. The advantage of the big firm being a financial 
intermediary is that such a financial system is more flexible and more resistant to the 
crisis as their interest is highly mixed. Even after most of the professional 
intermediaries ran into difficulties, the financial ecosystem consisting of one central 
big firm and the small firms surrounding it plays still a relevant role in the 
small-scaled financial transactions.  
 
Surveys on the Informal Credit Market 
 
I draw on some surveys and case studies to show the important role of social relation 
in the informal financial transaction. The Guangdong Division of the PBC (2002) 
conducted a survey on the informal financial market in 2001. They distinguished 
between two forms of informal lending, organized and unorganized. Organized 
lending is what I term “intermediated lending”. The research group found that 
information companies, loan offices, and loan cooperatives were set up to provide 
liquidity. However, the scale of such “intermediated lending” was small, with less 
than 90 million Yuan in 2001. At the same time, the amount of private lending was 5.9 
billion Yuan, while the amount of lending between firms was 648 million Yuan. One 
explanation is that it was difficult to collect data of the transactions in a gray area. 
What we have seen might be the tip of the iceberg.  
 
According to the survey, the scale of private lending was significantly larger than the 
scale of lending between firms. A high level of trust was formed in the inner circle of 
the social network, lowering the transaction cost. Hence, the private lending involved 
low costs, short procedures, and flexible repayment. If it was too costly for one to 
obtain bank loans or one has an urgent need for liquidity, one would choose to borrow 
money from relatives and friends. Embedding the financial transaction in the culture 
reduces the risk. So, where culture persists, there are private lending activities. The 
National School of Development of Beijing University also carried out a survey of a 
sample of 1951 rural households, and studies their lending behaviors (Yang, Chen and 
Zhu, 2011). They found the informal financial transaction more frequent than the 
formal transaction, and both transactions were similar in scale. About 88% of the 
loans were interest free. Most lending contracts were concluded in oral form. As the 
authors pointed out, the network, relationship, and trust played an essential role in 
creating an informal financial sector.  
 
The research group from the Guangdong Division of the PBC came to similar 
findings. 72.9% of the loans required neither collateral nor guarantee. It was the social 
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network that reduced the risk. The amount of loans involved in disputes accounted for 
9.6% of the total amount. Most disputes arose between individuals. The low rate of 
dispute implies that the rate of repayment was high, about 60% to 80%, much higher 
than the rate of repayment for the banks in the area. They also found that the interest 
rate was flexible in the informal financial market. Lending between relatives or 
friends was generally interest-free. In some cases, they required the interest to be paid, 
but the interest rate was not higher than that offered by banks. Certainly, for the outer 
circle of the social network, the rising risk resulted in a markup on interest rates. The 
annual interest rate varied from 9.6% to 36%, lower than the upper level prescribed in 
the law. There were also exceptions. The annual interest rate could rise to 60%, 
indicating either high risk or urgent demand. 
 
The surveys also suggested that traditional culture affects the informal financial 
transaction to a considerable degree. Hence, the differential mode of association can 
apply to the financial network and explain the private lending behavior. The problem 
is that the informal financial sector could not afford to lend a large amount of loans. 
Particularly, when the economy kept growing, the informal sector could not meet the 
increasing financial demand. So, firms still wanted to cooperate with the banks. The 
cross-guarantee mechanism was developed to solve the problem.   
 
8.3 The Cross-Guarantee Mechanism 
 
Cross-guarantee is usually seen in group or joint liability lending. In some cases, they 
refer to the same thing. As mentioned, it was difficult for the private sector to obtain 
bank loans because they could neither meet the collateral requirement nor share the 
genuine information with banks through institutional ties. Meanwhile, the private 
lending, being characterized by microloans and frequent transactions, could not meet 
the increasing financial demand of the private sector. Therefore, a deliberate 
mechanism must be developed to solve the problem or the growth would be deterred. 
In fact, the personal relationship is one of the solutions to the limited access to 
financial services. As the staff of state-owned banks are all in certain social network, 
the social network match the financial demand and supply in an informal way. For 
example, an owner of a private firm always seeks to develop the relationship with a 
bank manager who makes the decision with respect to lending. It works sometimes. 
But the problem is that this solution usually involves bribery. And making loans to the 
firms with poor performance increases the systemic risk. Besides the personal 
relationship, the social network also provides another solution, which is the 
cross-guarantee mechanism. To put it in a simple way, several firms borrow from a 
bank and guarantee the loans they lend for each other. In doing so, joint liability is 
imposed on the entire borrowers. Joint liability implies risk sharing. Hence, the risk 
decreases while the number of firms shares the joint liability. If the number of firms is 
sufficiently large, banks would lend to private firms due to the declining risk.  
 
Because cross-guarantee is a widely used financial mechanism, scholars are highly 
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interested in its effect and consequence. Stiglitz (1990) argued that peer monitoring is 
a partial solution to the moral hazard problem in the credit market. Impavido (1998) 
developed a model to show that group lending is a possible means to relax the credit 
rationing if the physical collateral is not available. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) also 
suggested that joint liability lending promotes screening, monitoring, state verification, 
and enforcement of repayment. Xie and Li (2011) emphasized the role of reputation in 
increasing the likelihood of repayment in group lending. Elsner and Zhang (2016) 
found the application of cross-guarantee mechanism in the historical documents in 
their paper on silk road and they call it “social leverage”.  
 
Mainstream research focuses on the advantage of the cross-guarantee mechanism. 
First, it is a self-enforcing mechanism. Second, it creates opportunities for private 
firms to obtain bank loans by diversifying the risk. However, the existing literature 
does not investigate the dynamic of interaction between banks and firms. As I pointed 
out, the private sector faces a networked environment while the banks, as a part of the 
state-owned economy, are bound to the formal rules. The institutional gap would 
result in rising risk. The interaction between the two systems might cause a crisis 
under certain circumstances. Li had already mentioned the potential risk embedded in 
the coexistence of relation-based and rule-based governance, and ascribed the Asian 
financial crisis to the institutional conflict. I will model the cross-guarantee 
mechanism to shed some light on the understanding of the conflict between different 
institutional settings that the banks and private sector face.  
 
Assume that there are 𝑁𝑁 firms that are networked. If a firm wants to borrow from a 
bank, it must have the loan guaranteed by other networked firms. According to the 
principle of reciprocity, it also has to guarantee the loans borrowed by other firms. To 
simplify the model, I assume that there are two types of firms. One is the “good” firm 
that always makes a profit. The other is the “bad” firm that could fail to repay the 
loans. If a “good” firm obtains the loan, it can expand production and generate 
additional profit. However, it has to pay the interest and assume the debt obligation of 
“bad” firms. Therefore, a “good” firm would borrow only when the following 
inequation holds:  
 
                      𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿) − 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 𝐿𝐿 (𝑁𝑁 − 𝜌𝜌)⁄ − 𝑟𝑟 > 0                   (2) 
 
𝐿𝐿	denotes the amount of loan that an individual firm borrows. 𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿) denotes the profit 
generated due to the expansion of production. 𝜌𝜌 denotes the number of the “bad” 
firm. 𝜌𝜌 denotes the probability with which the “bad” firm fails to repay the loan. As 
“bad” firms are homogeneous, they fail to repay loans at the same time. “Good” firms 
need to assume the debts of “bad” firms. So, the expected cost of joining the 
guarantee network is 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 𝐿𝐿 (𝑁𝑁 − 𝜌𝜌)⁄ . Besides, the firm needs to pay the regular 
interest 𝑟𝑟. When the benefit outweighs the cost, the firm decides to participate in the 
financial network and take the loan. Therefore, to form the cross-guarantee network, 
the profit needs to be high. As shown in the previous chapter, rising export demand 
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may ensure the high profit rate. Second, 𝜌𝜌 should be low. Because the firms face the 
same business environment, the risk parameter is presumably associated with the 
ability of individual entrepreneurs. Third, the number of “bad” firms should be small. 
The total cost rises with the proportion of “bad” firms in the network. In sum, it is 
always beneficial for “bad” firms to borrow. As for the “good” firms, if equation (2) 
holds, they would allow to weave “bad” firms into the financial network.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the information is perfect and complete for the members of 
the financial network. It is to say that (𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿), 𝜌𝜌, 𝑁𝑁, 𝜌𝜌, 𝐿𝐿, 𝑟𝑟) is known to any of the firms 
in the networked environment. As discussed above, the social network facilitates 
information transmission. The profit rate and business performance of individual 
firms, as well as entrepreneur ability, is interesting information for the indigenous 
entrepreneurs and they can easily acquire the information through the personal 
relationships. In that kind of environment, the information of (𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿), 𝜌𝜌, 𝜌𝜌 ) is 
observable information. By observable information, I mean that only the networked 
firms, as insiders, have access to such information. The banks, as outsiders, cannot get 
the information because it is not publicly available.  
 
The aim of introducing a cross-guarantee mechanism is to solve the financial problem 
for private firms. So, not only is the strategy of firms of importance, but the decision 
function of banks also matters. The major factor affecting the lending decision of 
banks is the risk. However, banks cannot make use of observable information. The 
observable information is produced in a networked environment. Hence, it cannot be 
verified or the verification incurs prohibitively high cost. The state-owned sector, 
being embedded in the rule-based governance system, cannot make use of the 
information. Rule-based governance requires that the information be produced and 
processed in a specified procedure and form. For example, a manager of the bank 
hears the rumor that one of their clients is not competitive in the market anymore. It is 
actually observable for the firms in the cluster, and the entrepreneurs may be very 
sensitive to the rumors. However, the manager cannot quote the information in the 
report because he did not obtain the information from a formal source such as 
accounting reports, government documents, or forms filled by clients with a 
commitment to the truth. So, this part of information will never be used in a formal 
procedure, even when the bank staffs hear the rumors. 
 
Hence, I assume that, unlike its clients perfect in information, the bank is only capable 
of estimating an average risk. The bank predicts that an individual firm defaults with 
probability 𝑘𝑘, and tries to minimize the risk by imposing joint liability. For the bank, 
the risk is reduced when the number of firms sharing joint liability increases. So, the 
market risk can be described as 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁). The market risk is referred to as the 
probability that a bank cannot get loans repaid. Two factors affect the market risk. The 
first one is the probability of default for individual firms. The second one is the size of 
the network. Hence, the condition for lending is as follows: 
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                (1 − 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁))(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐿𝐿 + 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁) ∗ 0 > 𝐿𝐿                (3) 
 
And it can be transformed into: 
 
𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁) < 1/(1 + 𝑟𝑟)                     (4) 
 
The implication is not counterintuitive. With higher interest rates, banks are ready to 
take more risk. However, the interest rate was controlled for the Chinese banks. Let 𝑟𝑟  
denote the maximum value of the interest rate. In the case of 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁) > 1/(1 + 𝑟𝑟), 
the banks deny the application for loans. However, the parameter 𝑁𝑁 indicates that the 
cross-guarantee mechanism increases the opportunity for private firms to obtain loans 
from banks because risk decreases in 𝑁𝑁. So, it is highly probable that 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁) <
1/(1 + 𝑟𝑟) holds.  
 
It is okay when all clients repay the loans. Then they cooperate with banks for a 
second round. This system seems to keep running forever. However, if the “bad” 
firms default, the system might run into a crisis. This event has two effects on the risk 
estimate 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁). The first effect is obvious. There are only 𝑁𝑁 − 𝜌𝜌 firms alive. 
Hence, the scale of insurance decreases. The second effect is not so obvious. The 
banks estimate that an individual firm might default with probability 𝑘𝑘 prior to the 
crisis. And they observe that 𝜌𝜌 firms default and would modify the estimate of risk 
by the observation. They may replace the probability 𝑘𝑘 with 𝑑𝑑. If 𝑘𝑘 is higher than 
𝑑𝑑, both effects work against each other. It depends on which effect is stronger. But if 
𝑘𝑘 is lower than 𝑑𝑑, the risk rises in the eye of the banks. The rising risk may lead to 
the following situation: 
 
𝑞𝑞(𝑑𝑑, 𝑁𝑁 − 𝜌𝜌) > 1/(1 + 𝑟𝑟)                   (5) 
 
So, the banks would require the “good” firms to repay the loans immediately because 
the risk turns out to be too high. A moderate consequence is a decrease in production 
scale. Without the external finance, private firms cannot maintain a high production 
capacity, or have to borrow from underground banks or lending firms, and pay a very 
high interest and bear more risk. It is also possible that “good” firms also default 
when early repayment is required. These firms need to pay the debts, the interest, and 
now repay the loans. They might not have sufficient liquidity.  
 
In the model, there are two factors creating the systematic problem. First, the size of 
the social network is inherently limited. So, 𝑁𝑁 can neither be manipulated by banks 
nor controlled by firms. It takes time and effort to create social capital. A social 
network can only be created by recurrent interactions. So, a “good” firm is willing to 
guarantee the loan made to a “bad” firm because the size of the social network is 
limited, and the bank requires sufficient firms to participate in the cross-guarantee 
program. Second, banks tend to overestimate credit risk. The actual probability with 
which a firm defaults is 𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑. Due to the imperfect information, banks use 𝑑𝑑 to 
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measure the level of risk. So, the overestimating of risk may lead to a tight credit 
policy which is more harmful to an economy undergoing rapid growth than a risky 
credit policy.  
 
In figure 8.3, I show the dynamic of the model. At first, private firms need loans to 
finance the expansion of production. However, because of 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 0) = 𝑘𝑘 > 1/(1 + 𝑟𝑟), 
an individual firm stands no chance to obtain the loan. So, the firms have to decide if 
they guarantee the liabilities for each other and thus reduce the market risk both for 
banks and themselves. If 𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿) − 𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑 𝐿𝐿 (1 − 𝑑𝑑)⁄ − 𝑟𝑟 > 0 holds, the firms enter into 
the financial network. Otherwise, they would withdraw the plan. If it is beneficial for 
firms to provide the reciprocal guarantee, banks need to calculate if it is beneficial for 
them to make the loans. As mentioned earlier, in the eyes of the bank, the market risk 
is measured by 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁). So, in the case of 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁) < 1/(1 + 𝑟𝑟), the bank decides to 
lend. If the result of calculation suggests the opposite, it denies the application. By the 
end of a round of interaction, the firms have to repay the loans. Another round of 
interaction will be carried out in the same way if the firms fulfill the repayment 
obligation. But, if the firms default, the cross-guarantee system would collapse. As the 
bank cannot rely on the information unverifiable for a formal institution, it estimates 
the risk by observation. As a result, the bank would modify the risk estimate from 
𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁) to 𝑞𝑞(𝑑𝑑, 𝑁𝑁 − 𝜌𝜌). If 𝑑𝑑 is higher than 𝑘𝑘, or the effect of downsizing the 
network is weaker than that of a decrease in the probability of default of an individual 
firm, the bank may require early repayment, which makes the “good” firms cut the 
production capacity or even default themselves. However, if the case is 𝑞𝑞(𝑑𝑑, 𝑁𝑁 −
𝜌𝜌) < 𝑞𝑞(𝑘𝑘, 𝑁𝑁), the bank would continue the cooperation with the “good” firms. 
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This model shows that the social network plays a relevant role in the financial market. 
The size of the social network, which is depicted by 𝑁𝑁 , determines if the 
cross-guarantee mechanism works. Social relation enables the cross-guarantee 
mechanism and thus reduces the risk for banks. If the risk is reduced sufficiently, the 
banks would make loans to the private sector. However, it is also the social network 
sowing the seeds of crisis. Under the relational system, the information is not 
processed and preserved in the way that can be verified for the formal institutions. So, 
due to the institutional gap, the information is not perfect for banks, which leads to the 
overestimating of risk. I assume that ρ is given in the model. In practice, they may 
vary over time. In an economy undergoing rapid development, ρ is low because even 
an average entrepreneur seizes the opportunity for success. In an economy undergoing 
slowdown, the intense market competition increases the probability of decline of the 
“bad” firms. Therefore, the cross-guarantee mechanism performs better in an 
economy that is experiencing strong growth. 
 
To simplify the model, I distinguished between two types of firm, the “good” one and 
“bad” one, with the ratio of “good” to “bad” given. I can relax this assumption and 
assume that firms are all different, and assign a competitive index to them. The 
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competitive index indicates, by its literal meaning, the competitiveness of a firm 
ranging from 1 to 𝑁𝑁. The firm with index 1 is the first firm that defaults and the firm 
with index 2 the second, and so on. The market condition determines how many firms 
default. Given the market condition, the number of firms that would probably default, 
which is denoted by 𝜌𝜌, is also determined, and they default with probability ρ. If the 
demand rises rapidly, 𝜌𝜌 is small. It increases the benefit of firms and reduces the risk 
for banks. If the growth is slowed down or even turned into a recession, 𝜌𝜌 is big and 
the cross-guarantee system becomes very fragile and vulnerable to the crisis. In sum, 
the institutional gap is not much of a problem in the financial market if the economy 
booms. However, during a recession, the cooperation between formal financial 
institutions and the private sector would probably fail unless the economic activity of 
the private sector is dis-embedded from the traditional network and re-embedded in 
the mixed institution of developmental network and rule-based governance, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
8.4 Summary and Consequences for the Following Investigation 
 
In this part, I will summarize. China’s financial system consists of two sectors, a 
formal and an informal sector. In the formal sector, almost all the banks are owned or 
controlled by the state. Owing to the institutional ties and the purpose of risk 
minimization, the banks preferred to lend to SOEs. Private firms had limited access to 
financial support. Yet, the SOEs were not so competitive, due to the different 
incentive structure. As we may expect, a huge part of loans made to the SOEs were 
turned into NPLs. 
 
China’s economic growth is ascribed to the creation of a private sector, but not 
restructuring of SOEs. Over the last three decades, China’s private sector has grown at 
an unprecedented rate. Enormous financial demand was derived from the rapid 
expansion of the private sector. This demand could not be met through existing means. 
Therefore, an informal financial market, basically a private lending market, was 
developed. Private lending behavior is affected by the local culture, featuring the 
“differential mode of association”. The social relation provides the information source 
and the enforcement mechanism. However, the closeness of the relationship decreases 
from the center to the edge of the personal network. The outer circle of the personal 
network suggests higher lending risk compared with the inner circle. Hence, for the 
loan made to a borrower who is only “weakly” tied to the lender, a higher interest rate 
is required to compensate the rising risk. So, private lending consists of two parts. 
One is lending between relatives and close friends involving low risk, low interest 
rate, and flexible repayment. At this level, social relation performs as the information 
source and enforcement means. The other one is specialized lending activities of 
informal financial intermediaries, involving high risk, high interest rate, and less 
flexible repayment. However, private lending firms pool the money and can afford to 
lend the medium amount loans to firms in need.   
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When the lender’s decision is based on the information obtained from social relations, 
the lending procedure is short and not costly. Yet, the disadvantage of specialized 
private lending is that it makes the financial system fragile, particularly in a 
transitional economy. It can be considered as financial activity during the period of 
prosperity, yet resembles gambling during the period of economic recession.  
 
As the Chinese economy kept growing, financial demand increased as well. 
Particularly, rising export demand made the appetite of the Chinese manufacturing 
sector for liquidity ever larger. So, private firms began to seek cooperation with the 
banks. To control risk, several firms provided a reciprocal guarantee for each other’s 
liability. They usually clustered to share information and resources. The problem was 
that the information they produced and shared could not be verified by the banks. So, 
the banks probably overestimated the risk. In that kind of environment, if there is an 
external shock to the economic system, it may destroy the most fragile section of the 
informal financial system. The informal financial market as a whole would also be 
impaired as a result of the chain effect of a crisis. Hence, it is extraordinarily 
dangerous for the Chinese economy to have a large-sized private intermediated 
lending sector. As a response, China’s financial reform carries on. First, further 
liberalization of the financial market can help to increase the supply of microloans. 
Recently, the first five private banks have been allowed to be formed by ten private 
enterprises. As reported, two of these five private banks focus on making microloans. 
One of them is invested in by the Alibaba Group. The aim of the Alibaba Group is to 
serve the small and medium-sized enterprises. It has numerous small and 
medium-sized enterprises retailing on its online platform. Hence, it has better access 
to information on small and medium-sized enterprises and is able to make an accurate 
evaluation of the value of those enterprises. Now, the Alibaba Group enters into the 
financial market and it will also focus on the customers on the online platform. The 
combination of financial transaction and online transaction will result in a new 
solution to microloans.  
 
Second, more financial products are available in the market. Based on the 
accumulated knowledge and experience, together with the development of financial 
theory, more and more new financial products are invented. The variety of financial 
products is supposed to improve the efficiency of financial system, as the efficiency 
market hypothesis would predict. However, it may also result in the contrary 
increasing the systemic risk. For example, the abuses of financial derivatives are 
considered the reason for the financial crisis in 2008. High leverage makes the 
financial system vulnerable. And during the crisis, the bailout of the “too-big-to-fails” 
would be an extra burden. As the financial market exhibits a characteristic of power 
law, a slight change in “input” signal would make the behavior totally different (Lux 
and Marchesi, 1999).75 Therefore, the China banking regulatory commission must be 
very prudent towards the financial innovation and regulate such activities in a 
                                                        
75 Lux and Marchesi’s model is in contradiction with the efficiency market hypothesis, which understands the 
operation of financial market from a neoclassical perspective. The efficiency market hypothesis is challenged for 
its inability to explain the financial crisis.  
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sophisticated way. On one hand, it must prevent any underestimating of risk to avoid 
potential crisis. On the other hand, it should not impose the barrier to beneficial 
financial innovation due to the over-emphasis on risk control.  
 
Third, direct finance is an alternative to indirect finance. China has already set up 
stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Some firms would choose to go IPO if their 
application is approved by the regulatory authority. For those enterprises that do not 
qualify for IPO, angel investment, venture capital, and private equity are also 
available for the small demand for a capital increase. Direct finance is a competitive 
substitution for informal private lending. The only problem is that direct finance is a 
part of modern business. To gain access to the venture capital, people need to pay the 
learning cost. On the contrary, as private lending is embedded in the local culture, 
people do not need to learn how to lend money from relatives. Hence, in the 
metropolitan area, direct finance began to play an increasingly important role. 
However, in the towns and villages, the informal financial system persists. 
 
I predict that the financial system will be gradually dis-embedded from the traditional 
network. However, the private lending sector will exist for a long time. Under certain 
circumstances, private lending provides a low-cost solution for the exchange of 
liquidity. It will play a complementary, rather than a substitute role in the formal 
banking system. However, another innovation in financial transaction threatens the 
future of the private lending sector. It is the rise of web banks. Information technology 
reduces the transaction cost, making microloans also profitable for the formal 
institutions. Web banks may have millions of customers and thus have better ability to 
control risk by using big data. Transplanting the transaction into the online form 
extends the impersonal market to where it has not reached before because it lowers 
the transaction cost to lower than that of social relation. But at the same time, the new 
financial products also get into the traditional network and are potential sources of 
bubble building. The proper solution might be embedding the financial market in a 
developmental network instead of the traditional network.  
 
Actually, the Chinese government pays particular attention to the financial security 
and stability and try to prevent the systematic risk. Recent research (Rasmus, 2016) 
shows that private debt ratios in China are not extraordinarily high and that China is 
indebted only in RMB. So the Chinese government still has the financial system in 
control. After the 19th national congress of the CPC October 2017 and the 
13th national people’s congress march 2018, several new policies are on the agenda. 
First, a financial stability and development committee is to be organized under the 
State Council. It works at national level to control the risk of financial crisis. Second, 
the informal financial activities are partly acknowledged and regulated through the 
formal measures. For example, the private lending contract is supported by the 
judicial authorities in spite of the mutually agreed high interest rate. Third, a balance 
between opening-up policy and security is to be sought. China wants to be part of 
world’s financial network for the improvement of financial efficiency. However, it can 
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also introduce more risk to the existing system. Again, the experimental approach is 
adopted to see in which way China can liberalize the financial sector while having it 
in control. Now the free trade zones are the experimental areas and a guideline on the 
negative list of financial services is just published. So, what the government has done 
hints that the private lending network would be increasingly regulated and protected 
by the formal institution and would be also connected to the global network as long as 
the opening policy and information technology allows it. In that case, the 
aforementioned developmental network would emerge as the interaction among 
informal financial sector, government and global financial network.  
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9. The Institutional Rivalry between Rule of Relation system and Rule of Law 
System 
 
This chapter is devoted to the investigation of the evolutionary coexistence of the 
“rule of law” and the “rule of relation” systems and the competition between them. 
According to Vernon Smith, under the “rule of relation” system the transaction 
indicates a personalized character whilst under the “rule of law” system the 
impersonal order of the market is applied to govern the transaction. There is an 
inconsistency between these two institutions regarding the involvement of personal 
relationships. A number of questions arise in this context, inter alia whether the 
transactions are exclusively governed by the impersonal market order, whether the 
“rule of relation” system defends against any kind of attempt to make the shift in 
institution, and whether the co-existence of these two institutions is to be expected 
and a mixed economy being constructed on the developmental network emerges 
eventually when China enters the post-reform era. 
 
In principle, the economic reform has two effects. First, it causes a one-shot shift in 
resource allocation, so that the “above-average” growth is to be observed following 
the effective economic reform. Second, it draws the economy back to a “normal” 
track so that it can pursue an efficient growth pattern. It means that the economy will 
not suffer from the low growth rate in the long run but maximize the production 
potential. All these happen only in an ideal world. After the potential of reform has 
been exhausted, the slowdown is biting the Chinese economy. During the slowdown, 
the second effect plays an increasingly important role whereas the first effect 
disappears totally. And it is possible that the institutional change takes place resulting 
in a more suitable environment for the new growth pattern. 
 
According to the IMF, in 2014, China overtook the USA to be the world’s largest 
economy. Such a huge economy could not be solely underpinned by the informal 
institution. Although it is beneficial to embed the economy in the networked system 
during the early stage of transition, the benefit declines as the reform proceeds. With 
the increasing size of the market, the rule-based governance becomes more efficient 
in coordinating the production and exchange than the relation-based governance. It 
turns out that the extensive order of the market gains increasing influence and thus 
undermine the importance of the Chinese characteristics. The formal contracts, legal 
enforcement and professional services are now necessary components of the Chinese 
economy. In some aspects, it is difficult to tell the difference between how the 
Chinese and US economy works. Taking a glance at Shanghai and New York, the 
business culture and even the life style there bear remarkable resemblances to each 
other. It raises several interesting questions. Is that a convergence in the growth 
pattern? Will the Chinese characteristics disappear when the extensive order of the 
market becomes the major means to govern transactions? To address these questions, 
we need to develop a model convenient for the investigation of the evolutionary 
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dynamic of the coexistence of the market order and the relational culture. This will be 
the focus of the current chapter. 
 
This chapter is arranged into four parts. Part one analyzes the conditions under which 
the institutional change will take place. The institution tends to persist due to the 
inertia of common belief, which is difficult to be shifted as it involves significant 
coordination problems. Hence, the institutional change may probably occur on 
account of the external shock that makes the coordination less costly and the shift in 
belief more beneficial. Part two introduces two changes caused by the opening-up 
policy on Chinese economy. The first change is China’s increasing contribution to the 
international trade, discussed in the previous chapter. The second one is the rising 
volume of foreign investment. Through these two foreign-related economic activities, 
the relational system was forced to be connected with the rule-based exchange system. 
Hence, part three endeavors to find out what will come out of the collision between 
these two different institutions by modelling the collision on an evolutionary 
game-theoretic approach. As part 3 contributes to the theoretical enrichment, part 4 
will deal with a more realistic state, in which the structured and layered network 
emerges as a result of interaction of two institutions at different level. The last part 
concludes. 
 
9.1 The Institutional Change and Institutional Inertia  
 
According to the model of chapter 3, the institutional change towards the rule of law 
is welfare-improving given a sufficiently large size of the market. The size of market 
will eventually exceed the threshold value when the market keeps growing. And there 
exists a turning point for the institutional competition. If we approach the dynamic of 
institutional change from a transaction cost viewpoint, we will probably associate the 
institutional change with that “turning point”. Because beyond that point the cost of 
maintaining a relational system becomes higher than the cost of running a rule-based 
trading system, it is natural to a rational individual to shift from the former to the 
latter institution. However, the complication here is that the institutional change is not 
merely a decision made by individuals independently and it can only be solved in a 
coordinated way. To put it more precisely, it is not beneficial for an individual to go 
for the institutional change if others remain in the old system.  
 
One thing for sure is that the institutional transition towards the rule of law would be 
welfare-improving as long as the market progresses beyond a certain point. But it 
does not mean that the institutional change occurs spontaneously. The institutional 
choice has a network effect. Everyone’s decision is dependent on all other persons’ 
decisions elsewhere. Hence, if the individuals cannot coordinate the shift in 
expectation smoothly, they fail to make the institutional change happen. Because it is 
necessary to introduce the interpersonal influence into the model of institutional 
change （Bush, 1987; North, 1990; Aoki, 2001; Elsner 2013; Elsner et al, 2014）, the 
transaction cost paradigm cannot help us to refine our understanding on the subject. 
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The best way to further the transaction cost paradigm is to refine the concept of 
institution. Aoki’s approach to institution, with its emphasis on the mental dimension, 
is a good one to be used here. It views the institution as a process so that both the 
endogenously-appearing and self-enforcing nature of institution is taken into 
consideration. Four phases are involved in the institutional dynamic. They are public 
presentation, common belief, cultural trait and behavioral pattern. The first three form 
the expectations. And the last one is the behavior shaped by the expectations. The 
public presentation of institution is like a lighthouse on the shore guiding the vessels 
over the sea. Under the influence of public presentation, the common belief is formed 
and evolved to the cultural trait for individuals. Then the behavior pattern emerges as 
the cultural trait is duplicated and spreads. Sometimes, the behavior pattern is 
considered equivalent to the institution. But if we glance at the origins of emerging 
behavior pattern, we find that the concept of institution has more dimensions. It is 
particularly important to our understanding of institutional change. 
 
A thorough investigation of the institution as a dynamic process suggests that the 
phase of formation of the common belief is to be affected first to cause a shift in the 
entire institution. The shift in common belief is always prior to the institutional 
change. As the common belief coevolves with the institution (in behavioral sense), the 
common belief is highly stable in the case of the institutional inertia. No one will 
make the move unless others make the move prior to his move or commit to make the 
move and the commitment is credible. Hence, if the coordination fails with respect to 
the shift in common belief, the institutional change will not take place even if it would 
have improved welfare significantly. The situation involves the coordination in 
character and can be illustrated by the stag-hunt game.  
 
 Hunt stag Hunt rabbit 
Hunt stag (10,10) (0,4) 
Hunt rabbit (4,0) (4,4) 
              
Figure 9.1 The payoff structure of stag-hunt game 
 
The stag-hunt game demonstrates a typical case where the coordination problem must 
be solved to ensure the cooperation. In a stag-hunt game, a player chooses between 
two strategies: hunt stag and hunt rabbit. Hunting stag requires the cooperation 
between two players and generates higher return. Hunting rabbit can be done alone 
but is not so beneficial compared to the cooperative strategy. Given the payoff 
structure, both strategy combinations (hunt stag, hunt stag) and (hunt rabbit, hunt 
rabbit) form Nash-equilibrium. Hence, a problem of equilibrium selection arises. 
(Hunt rabbit, hunt rabbit) is advantaged on account of its risk-dominant nature. 
Moreover, if we extend the model into a n-person one, the free-rider problem may 
arise because a player may want to share the output of stag-hunt and acquire an 
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additional income by hunting rabbit himself as long as his shift in strategy has little 
effect on the payoff of stag-hunt and would not be detected. The institutional inertia 
appears when the risk-dominant strategy dominates the n-person stag-hunt game. First, 
the more players are involved in the game, the more stable the equilibrium is. In a 
two-player game, if one player changes the strategy by mistake, the shift in 
equilibrium may occur. But in a n-person game, the action of individual player is of 
less importance. Since an institution affects a large group of people, it is a n-person 
game by nature. And the coordination cost rises significantly with the expansion of 
the group involved in the game. Moreover, the departure from the risk-dominated 
equilibrium might be beneficial for the individual players as long as their shift in 
strategies is not subject to punishment. But the departure from a risk-dominant 
equilibrium is absolutely irrational.  
 
Therefore, the change should be sought beyond the constraint imposed by the 
stag-hunt game. In general, there are two ways to make the shift from the old 
institution. The first one is endogenous. The economic system undergoes an 
environmental change and thereby the payoff of playing the strategy in equilibrium 
decreases so much that individuals cannot afford to play it anymore. A good example 
is the replacement of collective farming with household farming. During that period, 
the poor productivity of collective farming provides the households with the incentive 
to carry out the reform. But even in such a situation, the peasants demanded the 
contract with blood handprints as a commitment to the collective action. The second 
one is exogenous. An external shock can also make the economic system depart from 
the original equilibrium. As for the Chinese economy, the foreign economies are the 
sources of such shocks given its increasing integration into the world economy.  
 
Roland (2004) proposes a classification of institution into “slow-moving” and 
“fast-moving” institutions. By “slow-moving” institution he refers to the “culture” 
institutions including values, beliefs and customes. And “fast-moving” institution is 
primarily the political institutions. He argues that the interaction between 
“slow-moving” and “fast-moving” institutions is key to the understanding of 
institutional change. His work shares the same interest with the current study. Indeed, 
the “fast-moving” institution is not necessarily limited to the institution so termed in 
this dissertation. An example of a “fast-moving” institution is China’s reform policy, 
which is a state planning for the market. In a short time, Chinese leadership decided to 
replace the centrally-planned system with the market system. It is “fast moving” 
because the political authority can push the decisional change in a large step. An 
example of a “slow-moving” institution is the transition from the rule of relation to 
the rule of law. Such institutional change is not driven by the decision of an individual 
political authority. Actually, it is not possible for the authority to make the decision 
like that. Without the precise instructions and guidance, the institutional change of 
that sort takes a much longer time. The change takes place usually due to the 
competition between two different cultural groups as the culture, due to its 
self-generating and self-sustaining nature, shows a high degree of stability, a feature 
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also indicated by Aoki’s concept of institution. But the “fast-moving” institution may 
not be self-sustaining, particularly in the long run. In some cases, it will be hindered 
by the Polanyian counter-movement and thus become ineffective. From an 
endogenous view of institution, the “fast-moving” institution may not be identified as 
institution.  
 
Nevertheless, Roland’s classification inspires further studies. The current analysis 
uses the terms “centralized decision” and “decentralized practice” to capture the 
nature of “fast-moving” and “slow-moving” institution. An institutional change in 
relation to the “fast-moving” institution takes place in terms of centralized decision. 
Hence, the change is fast, intended but sometimes subject to failure. The policy itself 
cannot produce the institutional resources. It only imposes or removes constraints on 
the use of the institutional resources. On the contrary, the “slow-moving” institution is 
developed upon the “decentralized practice”. There is no central authority to 
coordinate and instruct the practices. In fact, it is not necessary to have one if the 
institution is to be established through the “decentralized practice”. The institutional 
change in relation to “slow-moving” institution is thus slow, not-human-devised and 
adaptive. Moreover, unlike the policy which merely serves as a signal, the culture is 
itself a sort of institutional resource. Once the institutional constraint is removed 
through a decisional change, the power to push the change of slow-moving institution 
is unleashed. There is one more point worth attention. Not all the political decision 
leads to the expected institutional change. Affected by the social counter-movement, 
the policy may have different consequences. The ideal situation is that the political 
decision also take the social counter-movement into consideration and makes room 
for such movement. 
 
The success of China’s economic reform, in particular the liberalization of the market, 
can largely be ascribed to the interaction between “fast-moving” and “slow-moving” 
institution. First, a centralized decision on liberalization of the market was made by 
the political authority. After the institutional constraint has been removed, the 
“slow-moving” institution was shifted toward a new equilibrium and, as a result, the 
market economy was embedded in the relational culture. As the experience of the first 
phase of transition suggests, the transition from the relation-based to the rule-based 
governance should also involve the interaction between the “fast-moving” and 
“slow-moving” institutions. First, the transition was started by the opening-up policy, 
which allowed China to participate in the globalization process. After China’s entry 
into the global value chain, the rule of law ideology began to challenge the 
domination of relational culture in the domestic market. As long as the domestic 
market is tightly connected with or even made an inseparable part of the world 
economy, the rule of law ideology continues to penetrate the domestic market with the 
superior economic power bolstering from behind. It is noted that the change of 
slow-moving institution involves an evolutionary process. To put it more precisely, it 
is not assumed that the incumbents change their philosophy of doing business even 
under the influence of the distinctive culture. Certainly, a learning process could 
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accelerate the incumbents’ adaptation to the new culture. But it takes time to learn. It 
is more likely that the new entrants outcompete the incumbents quickly thus 
increasing the proportion of the distinctive cultural trait among all the economic 
actors. They choose the rule of law because it brings the higher benefit for them given 
the constraints they face. By introducing the evolutionary idea into the modeling of 
the institutional change, we are able to study the dynamic process of transition. 
 
9.2 The Opening-up Policy, International Trade and Foreign Investment 
 
Before proceeding to the theoretical section of this chapter, the attention will be 
drawn firstly to the so-called “external shock” without which the shift in culture is not 
possible. Looking at the history, Chinese culture used to dominate in the region and 
the inflow of different ideas might have enriched the Chinese culture but never 
affected its nature. After the Industrial Revolution, the Western culture was diffused 
over the world through trade and force. For the Imperial China, the Opium War was a 
turning point marking the massive invasion of the Western culture. The May 4th 
Movement in 1919 was the first wave of ideological shift, forming a severe challenge 
to the Chinese ethical thoughts. However, the movement had been interrupted by civil 
wars and the Sino-Japan War. Hence, the relational culture continued to persist. The 
second wave of attempts to eradicate the influence of traditional culture was the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Yet it failed to accomplish the goal and the 
relational culture persists into the reform era.  
 
Now the third wave is on the way. With the opening-up policy having been 
implemented for last three decades, the Chinese market becomes increasingly 
integrated into the world economy and thus is notably influenced by the rule of law 
characteristics of the capitalist economies. And the tighter the Chinese relationship 
with the rest of the world is, the bigger the influence is. In general, the foreign-related 
economic activities can be categorized into two ways. The first one is the international 
trade which refers to the exchange between residents and non-residents. Apart from 
the market factor such as demand and supply, the institutional factor is also essential 
to the success of international trade. There must be an institution governing the 
contractual relationship among the parties. At this point, the issue of institutional 
choice rises. And it depends largely on the bargaining power of the parties. Asthe new 
entrants in the world market, Chinese firms possess obviously less bargaining power 
than their Western counterparts. Hence, the rules governing the transaction would be 
those formulated by the Western side. It is expected that the Chinese firms are forced 
to accept the rule of law if they want to take advantage of the trade with the Western 
world. Hence, they are bound by the rule of law in the world market and by the rule of 
relation in the domestic market. As previously mentioned, the relation-based 
governance minimizes the transaction cost to ensure the operation of market when the 
market is too small and segregated to afford the cost of the rule of law. And the 
relational culture persists because the coordination problem associated with the 
culture cannot be easily solved. On the other side, the capitalist countries urge the 
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Chinese government to develop a fair and efficient environment to prompt the trade 
particularly after China’s entry into the WTO. Still, the international trade helps to 
some extent to change the way the domestic market operates. Since a whole chapter 
has been devoted to the study of international trade, this chapter will not extend the 
analysis and will instead focus on other consequences of the opening-up policy. 
 
The free flow of resources is not restricted to the transfer of goods, but also includes 
the flow of capital. So the second consequence of the opening-up policy is the rising 
volume of foreign investment. With the political barrier removed, foreign firms are 
permitted to make investment in China. And they enter into the domestic market 
motivated by the opportunities to exploit the benefit of cheap labor. Unlike 
international trade, the setup of local branches of multi-nationals influences the 
indigenous business culture in a more profound way. These multi-nationals employ 
local workforce, negotiate and cooperate with local vendors, suppliers and distributors, 
and work closely with local governments. So the foreign investment provides a larger 
and broader platform for the communication between two different cultural groups 
compared to the cross-border trade. As for the multi-nationals, they have two 
approaches to handle the communication. The first approach is to act as a part of the 
local community sticking to the relational culture. The second approach is to change 
the environment they plan to settle down in. Obviously the second approach is more 
convenient and beneficial to those who look for market opportunities around. 
 
To protect the property right of capital and to realize a reasonable return on their 
investment, the multi-nationals would make the effort to create a desirable 
institutional environment. On the one hand, they put pressure on the Chinese 
government to turn the domestic market into a business battlefield with the rules 
transplanted from the international market. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
Chinese government engaged to develop a legal system in the modern sense. The 
major problem was the lack of attention to the formal means of governance. Though 
the organizational resources were made available, the common belief was not to be 
easily established and shifted. However, with the inflow of foreign capital which 
seeks the protection by the formal institutions, more attention will be drawn to the 
rule of law as a governance mechanism. Therefore, in a networked environment, the 
foreign capital forms an attraction basin for the rule-based governance and brings the 
idle institutional resources into utilization. To deepen the understanding of the role of 
foreign investment in China’s industrialization and transformation, it is necessary to 
investigate how China’s policy in relation to the foreign capital has changed over time. 
This will be the focus of the following part.  
 
China’s policy towards foreign investment 
 
The following sets out to address the question as to whether the foreign capital could 
affect China’s business culture. There may be a number of reasons why it would not 
have. First, it may not be necessary for the foreign investors to make the effort to 
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create a business environment that they find adequate. Second, the size of foreign 
capital may be not sufficiently large to affect the Chinese market. Third, the influence 
that the foreign capital wields may differ across sectors and regions. To clarify the 
issues, it is helpful to examine China’s experience in relation to the foreign capital 
first. 
 
At the beginning, the Party’s foreign policy was pragmatic-oriented. In a conversation 
with an American journalist, Mao Zedong expressed a positive attitude toward the 
foreign investment. He acknowledged that a significant volume of capital was needed 
to accelerate China’s industrialization. Thus he proposed that China and the USA 
could develop a partnership, at least in the commercial aspect (Guo, 2008; Yin, 2006). 
For the Party, the difference in the ideology was not the primary obstacle to the 
economic cooperation with Western countries. However, the foreign policy of the 
USA was largely based on the ideology not on the economic interest. As a result, a 
mutually beneficial economic relationship did not come into being between China and 
the USA. With the door to the Western world closed, China turned to seek support 
from the Soviet Union.  
 
At that time, the largest source of foreign capital for China was the Soviet Union. The 
relationship between China and the Soviet Union was purely political with the FDI 
serving as a political means. On the part of the Soviet Union, it aided the development 
of Chinese economy on the account of China’s reciprocating political support. Also, a 
rising China could be made a threat for enemies such as the USA and Western Europe. 
On China’s part, as a poor country, the technologies, professionals and materials were 
urgently demanded. At least, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries 
were considered as being able to promote and facilitate the industrialization in China. 
On China’s request, China-USSR Oil Corporation was formed in March 1950. 
Following that was the founding of China-USSR Ship Construction Corporation. 
Afterwards, more joint ventures were set up to transfer the technologies and capital to 
China’s industrial sector, ranging from the oil industry, the communication industry, 
ship construction, automobile manufacturing to the military industry, though the 
power behind the capital flow was the political benefit and not the economic benefit 
(Long, 1984; Yu, 2002; Xu 2011).  
 
The economic cooperation was ceased as soon as the political climate changed. 
During the 1950s, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union was frozen. 
As a response to that change, China adopted an independence strategy. Also, at that 
time, the radical interpretation of Communism gained currency. And the 
“independence” policy was thought to capture the true nature of the Communism. In 
1972, Chinese government announced that “China neither needs the foreign 
investment nor invests overseas.” In 1974, the Ministry of Foreign Trade repeated the 
“shut-down” policy towards the trade with the outside world. Hence, during the 1960s 
and the 70s, China only imported some equipment necessary for the industrialization 
not yet manufactured by domestic factories (Yu, 2002; Yin 2006; Xu 2011). The 
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picture was like that China was a boat floating in the ocean, without seeing any other 
boat nearby.  
 
By the end of the 1970s, that political movement came to an end and the economic 
development was made the priority on the agenda. China opened up the door to the 
world again removing the barrier to market entry for the foreign capital in a slow and 
phased manner. The Joint Venture Law enacted in 1979 finally legitimized foreign 
contribution to domestic firms. In addition, a specialist government body, the Foreign 
Capital Committee, was set up to regulate the foreign investment and the operation of 
foreign-invested firms. As mentioned earlier, the opening-up policy was started as an 
experimental program and was restricted to the special economic zones. Because of 
the notable contribution of foreign capital to the economic growth, the policy was 
expanded to be applied to the entire nation in a short time.  
 
At the early stage of development, foreign capital was rewarded by tax refund, tax 
abatement and fiscal subsidies. Foreign capital was thus preferred over the domestic 
one because the former had a spillover effect. With the influx of foreign capital, the 
technologies and business models were also brought to China and even the market 
share of Chinese products was enlarged. However, during the 1980s, the 
multinationals over-estimated the risk of investing in China. In fact, the amount of 
foreign debts increased faster than the amount of FDI. The multinationals estimated a 
high risk on ideological grounds. The economic interest provides a motivation but the 
political risk was not negligible. It was not surprising that the foreign investors might 
be deeply concerned for risks such as confiscation. At this point, the Confucian 
culture played a positive role. The investors of the so-called “ethnically Chinese 
economies” (Huang, 2002) were first to contemplate the entry into the Chinese market. 
Similar cultural background reduced the communication cost and enhanced the 
confidence of investors. Moreover, the information was renewed and updated timely 
for the investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore through the personal 
relationship they had with residents of Mainland China. On account of shared cultural 
background, pursuing the maximum monetary return to the investment, though, the 
investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore tended to respect the indigenous 
relational culture instead of replacing it with the extensive order of the market.  
 
In fact, the contribution of the “ethnically Chinese economies” accounted for the 
majority of the FDI inflow to China. Among them, Hong Kong was ranked number 
one. According to the statistical yearbook of 2013, 62.4% of the FDI inflow came 
from Hong Kong. But we should not think that all the capital was produced there. 
Indeed, many multinationals had regional headquarters in Hong Kong and invested 
via the regional headquarters. Hong Kong was a good place to manage the investment 
to China on account of its low tax rate, excellent financial service and close location 
to Mainland China.  
 
As the reform progressed, China’s policy became stabilized and transparent to the 
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Western world. The ethnically Chinese economies played an intermediary role liaising 
between China and the world. The foreign firms identified that China’s economic 
transition offered a rare opportunity and the economic reform was largely independent 
from the political issues. Hence, they decided to invest in China. The FDI inflow rose 
rapidly indicating that China was among the best investment destinations in the world. 
On the one hand, the cost of manufacturing was comparatively low whereas the 
quality of the manufactured products was acceptable. On the other hand, the potential 
of the domestic market was also very attractive for the adventurers (Dunning, 2002; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008). So the newcomers, aiming to seek the market 
opportunities yet unfamiliar with the relational culture, were motivated to force the 
Chinese government to change the rule of the game. 
 
The history of China’s experience in relation to foreign capital shows that the foreign 
investors were provided with the incentive to change the indigenous business 
environment. The attention needs to turn towards the size of the foreign capital next 
and see if it is sufficiently large to affect the local institutions. The following graphic 
illustrates the increase of foreign investment over the last three decades. As the 
figures indicate, FDI was the major form that the foreign investment took. After 
China’s participation in WTO, the FDI was almost the unique way to use the foreign 
capital. There were two reasons. The first reason was China’s commitment to the 
liberalization of industrial and service sectors for foreign capital. The second reason 
was the exit of the state from the economic domain. The amount of foreign capital 
used by the government declined sharply. On the contrary, the firm-level cooperation 
rose to a new level. 
 
 
Source: Chinese statistical yearbooks 
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As Chart 9.1 suggest, the annual value of the inward FDI has been tripled since 
China’s entry into the WTO in 2000, rising to approximately 120 billion dollars in 
2013. Though indicating a booming increase, compared to the domestic investment, 
the foreign participation in domestic industries remains low. It seems that the foreign 
capital could not profoundly affect the system. But two points are worth discussion. 
First, the local governments paid considerable attention to the spillover effect of FDI 
and were willing to pay for it even in a highly competitive environment. Hence, 
various preferential policies were implemented to attract the FDI. As long as the 
domestic capital remained silent about the business environment, the continuous 
effort of foreign investors to change the institutional setting would result in greater 
achievement. The other point is that the magnitude and the density of FDI were 
different across the regions. The FDI sought the highest return and tended to flow to 
the urban areas where talents, infrastructures and materials were better supplied. A 
good example is that the magnitude of FDI attracted by Shanghai was approximately 
18 billion dollars in 2013. One city took away 15% of the FDI cake of the country. 
According to the statistics of 2013, the contribution of the foreign-invested firms to 
the annual output of Shanghai was 21%. So the conclusion is that the invasion of 
extensive order of market was not even across the region. The metropolitan areas and 
relatively developed areas such as the Yangtze Delta and the Pearl River Delta were 
more prone to such “cultural invasion”. It is worth noting that the concentration of the 
inward FDI increases its influence on the local economy and thus enable it to 
participate in the determination of institutional settings. On the contrary, an even 
distribution of the inward FDI across the regions would probably result in an inferior 
position for the foreign investors to negotiate with the Chinese government and 
commercial partners.  
 
Moreover, the FDI inflow is characterized by not only the regional concentration but 
also the sectoral concentration. By the end of 2013, almost half of the inward FDI 
went to the manufacturing sector. With the booming of the real estate market, the 
foreign capital also increasingly participated in real estate development. Besides, 
multinationals like to invest in the wholesale and retailing sector, which implies the 
strategy to occupy China’s big domestic market. In recent years, the multinationals 
slowed down the pace of investment in the manufacturing sector as a response to the 
increasing labor cost. Meanwhile, the investment in commercial services sector and 
the R&D sector increased. The cost of talents in China is still quite competitive. And 
the service market has been growing continuously.  
 
Last but not least, as the FDI inflow rose by a factor of three, China’s regulatory 
policy in relation to the foreign participation in domestic industries also underwent a 
significant change. At the early stage of the reform, the regulation focused on the 
operation of foreign-invested firms. The policy was to some degree a contradiction in 
itself. In general, the foreign investment was encouraged through preferential policies. 
Meanwhile, the tight control was imposed on them. For example, the regulation was 
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extended to include the appointment of the general manager of joint ventures. During 
the 1990s, the attention of the regulator shifted from the corporate operation to the 
market access. In the recently established “China （Shanghai） Pilot Free Trade Zone”, 
the “negative list” for foreign investment was published for the first time, which 
simplified the regulation over foreign capital to a great degree. In the “negative list”,  
mapping, transportation, media and some financial services which are thought to be 
related to the national security or national interest, are not liberalized for the foreign 
firms. And the access to some less competitive industries such as aircraft 
manufacturing and automobile production are also limited. Obviously, Chinese 
government wants to achieve balance between opening-up policy, industrial policy 
and stability.  
 
9.3 Modeling the Coexistence of relational culture and extensive order of market: An 
Evolutionary Approach 
 
This part will shift the focus from the specific case to a theoretical model. What has 
been discussed above in relation with the inward FDI will be incorporated into the 
model. And the theoretical model serves two purposes. First, it is a better way to 
capture the fundamental factors underlying the change of slowing-moving institution. 
Second, it provides an opportunity to gain deeper understanding of the dynamic of the 
institutional change and enables prediction to be made in relation to the subject.  
 
To model the coexistence of two different cultures, it would be better to incorporate 
the evolutionary idea. As previously mentioned, it is costly for an incumbent to 
change its way of doing business. The next generation learns more quickly and 
outcompetes the old generation before they finish learning the new culture. Hence, it 
is assumed that the new business culture will not influence the existing firms. The 
magnitude of influence of an individual culture is solely measured by the number of 
the entrants with specific trait in the next round of game. So far as the exit and 
entrance of firms are concerned, the evolutionary model provides a good solution to 
capture the dynamic of the competitive interaction among different strategies which 
are considered inherent to the firms.  
 
This model begins with a basic evolutionary game. There are two strategies 
competing with each other: trade under rule-based governance and trade under 
relation-based governance. These two strategies are indeed the “cultural traits” in the 
evolutionary game-theoretic model. It means that an individual player cannot shift 
form one strategy to the other. The game is infinitely played. 𝑁𝑁 denotes the number 
of the firms operating in the game. It is not to be changed over time. By the end of 
every round of the game, 𝑀𝑀 firms disappear from the market and the new entrants of 
equal number come to fill the vacancy. It is analogous to the birth and death in the 
biological model which the evolutionary game theory is originally applied to. The 
new entrants choose the strategy that brings higher return and remain playing it as 
long as they survive. The following table shows the payoff structure: 
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Relation Rule 
Relation (𝑏𝑏, 𝑏𝑏) (βb, βb) 
Rule (βb, βb) (a, a) 
 
Figure 9.2 The payoff matrix of the evolutionary game-theoretic model 
 
The benefit of trade under a relational system is, as indicated in the figure 9.2, 𝑏𝑏. This 
value is assumed to be fixed because the magnitude of cooperation is limited under 
the relational system. The benefit of trade in a “rule of law” environment is a and 
increases as the number of the firms whose actions fit into the “rule of law” 
framework rises. And in this model, it is assumed that intercultural interaction is 
possible. The firms that follow different cultural patterns can do business with each 
other and receive a payoff of βb. The parameter β, 0<β<1, measures the 
communication difficulty in association with the intercultural interaction. Because the 
fixed cost of the “rule of law” system is significantly higher than that of relational 
system, it is less costly for the firms that are accustomed to the extensive order of 
market to learn about the characteristics of relational culture. In the case of β=0, the 
game will be reduced to a simple one, in which two cultural groups do not 
communicate with each other and the size of group alone determines their 
performance.  
 
In the evolutionary model, the cultural traits compete for survival. The probability of 
survival depends on two factors. One is the payoffs which have been already 
discussed. The other one is the distribution of the cultural traits. As to the model 
presented here, firms that prefer the personalized transaction are termed 
relation-developers and firms that are more satisfied with the impersonal market are 
called rule-takers. The first round of the game determines the sequential evolutionary 
dynamic of the model. Let 𝜆𝜆ô denote the proportion of rule-takers at 𝑡𝑡th round of the 
game and 1 − 𝜆𝜆ô the proportion of relation-developers at 𝑡𝑡th round of the game. 
Given the payoff structure indicated in figure 9.2, the condition under which the 
rule-takers prosper is as follows: 
 
                   𝜆𝜆𝑎𝑎 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏 > 𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑏𝑏                 (1) 
 
Because the time factor is irrelevant, 𝜆𝜆ô is generalized into 𝜆𝜆. Then the inequality (1) 
can be put another way: 
                     𝜆𝜆 >
(iqo)ö
õÑ(iq$o)ö
                  (2) 
The inequality (2) shows that, when the proportion of rule-takers exceeds 
(iqo)ö
õÑ(iq$o)ö
, 
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the personalized transaction would run out of fashion. It is clear that the rising 𝑎𝑎 and 
declining 𝑏𝑏 facilitate the duplication of cultural traits of rule-takers. What may 
interest us is the parameter measuring the cross-cultural interaction difficulty, 𝛽𝛽. If 
𝛽𝛽 = 0, we have a conventional inequality 𝜆𝜆 >
ö
õÑö
 illustrating the condition for the 
survival and prosperity of the different species in the evolutionary dynamic model 
because cooperation is not possible across the species due to the prohibitively high 
cross-cultural interaction cost. Yet the opening-up policy reduces the cross-cultural 
interaction cost and it should be taken into account as long as we deal with the 
human-devised modern economic system. The plan here is to conduct a comparative 
analysis by establishing the relationship between 𝜆𝜆 and 𝑎𝑎 with different value of 𝛽𝛽, 
which is denoted by 𝛽𝛽 and β'	and	 𝛽𝛽 > 𝛽𝛽û	(Communication	cost	decreases 
 
Two features of the function 𝜆𝜆=
(iqo)ö
õÑ(iq$o)ö
 need to be mentioned. First, since 0 <
𝜆𝜆 < 1, 𝑎𝑎 + (1 − 2𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏>0 and 𝛽𝛽 < 𝑎𝑎/𝑏𝑏 must hold for every possible combination (a, 
b). The second feature is essential to the dynamic analysis of the model: 
 
𝜆𝜆 £
> 𝜆𝜆û	if	𝑎𝑎 < 𝑏𝑏	and	𝛽𝛽 > 𝛽𝛽′
< 𝜆𝜆û	if	𝑎𝑎 > 𝑏𝑏	and	𝛽𝛽 > 𝛽𝛽′
= 0.5	if	𝑎𝑎 = 𝑏𝑏																					
 
 
It means that, if the benefit of being a rule-taker is lower than that of being a 
relation-developer with respect to the individual exchange with like players, the 
proportion of rule-takers in the population needs to be increased to approach the 
threshold value in the case that communication is getting easier and less costly. In 
order to prosper, the rule-takers like to decrease the communication cost and 
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cooperate with relation-developers as long as the benefit generated from the 
cooperation among ruler-takers is lower than that among relation-developers. 
Reversely, if the benefit of being a rule-taker is higher than that of being a 
relation-developer, the threshold proportion of rule-taker in the population increases 
in the case of declining difficulty of intercultural communication. The rule-takers try 
to avoid the cooperation with relation-developers and benefit more from the exchange 
with the like players.  
 
This implication seems anti-intuitive at first glance. The key point is how to interpret 
it while putting it into the big picture that the model attempts to illustrate. Indeed, the 
explanation lies in the payoff structure. The likelihood of encountering the like player 
should be high for the rule-takers so that they can prosper despite the lower payoff of 
their chosen strategy. And provided the rule-takers form the majority of the population, 
the low communication cost is more beneficial to the relation-developers as they are 
able to earn more income by trading with the majority group. On the contrary, the 
high communication cost prevents the intercultural interactions and excludes the 
relation-developers from the trade network of the rule-takers. It will be a bigger loss 
to them than to the rule-takers. So, if a strategy is adopted by the majority of the 
players but brings lower payoff, those who adopt this strategy should exclude the 
players who choose the other strategy from their trade network to make the rivals 
suffer more than they do.  
 
If the likelihood of encountering a like player is low for the rule-takers, at least lower 
than 50% and, incidentally, the payoff of their strategy is higher than that of the 
strategy chosen by the relation-developers, which means that the rule-takers has still a 
chance to prosper, it is better for them to work with the relation-developers. The 
reason is exactly the same. But this time the rule-takers do not discriminate between 
different cultural traits. What they ought to do is to reduce the communication cost 
and maximize the benefit generated from the intercultural interactions. To sum up, if a 
strategy is adopted by the minority of the players but brings higher payoff, those who 
play this strategy should play with those who choose the opposite strategy and 
endeavor to smooth their cooperative relationship. Certainly, the factors affecting the 
evolutionary cultural pattern such as cross-cultural interaction difficulty is determined 
in the model. What we discuss with respect to players’ strategy is based on the 
relaxation of the assumptions. If these factors are subject to change, the players can be 
better off adopting certain strategies. 
 
The findings above are important to the further analysis. But for now we turn to the 
comparison between the model and the reality. In an evolutionary model, the 
equilibrium is quite stable if only one cultural trait is involved. It means that the entire 
system remains what it is over time if 𝜆𝜆i = 0. And if 𝜆𝜆ô = 0, the relational culture 
dominates for the sequent rounds following up to the 𝑡𝑡th round. In the narrative 
analysis above, it has been indicated that the common belief may form a major 
obstacle to the institutional change. But in the model, the common belief is turned 
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into the cultural trait that will not be changed for individual player once determined. 
The assumption is not absolutely true for the reality but is reasonable for the 
simplification purpose. Given the assumption, the model predicts that China’s 
economic system is not to be changed until its integration into the world economy.  
 
But the model is not designed to explain how Chinese economy became an 
inseparable part of the world economy. The international trade and FDI inflow is 
exogenous to the model. As previously mentioned, the international trade and FDI 
inflow were strongly driven by China’s competitive advantage in labor cost. Given 
China’s integration into the world economy, the initial state of the model should be 
illustrated by 𝜆𝜆i > 0 and 𝑎𝑎 > 𝑏𝑏. And the concept of geography is to be introduced 
into the model. It implies that the distribution of different cultural traits is not even 
across the regions and the likelihood of encountering a rule-taker or a 
relation-developer is therefore not the same across the regions either. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 An illustration of the distributive structure of two cultural traits 
 
The foreign-invested firms, according to the way they are organized, are rule-takers. 
They trade mostly with the affiliated firms overseas. It means that the transaction does 
not take place between two players who meet randomly. The players identify the type 
of the opponents and decide if they cooperate or not. Because the foreign-invested 
firms operate as a part of the world economy, their business capacities are fully 
occupied by the foreign demand. And since the profit provided by the integrated 
global value chain is enormous, they have no reason to develop the local market. 
Moreover, as Figure 9.4 indicates, the foreign rule-takers agglomerate in the 
metropolitan areas and relatively developed regions to share the better infrastructure 
Foreign 
rule takers 
Local rule takers 
Relation-developers 
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and information. There is one more advantage. If they lobby the local government for 
a better business environment, the newcomers will settle down in the city where the 
investment facilitation is already provided. Their survival does not depend on the 
intercultural interaction but solely on their association with the world market. They 
are invaders but the aim of invasion is to make use of cheap labor and not to increase 
the share of local market. Further, to these foreign rule-takers, 𝛽𝛽 is low if not equal 
to 0 because the foreign-invested firms are organized in the same way as the 
multinationals.  
 
Now the question is how local firms react to challenges and opportunities provided by 
the opening-up policy. Introducing the geographical factor into the model allows the 
foreign rule-takers to agglomerate and thus divides the local firms into two groups: 
the firms neighboring to the rule-takers (they face a high value of 𝜆𝜆) and those 
located remotely (they face a low value of 𝜆𝜆). As indicated by the graphic above, 𝜆𝜆 
decreases from inner to outer circle, termed in this analysis as the effect of 
geographical distribution. Certainly the location and the concentration play an 
important role. But in reality, there might be some other cost that also affects the 
choice of strategy. For example, some TVEs, though being located remotely from the 
urban area, participated actively in the international trade and thus were also 
influenced by the idea of impersonal market. Furthermore, there is no assumption of 
continuity in 𝜆𝜆. Instead, for the purpose of distinguishing the two, a high and a low 
value of 𝜆𝜆 is used to label two types of firm. The second circle illustrated by the 
graphic above separates these two groups. As the value of 𝜆𝜆 is positively related to 
the benefit of being a rule-taker, the firms located between second and third circle, 
which indicates a low value of 𝜆𝜆, choose to follow the relational culture.  
 
On top of the opening-up policy, the transition from the centrally-planned economy to 
the market economy also affects the evolutionary dynamic of the coexistence of 
business cultures. The opening-up policy allows the concentration of rule-takers in a 
networked environment, thus initiating the shift in equilibrium, while the institutional 
transition separates the economic actors into two groups. The non-state sector relies 
on the market, the self-finance mechanism and the informal network that channels 
resources. On the contrary, the state-sector survive on the guard and support of 
government. At the early stage of the transition, establishing the link to the 
state-sector means being privileged. And new entrants sought eagerly the 
opportunities to be linked to the state-owned sector and government that controlled a 
significant section of the economic system for the institutional link to the state actors 
provides the access to various resources. However, not every new entrant could join 
the privileged group. Indeed, to preserve the privilege for its participants, the group is 
closed to most of the entrants. Hence, the privileged group features a high value of 𝛽𝛽. 
Meanwhile, inside the group, they follow the relational culture and develop the 
network to share the benefit derived from the privilege. And during the early stage of 
transition, the privilege was of great value so that 𝑏𝑏 outweighs 𝑎𝑎.  
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It is the Party’s policy to transfer the resources to urban areas to accelerate the 
industrialization. Hence, the privileged state sector operates largely in the urban area. 
The entrants need to choose between two sides. However, due to the limited access to 
the privileged network, they have little chance to establish the relationship but end up 
facing a high value of 𝛽𝛽. So most of them are forced to accept the Western business 
rule and trade with the foreign-controlled firms. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the 
foreign investors, to ensure their return on the investment in China, continue urging 
the Chinese government to improve the business and investment environment. The 
so-called “improvement” refers to the convergence towards a unified system governed 
by the rules of capitalism. Because the privilege of the state sector is not protected by 
the formal institution but by the specific policy or the way of implementing the policy, 
the government can fulfill the request of the foreign clients without hurting the 
interest of the privileged group. So the shift in institutional environment takes place as 
the result of the invasion of foreign capital. There is one more reason, though not 
reflected in the model, for the entrants to choose the capitalist order to follow. The 
model also suggests the advantage of rule of law. Because the situation in urban area 
satisfies 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑎𝑎, 𝜆𝜆 falls as 𝛽𝛽 rises. In that regard, the limited access to the resources 
controlled by the privileged group makes the diffusion of rule of law ideology easier. 
A lower degree of concentration is required to meet the condition set by the value of 
𝜆𝜆.  
 
So the rule of law thrives first in urban areas. In rural areas, 𝜆𝜆 falls to a small value 
so that the new entrants prefer to carry out the transaction in a personalized way. But 
the increase of number of rule-takers has two effects that may cause a shift in 
equilibrium for the outer circle in the graphic above. The first one is the increased 
value of 𝜆𝜆. The second one is the improvement in specialization and therefore a 
positive effect on the payoff of being-a-rule-taker strategy. Meanwhile, 𝑏𝑏 is lower for 
the relation-developers in rural area who have little access to the state-run economy. 
So the income gap between the rule-takers and relation-developers are widened. 
Moreover, it seems that 𝛽𝛽 is not prohibitively high, especially when the transaction 
occurs between two local firms. In the case where 𝑎𝑎 > 𝑏𝑏, 𝜆𝜆 needs not to be bigger 
than 0.5 to ensure the domination of the rule of law ideology. Further, it falls with the 
increase in the value of 𝛽𝛽. The active intercultural cooperation helps the rule of law 
system to prosper. Thus it is expected that the rule of law ideology spread from urban 
to rural areas. Even when the new entrants meet the rule-takers with a possibility 
lower than 0.5, it is still beneficial for them to become rule-takers on account of the 
increasing payoff and the additional benefit generated from the intercultural 
cooperation.  
 
The role of international trade is worth mentioning. The firms focused on the 
international trade need to learn the business rules governing the market transaction. 
Meanwhile, they also develop a local network to share market information, excessive 
production capacity and self-created liquidity. It is evidenced by trade across different 
cultural groups. If the foreign demand declines due to the rising labor cost, these firms 
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seek opportunities to cooperate with the local rule-takers. And the domestic market 
can thus be further integrated to improve the average output. 
 
The analysis above comes to three conclusions. First, the opening-up policy forms a 
shock to the relation-based trading system and initiates the transition from the rule of 
relation system to the rule of law system. Second, the geographical distribution of 
different cultural groups is essential to the cultural transition. The concentration of 
rule-takers in the urban area allows them to prosper in a networked environment. 
They also endeavor to create an institutional environment favorable to the operation 
of the impersonal market. Eventually, the rule of law ideology spreads from the urban 
area to the rural area where the relational culture is deeply rooted and difficult to be 
eradicated. Third, the trade across two cultural groups helps the rule-takers to survive 
and make it easier for them to prosper.  
 
It is predictable that the transition from rule of relation system to the rule of law 
system is slow at the beginning but will accelerate during the economic growth. If a 
firm wants to serve the entire domestic market, it needs to be a rule-taker. So the firms, 
as soon as they can afford the cost associated with the law enforcement, seek the 
protection from the formal institution, which is also costly, yet still financed by the 
state. On the other side, they still retain the skill to trade with the relation-developers. 
Eventually, the rule of law ideology will take over the domestic market and dis-embed 
the transaction from the relational culture. Consequently, the influence of the Chinese 
characteristics will be undermined. However, the relational system still persists as 
long as the personalized interaction is inevitable. But an unexpected technological 
innovation may reduce the frequency of personalized interaction. The extensive use of 
the internet in the commercial domain facilitates the impersonalization of market 
transactions. For example, the online transaction is mostly impersonal. Not only the 
way people trade changes but also the way people think about trade changes.  
 
Though instituting the rule of law system is a superior strategy to promote growth, the 
relation-based trading system continues to be a part of the Chinese economy. First, the 
rule of relation ideology still influences the mind of economic actors because it is 
difficult to separate the economic activities from other social activities in a small 
community. Second, under certain circumstance, the cost associated with contracting 
and law enforcement and financial service is too high for the economic actors. So they 
circumvent the formal institution and rely on the relational system which offers a 
low-cost solution. But the first and second points change over time. The most 
problematic point is the third. As previously mentioned, the state sector is a place 
where a large fraction of transaction is governed by relations. Its institutional link to 
the government provides it with a lot of privileges in the economic system. The SOEs 
are free-riders surviving on those privileges and sharing the benefit of the overall 
growth that they contribute less to. Moreover, the SOEs pursue the risk minimization 
instead of profit maximization. Hence, the state sector is not incentivized to make the 
departure from the current institutional settings. To change the situation, the SOEs 
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need to be further restructured so that they are no longer shielded by the privileges but 
bounded by the law.  
 
9.4 From Traditional Network to Developmental Network 
 
What we have discussed so far is about the theoretical aspect of the institutional 
rivalry. Prior to that, we also have glance at the background of the forthcoming 
transition. There is one more point still waiting for the elaboration. In the real world, 
the institutional competition between rule of relation and rule of law does not lead to 
the complete replacement of one with the other. As the socioeconomic system is 
structured and layered, the institutional competition occurs at different level. In a 
mature capitalist system governed by the law, the personal relation still plays a 
relevant role in, for example, labor market (Granovetter, 1974). Also, in a certain 
industry, the managers know each other and form a network to exchange information. 
So the social network persists in a capitalist system where the transaction tends to be 
impersonalized. In China’s case, the rule of law system will be established to some 
extent but not replace the rule of relation system in total as the incentive structure, the 
institutional/cultural environment and the magnitude of interaction differs at different 
level of society. It is highly probable that China develop a mixed economy, as we 
have discussed in last several chapters, with the Chinese characteristics showing the 
mixed nature of the economy. Some scholars (Chen, Wu and Xie, 1999; Chen, 1999; 
Chen and Li, 2004) have already analyzed China’s mixed economy. We will further 
their work and develop some new ideas based on the conclusions of previous 
chapters.  
 
It worth noting that the market as network would probably degenerate into oligopolies 
which tend to take control over the market transaction (Vitali, Battiston and 
Glattfelder, 2011). The rule-takers in the model would also be interlocked through 
personal network and make use of the so-called “rule” to limit the access to the 
resources through certain power structure. It is possible that the rule of law system 
faces a problem of corruption and only intervention from both government and 
society side can prevent such activities by regulating and embedding the market.  
 
Therefore, in a mixed economy, the operation of market is affected by two forces. 
One is the government. The other is the social system. In general, the market is 
embedded in the social system and how it is embedded and to which extent and 
degree it is embedded is determined by the government policy. Certainly, the social 
counter-movement comes to undermine the undesirable influence of policy. The 
government policy is still highly effective and changes the way that market and 
society interacts. We have discussed that Chinese government shows a positive 
attitude towards the local institutional innovation. Today, it is still a guideline for how 
the reform is carried out. As long as the government policy remains unchanged, the 
interaction between market and society can result in creating a new type of embedded 
market.  
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It is better to look at the emerging embedded market from two different viewpoints. 
One is to see it from the viewpoint of network. How is the traditional network 
affected by the embedding of market in the social system？As mentioned, the 
influence of traditional network is undermined as rule of law ideology invades the 
belief system. But as the model suggests, if the participants involved is small in 
number and the communication with outer environment is difficult or not necessary, 
they’d better form a network to deal with the economic issue. As the payoff structure, 
the cross-culture interaction difficulty and the initial state of belief system differs 
across the regions and markets, the entire economy shows a mixed character with the 
different culture governing the transaction in the individual section of the economy.  
 
 
The social structure of networked economy is illustrated in figure 9.5. The 
relationship between two individuals is either labeled by the full line or the dotted line. 
The full line denotes to the traditional relationship, which is flexible and cultivated by 
the two sides while the dotted one is an institutionalized relationship and mainly 
enforced by the state machine. Without the external shock, China has developed an 
network structure adaptive to the agriculture-based economy. Though the network is 
underpinned by the personalized transaction governed by the Confucian norms, the 
network also features the institutionalization of specific social relation, which follows 
the philosophy of legalism. The dotted line is not highly flexible as it was regulated 
by formal rules. But it is available as long as the social infrastructure is set up and 
social system is in order. What we call the transition is the replacement of the 
traditional network with the institutionalized network. As there is an external factor, 
namely, the connection with the world economy accompanied with the invasion of 
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rule of law ideology, Chinese economy became a mixed economy based on both 
traditional and institutionalized network. Some relationships which formerly fell 
within the private sphere now are subject to the formal rules. This part of change 
improves the efficiency of the economic system because the traditional network is not 
quite adaptive to the industrial production, which requires high precision and accuracy. 
But the transition has an end somewhere. A lot of relationship remains what they used 
to be as they provide flexibility to the economy, particularly to the small embedded 
markets. These small markets rely significantly on the flexibility of economic 
relationship and a web of such small markets stabilizes the economic system from 
bottom up. A gigantic system coordinated in an impersonal manner is more vulnerable 
to the crisis. The system fails when a section of the so-called global value chain runs 
into trouble. As we may recall, how the U.S. financial crisis in 2008 caused a 
recession of world economy.  
 
The part of economy illustrated by the dotted line is a sophisticated, yet fragile system. 
It is efficiency-improving as it promotes the specialization and production of 
knowledge, which we have discussed in former chapter. The other part of the 
economy is the networked markets, usually small-sized and main-knots-centered. We 
call the combination of these two parts the mixed economy. And how they are mixed 
in Chinese system is reflected in the Chinese characteristics. As the reform progresses 
and the Chinese economy becomes more integrated into the world economy, the 
traditional network is replaced by the rule of law system. A lot of transactions, 
contracts and economic actions are now governed by the formal rules. This change is 
a natural response to rise of “Made in China”, rise of China’s huge manufacture sector. 
And this change also makes the traditional network transform into a developmental 
network. In the mixed economy, there is still a strong relational culture exerting 
influence on the economic actions. Hence, the social network still exits and plays a 
role in coordinating the expectations and actions of individual actors. Particularly, 
when those who are familiar with both cultures increases in numbers, the benefit 
generated from the advantage of coexistence of institutions also increase. In that kind 
of environment, the individual actors can switch from the full line to the dotted line 
and switch back if necessary, thus making the economic system more flexible and at 
the same time more stable than a system consisting of pure relation-developers and 
rule-takers.  
 
One major disadvantage of traditional network is that the underlying social ritual is 
complicated and costly. It might be necessary for the operation of social network in an 
agricultural society. But it is not quite necessary for today, especially when the rule of 
law institution is established. To save the cost, some full lines are turned into dotted 
lines and the demand on the social ritual decreases and the cost is thus saved. The 
remaining social network is what we call the developmental network. It is the 
modernization of the traditional network dropping. The developmental network is 
complementary to the institutionalized network in some way and also takes the 
function of social counter-movement to deal with the weakness of market economy. It 
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provides the public goods such as social security, general financial services and 
reliable information sources as long as the public service is not available. The issue of 
developmental network waits further discussion. 
 
9.5 Summary and Implications for Further Investigations 
 
Previous chapters have demonstrated how important the relational culture is to 
China’s transition to a mixed economy and its unprecedented growth. However, as the 
Chinese economy becomes more and more integrated into the world economy, China 
is prepared for a second transition, namely from the personal network to the 
institutionalized network. And the transition is necessary to remove the institutional 
constraints that deters further growth for an economic system governed by the 
relational culture is not friendly to the specialization and production of knowledge.  
 
But the institutional inertia slows down the transition if not totally stops it. An 
institution is not like a mechanical device whose operation requires only the 
installation. The working of an institution is a dynamic process involving the common 
belief which makes it a focal point in equilibrium selection. The coordination cost 
will be prohibitively high when it comes to the shift in common belief. It is nearly 
impossible to solve the coordination problem unless a shock is given to the original 
system. As for the Chinese economy, the shock is the opening-up policy. The rule of 
law ideology comes along the stream of international trade and foreign investment. 
The concentration of foreign capital, on the one hand, improves the density of 
rule-takers in the urban area and relatively developed regions; on the other hand, 
pushes the government to create an adequate environment for the non-personalized 
trade. Hence, the rule of law ideology prospers first in the urban area and spreads to 
the rural area afterwards. The conclusion is that, once the system departs from the 
original equilibrium on account of the external shock, it will, under certain 
circumstances, move slowly towards a new state characterized by the coexistence of 
relational culture and rule of law system.  
 
Further studies need to focus on the section of the economy that remains being 
governed by relation. As mentioned, the traditional network is transformed into two 
kinds of new network. One is the institutionalized network. This part of network is 
governed by the formal rules and based on the enforcement of third part, namely, the 
state in a broad sense. The other part of network we call it the developmental network. 
It should play a positive role in promoting a sustainable growth and increase the 
stability as well as flexibility of the economic system. But the network also has some 
negative effect in China’s socioeconomic system. Due to the privilege originated from 
the institutional link to the government, the state sector is not bound by the rule 
governing the market transaction. Moreover, the imperfect incentive structure 
introduces the non-market characteristics to the state sector. Thus the SOEs adhere to 
the relational culture on the ground that the relational culture defines the common 
belief of like players. And, as suggested by the model above, they would not break up 
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the cooperative relationship with the rule-takers. As a result, the economic system 
would be split into two parts. One part comprises the private sector and foreign sector 
that operate within the scope of laws and regulations. The other part is the state sector 
with an underlying social network governing the allocation of resources. Hence, the 
economic system suffers the problem of “dual personality”. On the one hand, China’s 
formal institution has been established offering a convenient environment for the 
market-based cooperation. On the other hand, the state sector ignores the formal 
institution and regards, instead, the social relation as the primary means to govern the 
transaction and maintain the cooperation. Besides the state sector, other hierarchical 
organizations such as government, army also have the same problem. One 
consequence of network domination is the corruption which can develop into a major 
obstacle that prevents China from moving towards a sustainable growth. The policy 
implication is that the Party needs to introduce formal rules to regulate the behavior of 
individuals in the hierarchical organizations, including the restructuring scheme for 
the state sector and government bodies as well. The aim is to make the network less 
effective in such organizations and thus prevent the interest groups from capturing the 
core part of system. That is what the Party has done recently.  
 
And with “new normality”, a new perspective on the economy, the Party pursues a 
more balanced and inclusive growth, pay more attention to the interior economy and 
introduces new success measures besides the GDP. To develop the relational economy 
on the way to a mixed economy, the Party should use the political power to regulate 
and stabilize the embedded market. Particularly, the Party needs to develop different 
policies to regulate the state sector, the non-state sector and the foreign-invested 
sector, respectively. The aim of the policies is to prevent the economic system from 
being corrupted in the case of dis-embedding or over-embedding (radical relational 
embedding) of market. In a mixed economy, the growth should serve the general 
interest of people but not the interest of a specific class.  
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10. Conclusions 
  
Over the last three decades, China contributed significantly to the eradication of 
poverty, transformed the incredible manufacturing capability into various “made in 
China” products for the world and developed a vast domestic market to ensure 
sustainable growth in the future. However, at the beginning, China’s transition to the 
market economy was not expected to succeed. In fact, the success of China’s 
economic reform is something beyond the scope of preexistent understanding. Hence, 
a lot of literature has been produced to shed some light on China’s unique experience 
of transition and growth. This dissertation is part of the academic efforts attempting to 
incorporate China’s experience and the existing theoretical framework into a new 
account of the transitional economy and to enrich the economic theory in doing so, 
particularly the institutional dynamic of transition. So the conclusion will be made 
with an emphasis on the new ideas that China’s experience introduces to the existing 
theories. 
 
China’s unique experience in economic development 
 
It is understandable that China’s experience has been bothering scholars. The reason 
has been given by Karl Polanyi who points out that the self-preserving market is a 
fallacy. According to him, how market operates is affected by the institutional 
environment that it is embedded in. The developed countries have shaped a rule-based 
institutional environment for the rise of capitalist economy. And the neoliberalism 
derives some lessons from the practice such as privatization and liberalization of 
market and put them in the central position of economic policies. As influenced by the 
neoliberal ideology, it is so natural to presume that the market operates in an 
environment governed by the rule of law, and scholars used to take it as given in the 
economic models. However, this presumption is not true while applying to a 
transitional economy. The developing countries may not have prepared an ideal 
institutional environment prior to the transition. So an institutional blueprint is 
designed to fit the various needs for transition and growth. Following the blueprint, a 
set of policies is to be carried out to liberalize the market, privatize the non-private 
sector and allow the transplantation of the rule of law system. Unfortunately, this kind 
of international standard best practice is not really the best in practice. The 
fundamental mistake is to view the transition as a mechanical process. China’s 
experience shows that the transition is more like an organic process. It is not 
reasonable to transplant the rule of law system which is adaptive to the mature market 
system for a transitional economy neither has such institutional resources nor a 
mature market. An organic process means that the market needs to be embedded in 
the then-existing social system.  
 
As a result of the embedded market, the Chinese characteristics emerged and played a 
role in smoothing the transition. Lacking of knowledge and experience, China chose 
to base the reform strategy on the trial and error. The idea of phased innovation 
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underlying the gradualist and experimental approach to reform is adequate under 
China’s political system which features decentralization of economic authority while 
maintaining centralization of Party authority. As part of the gradualist reform scheme, 
China liberalized the market first and refused to privatize the state-owned sector at the 
same time. The restructuring of SOEs was saved for the later stage. Hence, the 
political and industrial elites have little chance to take control over the big firms and 
monopolize the access to the market, which would petrify the economic system in 
total. As the big SOEs remained the lazy cat, a non-state sector grew from the very 
beginning and attracted the resources consistently from the state sector. Moreover, the 
experimental approach allows the informal institution to evolve from the bottom-up 
and govern de facto the transactions. As a result of the local institutional innovation, a 
distinctive institutional environment has been shaped for the transition. 
 
If the rule of law system is not established, the question remains as to how the 
transaction cost can be minimized to ensure the smooth operation of the market. 
China’s experience suggests a new idea that can be incorporated into the economic 
theory. As Li (2003) argues, the relation-based governance is an alternative to the 
rule-based governance. For an emerging market system, the size of the market is not 
sufficiently large to allow the market participants to afford the high transaction cost 
incurred by the rule-based governance. In China, the relational culture persists thus 
preparing a networked environment for the market to be embedded in and 
underpinning the market system from the bottom up. The examples range from the 
household responsibility system, the rise of the TVE sector, to the formation of 
informal financial network. The relational system constitutes the institutional basis for 
the transition to a mixed economy and support the operation of the market at the early 
stage of development.  
 
The household responsibility system is considered the first move in the economic 
reform as it was the first institutionalized practice which introduces the personal 
freedom in the economic activities. As the household farming was always preferred 
by the peasants for economic reason and the collective farming preferred by the 
government for ideological reason, a game was played among central government, 
local governments and rural households to restructure the collective farming system 
recurrently. During that time, the ideal model of collective farming was challenged 
and refined. And finally, with the ideological constraint removed, the household 
responsibility system, as an outcome of interaction of relational culture and socialist 
organization, was introduced to improve the efficiency of agricultural production. 
 
Like the agricultural sector, the development of industrial sector was also affected by 
the networked environment. As a result of non-privatization policy, a number of small 
non-state enterprises emerged to compete for the share of market. Among them, the 
TVEs accounted for the major part. They were neither public organizations nor 
private enterprises. They were household-run businesses, collective firms and 
cooperatives. They shared a same institutional foundation, namely, the relational 
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culture and benefited enormously from the operation of various social networks. In 
the social network, the cadres’ entrepreneurial capability and the organizational 
resources derived from cultural and socialist tradition can be directed to their 
maximum uses. This development strategy, in contrast to the simple privatization 
policy, created a competitive manufacturing sector and prepared the foundation for 
the domination of ‘made in China’ products in the world market.  
 
Though the TVEs were successful, the traditional social network underlying the 
operation of TVE sector was not quite adaptive to the increasing size of market. And 
under the influence of neoliberal ideology, most of TVEs were privatized. 
Nevertheless, China’s manufacturing sector was already a competitive one and was 
ready to provide the service to the clients all over the world. With China’s entry in the 
WTO being a catalyst, Chinese market started to be integrated into the world market. 
Thereafter, Chinese economy benefited from both domestic institution and institution 
overseas. In the domestic market, the relational culture persisted and was used to deal 
with the transaction issues. But it was not adaptive to the knowledge creation. Such 
tasks were left to the section of global value chain which as governed by the rule of 
law institution. China leveraged the institution not available in the domestic market to 
improve the production efficiency and enhance the specialization through the 
international trade, which can be called a mechanism of “institutional arbitrage”. And 
this helped China to grow into a considerable economic power. 
 
Unlike the competitive manufacturing sector, China’s financial sector was not 
well-developed. Due to the regulations, only the state-owned banks were allowed to 
take savings and make loans. Even after part of regulations was removed, the large 
state-owned banks still dominated the financial market. The problem was that the 
state-owned banks, on the account of the institutional links, preferred to lend loans to 
the state-owned enterprises. Private firms, small businesses and cooperatives had little 
access to the formal financial services. Therefore, they seek helps from the social 
network which organized the informal financial activities ranging from self-financing, 
private lending and network-based intermediated lending. The social network is not 
totally independent. A cross-guarantee mechanism provided the network-based 
manufacturing cluster with the access to the formal financial services.  
 
In spite of the contribution of social network to China’s economic transition, the 
traditional network has increasing negative effect on the economic performance when 
the size of economy became larger and larger. Moreover, with the deep integration of 
Chinese economy into the world economy and the increasing volume of foreign 
investment, the rule of law ideology also invaded the sphere of China’s business 
culture. Now the rule of relation and rule of law institutions competes for the 
dominance. Under certain circumstance, which is probable the case in China, the 
rule-based system takes over some areas which was formerly governed by the 
relational culture. This change may improve the operation efficiency of the economic 
system. But the replacement is not overall. The remaining part of social network 
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would be turned into a developmental network, which provides the flexibility to the 
economic system and stabilizes the system making it less vulnerable to the 
fluctuation. 
 
The contribution of China’ experience to economics and the policy implications 
 
As summarized above, China’s experience is unique. It gives some lessons to those 
countries which are still trapped in the poverty and pursue a successful transition and 
to those which are afflicted by poor economic performance. Also to the scholars, 
China’s practice is of theoretical importance and may enrich our understanding of the 
embedded market. From what China has done we find following points which invites 
further elaboration.  
 
First, we view the market as the embedded market, not the self-preserving market. In 
the neoclassical economics, the institutional environment surrounding the market 
receives little attention. It is always assumed that the market operates in a rule of law 
environment and the institutional cost is not taken into consideration. That is why the 
neoliberal economists recommend a reform package containing the mechanic policy 
tools such as privatization, liberalization of market and rule-based governance. 
However, some of these strategies are too costly for a transitional economy. And 
some would lead to structural problem petrifying the economic system and make the 
next step of reform impossible. Policy-makers must have a look at what is available 
there and where they are going to start. As suggested by China’s practice, a 
decentralized institutional innovation, which is tested by an experimental approach, is 
a good way to avoid high risk. The transition involves high dynamic complexity. So it 
is better to allow the institutional change be pushed from bottom up and based on a 
trial and error process.What the government should do is to institutionalize those 
practices which prove to be effective and thus make the market transactions embed in 
the social system. An embedded market is stabilized through the embeddedness 
character of the system.  
 
Second, the role of social network in the economic system should receive more 
attention. Alternative to the rule of law, the rule of relation is also effective in 
securing the market transactions. There is no such market that is totally governed by 
the rule-based institution. In whatever an economic environment, the social network 
plays a certain role in information channeling and resources allocation. As an 
outcome of social interaction, the social network features a low fixed cost. Therefore, 
the social network is easily used for economic purposes such as organizing the 
production and enforcing the market transaction. But a network consisting of strong 
relationships is limited in size as it involves high marginal cost. So the market system 
needs the rule-based institution as a foundation for the further expansion. But in the 
individual transaction, the network can be a better alternative, particularly when the 
transaction is long-term one and requires flexibility. Though the network is so 
important, few economists pay attention to the market embedded in the social network, 
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not mention the politicians who believe mostly in rule of law.  
 
Third, the institutional aspect of growth brings a new perspective to the growth theory. 
The economic growth is not only affected by the endowment of natural resources, the 
level of technology and the amount of labor. Besides all those factors which are 
discussed recurrently in the literature, the institution also matters. As the growth is a 
phased process, the institution needs to be adapted to the different stage of growth. 
First, the market should be made available, which means the freedom to exchange 
should be allowed and ensured. Then this market is embedded in a networked 
environment during the early stage of development. As the size of market increases, 
the relation-based exchange system becomes less productive, particularly when it 
comes to the creation of knowledge and extension of value chain. Therefore, the 
economy pursuing the further growth needs to benefit from the advantage of 
rule-based governance through the trade with those economies governed by the rule 
of law system. After such benefit is exhausted, the growth enters the third stage. 
Slowly, a section of the traditional network which used to be beneficial to the 
economic growth is replaced by the institutionalized network (rule-based institution). 
And the economic system works on the basis of a combined network featuring the 
institutionalization on one side and the personal relationship on the other. We can all 
it a developmental network, which adapts well to the increasing complexity of 
market-based cooperation and is the key factor for the next wave of growth.  
 
Now we can answer the questions raised in Chapter one. They are also 
summarizations of what happened to Chinese economy during last three decades. 
 
1. In China, the market was embedded in a relational system. 
2. The market could only be embedded in the relational system when the 
government allows the bottom-up innovative practices and acknowledge the 
formal institution in a phased and experimental way.  
3. The relational system provides the market with a networked environment so that it 
can operate smoothly without being threatened by the danger of non-cooperation 
and insecure transactions.  
4. The individual sectors developed the adaptive institutions such as household 
responsibility system, collective enterprises, private lending system, which were 
part of China’s embedded market.  
5. Chinese economy will remain a mixed economy with the developmental network 
replacing the traditional network.  
 
In sum, the embedded market, the relation-based governance and the developmental 
network are three things which invite further studies. But we don’t only learn lessons 
from China’s great economic success. We also need to look at the challenges that 
China faces in the next decades.  
 
The challenges for China 
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The first challenge is the age structure of population. This point was not raised in the 
previous chapters because China’s one child policy did not cause enough damage 
until the aging problem arises. But from now on, China is going to suffer from a lack 
of the labor forces. It would probably cause a decline in the market volume. Not only 
the foreign capital but also domestic capital would relocate to where there is an 
abundance of labor forces. It is reasonable to submit that the one child policy has had 
a profound impact on China’s growth pattern and it seems that the consequence would 
be largely negative. Though China can upgrade the labor-intensive industries and 
make them less labor-dependent but more knowledge-dependent, the knowledge 
production also requires a certain degree of population intensity. Recently, China 
relaxed the one child policy yet only had a moderate effect on the increase of birth 
rate. The total removal of one child policy might be more effective in increasing the 
birth rate. And the government needs to consider preparing the basic services for the 
newborn Children, including medical care, babysitting, schooling and so on. 
Otherwise, these services are too expensive for middle and lower classes and their 
willingness to have more than one child is thus low. And China faces also the danger 
of “middle income trap”. People may increase their income. But the productivities do 
not increase with it. Particularly in the case of labor shortage, the economic system 
may not generate sufficient income to support the previous living standard. And the 
middle-class ideology has already begun to replace the collectivist culture and the 
contribution to the commons is not something valuable.  
 
 
The second challenge is how to preserve a constructive central-local relationship. As 
mentioned, the Chinese-style federalism is based on the decentralization of economic 
authority. However, the tax sharing system centralizes the fiscal revenue to a 
considerable degree. Though the central fiscal revenue is transferred to the local 
authorities, the central-locality bargaining is affected by that kind of arrangement. The 
direct economic control from top down is strengthened. Hence, it is more difficult for 
the local governments to implement the policy experimentation. How to arrange the 
central-local relationship was an important issue for the Party. It is one of those issues 
that need to be handled with prudence and courage. The establishment of “Pilot Free 
Trade Zones” is a new way to delegate the economic decision-making authority to the 
local governments and provide them with incentive to innovate. Besides, with the 
Chinese economy entering in the “new normality”, the local governments are not 
required to have the GDP as the single factor in their goal function. So the 
central-local relationship now contains more dimensions than before. It should be 
established on a basis of more interior  
 
The third challenge is the prevalence of relational culture in the non-economic 
domain. In the economic domain, the rule of law ideology gains increasing influence 
and help improve the efficiency of production and exchange while the relational 
culture still plays a role in coordinating the economic activities which requires the 
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flexibility or cannot afford to use rule of law institution. A structured and layered 
network emerges to lay the foundation for the operation of the embedded market. 
However, in the non-economic domain, sometimes the rule of law system does not 
generate sufficient benefit for the individual actors to change their behaviors. And the 
social network, once established, is self-reinforcing and it could cause a severe 
problem of corruption. For example, the politicians from the same town cooperate 
with each other to seize power. The academic positions are occupied by a scholar and 
his/her friends and students and formed a closed circle to deter the outside innovation. 
And this corrupted feature of network also affects the economic domain. The 
monopoly power can be given to a state-owned enterprise which has a reciprocal 
relationship with the government, even when this reciprocal relationship exists only 
between the general manager and the chief official. As the rise and decline of Chinese 
dynasties shows, the corruption caused by the over-networking could petrify the 
society. The Party also recognizes the negative effect of relational culture and begin 
to fight against network-based corruption.  
 
Chinese people and Chinese government have done very well during the last thirty 
years in transforming a poor country into an economic superpower. It is a miracle and 
it is sincerely hoped that the miracle would continue. Now the rising labor cost forces 
China to adopt an innovation-based strategy for growth. As for the next step, China 
plans to climb up the global value chain and exploit the potential of the domestic 
market. But those three challenges enumerated above may jeopardize China’s further 
development. It is China’s next mission to adapt its institutional environment to the 
specialization-based cooperation and to the creation of knowledge as well. Again, 
China needs to discover its own way to accomplish the new transition.  
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